[ad_1]
Supreme Court of India
Murlidhar Aggarwal (D) Thr.His Lr. Atul … vs Mahendra Pratap Kakan (Dead) Thr. Lrs on 24 April, 2025
2025 INSC 564 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4275 OF 2017
MURLIDHAR AGGARWAL (D.)
THR. HIS LR. ATUL KUMAR AGGARWAL APPELLANT(s)
VERSUS
MAHENDRA PRATAP KAKAN (D.)
THR. LRS. AND ORS. RESPONDENT(s)
JUDGMENT
K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. The present appeal calls in question the correctness of the
Judgment and Order dated 09.01.2013 in Writ-A No. 8508 of 1999
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. By the said
Judgment and Order, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition of
the appellant and confirmed the order of the Appellate Authority. The
Appellate Authority had reversed the order of the Prescribed
Authority dated 20.12.1983 by which the Prescribed Authority had
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
POOJA SHARMA
Date: 2025.04.24
16:09:51 IST
Reason:
1
allowed the application of the appellant and ordered the eviction of
the respondent-Ram Agya Singh on the ground of bona fide need.
BRIEF FACTS: –
2. On 13.10.1952, the respondents entered the suit property by
virtue of a lease deed executed by one Ram Swarup Gupta, the then
owner of the suit property. The lease was for a period of 10 years. The
predecessor-in-interest of the present appellant, one Shri Murlidhar
Aggarwal purchased the suit property on 26.03.1962. The suit
property is a Cinema building situated at 31, Shiv Charan Lal Road,
Allahabad, popularly known as Mansarovar Palace, along with its
furniture, fixture and fittings.
3. There is a previous round of litigation which requires a brief
mention. Case No. 124 of 1965 was instituted by Murlidhar Aggarwal
seeking eviction under Section 7A of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of
Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (for short ‘1947 Act’). An order of
eviction was made by the Additional District Magistrate which was
confirmed by the Additional Commissioner. On a revision filed under
Section 7F of the 1947 Act, the tenants succeeded in getting the
2
eviction order set aside by filing a representation before the State
Government. Though the learned Single Judge at the behest of Shri
Murlidhar Aggarwal quashed the order of the State Government, the
Division Bench reversed the order and this Court, by a judgment
reported in Murlidhar Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1974) 2 SCC 472,
confirmed the order of the Division Bench. The net result was that
the proceedings came to an end and the tenants continued to occupy
the premises.
4. On 09.10.1975, Murlidhar Aggarwal, the predecessor-in-interest
of the appellant herein filed Case No. 301 of 1975 under Section
21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short ‘Act of 1972’). Though
Rajkumar Aggarwal was applicant no. 2 before the Appellate
Authority, it is not in dispute that he has since relinquished his claim.
5. As is clear from the order of the Prescribed Authority, it was
specifically pleaded in the application that the said Shri Murlidhar
Aggarwal was living at the mercy of his father; that he has his wife
and children to look after; that there was no independent business
3
which they are doing and that in spite of their father’s repeated advice
to start some business they are not able to get a place to start the
business; that the opposite party is refusing to vacate the premises in
spite of the expiry of the lease; that the opposite party has other places
where he is carrying on business apart from their own residential
house; that the opposite party has cinema business in Gazipur and
Varanasi and are also doing film distribution business. It was
specifically pleaded that there was no independent income for the
applicants, and they are in bona fide need of the property. It was also
pleaded that their need was pressing, bona fide and genuine.
6. In response, the respondent-tenant (Ram Agya Singh, the
predecessor of the respondents) pleaded that he has spent around Rs.
30,000/- over the property, that the applicants are in joint family
business with their father Radhey Shyam Aggarwal; that Radhey
Shyam Aggarwal is running his business in the name of Ajanta
Talkies; and that the wife of Murlidhar Aggarwal, Prem Lata is a co-
licensee with her father-in-law in the Ajanta Talkies business. It was
also pleaded that the applicants have share in the firm Murlidhar
Gyanendra Kumar and that the monthly income was more than
4
sufficient for applicant No. 1 to maintain himself, his wife and
children. As far as their own business in Gazipur was concerned, it
was contended that it was in the name of the predecessor of the
respondent(s) and the premises of Gazipur were tenanted. The
running of the film distribution business in the name of Chitra Lok
Films was admitted. It was disputed that the need of the applicant is
bona fide and it was pleaded that a lot of employees were dependent
on the income from the Cinema which is being run in the suit
premises.
7. The Prescribed Authority held that in the earlier round, bona
fide requirement was found and the said finding was not disturbed
throughout. It independently examined the bona fide need in the
present application. The Prescribed Authority disbelieved the
contention that the applicant Murlidhar Aggarwal was part of the joint
family business with his father Radhey Shyam Aggarwal. The
Prescribed Authority held that no proof was adduced by the
respondent(s) to show that the Ajanta Talkies business was inherited
by the applicants.
