Telangana High Court
Andem Sudhakar Reddy And Another vs The State Of Telangana And 4 Others on 2 April, 2025
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY
+ WRIT PETITION No.26921 of 2019
% Date: 02.04.2025
Between:
# Andem Sudhakar Reddy and another. ... Petitioners
AND
$ The State of Telangana
Rep. by its Principal Secretary,
Revenue Department, Secretariat Building, Hyderabad
and others.
... Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioners : Sri P. Sasidhar Reddy.
^ Counsel for Respondent Nos.1 to 3 : Government Pleader for Revenue
^ Counsel for the Respondent No.4 : Sri J. Suresh Babu
^ Counsel for the Respondent No.5 : ---
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. (2005) 10 SCC 746
2. (1995) SUPP 1 SCR
3. (2024) 4 SCR 506
2
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.BHASKAR REDDY
WRIT PETITION No.26921 of 2019
ORDER:
This Writ Petition is filed by the petitioner seeking following
relief:
“….to issue writ or order more particularly one in the nature of writ of
MANDAMUS to declare the order No.B/963/2014 dt: 07.03.2015 of the
respondent No.3 and the orders passed in appeal case No.D/1580/2015
dt: 04.11.2019 of the respondent No.2 are illegal and contrary to the
provisions of the ROR Act, 1971 and Rules, 1989 apart from violation of
article 14 & 300-A of constitution of India and set aside the same and
consequently direct the respondent No.3 to issue new pattedar pass
books with regard to subject land held by the petitioners…”
2. It is stated that the petitioners are the absolute owners and
possessors of agricultural lands admeasuring Ac.2-00 gts in
Sy.No.138 and Ac.4-00 gts in Sy.No.132 situated at Dacharam
Village, Mothkur Mandal, Yadadri Bhongir District, having
purchased the same under registered sale deed bearing document
No.413/2004 dated 05.05.2004 from the respondent No.5. It is
further stated that names of the petitioners were mutated in the
revenue records and they were issued pattadar passbooks vide patta
Nos.675 and 828 as per the provisions of the Telangana Rights in
Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (for short “ROR Act, 1971”).
It is further stated that the petitioner No.1 has executed a gift
3
settlement deed vide document No.1653/2009 dated 31.01.2009 in
favour of his son i.e, petitioner No.2 in respect of land admeasuring
Ac.4-00 gts in Sy.No.132. It is the case of the petitioners that when
the respondent No.5 and others tried to interfere with their property,
they instituted a suit vide O.S.No.86/2014 on the file of Junior Civil
Judge, Ramannapet and the same was decreed vide judgment and
decreed dated 11.12.2014. While the things stood thus, it is stated
that the respondent No.3 has issued mutation proceedings
No.B/963/2014 dated 07.03.2015 in respect of lands admeasuring
Ac.0-16 gts in Sy.No.138 and Ac.0-12 gts in Sy.No.132 in favour of
respondent No.4 without following the procedure prescribed under
ROR Act, 1971 and Rules made thereunder. It is stated that
aggrieved by the said mutation proceedings, the petitioners filed
statutory appeal on the file of the respondent No.2 under Section 5(5)
of the ROR Act, 1971 and when the said appeal was not disposed of
within reasonable time, the petitioners were constrained to file
W.P.No.9618 of 2019 on the file of this Court and the same was
disposed of vide order dated 01.05.2019 directing the respondent
No.2 to decide the appeal, as expeditiously as possible, preferably
within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of a copy
of the order. In pursuance of the same, the respondent No.2 allowed
the appeal partly vide impugned order dated 04.11.2019 in Case
No.D/1580/2015 and directed the respondent No.3-Tahsildar to
4
refer the Court decrees for mutation under Section 58B of Telangana
Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and after collection of necessary stamp
duty, and validating the said decrees under Section 42 of the
Registration Act, take further steps in accordance with law. It is the
case of the petitioners that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 instead of
deciding their case in terms of the provisions of the ROR Act, 1971
have erroneously taken into consideration the orders dated
07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the
learned Junior Civil Judge, at Ramannapet, wherein the final decree
proceedings were issued in a partition suit instituted by the
respondent No.4 against the respondent No.5. It is stated that the
respondents are not entitled for implementation of the said final
decree proceedings after lapse of about 18 years and the respondent
No.2 is not having any power under Section 58B of the Telangana
Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli to validate the said decree. It is further
stated that the decrees which are barred by limitation are not
enforceable in law and prayed for allowing the writ petition by setting
aside the impugned proceedings.
3. Even though the respondent No.4 filed her appearance, she did
not chose to file any counter affidavit disputing the contents of the
writ affidavit.
