Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jitendra Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 8 April, 2025
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S. Kalgaonkar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S. KALGAONKAR
ON THE 8th APRIL, 2024
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 42157 of 2024
JITENDRA SINGH
Versus
STATE OF M.P. & ANR.
Appearance:
Shri Gulab Sharma with Shri Hitesh Sharma - Advocates for the
petitioner.
Shri Amit Rawal - Govt. Advocate for the respondent no.1/State.
Shri Satish Tomar - Advocate for the respondent no.2.
ORDER
This petition under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 has been filed by the
petitioner seeking quashment of FIR pertaining to Crime No. 256/2017
registered by P.S. Nanakheda, Distt. Ujjain for offences punishable under
Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of IPC with all consequential
proceedings thereto, on the basis of compromise arrived at between the
parties.
2. The exposition of the facts, giving rise to the present petition, is as
under-
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Balwinder Singh Chabra S/o Late Preetam Singh Chabra reported to
P.S. , SHO Nanakheda Distt. Ujjain on 26.05.2017 that Narendra Patel and
Laxmikant Patel offered to sell him a land at Survey No. 30 admeasuring
0.470 hectures at Goylakhurd @ Rs. 900 per sq.ft.. An agreement was
executed by Narendra and Laxmikant Patel in his favour on 21.12.2014. He
paid Rs. 34 lakhs in furtherance of the agreement, but Narendra Patel and
Laxmikant Patel did not execute the sale deed of the land in his favour and
also not returning the consideration amount paid to them. He came to know
that Narendra Patel has already entered into agreement for the same land
with Sarvesh Jhavar and had taken Rs. 16 lakhs from Sarvesh. On such
allegations, P.S. Nanakheda registered FIR for offence punishable u/S 420,
467, 468, 471 r/W 34 of IPC against Narendra Patel and Laxmikant Patel.
The matter was investigated and on completion of investigation, The final
report was filed against the accused Laxminarayan and Narayan Patel,
pending the investigation against other suspects/accused. It was revealed
during investigation that the land in question was acquired by the State
Government in favour of M.P. Housing Board, therefore, further
investigation is needed in the matter.
3. During further investigation, the documents relating to acquisition of
land were requisitioned and seized from the office of M.P Housing Board. It
was further revealed that the land was acquired vide order dated 19.09.2003
and a cheque dated 12.06.2006 of compensation amount was given to the
land owner Mangilal, Shanti Bai, Leela Bai, Rameshwar Singh, Bhanwar
Singh and others. Bhanwar Singh was apprehended. Bhanwar Singh, Hakam
Singh and Shanti Bai in their statement recorded u/S 27 of the Evidence Act
informed that all the owners of the land had received cheques of
compensation amount towards acquisition of the land in the year 2003.
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Thereafter, Mahendra Singh and Jitendra Singh offered to pay them money
for the same land, therefore, Hakam Singh, Rameshwar Singh, Shanta Bai
executed power of attorney in favour of Mahendra Singh and Mahendra
Singh executed sale deed of the same land in favour of Jitendra Singh.
Mahendra Singh and Jitendra Singh paid them Rs. 25 lakhs, which were
distributed amongst them. Jitendra is absconding.
4. The impugned FIR is assailed in the present petition mainly on the
following grounds:
(i) Initially, the petitioner was not named in the FIR. Petitioner is
not concerned with the transaction between the complainant and
Narendra Patel. After release of Narendra Patel from jail, the
agreement to sale with Narendra Patel has been cancelled and entire
amount is returned to Narendra Patel.
(ii) A Division Bench of the High Court of M.P. has quashed the
acquisition proceedings initiated by Housing Board in W.P. No.
30059/2023. Therefore, the land in question has been released.
(iii) The petitioner had purchased the land when it was recorded in
the name of Mangilal and his family in revenue record and all other
government documents. Petitioner had paid the stamp duty for
registration of sale deed. He is a bonafide purchaser. He was not
aware of the fact that land was acquired by Housing Board in the year
2003.
(iv) The Deputy Secretary, General Administration Department vide
letter dated 07.07.2015 directed the Commissioner, Housing Board to
release untraceable land admesuring 0.470 hectares and directed that
the compensation of remaining land be given to the land owner.
(v) There was no intention to cheat at the inception. There was no
mens rea to commit fraud. The petitioner did not forge any document.
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Therefore, the offence punishable u/Ss 420, 467, 468 ,471 r/W 34 of
IPC is not made out against the petitioner.
