Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 01.04.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors on 22 April, 2025
2025:HHC:10463
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 426 of 2025
Reserved on: 01.04.2025
Date of Decision: 22nd April 2025.
Suresh Mahajan ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Vikas Rathore, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State. : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
cancellation of the bail granted by learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Nurpur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) to respondents No.2 and 3
in Case No. 243/2024. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a
businessman. The respondents Nos. 2 and 3 lodged an FIR No.326
of 2017 dated 22.10.2017 against the petitioner for the commission
of offences punishable under Sections 420 and 506 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The matter was
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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compromised, and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 agreed to pay
₹1,80,00,000/- as consideration for the property to the petitioner.
A cancellation report was filed before the Court. Subsequently, the
amount was not paid, and the petitioner lodged FIR No. 206 of 2021
and FIR No. 12/2022 against the respondents. Respondents Nos. 2
and 3 also filed a petition before this Court, which was registered as
Cr.MMO No. 677 of 2023. The petition was dismissed by this Court
on October 25, 2024. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed a petition for
granting pre-arrest bail, which was allowed, and the learned Trial
Court granted interim bail to the respondents on 03.12.2024, which
was confirmed on 11.12.2024. The learned Trial Court did not notice
the gravity of the offence. Signatures of the petitioner, his wife, his
son and his brother were forged by respondents Nos 2 and 3. This
aspect was ignored by the learned Trial Court; therefore, it was
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted to
respondents nos. 2 & 3 be cancelled.
2. I have heard Mr. Vikas Rathore, learned counsel for the
petitioner, who has submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in
granting bail to respondents No.2 and 3 without considering the
gravity of the offence. The bail was granted hurriedly. The learned
Trial Court held that the investigation was almost complete and
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respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were not required by the police for
interrogation. However, the report of FSL is awaited, and the
investigation cannot be said to be complete; hence, he prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the bail granted to respondents
Nos. 2 and 3 be cancelled.
3. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State submitted that the State has not
filed any petition for cancellation of the bail, and this Court may
pass any appropriate order in the facts and circumstances of the
case.
4. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Ajwar v. Waseem
(2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974 that the bail, once
granted, should not be cancelled mechanically; however, an
unreasoned and perverse order is open to interference by the
Superior Court. The bail can be cancelled if there are serious
allegations against the accused. It was observed at page 783:
“Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted
in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court
4
2025:HHC:10463must consider relevant factors like the nature of the
accusations made against the accused, the manner in which
the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of
the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of
the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are
released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being
unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of
obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice
and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail.
[Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P.,
(2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra
Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh
Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri)
1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009)
14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16
SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 558] .]
27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not
to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an
unreasoned or perverse bail order is always open to
interference by the superior court. If there are serious
allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused
the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the
same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked
by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have
ignored the relevant material available on record or not
looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on
society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of
M.P. [P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-
judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima
Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh
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with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an
accused under Section 439(1)CrPC in the following words :
(SCC p. 224, para 24)
“24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for
cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider
whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or
the conduct of the accused post grant of bail
demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair
trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying
the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of
Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it
differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court
would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by
the court below granting bail, but if such an order is
found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material
that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to
scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.”
Considerations for Setting Aside Bail Orders
28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court
for setting aside the bail order on an application being
moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening
circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief
to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any
attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting
in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended
to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the
accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may
add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive.
However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of
granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined,
and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that
may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided.
Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors
that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to
the accused.
29. In Jagjeet Singh [Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9
SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560], a three-judge Bench of this
6
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Court has observed that the power to grant bail under
Section 439CrPC is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a
Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with
considerable discretion while deciding a bail application. But
this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must
reflect the due application of the judicial mind following
well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course,
courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail
has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that
such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly
irrelevant material, the appellate court would be well within
its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also
refer: Puran v. Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338:
2001 SCC (Cri) 1124]; Narendra K. Amin v. State of
Gujarat [Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 13 SCC
584: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813].)
6. Similar is the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Manik Madhukar versus Vitthal Damuji Meher and Ors. 2024:
INSC:636 wherein it was observed as under: –
“19. Courts, while granting bail, are required to consider
relevant factors such as the nature of the accusation, the role
ascribed to the accused concerned, possibilities/chances of
tampering with the evidence and/or witnesses, antecedents,
flight risk, et al. Speaking through Hima Kohli, J., the present
coram in Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, apropos
relevant parameters for granting bail, observed:
“26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal
offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the
nature of the accusations made against the accused, the
manner in which the crime is alleged to have been
committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to
the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the
probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the
offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of
7
2025:HHC:10463the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the
possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the
courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the
accused on bail. (Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7
SCC 525; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias
Pappu Yadav (supra) (2004) 7 SCC 528; Masroor v. State of
Uttar Pradesh (2009) 14 SCC 286; Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496; Neeru
Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil
Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129;
Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia (supra) (2020) 2 SCC 118.
27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not
to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an
unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to
interference by the Superior Court. If there are serious
allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused
the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the
same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked
by a Superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have
ignored the relevant material available on record or not
looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society,
resulting in such an order. In P v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (supra) (2022), 15 SCR 211 decided by a three-
judge bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima
Kohli, J)] has spelt out the considerations that must be
weighed with the Court for interfering in an order
granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) of
the CrPC in the following words:
“24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for
cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider
whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or
the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates
that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him
to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail
during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1
SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in
ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to
interfere with an order passed by the court below granting
8
2025:HHC:10463bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse
or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an
order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the
appellate court.” (emphasis supplied)
20. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1085, speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah,
J.), the Court, while setting aside an order of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail, discussed
and reasoned:
“7. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is
warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide
the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra
Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta
Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496, the
relevant principles were restated thus:
‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
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(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
the grant of bail.’
8. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia (2020) 2 SCC 118,
this Court opined as under:
’16. The considerations that guide the power of an
appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order
granting bail stand on a different footing from an
assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail.
The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the
anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary
exercise of discretion in the grant of bail. The test is
whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or
unjustified. On the other hand, an application for
cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of
the existence of supervening circumstances or violations
of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has
been granted. …’
9. In Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak, 2023
INSC 761, this Court, in view of Dolat Ram v. State of
Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Kashmira Singh v. Duman
Singh, (1996) 4 SCC 693 and X v. State of Telangana, (2018)
16 SCC 511, held as follows:
’13. It is also required to be borne in mind that when a
prayer is made for the cancellation of the grant of bail,
cogent and overwhelming circumstances must be present,
and bail, once granted, cannot be cancelled in a
mechanical manner without considering whether any
supervening circumstances have rendered it in conducing
to allow fair trial. This proposition draws support from the
Judgment of this Court in Daulat Ram v. State of
Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349, Kashmira Singh v. Duman
Singh (1996) 4 SCC 693 and XXX v. State of
Telangana (2018) 16 SCC 511.’
10. In XXX v. Union Territory of Andaman & Nicobar
Islands, 2023 INSC 767, this Court noted that the principles
10
2025:HHC:10463in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra) stood reiterated in Jagjeet
Singh v. Ashish Mishra (2022) 9 SCC 321.
11. The contours of anticipatory bail have been
elaborately dealt with by 5-Judge Benches in Gurbaksh
Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
565 and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5
SCC 1. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 is worthy of mention in this
context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila
Aggarwal (supra). We are cognizant that liberty is not to be
interfered with easily. More so when an order of pre-arrest
bail already stands granted by the High Court.
12. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be
exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by
this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative and
not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on its
own facts and merits.” (emphasis supplied)
21. In Ajwar (supra), this Court also examined the
considerations for setting aside bail orders in terms below:
“28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate Court
for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved
by the aggrieved party include any supervening
circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to
the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any
attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting
in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended
to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the
accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may
add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive.
However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of
granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined,
and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that
may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided.
Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors
that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to
the accused.
11
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29. In Jagjeet Singh (supra) (2022) 9 SCC 321, a three-
judge bench of this Court has observed that the power to
grant bail under Section 439 Cr. P.C. is of wide amplitude and
the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is
bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding an
application for bail. But this discretion is not unfettered. The
order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial
mind following well-established principles of law. In
the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with
the order where bail has been granted by the courts below.
But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or
based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate Court
would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the
bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Ram Bilas (2001) 6 SCC 338;
Narendra K. Amin (Dr.) v. State of Gujarat (2008) 13 SCC
584)” (emphasis supplied)
7. A similar view was taken in Kailash Kumar versus State of
H.P., in Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2025 decided on 20.02.2025 (SC)
wherein it was observed:
“10. The decision of this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem and Anr.
(2024) 10 SCC 768, relied on by the High Court, has been
perused. In terms of such decision, while seized of an
application for cancellation/revocation of bail, the
considerations (illustrative, not exhaustive) which ought to
weigh with the courts are whether: (i) the accused has
misused the concession of liberty; (ii) he has been delaying
the trial; (iii) he has been influencing/threatening the
witnesses; (iv) he has been tampering evidence in any
manner; and (v) there has been any supervening
circumstance after grant of bail warranting a relook. The
decision also lays down that orders granting bail could be
interfered with if the same is found to be perverse or illegal in
the sense that the Court’s conscience is shocked or
extraneous material has been considered.”
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8. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
9. The allegations in the FIR show that the disputes are
pending between the parties, which were compromised. When the
terms of the compromise were not honoured, the present FIR was
registered. As per the petitioner, his signatures, and the signatures
of his wife, son and brother were forged. The police have already
sent the signatures for comparison, and the report from FSL is
awaited. The petitioner cannot tamper with the report of the FSL;
therefore, releasing respondents No.2 and 3 on bail will not affect
the investigation adversely. Hence, the submission that granting
bail to the petitioner during the investigation will affect the
investigation adversely is not acceptable.
10. There is no allegation in the petition that the petitioner
had misused the liberty extended to them by the learned Trial
Court. Therefore, the bail cannot be cancelled due to the
supervening circumstance.
11. It was submitted that the order passed by the learned
Trial Court is not detailed and does not contain any reason. It is
true that the order dated 11.12.2024 does not contain any reason,
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but it confirms the order dated 03.12.2024, which is not brought on
record; therefore, it cannot be said that the bail is liable to be
cancelled because of inadequate reasons assigned in the order
granting the bail.
12. It was submitted that the offences are heinous and the
learned Trial Court erred in granting bail. This is not acceptable.
The allegations pertain to cheating and forgery, which are triable
by a Magistrate and cannot be said to be heinous.
13. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the
discretion exercised by the learned Trial Court while granting the
bail.
14. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is
dismissed.
15. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case’s merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
22 April 2025
nd
Judge
(Saurav Pathania)
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