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Uttarakhand High Court
(Under Section 482 Of The Code Of … vs State Of Uttarakhand & Another on 3 April, 2025
2025:UHC:2774
IN THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAINITAL
CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION NO.336 of 2020
(Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973)
Lalit Giri Goswami ......Applicant
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & Another ........Respondents
Presence:
Mr. Vipul Sharma, learned counsel for the Applicant.
Ms. Sukhwani Singh, learned counsel for the Respondents.
H on 'ble Ashish N a it h a n i, J ( Or a l)
1. The present application under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C."), has been filed
by the applicant, Lalit Giri Goswami, seeking quashing of the charge sheet
dated 17.08.2019, the cognisance order dated 17.09.2019, and the entire
proceedings of Criminal Case No. 6808 of 2019 pending before the Learned
Judicial Magistrate, Haldwani, District Nainital, under Sections 376, 504, and
506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
2. The applicant, a Sub-Inspector posted at Dharchula, Pithoragarh,
has vehemently denied the allegations levelled against him by Respondent
No. 2, Sarita Goswami, which include charges of rape (Section 376 IPC),
criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC), and intentional insult (Section 504
IPC).
3. The gravamen of the allegations is that the applicant, after
promising marriage to the complainant, established a physical relationship
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with her and later reneged on his promise, causing her mental and emotional
trauma.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties--Mr. Vipul Sharma, learned
counsel for the applicant, and Ms. Sukhwani Singh, learned counsel for the
respondents, perused the annexures in light of the advanced arguments.
5. The genesis of the case lies in an FIR No. 0067 of 2019
registered on 01.07.2019 at Police Station Kaladhungi, District Nainital,
under Sections 376, 504, and 506 IPC. The complainant, Sarita Goswami,
alleged that the applicant, Lalit Giri Goswami, exploited her sexually on the
false pretext of marriage. It was further alleged that the applicant and his
family members threatened and defamed her when she insisted on
solemnising the marriage.
6. The investigation culminated in a charge sheet filed on
17.08.2019, and the Learned Magistrate took cognisance of the offences on
17.09.2019. The applicant, aggrieved by these proceedings, filed the present
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., contending that the allegations, even if
taken at face value, do not constitute the offences charged, and the
continuation of the proceedings would amount to a travesty of justice.
7. The learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Vipul Sharma, submits
that the allegations under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC are vague and lack
specificity. No overt acts or explicit threats have been substantiated in the
complainant's statements or the charge sheet.
8. It is also contended that the applicant, a public servant, has an
unblemished record, and the allegations appear to be an afterthought to
pressure him into marriage.
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9. Concerning the allegation under Section 376 IPC, it was
vehemently argued that the relationship between the applicant and the
complainant was completely consensual. The applicant never made any false
promise of marriage to deceive the complainant.
10. The learned counsel for the applicant relies on the Hon'ble
Supreme Court judgement in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of
Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608 has held that a mere breach of promise to
marry does not constitute rape unless it is shown that the promise was false
from its very inception and was made with the sole intention to exploit the
victim sexually.
11. It is argued that in the present case, there is not enough evidence
to suggest that the applicant had any malafide intention when entering into
the relationship.
12. Regarding the allegations under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, it was
submitted that they are vague, general, and lack specificity. The complainant
has failed to particularise any instance of criminal intimidation or intentional
insult.
13. The statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. do
not disclose any overt act that would constitute these offences. The applicant,
being a responsible police officer, has an unblemished service record, and
these allegations appear to have been fabricated only to harass him.
14. It was further contended that the so-called compromise was not
voluntary but was obtained under coercion from the local police. The medical
report completely belies the allegation of rape as it does not show any signs
of forcible sexual assault.
15. As per the applicant, the entire prosecution story contains
contradictions and does not inspire confidence.
16. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State, argued that the
complainant's statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C.
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establish that the applicant had physical relations with her on the false pretext
of marriage.
17. The applicant's subsequent refusal to marry her after exploiting
her sexually clearly attracts the provisions of Section 376 IPC. The
compromise document proves that the applicant had acknowledged his
relationship with the complainant and agreed to marry her, a promise he later
dishonoured.
18. Regarding the allegations under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, it was
submitted that the complainant and her family members have consistently
stated that the applicant and his family members not only refused to marry
her but also threatened and intimidated her when she insisted on the marriage.
The statements of the complainant's parents and other witnesses corroborate
her version.
19. Having heard the learned the counsel for both the parties, this
court observes that if an individual is accused of engaging in a sexual
relationship under a false promise of marriage and is to be held criminally
liable, the physical relationship in question must be directly attributable to the
deceptive promise, unqualified by extraneous circumstances or
considerations. It is also recognised that a woman may engage in a physical
relationship for reasons independent of a promise of marriage, such as
personal affection or a desire for companionship, without requiring formal
marital commitment.
