Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 02.04.2025 vs State Of H.P. And Anr on 22 April, 2025
2025:HHC:10433
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 711 of 2023
Reserved on: 02.04.2025
Date of Decision: 22nd April 2025.
Shiv Singh and Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. and Anr. ...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Vijay Bir Singh, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 : Ms. Vandana Thakur, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 10 of 2019 dated 30.01.2019 registered at
Police Station Indora, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 354, 354-C, 504, 323 and 34 of
the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the victim (name being withheld to protect her
identity) had gone to her bathroom on 30.01.2019 at about 6 a.m.
The bathroom does not have a door and a bedsheet is hung in
place of the door. The petitioner started doing obscene acts after
standing near the bathroom. He also pelted stones towards the
bathroom. The informant got frightened and started screaming.
Her husband and her sisters-in-law ran towards the bathroom.
The informant narrated the incident to them. The informant’s
husband asked the petitioner/accused whether he did not have any
mother or sister at home. The petitioner abused the informant’s
husband and inflicted injury on him with some sharp edged
weapon. The petitioner-accused Anju Devi also came to the spot
after hearing the noise. She pushed the informant over the barbed
wire. She also gave beatings to the informant. The accused Shiv
Singh used to peep into the bathroom whenever the informant
used to go inside it on earlier occasions as well. The Police
registered the FIR, conducted the investigation, and filed a charge
sheet after the completion of the investigation before the learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, (learned Trial Court), Indora,
District Kangra, H.P.
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3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing
of the charge sheet, the petitioners have filed the present petition
asserting that petitioner No. 1 had filed a complaint against the
informant and other persons in Police Station, Indora, District
Kangra, H.P. asserting that the informant, her husband and her
son gave beatings to petitioner No.1 on 27.01.2019 when he was
sweeping his house. Petitioner No.1 sustained injury and he
reported the matter to the Police but the Police did not register
any FIR or any entry in the Daily Diary. The Police got the medical
examination of petitioner No.1 conducted on 27.01.2019 and
referred him to the expert opinion from the Radiologist. The
Police filed a complaint under Sections 107, 145 and 150 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Indora, District Kangra, H.P. The Investigating Officer
asked petitioner No.1 to give a fresh complaint, as per his own
version and sign the same. Subsequently, the Police registered an
FIR No.09/2019 dated 28.01.2019 for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 341, 325, 323, 504, 506 and 34 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station, Indora, District Kangra,
H.P. The informant filed a false complaint on 30.01.2019 against
the petitioners. The informant also made a statement under
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Section 164 of Cr.P.C. which is totally contradictory to the contents
of the FIR. Petitioner No.1 also filed a complaint on 29.11.2018
regarding the disposal of garbage and drainage of dirty water into
the residential area of petitioner No.2. Civil proceedings are
pending between petitioner No.1 and the informant and an interim
injunction was also issued by the competent Court. The present
FIR has been lodged to wreak vengeance upon the petitioners. The
ingredients of Section 354-C of IPC are not satisfied. The
continuation of the proceedings amounts to abuse of the process
of the Court; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the FIR be quashed.
4. The petition is opposed by respondent/State by filing a
reply making preliminary submissions regarding the lack of
maintainability, and the petitioners having not approached the
Court with clean hands. The contents of the petition were denied
on merits. However, it was admitted that the informant and
petitioner No.1 had reported the matter to the Police. It was
asserted that the Police conducted the investigation. There was an
apprehension of a quarrel between petitioner No.1 and the
informant. Hence, a complaint under Sections 107, 145 and 150 of
Cr.P.C. was prepared against the informant, her husband and her
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son. Petitioner No.1 submitted a complaint on 28.01.2019
regarding the wrongful restraint by the informant, her husband
and her son. The Police registered the FIR and conducted the
investigation. The Medical Officer certified the injury sustained by
petitioner No.1 as grievous. The Police filed a charge sheet before
the learned Trial Court and the petitioners have a remedy of
seeking their discharge, hence, it was prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
5. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and
affirming those of the petition was filed.
6. I have heard Mr Vijay Bir Singh, learned counsel for the
petitioners, Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General
for respondent No.1/State and Ms Vandana Thakur, learned
counsel for respondent No.2/informant.
7. Mr. Vijay Bir Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners
submitted that petitioner No.1 had sustained grievous injury on
27.01.2019. He reported the matter to the Police. The Police filed a
complaint under Sections 107, 145 and 150 of Cr.P.C. and also
registered an FIR No.09/2019 on 28.01.2019. The informant lodged
the FIR against the petitioners as a counter-blast to the FIR
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lodged by petitioner No.1. The continuation of the proceedings
amounts to abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and the
consequential proceedings be quashed.
8. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for
respondent No.1/State submitted that the Police conducted the
investigation into the FIRs lodged by petitioner No.1 and the
informant and filed separate charge sheets before the competent
Court. The petitioners have a remedy of seeking their discharge
before the learned Trial Court and this Court should not exercise
jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. when the learned Trial
Court is seized of the matter. The allegations in the FIR constitute
the commission of a cognizable offence, therefore, he prayed that
the present petition be dismissed.
9. Ms Vandana Thakur, learned counsel for respondent
No.2/informant adopted the submissions of Mr. Prashant Sen,
learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State and
submitted that petitioner No.1 had harassed the informant. He
used to watch her whenever she would go to the bathroom. He
inflicted injury upon the informant’s husband with a sharp-edged
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weapon. Petitioner No.2 gave beatings to the informant. These
allegations constitute the commission of a cognizable offence,
therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has
summarized some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
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2025:HHC:10433list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should
be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would
be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR
or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such
a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of
this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.
