Orissa High Court
Harihar Kharasudha Patnaik vs The State Of Orissa on 10 April, 2025
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLA No.519 of 2009
(In the matter of an appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973)
Harihar Kharasudha Patnaik ....... Appellant
-Versus-
The State of Orissa ....... Respondent
For the Appellant : Mr. Subir Palit, Senior Advocate
along with Ms. S. Sen, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. M.S. Rizvi, ASC, Vigilance
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
Date of Hearing: 10.03.2025 : Date of Judgment: 10.04.2025
S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal has been filed by the appellant
under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging
the Judgment and Order dated 17.11.2009 passed by the learned Special
Judge (Vigilance), Jeypore, in G.R. Case No. 28 of 1995(V)
corresponding to T.R. No. 81 of 2007. By the impugned judgment, the
appellant, along with his co-accused, were convicted under Section 13(2)read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as
well as under Sections 467, 477-A, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860. Four persons were convicted by the impugned judgment, all of
whom filed separate appeals before this Court assailing conviction and
sentence passed against them. However, during pendency of appeals,
three of the appellants passed away, resulting in the abatement of their
respective appeals. Consequently, only the present appeal remains for
adjudication.
2. The brief fact of this case is that, on 01.10.1995, the Inspector of
Vigilance, Berhampur Squad, submitted the First Information Report
(FIR) before the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Berhampur. In the
FIR it is alleged that a vigilance inquiry had revealed irregularities in the
M.E. Common Examination for the year 1994, conducted by the Board
of Secondary Education, Cuttack, Orissa, in May 1994.
The examination was conducted under the Chairmanship of the
concerned Circle Inspector of Schools, with the District Inspector (D.I.)
Page 2 of 23
of Schools supervising the evaluation of answer sheets. The answer
papers of Jeypore Education District were valued under the supervision
of the D.I. of Schools, Umerkote, who later prepared the result sheets.
During verification, it was found that in the result sheet of
Kabisurya M.E. School, U.K. Power House Colony, 15 students had
originally been marked as failed. However, Gananath Joshi, the then D.I.
of Schools, issued a handwritten chit to the Headmaster of Kabisurya
M.E. School, instructing him to bring the result sheet on 04.07.1994.
Upon submission of the result sheet, Joshi, along with other accused
persons, manipulated the marks, altering the results by striking off the
word “fail” and rewriting “pass” in columns 8 to 17 of the result sheet,
thereby illegally declaring 15 students as passed without making any
corresponding corrections in their answer papers.
Further inquiry established that similar manipulations were made
in the result sheets of U.G.M.E. School, Harijan Sahi, Municipal High
School No.2, Chandanbada Sahi, and other schools, allowing 38
additional failed students to be declared as passed through falsification
of official records.
Page 3 of 23
The present appellant happened to be the Headmaster of Municipal
High School No.2 at the relevant time.
Based on this report, a vigilance case was registered, and during the
investigation, the Vigilance Inspector examined witnesses and verified
relevant documents, including the manipulated result sheets seized from
the concerned schools. Specimen handwriting and signatures of the
accused, including the then D.I. of Schools and attached teacher M.
Prasad Rao, were collected and sent for handwriting analysis. The expert
opinion confirmed the manipulations; therefore, the competent authority
accorded sanction to prosecute the accused.
3. After completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was
submitted against the accused persons. During course of trial, Gananath
Joshi, the then D.I. of Schools, passed away, resulting in the abatement
of proceedings against him. Consequently, the cases proceeded against
the remaining four accused persons and accordingly after the completion
of trial, they were convicted by the learned Trial Court and awarded
various sentences which are under challenge.
Page 4 of 23
Being aggrieved by the aforementioned Judgement and order
dated 17.11.2009 of learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Jeypore, the
appellant has preferred the present appeal.
4. Heard Mr. Subir Palit, learned Senior Counsel with Ms. Subhashree
Sen, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. M.S. Rizvi, learned
Additional Standing Counsel for the Vigilance Department.
