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Telangana High Court
Mudavath Ramesh vs The State Of Telangana, on 21 April, 2025
Author: K. Lakshman
Bench: K.Lakshman
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN
CRIMINAL PETITION No.641 OF 2025
ORDER:
Heard Sri R. Prashanth, learned counsel for the petitioners,
and Ms. Shalini Saxena, learned counsel representing Sri Palle
Nageshwar Rao, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for
respondents.
2. This criminal petition is filed under Section 528 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNSS’) to
set aside the remand docket orders both dated 09.01.2025 in
Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 of P.S.Bomraspet, pertaining to the
same incident which is the subject matter of FIR No.153 of 2024 of
P.S. Bomraspet, passed by the II Additional Special Judge for Trial
of SPE &ACB Cases -cum – Special Judge for Trial of Cases filed
Under PDPP Act, Hyderabad (for short, ‘the trial Court’) and
consequently quash the proceedings in the above said crimes.
3. Vide the aforesaid remand orders, the trial Court
remanded the petitioners herein to judicial custody till 23.01.2025
in Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024.
2
4.The particulars of the date, place and time of incident,
offences which are relevant and the same are extracted below:-
Cr. Name of the Place of the Time of Offences
No. complainant incident the
& incident
Designation
153/ N.Srinivasa Anjaneya 12.20 under Sections 61 (2),
2024 Reddy, Temple, PM 191(2), 191(3) 132,109,
Sub Primary 121(1), 126(2), 324 (4) read
Divisional School, with 190 BNS, Section 3 of
Police Lagcherla PDPPA
Officer,
Vikarabad
154/ Karra Kishan Hanuman Not under Sections 191(2),
2024 MRO, temple, specific 191(3) 132,109, 121(1),
Dudyal Lagicherla ally 126(2), 324 (4) read with
mentio 190 BNS, Section 3 of
ned in PDPPA
the
complai
nt
155/ District Chellapuram 12.20 under Sections 191(2),
2024 Crime Venkataiah's PM 191(3) 132,109, 121(1),
Report residence, 126(2), 324 (4) read with
Bureau, Lagcherla 190 BNS, Section 3 of
(DCRB) PDPPA
DSP,
Vikarabad
5. The petitioners herein are A.32, A.68, A.69 and A.70 in
Cr.No.153 of 2024.
6. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners
are as follows:-
i. The proceedings are maliciously instituted with an intention
to implicate the petitioners in the present crimes. Therefore,
3continuation of proceedings against the petitioners in the
aforesaid crimes is an abuse of process of law.
ii. The police completed material part of the investigation and
all material witnesses were examined as such there will be
no apprehension of tampering with the evidence.
iii. The petitioners attended the public hearing to express their
grievance relating to the proposed land acquisition
proceedings but not involved in the alleged incident as such
no such motive could be attributed to the petitioners.
iv. The prosecution failed to show that the petitioners herein
had shared a common object with other Members of the
alleged unlawful assembly.
v. The date of incident, place of incident etc., are same. Basing
on the same incident, the police cannot register the aforesaid
three crimes against the petitioner herein.
vi. The allegation against the petitioners herein is conspiracy.
vii. The allegations leveled against the petitioners in all three
crimes are one and the same and therefore, registration of the
4other two crimes i.e. Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024 is illegal
and they are liable to be quashed.
viii. Reliance is placed on the principle laid down in
Akbaruddin Owaisi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 1, Smt.
K.Mathamma vs. State of Telangana 2.
With the said submissions, he sought to quash the Cr.Nos.154 and
155 of 2024.
7. Whereas, learned Public Prosecutor would contend that
the allegations leveled against the petitioners in the aforesaid three
crimes are different. Place of incident is different. Victims and
accused are different. Even the offences are also different. There is
no political motive. The petitioners have attacked the District
Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials, who went to
the spot for the purpose of conducting public hearing. They have
formed into unlawful assembly and attacked the said Special
Officer, KADA with deadly weapons. Investigation is at the
threshold. Quashing of the three crimes at the threshold is
impermissible as per the principle laid down by the Apex Court
1
2013 (6) ALT 101
2
2022 (1)ALT (Crl) 12 (T.S.)
5
and this Court in Crl.P.Nos.1232 of 2022 and batch vide order
dated 29.04.2022. He has placed reliance on the principle laid
down in TT Antony vs. State of Kerala 3 and Jacob John vs.