4. There is no representation on behalf of respondent No.5.
5
5. Heard the submissions of Sri P.Sasidhar Reddy, learned
counsel for the petitioners, learned Government Pleader for Revenue
appearing for the respondent Nos.1 to 3, Sri J. Suresh Babu, learned
counsel for the respondent No.4 and perused the record.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the
petitioners are the absolute owners and possessors of agricultural
lands admeasuring Ac.2-00 gts in Sy.No.138 and Ac.4-00 gts in
Sy.No.132 situated at Dacharam Village, Mothkur Mandal, Yadadri
Bhongir District, having purchased the same under registered sale
deed bearing document No.413/2004 dated 05.05.2004 from the
respondent No.5 and their names were mutated in the revenue
records. It is further submitted that without following the procedure
prescribed under ROR Act, 1971 and Rules made thereunder, the
respondent No.3-Tahsildar issued proceedings vide No.B/963/2014
dated 07.03.2015 mutating the name of respondent No.4 in the
revenue records in respect of part of the lands purchased by the
petitioners. Aggrieved by the same, an appeal under Section 5(5) of
the ROR Act, 1971 was preferred by the petitioners on the file of the
respondent No.2 and the respondent No.2 in Case No.D/1580/2015
vide impugned order dated 04.11.2019. It is vehemently contended
by the learned counsel that as per Section 4(1) of the ROR Act, 1971,
any person acquiring the right by succession, survivorship,
6
inheritance, Government patta, decree of a Court or otherwise any
right as owner, pattadar, mortgagee, occupant or tenant of a land
and any person acquiring any right as occupant of a land by any
other method shall intimate in writing his acquisition of such right,
to the Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO) within ninety days from the
date of such acquisition, whereas the respondent No.4 herein having
acquired alleged final decree proceedings in I.A.No.275/1991 in
O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil Judge, at Ramannapet
on 07.04.1995, did not submit the application within the time
stipulated under Section 4(1) of the ROR Act. Therefore, the alleged
final decree proceedings cannot be implemented for mutation. An
alternative submission is made by the learned counsel that even if
the respondent No.4 is entitled for mutation, the final decree
proceedings vide orders dated 07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991
in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil Judge, at
Ramannapet are not enforceable as the same are barred by limitation
and the provisions of Section 58B of the Land Revenue Act, 1317
Fasli are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on
hand. Thus the learned counsel prayed to allow the writ petition by
setting aside the impugned orders on the ground that the final
decree proceedings are not implementable beyond the period of
limitation prescribed under Article 136 or 137 of Limitation Act,
1963.
7
7. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.4 has submitted that an application submitted to the
Court to send decree and papers to Collector to carry out partition is
not an application for execution and as per Section 54 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), the Collector is competent to examine
the final decree proceedings for implementation of the same by
putting the parties in possession of their respective portion allotted
to them. Since the actual possession has not been allotted to the
parties, the limitation prescribed in either under Article 136 or 137 of
the Limitation Act, does not apply to the case on hand and prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition.
8. A careful examination of the records would reveal that the
petitioners claims to have purchased agricultural lands admeasuring
Ac.2-00 gts in Sy.No.138 and Ac.4-00 gts in Sy.No.132 situated at
Dacharam Village, Mothkur Mandal, Yadadri Bhongir District, under
registered sale deed bearing document No.413/2004 dated
05.05.2004 from the respondent No.5 and their names were mutated
in the revenue records and issued pattadar passbooks vide patta
Nos.675 and 828 under the provisions of the ROR Act, 1971 and the
Rules made thereunder. While the matter stood thus, basing on the
final decree proceedings vide orders dated 07.04.1995 passed in
I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil
8
Judge, at Ramannapet, the respondent No.4 obtained mutation
proceedings from the respondent No.3 vide proceedings
No.B/963/2014 dated 07.03.2015. Questioning that the said
proceedings is contrary to Sections 4(1) and 5(3) of the Act, the
petitioners have filed statutory appeal under Section 5(5) of the Act,
on the file of the respondent No.2 vide case No.D/1580/2015. The
respondent No.2 vide impugned order dated 04.11.2019 taking into
consideration the final decree proceedings dated 07.04.1995 passed
in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil
Judge, Ramannapet, permitted the respondent No.4 to validate the
final decree proceedings under Section 58B of the Telangana Land
Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli.
9. As seen from the material placed on record, the respondent
No.4 instituted a partition suit vide O.S.No.367/1989 on the file of
learned Junior Civil Judge, Ramannapet, against the respondent
No.5 and others in respect of lands admeasuring Ac.0-31 gts in
Sy.No.131/A, Ac.0-36 gts in Sy.No.132, Ac.0-16 gts in Sy.No.138/A,
Ac.0-08 gts in Sy.No.148/2, Ac.0-06 gts in Sy.No.52/2 situated at
Dacharam Village, Mothkur Mandal, Nalgonda District. A preliminary
decree was granted on 30.04.1991 and thereafter final decree was
passed vide orders dated 07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991 in
O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil Judge, at Ramannapet.