5. Mr. Palit, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that the
appellant, who was the Headmaster of Municipal High School No. II,
Chandanbada, Jeypore, was on leave from 24.05.1994 to 26.06.1994,
during which one Krushna Ch. Panigrahi was in charge. During this
period, manipulations in the result sheets of eleven failed students of 7th
Board Eamnination were allegedly made at the D.I. of Schools level.
Upon the appellant‟s return on 27.06.1994, the D.I. of Schools, Gananath
Joshi, issued a handwritten chit, directing him to submit the result sheets
on 04.07.1994, which he complied with. However, the manipulation of
marks and alteration of the results of eleven students from “fail” to
Page 5 of 23
“pass” was done by Gananath Joshi and others, without the appellant‟s
knowledge or participation.
It was further argued that the prosecution failed to establish any
pre-arranged plan or prior concert between the accused persons to prove
a common intention under Section 34 of IPC to commit the alleged
crime. The appellant‟s mere compliance with the direction of his
superior does not amount to active participation in the commission of
alleged offence. The learned counsel relied on Dani Singh v. State of
Bihar1, which held:
“20. “Common intention” implies prearranged plan and
acting in concert pursuant to the prearranged plan. Under this
section a preconcert in the sense of a distinct previous plan is not
necessary to be proved. The common intention to bring about a
particular result may well develop on the spot as between a
number of persons, with reference to the facts of the case and
circumstances of the situation. Though common intention may
develop on the spot, it must, however, be anterior in point of time
to the commission of offence showing a prearranged plan and
prior concert. (See Krishna Govind Patil v. State of
Maharashtra [AIR 1963 SC 1413 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 351] .)
In Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab [(1972) 4 SCC (N) 42 : 1972
Cri LJ 465] it has been held that common intention presupposes
prior concert. Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar
intention with common intention; the partition which divides
their bonds is often very thin, nevertheless, the distinction is real
and substantial, and if overlooked, will result in miscarriage of1
(2004) 13 SCC 203Page 6 of 23
justice. To constitute common intention, it is necessary that
intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them and
shared by them. Undoubtedly, it is a difficult thing to prove
even the intention of an individual and, therefore, it is all the
more difficult to show the common intention of a group of
persons. But however difficult may be the task, the prosecution
must lead evidence of facts, circumstances and conduct of the
accused from which their common intention can be safely
gathered. In Maqsoodan v. State of U.P. [(1983) 1 SCC 218 :
1983 SCC (Cri) 176 : AIR 1983 SC 126] it was observed that
prosecution must lead evidence from which the common
intention of the accused can be safely gathered. In most cases it
has to be inferred from the act, conduct or other relevant
circumstances of the case in hand. The totality of the
circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at a
conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to
commit offence for which they can be convicted. The facts and
circumstances of cases vary and each case has to be decided
keeping in view the facts involved. Whether an act is in
furtherance of the common intention is an incident of fact and
not of law. In Bhaba Nanda Sarma v. State of Assam [(1977) 4
SCC 396 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 602 : AIR 1977 SC 2252] it was
observed that prosecution must prove facts to justify an
inference that all participants of the acts had shared a common
intention to commit the criminal act which was finally
committed by one or more of the participants. Mere presence of
a person at the time of commission of an offence by his
confederates is not, in itself sufficient to bring his case within
the purview of Section 34, unless community of design is
proved against him. (See Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P. [(1975)
3 SCC 311 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 919 : AIR 1975 SC 12] ) In
the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “furtherance” is
defined as “action of helping forward”. Adopting this definition,
Russell says that “it indicates some kind of aid or assistance
producing an effect in future” and adds that any act may be
regarded as done in furtherance of the ultimate felony if it is a
step intentionally taken, for the purpose of effecting that felony.
(Russell on Crime, 12th Edn., Vol. I, pp.487 and 488.)
In Shankarlal Kacharabhai v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1965 SC
1260 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 266] this Court has interpreted the word
“furtherance” as “advancement or promotion”. “
Page 7 of 23
Similarly, reliance was placed on Ramesh Singh v. State of A.P.2,
wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed:
” 12. To appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the
appellants it is necessary to understand the object of
incorporating Section 34 in the Penal Code, 1860. As a general
principle in a case of criminal liability it is the primary
responsibility of the person who actually commits the offence and
only that person who has committed the crime can be held guilty.