State of Manipur4 and common order dated 29.04.2022 in
Crl.P.No.1232 of 2022.
8. Perusal of the aforesaid complaints in Cr.Nos.153, 154
and 155 of 2024 pending on the file of Bomraspet Police Station,
would reveal that the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA
and other officials went to the outskirts of Lagcherla Village for the
purpose of conducting public hearing with regard to establishment
of Pharma Company. Villagers and other stakeholders were not
found to participate in the public hearing. A.2 informed the District
Collector and other officials stating that nobody will come to the
said place of meeting and they have to conduct public hearing at
Lagcherla village. They can hold gramsabha in the village.
Thereafter, the District Collector and other officials believed his
version bonafidely and went to Lagcherla village in his car bearing
3
(2001) 6 SCC 181
4
(2020) Supreme (Manipur) 176
6
No.TS 07 EV 2929. Other officials including defacto-complainants
in all the said crimes followed them to the village.
9. It is further alleged that in Lagcherla village, the people of
Lagchrela, Rotibanda Thanda and Pulicherlakunta Thanda formed
themselves into an unlawful assembly with stones, sticks and Chili
powder. At about 12.20 hours, when all the officials including the
Collector reached Lagcherla village, accused and others raised
slogans against the District Collector saying that ‘go back Pharma’.
They have also obstructed the Collector’s vehicle and also Special
Officer, KADA. They have attacked the Collector. They have also
attacked the defacto-complainants in all the aforesaid crimes with
stones, sticks and chilli powder. They have also damaged
Collector’s vehicle. When Special Officer, KADA tried to
convince the accused and other people, they have attacked him. In
the said attack, he received injuries on the left hand and back side
of his neck and right leg etc. He has saved himself, otherwise they
would have killed him. Thus, all the accused formed into unlawful
assembly, tried to kill the Collector, Special Officer, KADA and
other officials for conducting public hearing.
7
10. In all the aforesaid three complaints, there is no
allegation against the petitioners herein that the petitioners
conspired with other accused and attacked the District Collector,
Special Officer, KADA and other officials who came to Lagcherla
village for conducting public hearing. In the remand report, there
is an allegation of conspiracy against the petitioners herein. A.32
and A.68 were arrested on 05.12.2024, A.69 was arrested on
16.11.2024 and A.70 was arrested on 22.11.2024. They were also
accused in Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024. Basing on the statements
recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. of L.Ws.4 and 5, and on the
confession made by the petitioners herein, the aforesaid crimes
were registered against the petitioners herein. In all the aforesaid
three complaints, the date of incident is 11.11.2024 and time of
incident is around 12.20 P.M.
11. In all the three complaints in the aforesaid three crimes,
it is specifically alleged about forming of unlawful assembly by the
accused, attacking the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA
and other officials who came to Lagcherla village for the purpose
of conducting public hearing. They have also raised slogans ‘go
8
back Pharma’. They are opposing establishment of Pharma
Company in the said village and also opposing the public hearing.
They have attacked the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA
and damaged their vehicles. Special Officer, KADA received
injuries.
12. As discussed supra, learned counsel for the petitioners
contended that the allegations in all the aforesaid complaints is one
and the same. Therefore, the Police, Bomraspet Police Station
cannot register crimes vide Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024 on the
very same allegations. It is contrary to the procedure laid down in
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ( for short, ‘BNSS’) and
also principle laid down by the Apex Court and this Court in catena
of decisions.
13. In the light of the said discussion, it is relevant to note
that in TT Antony (supra), the Apex Court had an occasion to deal
with the registration of multiple F.I.Rs. In paragraph No.24, the
Apex Court held that there can be no second FIR and consequently
there could be no fresh investigation in receipt of every subsequent
information in respect of the same cognizable offence or some
9
occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable
offences. It was further held that only the information about the
commission of cognizable offence(s), which is first entered in the
Station House Diary by the Officer In-Charge of the Police Station,
can be regarded as First Information Report under Section 154 of
Cr.P.C; on subsequent information, the same offence will be
covered by Section 162 of Cr.P.C.
14. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are
extracted below:-
A just balance between the fundamental rights of the
citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the
expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable
offence has to be struck by the Court. There cannot be any
controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C.
empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain
further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a
further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narangs’ case
(supra) it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate
to conduct further investigation with the permission of the
Court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not
warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by
the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or
more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive
FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under
Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. It would clearly be beyond the purview
10of Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C. nay, a case of abuse of the
statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a
case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive
FIRs, not being a counter case, filed in connection with the
same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been
committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect
of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is
underway or final report under Section 173(2) has been
forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of
power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226/227 of
the Constitution.
15. Relying on the said judgment, in Akbaruddin Owaisi
(supra), this Court held that the sweeping power of investigation
does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to a fresh
investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving
rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of
successive, FIRs, whether before or after filing the final report
under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. the Court, observed that case of fresh
investigation based on the consequent or successive FIRs not being
counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected
cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of
the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first
FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section
11
173 (2) of Cr.P.C. has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be fit
case for exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under
Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
16. In Upkar Singh (supra), the Apex Court clarifying the
principle laid down by it in TT Antony (supra), held that any
further complaint by the same complainant or others against the
same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited
under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have
already started and further complaint against the same accused will
amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original
complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code.
17. In Babu Bai vs. State of Gujarat 5, in paragraph No.21,
the Apex Court held as follows:-
“21. In such a case the court has to examine the facts and
circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of
sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the
FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same
occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two
or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is in
the affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed.
However, in case the contrary is proved, where the version5
(2010) 12 SCC 254
12in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the
two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is
permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the
accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different
version or counterclaim, investigation on both the FIRs
has to be conducted.”
This Court held that the relevant enquiry is whether two or
more FIRs relate to the same incident or relate to
incidents which form part of the same transactions. If the
Court were to conclude in the affirmative, the subsequent
FIRs are liable to be quashed. However, where the
subsequent FIR relates to different incidents or crimes or
is in the form of a counter-claim, investigation may
proceed. [See also in this context ChirraShivraj v. State of
A.P. [ChirraShivraj v. State of A.P., (2010) 14 SCC 444 :
(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 757] and Chirag M. Pathak v.
Dollyben Kantilal Patel [Chirag M. Pathak v. Dollyben
Kantilal Patel, (2018) 1 SCC 330 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri)
369]
18. In Anju Chaudhary vs. State of UP 6, the Apex Court had
an occasion to deal with the concept of registration of second FIR
at length. In paragraph No.14, the Apex Court held as follows:
14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections
154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that
there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the6
2013 (6) SCC 384
13opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to
commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced to writing by the
officer in-charge of a Police Station. This implies that there has to be the
first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable
offence. The purpose of registering of an FIR is to set the machinery of
criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the
police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be
appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs
registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate;
offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is
of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the
FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most
important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the
legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These
safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double
jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power
by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for
the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the Investigating
Agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in
accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon
completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging
commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court
of competent jurisdiction attains a kind of finality as far as police is
concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further
investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a
person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or
otherwise, reexamination by the investigating agency on its own should
not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the
same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then
possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the Police cannot be
14
ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such interpretation should
be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it would not only further the
object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the
backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, re-
investigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not
only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate.
The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it would be
opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167(2)
of the Code. [Ref. Rita Nag v. State of West Bengal [(2009) 9 SCC 129]
and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak & Ors. (SLP (Crl) No.9185-
9186 of 2009 of the same date).
19. In Kari Chowdhary vs. Sita Devi7, in paragraph No.11,
the Apex Court held as follows:-
“11. Learned counsel adopted an alternative contention that once
the proceedings initiated under FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the
police had no authority to register a second FIR and number it as FIR
No. 208. Of course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs
against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are
rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take
the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under
both of them by the same investigating agency. Even that apart, the
report submitted to the court styling it as FIR No. 208 of 1998 need be
considered as an information submitted to the court regarding the new
discovery made by the police during investigation that persons not
named in FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To quash the said
proceedings merely on the ground that final report had been laid in FIR
No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The ultimate object of every7
2002 (1) SCC 714
15investigation is to find out whether the offences alleged have been
committed and, if so, who have committed it.”
(Emphasis supplied).
20. On consideration of the said principles laid down in the
said judgments, in the State of Rajasthan vs. Surender Singh
Rathore 8, the Apex Court laid down the following principles with
regard to the permissibility of registration of second FIR:-
9. From the above conspectus of judgments, inter alia, the following
principles emerge regarding the permissibility of the registration of a
second FIR:
9.1 When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival
version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR already
stands registered.