(vi) The further investigation u/Sec. 173(8) of Cr.P.C. cannot
proceed without the permission of Magistrate. Since, no new evidence
has been collected after filing of chargsheet, further investigation is
not permissible in law.
5. On these grounds, it is prayed that FIR at Crime No. 256/2017
registered against the petitioner be quashed alongwith all consequential
proceedings arising out of the same FIR and cost of Rs. 5 lakhs be imposed
on respondent no. 2.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in addition to the grounds
mentioned in the petition submits that the petitioner – Jitendra purchased a
piece of land from Mangilal and his family members through registered sale
deed dated 23.03.2012. The land in question was registered in the name of
Mangilal and his family members in the revenue records at the time of
execution of sale deed. The land in question was mutated in favour of the
Housing Board in the year 2015. The Division Bench of High Court of M.P.
set aside the scheme for acquisition of land vide order dated 03.06.2024
passed in W.P. no. 30059/2023. Therefore, the petitioner Jitendra is a
bonafide purchaser. The petitioner is sought to be implicated in Crime No.
256/2017 after a period of almost four years on the basis of agreement to
sale dated 11.04.2024 executed in favour of Laxmikant Patel (the named
accused in the FIR), which was later cancelled vide cancellation deed
Annexure P-9. The alleged offence is not made out against the petitioner,
therefore the impunged FIR deserves to be quashed.
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7. Per contra, learned counsel for the State ably assisted by learned
counsel for the complainant/objector contends that the land in question was
acquired by the State Government vide order dated 19.12.2003. In the year
2006, Mangilal and others were paid the compensation through cheque.
Mangilal and others executed power of attorney in favour of Mahendra
Singh, who executed registered sale deed dated 30.03.2012 in favour of his
brother Jitendra of Survey No. 30, admeasuring 0.470 hectares which was
already acquired in favour of Housing Board. The sale deed was executed
for Rs. 25 lakhs against its market value of Rs. 1.31 crore. It goes to show
that conspiracy to subvert the land under acquisition. Jitendra applied to the
Tehsildar for mutation. The Tehsildar rejected his application.
8. Learned counsel for the State further referring to the statement of
Bhanwar Singh, Gautam Singh and Shanti Bai recorded u/S 27 of the
Evidence Act contends that they have revealed the conspiracy of Jitendra
and Mahendra. Petitioner was aware of the acquisition of land and has
purchased it for lesser consideration and later attempted to transfer it to
Laxmikant Patel.
9. Learned counsel further referring to documents on record submits that
the discrepancy with regard to area of land acquired stand clarified vide
letter dated 27.05.2016 and the report of revenue officials. The Writ Petition
No. 30059/2023 does not relate to land in question. The petitioner is
absconding. Therefore, the petition is meritless and deserves to be
dismissed.
10. Heard, learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner referring to the judgments passed in
the case of Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported in
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(1979) 2 SCC 322 , Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi Vs. State of Gujarat
reported in AIR 2004 SC 2078 and Vijay Kumar Vs. Kamruddin & Anr.
reported 1999 (1) KLJ 59 contends that it is obligatory on the part of
Investigation Officer to seek permission before commencement of further
investigation in the matter u/S 173(8) of Cr.P.C.. The further investigation
conducted u/S 173(8) of Cr.P.C. without formal permission of concerned
Magistrate is bad in law. Therefore, the investigation regarding petitioner
Jitendra, after filing of final report against the main accused Narendra Patel
and Laxmikant Patel, deserves to be quashed.
12. The Supreme Court, in the case of Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi
Administration) reported in 1979(2) SCC 322 has observed as under:
20. Anyone acquainted with the day-to-day working of the criminal courts will be
alive to the practical necessity of the police possessing the power to make further
investigation and submit a supplemental report. It is in the interests of both the
prosecution and the defence that the police should have such power. It is easy to
visualise a case where fresh material may come to light which would implicate
persons not previously accused or absolve persons already accused. When it
comes to the notice of the investigating agency that a person already accused of
an offence has a good alibi, is it not the duty of that agency to investigate the
genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report to the Magistrate? After all
the investigating agency has greater resources at its command than a private
individual. Similarly, where the involvement of persons who are not already
accused comes to the notice of the investigating agency, the investigating agency
cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information. It is their duty
to investigate and submit a report to the Magistrate upon the involvement of the
other persons. In either case, it is for the Magistrate to decide upon his future
course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he
has already taken cognizance of the offence, but has not proceeded with the
enquiry or trial, he may direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered
to be involved and deal with all the accused in a single enquiry or trial. If the case
of which he has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to some
extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed against the newly
involved accused and proceed with the case as a separate case. What action a
Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC in such
situations is a matter best left to the discretion of the Magistrate. The criticism
that a further investigation by the police would trench upon the proceeding before
the court is really not of very great substance, since whatever the police may do,
the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate. That the final
word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or
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abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation. We should not,
however, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a
proceeding before a court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if
no cognizance had been taken by the Court of any offence. We think that in the
interests of the independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests
of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the
comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of
such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform
the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh
facts come to light.