By introducing Section 34 in the Penal Code the legislature laid
down the principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act. The
essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a
common intention connecting the accused leading to the doing of
a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. Thus, if the act is
the result of a common intention then every person who did the
criminal act with that common intention would be responsible for
the offence committed irrespective of the share which he had in
its perpetration. Section 34 IPC embodies the principle of joint
liability in doing the criminal act based on a common intention.
Common intention essentially being a state of mind it is very
difficult to procure direct evidence to prove such intention.
Therefore, in most cases it has to be inferred from the act like,
the conduct of the accused or other relevant circumstances of the
case. The inference can be gathered from the manner in which
the accused arrived at the scene and mounted the attack, the
determination and concert with which the attack was made, and
from the nature of injury caused by one or some of them. The
contributory acts of the persons who are not responsible for the
injury can further be inferred from the subsequent conduct after
the attack. In this regard even an illegal omission on the part of
such accused can indicate the sharing of common intention. In
other words, the totality of circumstances must be taken into
consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused
had the common intention to commit an offence of which they
could be convicted. (See Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf2
(2004) 11 SCC 305Page 8 of 23
Momin v. State of Maharashtra [(1970) 1 SCC 696 : 1970 SCC
(Cri) 274 : AIR 1971 SC 885] .).”
Mr. Palit, learned Senior Counsel, extensively read out the
evidence of the prosecution and submitted that the prosecution evidences
indeed established the innocence of the appellant, however
overwhelming evidence illuminating on record in favour of the appellant
has been mis-appreciated by the trial court. On the strength of Judgement
cited at the Bar, Mr. Palit submits that the appeal deserves merit.
6. The prosecution witness (P.W.7), Krushna Chandra Panigrahi,
who was the acting Headmaster during the appellant‟s leave, admitted
that he handed over the result sheets to Jhadeswar Pattanaik, a Clerk in
the D.I. of Schools Office, and received them back with corrections. He,
however, denied any knowledge of the manipulation. The learned Trial
Court, while dealing with the testimony of P.W.7 has observed as under:
P.W.7, the assistant teacher of Municipality High School
no.2 stated in his evidence that accused Jhadeswar Patnaik was
working as a clerk in D.I. of Schools, Jeypore and he requested
the Headmaster to give the result sheets of M.E. common
examination, 1994, and the headmaster gave him the result
sheets and those were returned to the schools with some
corrections. But in cross-examination he clarified that he did notPage 9 of 23
remember who handed over the result sheets to Jhadeswar
Patnaik.
Similarly, while dealing with the allegations of manipulation, the Trial
Court relied upon the testimony of P.W.6, who was the handwriting
expert. The Trial Court appreciated the evidence of P.W.6 and returned
the following findings:
“Again, according to P.W.6, the person who wrote B-I to
B-7 did not write the red enclosed disputed signature appearing
in Exts. 15 and 16, marked as W-1 and W-2, purported to have
been sent from the office of the D.I. of Schools did not belong to
the said D.I. Gananath Joshi and those signatures have been
forged. So the corollary inference would be that the contents of
Ext. 15 were stated to have been written by accused M. Prasad
Rao, he also forged the signature of the D.I. in Exts. 15 and 16
without the knowledge of the D.I. or C.I. and abused his official
position by putting the seal of the D.I. of Schools after forging
the signature and thereby illegally issued letters from the office
of the D.I. of Schools vide letter no. 5437 of dated 19.9.94
promoting two students vide Ext. 15 and vide letter no. 4624
dated 16.8.94 thereby promoting 11 students having different roll
numbers to have promoted to VIII class under his consideration.