9
The parties to the said proceedings have not taken any steps for
implementation of the said decree by making an application under
Section 4 of the ROR Act, 1971. It is relevant to refer Section 4 of the
ROR Act, 1971 which reads as follows:
“Section 4 – Acquisition of rights to be intimated:
(1) Any person acquiring by succession, survivorship, inheritance,
partition, Government patta, decree of a court or otherwise any right as,
owner, pattadar of a land and any person acquiring any right as
occupant of a land by any other method shall intimate in writing his
acquisition of such right, to the Tahsildar within thirty days from the
date of such acquisition. The Village Revenue Officer on noting the
acquisition of rights in his jurisdiction shall intimate the Tahsildar within
one(1) day as prescribed. The Tahsildar shall give or send a written
acknowledgement of the receipt of such intimation to the person making
it:
Provided that where the person acquiring the right is a minor or
otherwise disqualified, his guardian or other persons having charge of
his property shall intimate the fact of such acquisition to the Tahsildar.](2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908
(Central Act 16 of 1908), every registering officer appointed under the Act
and registering a document relating to a transaction in land, such as
sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise shall intimate the Mandal
Revenue Officer of the Mandal manually or electronically in which the
property is situate of such transaction.
Explanation-I: The right mentioned above shall include a mortgage
without possession and a right determined by civil court.
Explanation-II: A person in whose favour a mortgage is discharged or
extinguished, or a lease is determined, acquires a right within the
meaning of this section.”
10
10. The respondent Nos.2 and 3 passed impugned orders basing
on the final decree proceedings passed vide orders dated 07.04.1995
in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil
Judge, at Ramannapet. The respondent No.4 has made an
application seeking mutation of her name in the revenue records on
23.12.2013 and 14.11.2014. It is apt to refer Articles 136 and 137 of
Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under:
Period of
Article Description of suit Time from which period beings to
limitation
run
136 For the execution of Twelve When the decree or order becomes
any decree (other years. enforceable or where the decree or
than a decree any subsequent order directs any
granting a payment of money or the delivery of
mandatory any property to be made at a certain
injunction) or order date or at recurring periods, when
of any civil court. default in making the payment or
delivery in respect of which execution
is sought, takes place:
Provided that an application for the
enforcement or execution of a decree
granting a perpetual injunction shall
not be subject to any period of
limitation.
137 Any other Three When the right to apply accrues.
application for which years.
no period of
limitation is provided
elsewhere in this
Division.
11. There is no doubt that Article 136 of Limitation Act equally
applies to the partition suits. The partition decree is enforceable from
the date of passing of the decree but not from the date of engrossing
the same on the stamp paper. Even if there is direction by the Court
11for furnishing of stamp papers on a particular date for the purpose of
engrossing of the decree, the period of limitation begins to run from
the date when the decree is passed but not from the date when the
decree is engrossed on the stamp papers supplied by the parties.
Since in the instant case, the final decree has been passed on
07.04.1995, the applications dated 23.12.2013 and 14.11.2014
submitted by the respondent No.4 for mutation are hopelessly barred
by limitation. Further, as per Section 4 of ROR Act, 1971, the
parties who acquire rights from the Court decrees, mandates that
mutation application shall be filed within 90 days from the date of
acquisition of such rights. It is settled law that even in the absence
of any time limit being prescribed under the statute, the time
prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply
to all the cases.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chiranji Lal (Dr.) v. Hari
Das 1, observed as follows:
“25. The engrossment of the final decree in a suit for partition would
relate back to the date of the decree. The beginning of the period of
limitation for executing such a decree cannot be made to depend upon
date of the engrossment of such a decree on the stamp paper. The date
of furnishing of stamp paper is an uncertain act, within the domain,
purview and control of a party. No date or period is fixed for furnishing
stamp papers. No rule has been shown to us requiring the Court to call
upon or give any time for furnishing of stamp paper. A party by his own1
(2005) 10 SCC 746
12act of not furnishing stamp paper cannot stop the running of period of
limitation. None can take advantage of his own wrong. The proposition
that period of limitation would remain suspended till stamp paper is
furnished and decree engrossed thereupon and only thereafter the
period of twelve years will begin to run would lead to absurdity. In
Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari [1950 SCC
766 : 1950 SCR 852 : AIR 1951 SC 16] it was said that the payment of
court fee on the amount found due was entirely in the power of the
decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it then
and there; it was a decree capable of execution from the very date it was
passed.
26. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. As above-noted, there is
no statutory provision prescribing a time-limit for furnishing of the stamp
paper for engrossing the decree or time-limit for engrossment of the
decree on stamp paper and there is no statutory obligation on the court
passing the decree to direct the parties to furnish the stamp paper for
engrossing the decree. In the present case the Court has not passed an
order directing the parties to furnish the stamp papers for the purpose of
engrossing the decree. Merely because there is no direction by the Court
to furnish the stamp papers for engrossing of the decree or there is no
time-limit fixed by law, does not mean that the party can furnish stamp
papers at its sweet will and claim that the period of limitation provided
under Article 136 of the Act would start only thereafter as and when the
decree is engrossed thereupon. The starting of period of limitation for
execution of a partition decree cannot be made contingent upon the
engrossment of the decree on the stamp paper. The engrossment of the
decree on stamp paper would relate back to the date of the decree,
namely, 7-8-1981, in the present case. In this view the execution
application filed on 21-3-1994 was time-barred having been filed beyond
the period of twelve years prescribed under Article 136 of the Act. The
High Court committed illegality in coming to the conclusion that it was
not barred by limitation.
13
13. Culmination of the facts of the case on hand would lead to
conclusion that for implementation of the decrees/enforceability of
the same, the limitation would start from the date of passing of the
decree. The decree holders submitting the stamp paper for
engrossing the decree would not extend/suspend the limitation.
Seeking implementation of the final decree, an application for
execution necessarily has to be filed within a period of 12 years from
the date of the decree and the said decrees which have become non-
est in law after the period of limitation are not enforceable under any
of the statute. In this context, it is also necessary to examine that
non-implementation of the decree in time, or implementation of the
decree beyond the period of limitation would have an impact on the
settled position over the rights of the third parties. Further, the law
is well settled that Courts never tolerate an indolent litigant since
delay defeats equity – the Latin maxim vigilantibus et non
dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists those who are vigilant
and not those who are indolent).
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue
relating to undue delay and laches, in the case of State of
Maharashtra vs. Digambar 2, observed as under:
“A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati & Ors.
2
(1995) SUPP 1 SCR
14[1969 (1) SCR 808], reiterated the said principle of laches or undue delay
as that which applied in exercise of power by the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under
Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for
granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his
disentitlement for such relief due to his blame- worthy conduct of undue
delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ
becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in
exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily.
XXX
Thus, when the writ petitioner (respondent here) was guilty of laches or
undue delay in approaching the High Court, the principle of laches or
undue delay adverted to above, disentitled the writ petitioner
(respondent here) for discretionary relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution from the High Court, particularly, when virtually no attempt
had been made by the writ petitioner to explain his blame- worthy
conduct of undue delay or laches. The High Court, therefore, was wholly
wrong in granting relief in relation to inquiring into the allegation and
granting compensation for his land alleged to have been used for scarcity
relief road works in the year 1971-72…….”
15. In Mrinomy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and others3, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:
“This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or
laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High
Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to
invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to
assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and
attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action”
3
(2024) 4 SCR 506
15
16. In the instant case, the respondent No.4 relying on the final
decree proceedings dated 07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991 in
O.S.No.367/1989 by the Junior Civil Judge, at Ramannapet, filed
mutation applications on 23.12.2013 and 14.11.2014. Except stating
that she has obtained the final decree, no reasons whatsoever are
forthcoming from the respondent No.4 for making an application for
mutation nearly after a period of more than 18 years after passing of
the final decree. As per Section 4(1) of the ROR Act, 1971, the person
acquiring rights by a decree of the Court or otherwise any right as an
owner, has to make an application to the MRO within 90 days from
the date of such acquisition of right. It is not the case of the
respondent No.4 that application was made within three years to
extend the benefit of limitation prescribed under Article 137 of
Limitation Act, 1963. The present case squarely falls within the
limitation prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. Viewing
the case from any angle, the respondent No.4 is not entitled for
mutation of her name in the revenue records vide impugned orders
basing on the time barred final decree dated 07.04.1995 passed in
I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989. The respondent No.2
miserably failed to examine the facts properly and erroneously stated
that Section 58B of the Telangana Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli
would apply to the facts of the case. In fact, Section 58B applies to
16
the occupancy rights which are declared non-transferrable without
sanction of the District Collector.
17. For the aforesaid reasons, this Writ Petition is allowed and the
impugned proceedings No.B/963/2014 dated 07.03.2015 issued by
the respondent No.3 and the orders passed in appeal Case
No.D/1580/2015 dated 04.11.2019 by the respondent No.2 are set
aside. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 are directed to delete the name of
respondent No.4 in the revenue records and issue pattadar
passbooks to the petitioners, in accordance with law in force.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications if any pending shall
stand closed. No costs.
}
__________________________
C.V. BHASKAR REDDY, J
Date: 02.04.2025
Note: L.R Copy to be marked: YES/NO
(b/o)
scs
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