21. As observed by us earlier, there was no provision in the CrPC, 1898 which,
expressly or by necessary implication, barred the right of the police to further
investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate. Neither
Section 173 nor Section 190 lead us to hold that the power of the police to further
investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence.
Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated
investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our view, notwithstanding that a
Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted
under Section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further investigate
was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as necessary
when fresh information came to light. Where the police desired to make a further
investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the court by
seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.
13. Later, the Supreme Court, in the case of Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali,
(2013) 5 SCC 762 observed as under:
15. A very wide power is vested in the investigating agency to conduct further
investigation after it has filed the report in terms of Section 173(2). The
legislature has specifically used the expression “nothing in this section shall be
deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report
under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate”, which
unambiguously indicates the legislative intent that even after filing of a report
before the court of competent jurisdiction, the investigating officer can still
conduct further investigation and where, upon such investigation, the officer in
charge of a police station gets further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall
forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in
the prescribed form. In other words, the investigating agency is competent to file
a supplementary report to its primary report in terms of Section 173(8). The
supplementary report has to be treated by the court in continuation of the primary
report and the same provisions of law i.e. sub-section (2) to sub-section (6) of
Section 173 shall apply when the court deals with such report.
22. “Further investigation” is where the investigating officer obtains further oral
8NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:9554
or documentary evidence after the final report has been filed before the court in
terms of Section 173(8). This power is vested with the executive. It is the
continuation of previous investigation and, therefore, is understood and described
as “further investigation”. The scope of such investigation is restricted to the
discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. Its purpose is to bring the
true facts before the court even if they are discovered at a subsequent stage to the
primary investigation. It is commonly described as “supplementary report”.
“Supplementary report” would be the correct expression as the subsequent
investigation is meant and intended to supplement the primary investigation
conducted by the empowered police officer. Another significant feature of further
investigation is that it does not have the effect of wiping out directly or impliedly
the initial investigation conducted by the investigating agency. This is a kind of
continuation of the previous investigation. The basis is discovery of fresh
evidence and in continuation of the same offence and chain of events relating to
the same occurrence incidental thereto. In other words, it has to be understood in
complete contradistinction to a “reinvestigation”, “fresh” or “de novo”
investigation.
41. Having discussed the scope of power of the Magistrate under Section 173 of
the Code, now we have to examine the kinds of reports that are contemplated
under the provisions of the Code and/or as per the judgments of this Court. The
first and the foremost document that reaches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is
the first information report. Then, upon completion of the investigation, the police
is required to file a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will be
appropriate to term this report as a primary report, as it is the very foundation of
the case of the prosecution before the court. It is the record of the case and the
documents annexed thereto, which are considered by the court and then the court
of the Magistrate is expected to exercise any of the three options aforenoticed.
Out of the stated options with the court, the jurisdiction it would exercise has to
be in strict consonance with the settled principles of law. The power of the
Magistrate to direct “further investigation” is a significant power which has to be
exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to achieve the ends of justice. To
provide fair, proper and unquestionable investigation is the obligation of the
investigating agency and the court in its supervisory capacity is required to ensure
the same. Further investigation conducted under the orders of the court, including
that of the Magistrate or by the police of its own accord and, for valid reasons,
would lead to the filing of a supplementary report. Such supplementary report
shall be dealt with as part of the primary report. This is clear from the fact that the
provisions of Sections 173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to such reports in
terms of Section 173(8) of the Code.
49. Now, we may examine another significant aspect which is how the provisions
of Section 173(8) have been understood and applied by the courts and
investigating agencies. It is true that though there is no specific requirement in the
provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code to conduct “further investigation” or file
supplementary report with the leave of the court, the investigating agencies have
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not only understood but also adopted it as a legal practice to seek permission of
the courts to conduct “further investigation” and file “supplementary report” with
the leave of the court. The courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a
similar view. The requirement of seeking prior leave of the court to conduct
“further investigation” and/or to file a “supplementary report” will have to be
read into, and is a necessary implication of the provisions of Section 173(8) of the
Code. The doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid of such
interpretation as the matters which are understood and implemented for a long
time, and such practice that is supported by law should be accepted as part of the
interpretative process.