Again P.W.6 found several corrections in the result sheets and
interpolation in the marks as pointed out in X-I to X-50. Again
according to p.w.6 in the result sheets the original word ‘fail’ has
been scored through and ‘Pass’ has been written subsequently as
noticed in Y-I to Y-52 marked by him either the ‘Pass’ was
written subsequently to the write or decified word ‘fail’ or the
original word ‘fail’ has been changed to ‘pass’ by overwriting or
has been written separately. So even though no definite opinion
was made by P.W.6 as to who had made the correction of pass
and fail or interpolated the marks in the result sheets, the gist of
his evidence revealed that the then D.I. Gananath Joshi had
issued the chit of letter (Ext. 19) to the Headmaster, KabisuryaPage 10 of 23
M.E. School for the production of his result sheets but the
subsequent letters’ vide Exts. 15 and 16 signatures therein, and
the result sheets of the disputed two schools were found to have
been manipulated, interpolated and forged, either by the
attached teacher M. Prasad Rao, who stated to have issued
Exts. 15 and 16 declaring 13 unsuccessful students to have
passed and there were several manipulations and interpolations
in marks of different students who were originally failed as per
the copy of the result sheets of the C.I. of Schools and that of
the D.I. of Schools, Jeypore, but subsequently were shown to
have passed as per the said result sheets of the two schools, vide
Exts. 7 and 9,the custodians of which were accused Harihar
Karasudha Patnaik and Smt. Pramila Gantayat.
The opinion of the handwriting expert can be relied upon
when supported by other items of internal and external evidence.
A.I.R.2003 SC 282. It is not the law that the handwriting expert’s
opinion can never be acted upon unless substantially
corroborated by other evidence in case where the reasons for
opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence
throwing any doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of
handwriting expert may be relied upon. A.I.R.1980 SC 531 .So
basing upon this when the evidence by P.W.6 has not been
shaken by way of cross-examination by any of the accused
particularly M.Prasad Rao, the same can be accepted and can be
held to be reliable with reference to the opinion in Exts. 15 and
16.”
The documentary evidence, namely Ext.15 – Letter No. 4624,
Ext.16 – Letter No. 5437, and Ext.19 – Paper chit, were found to have
been issued under the forged signature of the D.I. of Schools by accused
No.1, M. Prasad Rao, to dispatch the result sheets through the Clerk,
Jhadeswar Pattanaik. The accused Headmaster, instead of verifying the
authenticity of the letters and the paper chit, simply handed over the
Page 11 of 23
result sheets. The Trial Court based its reasoning on this aspect to
connect the appellant to the offence. However, it was contended that the
accused Headmaster might be negligent on the part of his duty, but
having no criminal mindset merely cannot be liable in a criminal offence
based on presumption of fact.
7. In its judgment, the Learned Trial court acknowledged the absence
of direct evidence against the appellant and relied solely on Section 114
of the Evidence Act to infer guilt based on presumption. For ready
reference, the relevant part of the impugned judgement is reproduced as
under:
Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a fact
can be proved but that is not the only mode envisaged in the
Evidence Act. Proof of fact depends upon the degree of
probabilities of its having existed. The standard required for
reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any
important manner concerning him. In this connection Flatcher
Maulton L.J in Hawkins Vrs. Pawels Tillery steam coal Co. Ltd.
1991(I) KB 988 observed as follows: “Proof does not mean proof
through rigid mathematical demonstration, because that is
impossible, it must mean such evidence as would induce a
reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion”.
The said observation has stood the test of time and can now to be
followed as standard of proof. In reaching the conclusion, the
court can use the process of inference to be drawn from the facts
produced or proved. Such inferences are a kin to presumption in
Law. Law gives absolute discretion to the court to pressure the
existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. InPage 12 of 23
that process the court may have to regard to common course of
natural event, human conduct, public or private business vis. a
vis the fact of particular case. The discretion is clearly envisaged
in sec.114 of the Evidence Act.
“Presumption” is an inference of certain fact drawn from other
proved facts. While interfering the existence of a fact from
another, the court is only applying the process of intelligent
reason which the mind of a prudent man would do under similar
circumstances. Presumption is not the final conclusion to be
drawn from other facts but it could as well be final if it remain
undisturbed later. Presumption in law of evidence is a rule
indicating the stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a
certain fact or facts the court can drawn an inference and that
would remain until such inference is either disproved or
dispelled as observed on 2001 (I) S.C.C.691.
8. The learned Senior Counsel emphasized that in the absence of
concrete evidence proving common intention or active participation, the
conviction of the appellant under Section 34 of IPC is unsustainable in
law.