20. Therefore, in cases where a woman knowingly engages in a
prolonged physical relationship, it cannot be conclusively determined that
such a relationship was solely based on the appellant's alleged promise of
marriage.
21. To establish criminal liability, it must be demonstrated that the
physical relationship was entered into purely due to the promise of marriage,
with a direct and exclusive causal link, uninfluenced by any other
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considerations. In the absence of a clear nexus, it cannot be said that consent
was vitiated under a misconception of fact.
22. Furthermore, for a promise to constitute a "false promise"
amounting to a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the Indian Penal
Code, it must be shown that the promise was made with fraudulent intent
from the outset, specifically to mislead the woman into consenting to a
physical relationship.
23. If it is proven that such consent was obtained through deception,
it is rendered legally invalid. In this context, reference may be made to the
decision in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana 2013 AIR SCW 2987, wherein
it was held that:
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,
accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court
must very carefully examine whether the accused had wanted to
marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false
promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls
within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between merely breaching a promise and not fulfilling a false one.
Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early
stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether
the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the
nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a
case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on
account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or
where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not
have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to
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marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases
must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape
only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the
accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives."
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show
that at the relevant time, i.e. at the initial stage itself, the Accused had no
intention whatsoever of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may
be circumstances when a person with the best intentions cannot marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a
promise concerning a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are unclear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to the misconception of
fact. To come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the
fact must have an immediate relevance. Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code
cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in its
entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured
of the fact that from the very beginning, the Accused had never really
intended to marry her.
25. It is also essential to recognise that there may be instances where
a promise to marry was genuinely made at the outset. Still, the individual can
ultimately not fulfil it due to unforeseen circumstances. However, suppose
such a promise was not made with a dishonest intent from the beginning to
deceive the woman. In that case, it does not constitute a false promise that
would invoke the penal provisions of Section 375 of the IPC, punishable
under Section 376.
26. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar
Sonar Vs. Naval Singh Rajput and others reported in 2019 (3) MPLJ (Cri.)
SC 52 has held as under:-
''20. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and
consensual sex. In such cases, the Court must carefully examine
whether the complainant had wanted to marry the victim or had
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mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect
only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of
cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere
breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the
accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to
seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act
would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her
love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the
misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on
account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or
which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite
having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated
differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if
he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The
acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the
parties would not constitute an offence under section 376 of the
Indian Penal Code."
27. The factual matrix of the case reveals that the complainant was
neither naive nor could she be easily deceived, but rather a mature individual
fully capable of comprehending the nature and consequences of her actions.
Her prior acquaintance with the applicant and the sustained physical
relationship over multiple instances demonstrate her conscious participation
in the relationship.
28. The circumstances indicate she entered into this relationship with
full awareness, making informed choices rather than acting under any
misconception. Her conduct throughout suggests a level of maturity that
negates any claim of being misled or exploited, as she maintained the
relationship voluntarily without immediate protest or indication of coercion.
This factual backdrop undermines the allegation that her consent was vitiated
by deception regarding marriage.
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29. Where a woman does not "consent" to the sexual acts described
in the main body of Section 375, the offence of rape has occurred. While
Section 90 does not define the term "consent", a "consent" based on a
"misconception of fact" is not consent in the eyes of the law.
30. The present case requires careful examination of the nature of
consent and the distinction between consensual sexual relations and rape
under Section 376 IPC. The material on record indicates a prolonged
relationship between the parties where physical intimacy occurred over a
significant period. The complainant's statements suggest this relationship
continued with mutual understanding and without immediate protest.
31. The critical question before this Court is: whether the consent
given was vitiated by any misconception of fact arising from a false promise
of marriage.
32. The evidence reveals that the parties engaged in formal
discussions about marriage, including horoscope matching, and the applicant
sought time until 30.06.2019 for solemnisation. The subsequent failure to
marry resulted from astrological incompatibility, "manglik and non-manglik",
rather than dishonest intentions. This sequence of events suggests the promise
was made in good faith initially, with the inability to fulfil it arising from
circumstances beyond the applicant's control.
33. "Manglik" is commonly translated as affected by "Mangal
Dosha" or having Mars affliction in the horoscope. Owing to astrological
incompatibility, specifically the applicant being identified as 'Manglik'--a
condition in Vedic astrology denoting Mars affliction in the horoscope,
traditionally believed to affect marital harmony.
34. The medical examination records do not indicate signs of
forcible sexual activity. The forensic analysis detected no seminal traces or
foreign DNA in vaginal swabs. Crucially, the medical opinion concludes that
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all findings are "consistent with consensual intercourse," directly
contradicting the complainant's version of events.
35. The claims under Sections 504/506 IPC suffer from fatal
evidentiary deficiencies. The complainant failed to provide specific dates,
locations, or particulars of alleged threats.
36. No independent witnesses corroborate the family's claims of
intimidation, despite the complainant's frequent public interactions with the
applicant.