The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
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2025:HHC:10433within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting
the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial
Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the
following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been
filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the
legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv)
the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains
vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are
willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
13. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
14. The allegations in the FIR show that petitioner No.1
used to watch the informant whenever she would go to the
bathroom to urinate. This was a private moment for the informant
where she was not expected to be watched by any person. The act
of the petitioner watching the informant falls within the
definition of Voyeurism defined under Section 354-C of IPC. It was
wrongly contended in the petition that the offence of voyeurism
would be attracted only when the image of the woman is captured.
This offence is not only attracted when the image is captured but
by watching the woman as well and the submission that no
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offence punishable under Section 354-C of IPC is made out is not
acceptable.
15. The petitioners had given beatings to the informant
and her husband which prima facie attracts the provisions of
Section 323 read with Section 34 of IPC. The petitioners abused
and threatened the informant and her family members, hence the
offence punishable under Section 504 of IPC is also made out.
Petitioner No.1 had used criminal force to the victim with an
intent to outrage her modesty and the offence punishable under
Section 354 of IPC is made out. Thus, the allegations in the FIR
prima facie constitute the commission of cognizable offences.
16. It was submitted that the FIR is a counter-blast to the
complaints made by the petitioners against the informant and her
family members. It was filed with an intent to wreak vengeance
upon the petitioners. This submission will not help the
petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh 2023(6) SCC 559 that
when an investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed,
the question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was
observed:
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“78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information
is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in
respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material
collected during the investigation and evidence led in court
that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To
our mind, whether the first information report is the
outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance.
In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of
some prima facie worth, would pale into insignificance if
sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up
for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form
the basis for quashing the first information
report/complaint.
79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial
importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon
adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it
does not become vitiated on account of significant political
overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of
contradiction, that it is not in all cases in our country that
an individual, who is accused of acts of
omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but has
the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the
police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a
case (where a prosecution should have been but has not
been launched) the succeeding political dispensation
initiates steps for launching prosecution against such an
accused but he/she is allowed to go scot-free, despite there
being materials against him/her, merely on the ground that
the action initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the
sense that it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime
or to wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an
eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal
justice that would be the casualty. This is because it is
difficult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of
reading a first information report that the public servant is
either in or not in possession of property disproportionate
to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend
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on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is
complete. Needless to observe, the first information report
in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity,
prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that
there is fair enough reason to suspect the commission of a
cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct”
punishable under the PC Act and to embark upon an
investigation.”
17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a
complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to
enmity. It was observed:
“30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by
reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for
quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by
Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1
SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a
criminal prosecution if otherwise justified and based upon
adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of
mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or
complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in
Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there
was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To
quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh
(1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is of the fulfilment of
a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is
not legicidal.”
Xxxx
39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot
be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has
been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false
complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political
opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify
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interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the
criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of
retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts
alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal case cannot be
ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an
offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations
are true or untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. In
the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the
Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations
in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is
patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not
disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is
not such a case which should be quashed at the inception
itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly
dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.”
18. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the
ground of enmity. Moreover, enmity is a double-edged weapon –
while it furnishes the motive for false implication, it also
furnishes a motive for the commission of the crime; therefore, the
submission that F.I.R. has to be quashed due to the enmity cannot
be accepted.
19. It was submitted that there are discrepancies in the
contents of the FIR and the statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C.
The allegations made in the FIR are false. This submission will not
help the petitioners. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position
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was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 643 wherein it was held: –
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of
the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face
value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make
out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in
the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint
even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the
commission of an offence or make out a case against the
accused. We are of the considered view that the present case
would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated
by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court
in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that
once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit
in this submission, keeping in mind the position of
this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj
A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC
59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the
question of whether the High Court could entertain
the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the
charge-sheet was filed by the police during the
pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC
p. 63, para 16)
16
2025:HHC:10433“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various
sections under which the appellant is being
charged and is to be prosecuted would show that
the same is not made out even prima facie from
the complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge sheet
had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph
Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj
365] could have still examined whether the
offences alleged to have been committed by the
appellant were prima facie made out from the
complainant’s FIR, charge-sheet, documents,
etc. or not.”
20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court while exercising
jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC cannot conduct a mini-
trial. It was observed at page 397:
“17. This Court in a series of judgments has held that while
exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not
supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be
made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan
Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The
relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
“6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the
Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the
powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether
any sufficient material is available to proceed further
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2025:HHC:10433against the accused for which the accused is required to
be tried or not’.”
21. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the
truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.
22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal
v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when
the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left
to appreciate the same. It was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready
to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do
not inspire any confidence particularly in the absence of any
specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the
view that the appellants should prefer a discharge
application before the trial court under Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even
according to the State, the investigation is over and the
charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court.
In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to
look into the materials which the investigating officer
might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If
any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall
look into the materials and take a call whether any
discharge case is made out or not.”
23. In the present case, the charge sheet has been filed and
the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. Therefore, the
learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the matter.
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24. It was submitted that the petitioners had sustained
grievous injuries and it was not possible for him to do the acts
attributed to him in the FIR. This submission is not acceptable. A
CT Scan of the brain showed a linear fracture of the lateral wall of
the right maxillary sinus and mild soft tissue swelling over the
right mid-parietal region. Therefore, petitioner No.1 had not
sustained any injury which would have prevented him from doing
his normal activity. Hence, the submission that petitioner No.1
was unable to do the acts attributed to him in the FIR is not
acceptable.
25. No other point was urged.
26. In view of the above, the present petition is dismissed,
so also the pending miscellaneous application(s) if any.
27. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on
the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
22 April,2025
nd
Judge
(Rupsi)
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