9.2 When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they
may arise from the same set of circumstances.
9.3 When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier FIR or
set of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy.
9.4 When investigation and/or persons related to the incident bring to
the light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances.
9.5 Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different.
21. On examination of the facts of the said case wherein the
first FIR refers to a particular incident, action taken therein was
limited, the second FIR pertains to the larger issue of widespread
corruption in the concerned department and, therefore, is much
8
2025 Law Suit (SC) 249
16
larger in its scope than the previous FIR. On consideration of the
said facts, the Apex Court held that two incidents are different and
distinct. Therefore, registration of second FIR is permissible.
22. In Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs Union Of India9, the
Apex Court, on examination of the facts therein, more particularly,
registration of multiple F.I.Rs against the petitioner therein, based
on TV show aired on a particular day i.e. 21.04.2020, the facts
mentioned in all the F.I.Rs. was the same, TV show and that it was
held that no subsequent FIR can be registered in respect of same
incident arising out of the same occurrence or incident.
23. In Krishna Lal Chawla vs. State of UP 10, the Apex
Court reiterated the principle laid down in TT Antony (supra), and
Upkar Singh (Supra) and held as follows:
7. This Court in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved
Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] has
clearly stated that any further complaint by the same
complainant against the same accused, after the case has
already been registered, will be deemed to be an
improvement from the original complaint.
Though Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash,
9
AIR 2020 SC 2386
10
AIR 2021 SC 1381
17
(2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] was rendered
in the context of a case involving cognizable offences,
the same principle would also apply where a person gives
information of a non-cognizable offence and
subsequently lodges a private complaint with respect to
the same offence against the same accused person. Even
in a non-cognizable case, the police officer after the order
of the Magistrate, is empowered to investigate the offence
in the same manner as a cognizable case, except the power
to arrest without a warrant. Therefore, the complainant
cannot subject the accused to a double whammy of
investigation by the police and inquiry before the
Magistrate.
24. In C. Muniappan (Supra), the Apex Court held that two
or more crimes can be clubbed if the circumstances and facts
indicate that the second crime was connected or was a result of the
first crime. The relevant portion is extracted below:
37. The submission on behalf of the appellants that two
crimes bearing Nos. 188 and 190 of 2000 could not be
clubbed together, has also no merit for the simple reason
that if the cases are considered, keeping in view the
totality of the circumstances and the sequence in which the
two incidents occurred, taking into consideration the
evidence of drivers and conductors/cleaners of the vehicles
involved in the first incident and the evidence of C.
Ramasundaram, VAO (PW 87), we reach the inescapable
18conclusion that the second occurrence was nothing but
a fall out of the first occurrence. The damage caused to
the public transport vehicles and the consequential burning
of the University bus remained part of one and the same
incident. Merely because two separate complaints had
been lodged, did not mean that they could not be clubbed
together and one charge-sheet could not be filed (see T.T.
Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC
(Cri) 1048] ).
25. The decisions in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (Supra)
and Yanob Sheikh (Supra) relied upon by the Petitioners herein
also reiterate that multiple FIRs relating to the same transaction
and between same parties are not maintainable.
. 26. In Akbaruddin Owaisi (supra), this Court held that
multiple FIRs cannot be registered if the offences relate to the same
incident and arise out of same circumstances. The Court therein
discussed the test of sameness to be applied while deciding
whether the subsequent FIRs are maintainable. The Court held as
follows:
39. Let us now briefly refer to the tests which should,
ordinarily, be applied to determine whether or not the two
FIRs under consideration relate to the same
incident/transaction. The law recognizes a common trial
19or a common FIR being registered for one series of acts
so connected together as to form the same transaction as
contemplated under Section 220 Cr.P.C. The expression
‘same transaction’, from its very nature, is incapable of
exact definition. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ
776); Mohan Baitha v. State of Bihar57.). The distinction
between two FIRs relating to the same incident, and two
FIRs relating to different incidents or occurrences of the
same incident, should be carefully examined. (Babubhai)
: 2010 AIR SCW 5126. The merits of each case must be
considered to determine whether a subsequently
registered FIR is a second FIR relating to the same
incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different
facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different
or not. It will not be appropriate for the Court to lay down
one straight jacket formula uniformly applicable to all
cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and
fact depending on the merits of a given case. (Anju
Chaudhary.). The test, to determine whether two FIRs
can be permitted to exist, is whether the two incidents are
identical or not. (Ram Lal Narang, (1979 Cri LJ 1346)).