14. Recently, in the case of State through Central Bureau of
Investigation Vs. Hemendra Reddy and Another reported in (2023) 16
SCC 779, the Supreme Court, considering precedents on the point, held as
under:
“What is the meaning of the term “Further Investigation”?
52. In Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar,
(2009) 6 SCC 346 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1059] , this Court held that : (SCC p. 349,
para 17) further investigation within the meaning of provision of Section
173(8)CrPC is additional; more; or supplemental. “Further investigation”,
therefore, is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh
investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier
investigation altogether.
What is the prime consideration for “Further Investigation”?
54. As observed in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat [Hasanbhai
Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 5 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1603] ,
the prime consideration for further investigation is to arrive at the truth and do
real and substantial justice. The hands of investigating agency for further
investigation should not be tied down on the ground of mere delay. In other
words, the mere fact that there may be further delay in concluding the trial should
not stand in the way of further investigation if that would help the court in
arriving at the truth and do real and substantial and effective justice.
60. This Court in Hasanbhai [Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat,
(2004) 5 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1603] held thus :
“12. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code permits further investigation,
and even dehors any direction from the court as such, it is open to the police
to conduct proper investigation, even after the court took cognizance of any
offence on the strength of a police report earlier submitted. All the more so, if
as in this case, the Head of the Police Department also was not satisfied of the
propriety or the manner and nature of investigation already conducted.
13. In Ram Lal Narang v. State (UT of Delhi) [Ram Lal Narang v. State (UT
of Delhi), (1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was observed by this
Court that further investigation is not altogether ruled out merely because
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cognizance has been taken by the court. When defective investigation comes
to light during course of trial, it may be cured by further investigation, if
circumstances so permitted. It would ordinarily be desirable and all the more
so in this case, that the police should inform the court and seek formal
permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light
instead of being silent over the matter keeping in view only the need for an
early trial since an effective trial for real or actual offences found during
course of proper investigation is as much relevant, desirable and necessary as
an expeditious disposal of the matter by the courts. In view of the aforesaid
position in law, if there is necessity for further investigation, the same can
certainly be done as prescribed by law. The mere fact that there may be
further delay in concluding the trial should not stand in the way of further
investigation if that would help the court in arriving at the truth and do real
and substantial as well as effective justice.”
62. In State of A.P. v. A.S. Peter [State of A.P. v. A.S. Peter, (2008) 2 SCC
383 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 427] , this Court held thus : (SCC p. 386, para 9)
“9. Indisputably, the law does not mandate taking of prior permission
from the Magistrate for further investigation. Carrying out of a further
investigation even after filing of the charge-sheet is a statutory right of the
police. A distinction also exists between further investigation and
reinvestigation. Whereas reinvestigation without prior permission is
necessarily forbidden, further investigation is not.”
63. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab [Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State
of Punjab, (2009) 1 SCC 441 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 523] , this Court held as
follows
“68. An order of further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of the
Code by the State in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 36 thereof
stands on a different footing. The power of the investigating officer to
make further investigation in exercise of its statutory jurisdiction under
Section 173(8) of the Code and at the instance of the State having regard
to Section 36 thereof read with Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861 should
be considered in different contexts. Section 173(8) of the Code is an
enabling provision. Only when cognizance of an offence is taken, the
learned Magistrate may have some say. But, the restriction imposed by
judicial legislation is merely for the purpose of upholding the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary. It is one thing to say that
the court will have supervisory jurisdiction to ensure a fair investigation,
as has been observed by a Bench of this Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of
U.P. [Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri)
440] , correctness whereof is open to question, but it is another thing to
say that the investigating officer will have no jurisdiction whatsoever to
make any further investigation without the express permission of the
Magistrate.”
64. In Vinay Tyagi [Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762 : (2013) 4
SCC (Cri) 557] , it was held that “further investigation” in terms of Section
173(8)CrPC can be made in a situation where the investigating officer obtains
further oral or documentary evidence after the final report has been filed
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before the court. The report on such further investigation under Section
173(8)CrPC can be termed as a supplementary report.
66. In Vinubhai [Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 17
SCC 1 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 228] a three-Judge Bench of this Court has
endeavoured to lay at rest the controversy enveloping the evasive issue of
further investigation directed by the Magistrate. This Court, speaking through
R.F. Nariman, J. has laid down at para 42 that : (SCC p. 39)
“42. … To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the
conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the
Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till
charges are framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate
suddenly ceases midway through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount
to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further
investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an
accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no
warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the
Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3)
read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h) and Section 173(8)CrPC, as has
been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the
progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences. It would
also be in the interest of justice that this power be exercised suo motu by
the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether
further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the
discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on
the facts of each case and in accordance with law.”