The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant further submitted
that the allegations against the appellant rest solely on presumption
under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, which permits the court to
assume the existence of certain facts unless disproven by a
preponderance of evidence. However, presumption alone cannot
substitute for concrete proof, especially when the prosecution’s case
hinges on the doctrine of common intention under Section 34 of IPC.
Page 13 of 23
Relying on Dani Singh v. State of Bihar (supra), it was argued that
liability under Section 34 of IPC requires the satisfaction of two essential
tests:
1. Existence of a prearranged plan demonstrating common intention.
2. Active participation of the accused in the criminal act.
The Counsel contended that neither of these elements was established
in the present case nor any corroborative evidence born on record to
support presumption. The failure of the appellant to verify the
authenticity of the forged signature of M. Prasad Rao and his compliance
with instructions from the D.I. of Schools without waiting for a duly
signed letter may at most amount to negligence. The learned Counsel
submits that such an act might attract departmental proceedings but does
not constitute criminal complicity in the alleged offence.
Since common intention was neither proved nor established, the
appellant cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 34 of IPC
alongside the co-accused. Therefore, the appellant is not guilty of the
offences charged and cannot be convicted on mere presumption.
Page 14 of 23
9. On contrary, learned Additional Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the respondent vehemently opposed the contentions of the appellant and
submitted that as sufficient evidences and witnesses have deposed
against the appellant and with the support of such evidences; the learned
Trial Court has rightly convicted the accused appellant. To substantiate
his submissions about the sustainability of conviction the learned
Additional Standing Counsel for Vigilance has relied upon the findings
of the Trial Court, which reads under: –
“12. That apart it has been brought out that as per the entries in
the despatch register and despatch number put in Exts. 15 and
16, the contents of those letters and the subjects thereof were
different and did not tally with each other which clearly go to
show that the accused persons like M.Prasad Rao and
Jhadeswar Patnaik attached to D.I. of Schools and the later
being the in charge of despatch register issued Exts.15 and 16 by
forging the signatures of the D.I. of schools but put the official
seal of the D.I. and put fake despatch numbers in those letters
and issued the names and roll numbers of 13 students who had
originally failed to have passed and promoted. That apart as it is
seen from the result sheet of the two impugned schools and the
result sheet of which was admittedly under the strict care and
custody of the respective headmaster/headmistress with that of
the result sheet of the C.I. and D.I. originally in U.G.M.E.
school, Harijan sahi, Jeypore 74 students had appeared out of
which 33 ‘passed’ and at Municipality High schoo1 no.2,114
students had appeared out of which 33 ‘passed’ vide Exts.4 and 5
respectively out of 74 students appeared in U.G.M.E. school.
Harijan sahi, Jeypore, 60 students were stated to have passed
instead of 33 and out of 114 students, 42 were stated to have
passed instead of 33 from Municipality High School no.2.
Page 15 of 23
It was submitted by the prosecution that after recording
among the 114 students sent by C.I. of Schools, the roll no.3167
was only covering for these two schools and on comparison of
the said result sheets it is sen that the marks in the said roll
number was also manipulated before reaching the letter of
recounting in that school to which the concerned headmaster had
not explained. So as stated by the I.0. (P.W.11) and other
witnesses. Exts.3 to 6 were copy of result sheets of C.I. of
Schools where no corrections were made Exts. 30 to 33 were
copies of result sheets of D.I.of Schools and out of it in Exts. 32
and 33, two corrections were made as per the recounting of the
result sheets out of 114 students made by the C.I.of Schools.
Exts.7 to 10 are the result sheets of the four concerned schools
out of which the present two head masters are facing the trial for
the result sheets of Exts.7 and 9. So on a comparision of three
copies of the result sheets, as per Ext.7, the result sheet of
U.G.M.E. School, Harijan sahi, Jeypore corrections in 26 roll
numbers were made who were shown to have been passed by
overwriting the marks and by striking out the word ‘fail’ . So also
as per the result sheet. Ext.9 of Municipality High School no.2
out of 114 students as against 11 roll numbers, the marks were
manipulated and they were shown to have passed by striking out
the word ‘fail’ including th of the roll no.3167.
Prosecution clarified that in the result sheet of Govt.