40. The concept of “sameness” has been given a
restricted meaning. In order to examine the impact of
one or more FIRs. the Court has to rationalise the facts
and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of
‘sameness’ to find out whether both FIRs relate to the
same incident and to the same occurrence; and whether
20they are in regard to incidents which are two or more
parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two
distinct occurrences.It is only if the second FIR relates to
the same cause of action, the same incident, there is
sameness of occurrence and an attempt has been made to
improvise the case, would the second FIR be liable to be
quashed. In cases where every FIR has a different
spectrum, and the allegations made are distinct and
separate, it may be regarded as a counter complaint, but it
cannot be stated that an effort has been made to improve
the allegations that find place in the first FIR or that the
principle of “sameness” is attracted. (Babubhai, (2010 AIR
SCW 5126); Surendra Kaushik v. State of Uttar Pradesh-
2013 CrlLJ 1570).
41. It is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal
application to determine whether two or more acts
constitute the same transaction. They are to be gathered
from the circumstances of a given case indicating
proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity
of action, commonality of purpose or design. For several
offences to be part of the same transaction, the test to be
applied is whether they are so related to one another in
point of purpose or of cause and effect or as principal and
subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Where
there is commonality of purpose or design, where there is
a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can
be accused of the same or different offences “committed in
21
the course of the same transaction”. Where two incidents
are of different times with involvement of different
persons, there is no commonality, the purpose thereof is
different, they emerge from different circumstances, and
would not form part of the same transaction. (Anju
Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ 776)).
27. In Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy vs. The State of
Telangana 11, this Court discussed various decisions held that in
following cases multiple FIRs are maintainable:
20. The sum and substance of the above said judgments
is that there is no embargo for registration of two FIRs
on the following circumstances/grounds:
(a) where the allegations made in both the FIRs are from
different spectrum, where there are different versions
from different persons;
(b) same set of facts may constitute different offences;
(c) where there are two distinct offences having different
ingredients;
(d) where the allegations are different and distinct;
(e) when there are rival versions in respect of same
episode, they would normally take shape of two different
FIRs and investigation can be carried out under both of
them by the same Investigating Agency.
11
2021(2) ALT (Crl) 171 (TS)
22
The decision in Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy (Supra) was
subsequently followed by this Court in K. Mathamma (Supra).
28. Relying on the said principles, this Court in
Crl.P.No.1232 of 2022 held that registration of multiple FIRs is
impermissible, if they relate to the occurrence of same incident,
involve same parties and arise out of the same cause of action.
Registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible even in cases of
different incidents if such incidents form part of the same
transaction. In other words, if the subsequent offence alleged in the
subsequent FIR is connected with the first FIR or is the
consequence of the first FIR, such subsequent FIR is not
maintainable. The courts before reaching a conclusion that the
subsequent FIRs are not maintainable, shall see if the alleged
incidents or offences are identical or not and whether any
commonality between the accused and the complainant exists.
Further, registration of subsequent FIRs are impermissible if they
are filed only to improve the case of the prosecution or fill up the
lacunae in the earlier complaint.
23
29. In Sreekumar vs. State of Kerala 12, the Apex Court
held that where the subsequent FIR was registered on different set
of allegations by a different person, the said FIR is maintainable.
30. In Jakir Hussain Kosangi vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh 13 Division Bench of this Court discussed various
decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with multiple registration
of crimes. The Court held that where similar offences involving
various victims are committed, each of such offence involves an
independent cause of action. Further, registration of FIRs by
multiple victims cannot be prohibited simply because the nature of
allegations are the same as each offence arises out of an
independent cause of action.
31. In Jacob John (supra), wherein two complaints were
registered against the accused i.e. one in Ukhrul Police Station, and
the other is by Mansarovar Police Station, Jaipur city. The offences
alleged against the petitioner therein are punishable under Sections
370 (5), 376, 34 of IPC and Section 6/2010 of the POCSO, 2012.
On examination of the facts therein, Manipur High Court at Imphal
12
(2018) 4 SCC 579
13
2017(5) ALT 342
24
held that successive FIRs for the same incident are permissible if
they pertain to different incidents/crimes. The seriousness of the
offences and their societal impact, shall also be considered and the
accused must face trial in two different places.