68. Thus, in view of the law laid down by this Court in the various decisions
cited hereinabove, it is well settled that sub-section (8) of Section 173CrPC
permits further investigation, and even dehors any direction from the court, it
is open to the police to conduct proper investigation, even after the court takes
cognizance of any offence on the strength of a police report earlier submitted.
15. Initially, the final report was submitted against Laxmikant Patel and
Narendra Patel, pending the investigation against other accused u/S 173(8)
of Cr.P.C, 1973. It is an established practice that on completion of
investigation against an accused, final report is submitted while continuing
investigation against other suspects/accused. Upon gathering the material
against such other accused, supplementary final report/chargsheet is filed
u/S 173(8) of Cr.P.C. When the final report was submitted against the
accused Narendra Patel and Laxminarayan Patel, the Investigation Officer
specifically mentioned about pending investigation against other suspects
under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate accepted the final
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report with such reservation and took cognizance of the offence against
Narendra Patel and Laxminarayan Patel. It shows tacit approval of the
Magistrate for further investigation in the matter. It is not a case of re-
investigation or further investigation against the charge-sheeted accused.
Rather, it is a case of further investigation against other suspects / accused,
which was kept pending u/s 173(8) of Cr.P.C. Therefore, no impropriety,
much less, an illegality is made out to stultify further investigation in the
matter.
16. The Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan
Lal & Others, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 after an elaborate consideration
of the matter and after referring to its various earlier decisions, has observed
in para 102 as under:-
”102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of
the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under
Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above,we give the following categories of cases by way
of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of
the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
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(4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously Instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
17. Relying on the judgment in the case of Bhajanlal (supra), the Apex
Court in the case of Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Mohd.
Sharaful Haque & Ors. reported in (2005) 1 SCC 122 and held as under:
11. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are
very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is
based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a
legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should
normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire
facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected
and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal,
are of magnitude and can-not be seen in their true perspective without sufficient
material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in
which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the
proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S.Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305),
and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 1). It would not be
proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all
probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and
on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It
would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the
complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint,
exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a
case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious
or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the
offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the
14NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:9554
High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section
482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous
analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in
conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that
on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of
the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and
there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or
vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the
High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is
registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary
importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led
in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala
fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be
the basis for quashing the proceedings. (See: Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna
Kumar (1990 Supp SCC 686), State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma (AIR 1996 SC 309),
Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995 (6) SCC 194), State of Kerala
v. O. C. Kuttan (AIR 1999 SC 1044), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma (1996 (7)
SCC 705), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC 397),
Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (AIR 1996 SC 2983) and Rajesh
Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi (1999 (3) SCC 259.
18. The intention is a mental state. The direct evidence of intention would
be seldom available in any matter. The intention is to be inferred from the
act and conduct of parties and the surrounding circumstances. The material
gathered during further investigation prima-facie reveals that the petitioner
Jitendra and his brother approached the land owners Mangilal and others for
transfer of land comprised in the acquisition proceedings. A power of
attorney was executed in favour of Mahendra, brother of petitioner Jitendra.
Mahendra, in turn, executed the registered sale deed of the land in question
in favour of his brother Jitendra on meager consideration as compared to its
market value.
19. The further investigation prima- facie reveals an intention to defraud
and manipulate the land involved in the acquisition. Therefore, the
investigation cannot be said to be absurd, malafide, vindictive or inherently
improper. The petitioner evaded investigation for 7 years and is still at large.
To scuttle the investigation, in aforestated scenario, would itself be an abuse
of process of Court. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court,
15
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:9554
exercise of inherent jurisdiction u/S 528 of BNSS, 2023 is not needed to
quash further investigation and consequential proceedings.
20. Consequently, the petition, being meritless, is hereby dismissed.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
sh/-
SEHA
Digitally signed by SEHAR
HASEEN
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT
OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH INDORE, ou=BENCH
R
AT INDORE,
2.5.4.20=900ec6fc757798e
aeb3df7a32860bd3298415
a4d1c2d91436213f2568c8f
HASE
27da, postalCode=452001,
st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=E7DBBA955
B262C04B8413251CE7FB6F
0B7DBA610C57F1559C08B
EN
F6C6F5DD40D4, cn=SEHAR
HASEEN
Date: 2025.04.09 18:25:36
+05’30’
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