Girls High School, Jeypore, the Headmaster was not prosecuted,
since the consideration was made with respect to other 7
students as seen from both the result sheets of C.I. copy (Ext.3)
and school copy (Ext.10) out of 18 students.
13. Thus, the result sheets being one of valuable documents to be
possessed by the headmaster himself under his strict custody or
vigilance for any alteration or manipulation therein he or she is
to account for the same as to how and under what circumstances,
the corrections or manipulations in the result sheet with respect
to unsuccessful students were made and the same was in
accordance with examination Regulation and procedure
conducted under the chairmanship of the C.I. of schools. Any
deviation or defalcation thereof has to be explained reasonably
by the headmaster. Here in this case, the C.I. had no knowledge
regarding the extra correction or alteration nor there was any
official communication by the concerned D.I. to the HeadmastersPage 16 of 23
who were the custodian of the result sheets of the students.
Merely because the D.I. of Schools subsequently died it can not
be taken for granted in the absence of any positive proof that he
asked for the result sheets to the headmasters non-officially and
made the manipulations for any unlawful gain and returned the
same without the knowledge of the headmaster under whose
authorities those were handed over and were brought back. So
the connivance or conspiracy by the staffs of the D.I. of schools
and the concerned Headmaster or headmistress for abuse of
their official position can not be ruled out in the absence of any
official communication to them either through the C.I. or D.I.
The headmasters being the person in authrotiy for the custody of
the result sheets-a valuable security by which the future of a
students is created or remained at stake any deviation on the part
of the headmaster/headmistress has to be reasonably explained
by them. So, considering the opinion evidence by p.w.6 who has
found the role of accused attached teacher M. Prasad Rao in
sending forged letters by forging the signatures of the D.I. by
manipulating the despatch register un under the custody of
Jhadeswar Patnaik who also took part in bringing the result
sheets privately from one of the schools and in view of the
tampering in the results of ‘pass’ and fail’ of so many students,
indisputeably the role by the concerned headmaster/headmistress
can not be stated to be official or in accordance with
examination norms. Instead of simply handing over the result
sheets they should have asked for the official written order or
should have brought it to the notice of the higher authority i.e.
the Committee of examination or the C.I. of Schools, so that such
manipulation should have been prevented.”
10. Mr. Rizvi, learned Additional Standing Counsel for Vigilance
further contended that the oral testimonies of all Prosecution Witnesses
(PWs) were unequivocal and unambiguous, specifically establishing the
forgery and falsification of the Result Sheet and the credibility of PW-2
Page 17 of 23
(Sr. Clerk-cum-Jr. Accountant) and PW-6 (G.E.Q.D.) remained
unimpeached, even under meticulous cross-examination.
He further submitted that the learned Trial Court thoroughly
analysed the evidence and rightly concluded that the appellant was
responsible for forgery and falsification of the Result Sheet as he was the
custodian of the result sheet. Therefore, there is no legal infirmity or
perversity in the impugned judgment dated 17.11.2009.
11. This Court has carefully examined the precedents cited, the
materials on record, the depositions of witnesses, and the reasoning of
the learned trial court. From the collective evidence of Prosecution the
narrative in entirety vis-a-vis the appellants borne on record is that the
appellant was working as Headmaster in Municipal High School No. 2
during the alleged crime happened. He was on leave from 24.05.1994 to
26.06.1994. In his absentia P.W.7 was in charge. On 04.07.1994,
appellant‟s boss, the D.I. of Schools send a chit in the form of letter
(Ext.19) asking him to send the result sheet. The said Ext.19 found to be
a manipulated letter at the instance of the co-accused namely M. Prasad
Rao. He complied the purported direction of the D.I. of Schools
Page 18 of 23
oblivious of the fact that the chit was a forged one. Prosecution also
proved on record that all manipulation in the result sheet has been done
by the co accused persons. However, the appellant‟s complicity in the
commission of crime has been assumed as he was the custodian of the
result sheet being the Headmaster. Therefore, the conviction is solely
based on the inference of presumption u/s 114 of the Evidence Act,
1872. Appellant is convicted under aid of Section 34 of IPC as
admittedly he has not participated in the forging of the documents. It is
well established that a conviction under Section 34 of IPC requires proof
of a common intention, which necessitates: (i) A pre-arranged plan or
prior meeting of minds. (ii) Active participation of the accused in the
commission of the offence.