32. In the light of the said principle, coming to the facts of
the present case, as discussed supra, the incident is one and the
same which took place on 11.11.2024. All the accused are
common. On the complaint lodged by 7th respondent i.e. Sub
Divisional Police Officer, Vikarabad, Bomraspet Police, registered
a case in Cr.No.153 of 2024 for the offences punishable under
Sections 61 (2), 191(2), 191(3) 132,109, 121(1), 126(2), 324 (4)
read with 190 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short ‘BNS’), Section
3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 ( for
short, ‘PDPPA’). The Police, Bomraspet, received a complaint
from 7th respondent at 14.00 hours on 11.11.2024 and they have
registered the aforesaid crime at 14.00 hours. Admittedly, except
the name of the 2nd petitioner, names of the other petitioners are not
there in the said complaint dated 11.11.2024 of 7th respondent.
25
33. On the complaint lodged by 2nd respondent – the MRO,
the very same police, registered a case in Cr.No.154 of 2024
against the accused for the offences punishable under Section
191(2), 191(3) 132,109, 121(1), 126(2), 324 (4) read with 190
BNS, Section 3 of PDPPA. The said complaint was received by the
Police, Bomraspet Police Station at 15.00 hours on 11.11.2024 and
they have registered the said crime at 15.00 hours.
34. On the complaint lodged by 3rd respondent, the very
same police, registered a case in Cr.No.155 of 2024 at 16.00 hours
for the offences under Section 191(2), 191(3) 132,109, 121(1),
126(2), 324 (4) read with 190 BNS, Section 3 of PDPPA .
35. In Cr.No.153 of 2024, the place of incident is mentioned
as near Anjaneya Swamy temple, Lagcherla village. Time of
incident is 12.20 p.m. In the complaint in Cr.No.154 of 2024, place
of incident is mentioned as Anjaneyaswamy temple, Lagcherla
village. In the complaint in Cr.No.155 of 2024, the place of
incident is mentioned as Chellapuram Venkataiah’s residence. As
discussed supra, Cr.No.153 of 2024, Cr.No.154 of 2024 and
26
Cr.No.155 of 2024 were registered at 14.00, 15.00 and 16.00 hours.
by the Police, Bomraspet Police Station on the complaints lodged
by respondent Nos.7 to 9.
36. It is also relevant to note that the scribe of all the three
complaints is one and the same. Complainant in Cr.No.153 of 2024
is Sub Divisional Officer, respondent No.2 is Mandal Revenue
Officer, respondent No.3 is also a DCRB, DSP, who are highly
educated and responsible officers. Instead of preparing complaints
on their own by mentioning the incident specifically, they have
signed on the written complaint prepared by Writer of Bomraspet
Police Station. The only explanation offered by Smt. Shalini
Saxena, learned counsel representing learned Public Prosecutor
with regard to the same is that there was attack on the District
Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials and situation
in the village was tense. Therefore, respondent Nos.2 and 3 were
not in a position to prepare complaint on their own. However, the
complaints were prepared by Writer of Bomrapet Police Station on
the instructions of respondent Nos.2 and 3 and after going through
27
the same, they have signed. The said explanation offered by the
learned Additional Advocate General is not satisfactory.
37. Respondent Nos.2 and 3 being the MRO and Deputy
Superintendent of Police, including other complainant Sub
Divisional Police Officer, have to prepare complaints by
mentioning the incident specifically. They cannot sign on the
complaints prepared by Writer of the very same Police Station and
lodge a complaint with police, Bomraspet Police Station at
different timings i.e. at 14.00, 15.00 and 16.00 hours. In the said
complaints, there is no mention that on the instructions of
complainants, Writer of the said Police Station prepared complaints
and on going through the same, they have signed on the same. The
said facts would show the intention of the respondents in
implicating the petitioners in the aforesaid three crimes.
38. It is trite to note that learned counsel representing learned
Public Prosecutor fairly admitted that the place of incident in
Cr.No.153 of 2024 and 154 of 2024 is one and the same.
39. It is also relevant to note that in all the aforesaid three
FIRs, the only allegation leveled against them is conspiracy.