37. After the alleged compromise, the complainant's continued
participation in the relationship suggests her consent may not have been
solely contingent on the marriage promise. The absence of immediate
complaints during the relationship's duration requires careful consideration.
38. The primary contention advanced by the learned counsel for the
State on behalf of the complainant is that the applicant engaged in sexual
relations with her on the false promise of marrying her, and therefore her
"consent", being premised on a "misconception of fact" (the promise to
marry), stands vitiated.
39. The learned Magistrate's cognisance order dated 17.09.2019 does
not reflect a reasoned analysis of whether the allegations prima facie
constitute offences under Sections 376, 504, or 506 IPC. The charge sheet
appears to be mechanically accepted without critically scrutinising the
evidence. The absence of corroborative evidence and the contradictions in the
complainant's statements render the proceedings unsustainable.
40. The allegations of criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC) and
intentional insult (Section 504 IPC) are vague and lack specificity. The
complainant has not provided concrete instances, dates, or independent
witnesses to substantiate these claims. The statements of the complainant's
family members are hearsay and do not meet the threshold required to
establish these offences. As a public servant with an unblemished record, the
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applicant has been subjected to these allegations without credible evidence,
indicating a potential misuse of the legal process.
41. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that consent
concerning Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the proposed
act's circumstances, actions and consequences. An individual who makes a
reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or
inaction) and the possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction
consents to such action. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs The State of
Maharashtra, AIR 2019 SC 327, which was a case involving the invoking of
the jurisdiction under Section 482, this Court observed: (SCC para 15)
"15.... An inference as to consent can be drawn if it is based only
on evidence or probabilities of the case. "Consent" is also an act of
reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in a
person's mind to permit the doing of the act complained of."
42. This understanding was also emphasised in the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala (SCC p. 118, para
12) wherein the Hon'ble Court held that:
"12. "Consent", for Section 375, requires voluntary participation
not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge
of the significance of the moral quality of the act but after fully
exercising the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there
was consent is to be ascertained only by carefully studying all
relevant circumstances."
43. For consent under Section 375 to be legally valid, it must stem
from an active and reasoned deliberation on the proposed act. Two key
conditions must be met to determine whether consent was vitiated due to a
"misconception of fact" arising from a promise of marriage. First, the
promise of marriage must have been false from the outset, made in bad faith,
and with no genuine intention of being fulfilled when it was given. Second,
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the false promise must have been directly relevant to the woman's decision to
engage in the sexual act, establishing a clear causal link between the
deception and her consent.
44. Firstly, the evidence demonstrates that the applicant's promise of
marriage was made in good faith, not with fraudulent intent. The parties
engaged in formal marriage discussions, including horoscope matching, and
even entered into a police-mediated compromise in 2016, showing a genuine
intent to marry. The eventual failure to wed resulted from astrological
incompatibility ("manglik and non-manglik"), an external factor beyond the
applicant's control. Crucially, there is no evidence suggesting the applicant
never intended to fulfil his promise when it was made. This satisfies the first
condition that a promise must be proven false from inception to vitiate
consent, which the complainant has failed to establish.
45. Secondly, the complainant's prolonged voluntary participation in
the relationship undermines any claim that her consent was solely based on
the marriage promise. Medical evidence confirms the physical relationship
was consensual, with no signs of coercion. The complainant continued the
relationship even after the alleged compromise, suggesting her consent
stemmed from mutual affection rather than reliance on the promise.
46. As held in Dr. Dhruvaram Sonar, consent requires the promise to
be the exclusive reason for the sexual relationship - a link completely absent
here. The delayed allegations further weaken any claim of immediate
misconception, failing to satisfy this critical second condition for invalidating
consent under Section 375 IPC.
47. In this case, both conditions required to vitiate consent under
Section 375 IPC remain unfulfilled. The promise of marriage was neither
false at the outset nor the exclusive basis for the complainant's consent. Thus,
the allegations of rape under Section 376 IPC are unsustainable, and the
proceedings qualify for quashing to prevent abuse of the legal process.
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ORDER
In light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and for the
reasons discussed above, this Court is of the opinion that in the present case
no prima facie case has been made out about commission of an offence of
rape punishable under Section 376.
Considering the above legal precedents, this Court finds that
continuing the criminal proceedings against the applicant would result in a
gross miscarriage of justice. The applicant, subjected to unnecessary
litigation, has been compelled to seek legal recourse to prevent unwarranted
harassment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again cautioned
against the misuse of criminal law and has emphasised the duty of the courts
to ensure that frivolous prosecutions do not consume judicial time and
resources.
Accordingly, the C482 application is allowed. The entire
proceedings of Criminal Case No. 6808 of 2019, under Sections 376, 504 and
506 of IPC, along with Charge-sheet No.01, dated 17.08.2019, pending in the
Court of Judicial Magistrate, Haldwani, District Nainital, are quashed. No
order as to costs.
(Ashish Naithani J)
Dated:03.04.2025
NR/
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