12. In the present case, there is no direct evidence establishing that the
appellant conspired or acted in concert with the principal accused to
manipulate the result sheets. The evidence of prosecution witness
(P.W.7), Krushna Chandra Panigrahi, clearly suggests that the result
sheets were already altered before they were handed back to the
appellant. Furthermore, the handwriting expert’s report (P.W.6) merely
Page 19 of 23
confirmed the alteration but did not link the appellant directly to the
forgery.
13. The reliance on Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to
infer guilt solely based on circumstantial evidence is misplaced. As held
in Dani Singh v. State of Bihar (supra) and Ramesh Singh v. State of
A.P. (supra), mere negligence or omission cannot be equated with guilt
of criminal liability unless there is clear evidence of intent and active
participation. The learned trial court erred in placing undue reliance on
“presumption” without substantial proof of common intention.
14. Moreover, in a criminal trial, the burden lies on the prosecution to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of any material
linking the appellant directly to the act of forgery or tampering of marks
negates the prosecution’s case. At best, the appellant’s actions amount to
mere procedural negligence on his part which cannot lead to draw a
presumptive inference as „mens rea’, hence, does not satisfy the
ingredients of the offences charged under Sections 467, 477-A, and 34 of
IPC along with Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.
Page 20 of 23
15. Moreover, the learned Trial Court while recording conviction for
the offense U/s 467 of the IPC, considered the manipulated result sheet
to be “Valuable Security”. It is an established principle of law that a
valuable security as defined U/s 30 of IPC denotes a document which is
or purport to be a document whereby any legal right is created, extended,
transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or where by any person
acknowledges that he lies under a legal liability or has not ascertained
legal right. At this point it would be apt to rely on the ruling of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shriniwas Pandit Dharamadhikari v. State
of Maharashtra3, in which it was held thus: –
“The appellant was convicted of offence under Sections 417, 420
read with Section 511 and Section 471 read with Section 467 of
the Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to various terms of
imprisonment and fine for those offences. Having heard counsel
for both sides we do not find any reason to disturb the order of
conviction in respect of offences under Sections 417 and 420 read
with Section 511 but as regards the offence under Section 471
read with Section 467 IPC we do not think that the two
certificates the appellant has been found to have forged to get
admission in the Arts and Commerce College affiliated to Poona
University could be described as “valuable security” as the
expression is defined in Section 30 of the Penal Code, 1860. We
therefore alter the conviction under the aforesaid sections to one3
(1980) 4 SCC 551Page 21 of 23
under Section 471 read with Section 465 of the Penal Code, 1860.
However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case we set aside the sentences passed against the appellant and
remit the matter to the trial court to consider, as provided in
Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, whether the
appellant should be given the benefit of Section 4 of the said Act.
If the trial court does not find it expedient to release the appellant
on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of that Act, it
should then pass proper sentences on the appellant for the
offences of which the appellant has been found guilty. The fine
imposed on the appellant, if paid, shall be refunded. The appeal is
disposed of as above.”
Going with the reasoning given by the Hon‟ble Apex Court, the
alleged result sheet can‟t fall under the definition of “valuable security”.
Therefore conviction of the co-accused u/s 467 of IPC cast a shadow of
doubt. Under the aid of Section 34 of IPC it is not safe to sustain
conviction of the appellant, when the evidence is doubtful and unclear,
which undermines the prosecution case beyond a reasonable threshold
warranting acquittal.
16. Considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court finds that
the prosecution has failed to establish the appellant‟s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The conviction and sentence imposed by the learned
Trial Court are thus unsustainable in law and are hereby set aside.
Page 22 of 23
17. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The appellant is acquitted of
all charges. Bail bonds, if any, stand discharged.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Dated the 10th April, 2025/ Swarna
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SWARNAPRAVA DASH
Designation: Senior Stenographer
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 12-Apr-2025 15:38:28 Page 23 of 23
[ad_1]
Source link