28
According to the respondent Nos.2 and 3, the petitioners, on the
instigation of A.1, formed into unlawful assembly, attacked the
District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials with
an intention to kill them. Except the said allegation, there is no
other allegation against the petitioners herein.
40. Thus, the allegation leveled against the petitioners in all
the three crimes is same i.e. conspiracy. There is no allegation
against them that they were present physically in all three incidents
and that they have participated in the said attack.
41. Vide order dated 20.01.2025 in I.A.No.2 of 2025 granted
bail to the petitioners herein.
42. In the light of the said submission, it is relevant to extract
paragraph Nos.15 and 16 of the judgment of the Apex Court in
Hazi Iqbal @ Bala through SPOA vs. State of UP14 and the
same are as follows:-
15. At this stage, we would like to observe something important.
Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed
essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous
or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look
14
Order dated 08.08.2023 in Crl.A.No.2345 of 2023 of the Apex Court.
29
into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once
the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior
motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that
the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings.
The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the
FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for
the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or
vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other
attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and
above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection
try to read in between the lines.
The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to
the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as
the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance
the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of
time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of
multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.
16. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6
SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of
materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a
fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as
evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that
manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for
quashing an FIR. The Court held:-
“5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if
any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice,
the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the
process of the court to allow any action which would result in
injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers
court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court
or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be
quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the
complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if
the allegations are accepted in toto.
30
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ
1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR
p.869, para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the
institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint
taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not
constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal
evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly
fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the
distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where
there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations
made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation,
may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily
embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or
not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not
be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no
doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless
harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising
discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in
the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any
person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument
handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about
its sudden death…..” (Emphasis supplied)
43. In the light of the said discussion and the principle laid
down by the Apex Court and this Court, registration of multiple
FIRs against the petitioners is impermissible. If they relates to the
occurrence of same incident and investigation is same, arising out
of the same cause of action, registration of multiple FIRs is
impermissible even in case of different incidents. This Court has to
31see if the alleged incident or offences are identical or not or
commonality between the accused and the complainant exists or
not. Registration of subsequent FIRs is impermissible, if they are
filed only to improve the case of the prosecution or to fill up
lacunae in the earlier complaint.
44. As discussed supra, the incidents, nature of allegations,
most of the accused, damage to vehicles and cause of action in
three crimes, offences registered are one and the same. There is
commonality between the accused and the complainant. Therefore,
registration of multiple FIRs i.e. Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 of
Bomraspet Police Station with regard to the same incident against
the petitioner is impermissible and are liable to be quashed.
45. The complaints in Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 and
statements, if any, recorded by the Investigating Officer shall be
treated as statements in Cr.No.153 of 2024 and the statements of
the witnesses recorded under Section 180 of BNSS, may be treated
as statements of witnesses in Cr.No.153 of 2024.
46. Vide order dated 29.11.2024 in W.P.No.32798 of 2024,
this Court quashed the proceedings in the present Cr.No.154 and
32155 of the very same police station against A.1, an Ex-MLA. This
Court held that the incidents, nature of allegations, most of the
accused, damage to vehicles and cause of action in three crimes,
offences registered are one and the same. There is commonality
between the accused and the complainant. Therefore, registration
of multiple FIRs i.e. Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 of Bomraspet
Police Station with regard to the same incident against the
petitioner is impermissible and are liable to be quashed. No appeal
is preferred against the said order. Therefore, the said order has
become final.
47. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this criminal
petition is allowed. The remand docket orders both dated
09.01.2025 in Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024 passed by the II
Additional Special Judge for Trial of SPE &ACB Cases -cum –
Special Judge for Trial of Cases filed Under PDPP Act,
Hyderabad, remanding the petitioners herein to judicial custody,
are hereby set aside. The proceedings in Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of
2024 pending on the file of Bomraspet Police Station against the
petitioners/A.32, A.68, A.69 and A.70 alone, are hereby quashed.
33
The investigating Officer in Cr.No.153 of 2024 pending on the file
of Bomraspet Police Station is at liberty to record statements of
respondent Nos.2 and 3 (complainants in Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of
2024) in Cr.No.153 of 2024. The statements, if any, recorded by
the Investigating Officer in Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 shall be
treated as statements in Cr.No.153 of 2024.
Consequently, miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending, shall
also stand closed.
__________________
K. LAKSHMAN, J
Date:21.04.2025
Vvr
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