5
8. The Prescribed Authority found that the applicant was getting a
salary of Rs. 1200/- from Ajanta Talkies business and Rs. 500/- per
month from Radhey Shyam and Sons and this was the only source of
income of applicant no. 1-Murlidhar Aggarwal.
9. The Prescribed Authority found that the respondent tenant could
not dispute the bona fide need of the applicant. The Prescribed
Authority further found that the applicant no.1-Murlidhar Aggarwal
had only some casual income which came from some speculative
business and the income was Rs. 11,142/- in 1975-76 and Rs. 9115/-
in 1976-77 and the applicant had a loss of Rs. 10,118/- in 1974-75. It
was concluded that the applicant no. 1-Murlidhar Aggarwal was
possessing wealth in the negative. In the end, the Prescribed Authority
recorded the following findings:-
“In the present case the income of applicant No1 does not
exceed more than Rs.ll,000/-. The applicant No 2 income
does not exceed more than Rs. 10,000/-. They are hardly
paying income Tax. The applicant No 2 has no other
business to do. His only income is from the interest on
deposits. They have wealth in minus. The opposite party
stated in his written statement in para No 2 that the
premises are purchased for doing profiteering. Applicant
No1 is married have children to look after. The applicant
are (sic) his demand for the release of the premises for6
doing the Cinema business. The premises are not released.
If applicant started to earn his bread himself and for his
family by doing speculation and doing service elsewhere.
It does not mean (sic) they have no bona fide need of
premises. The applicant has to look for the avenues of
income to support his family. It is not the requirement of
law that applicant should sit idle till his premises are not
released. The opposite party failed to establish that there
is deceit in the need of the applicants. It appears that
premises are honestly and in good faith required by
landlord for carrying out his business as applicant No 2 is
still out of business. There is felt need on the part of
landlord for the release therefore; they are passing his
claim from 1965. The element of deceit is absent.
Therefore, I reach at conclusion that the premises in
dispute are bona fide required by the landlord. There is
felt need on the part of landlord for carrying the business.”
10. Thereafter, the aspect of comparative hardship was appreciated.
The Prescribed Authority recorded the following findings: –
“The three sons of the opposite party got the 2 proprietors
(sic.) at Ghazipur by a Will which is paper No Annexure
Paper No 27/A. the one property is Regal Talkies and other
property is not disclosed. The opposite party inherited the
ancestral property as only father of opposite party bequeathed
the self acquired property of his 3 grand sons. Thus the sons
of opposite party are well settled. The opposite party is man
of substance and running several Cinema Houses and paying
7 lacks Tax to Government. He is man of 76 year and
confined to bed as admitted in the Court. His all daughters
are married. He is also running the business of film
distribution.
I am putting on the weighing scale the need of both the
parties to Judge the comparative hardship. On one hand the
7
opposite party Ram Agya Singh is man of substance running
several Cinema Houses in U.P doing also film distributing
business. His all the three sons are well settled. He is owner
No50/B/51/B and 36/A. He has no wordly liabilities to
discharge on his shoulders. His all daughters are married. He
is man of 76 years old and confined to bed. Fast approaching
toward the point of eternal sleep fixed for every human being.
The applicant No 1 is married and started to do service in
Ajanta Talkies and M/s Radhey Shyam and sons on the
monthly salary due to forced circumstances to maintain his
family. He has no other business to do. His income hardly
exceeds Rs. 1000/- per year. He started to do speculation
business to look after his family which is no longer a good
job. He has to discharge the wordly liabilities that are to
perform the marriages of his daughter. He is man of 40 years
age and have to long face the world. His sons are not settled
and pursuing the studies.
After giving the human touch to the whole affair it clear that
balance is in favour of landlord applicant. The premises were
leased out to opposite early for the period of 10 years in
year’1952. He is enjoying the premises from last 31 years.
I reach at conclusion on the basis of above findings that
landlord will suffer more hardship if the premises in question
not released in their favour.”
So finding, the Prescribed Authority ordered the eviction of the
respondent and further ordered the payment of Rs. 72,000/- as
equivalent to rent of 5 years as compensation for goodwill and loss of
business.
11. The respondent filed an appeal before the XIth Addl. District
Judge Allahabad, challenging the order of the Prescribed Authority.
8
Arguments that were already rejected about the alleged multiple
businesses of the appellant were once again canvassed.
12. The Appellate Authority discarded the finding of the Prescribed
Authority insofar as it was held by the said Authority that bona fide
need had already been found in the earlier round of litigation. Be that
as it may, we will keep this aspect of the matter aside since we find
that the Appellate Authority has not given convincing reasons for
dislodging the independent findings arrived at in the present
proceedings by the Prescribed Authority that the need for the
appellant was bona fide. The only finding recorded in this regard by
the Appellant Authority is as follows: –
“I fully agree with the contention of the applicants that on
the basis of the evidence the need of the respondents/
applicants for the disputed building is not bona fide. My
above view gets this support from the fact of the applicants
of the application. Appellant No. 1 has stated that he does
not have any business and or his savings and money have
been invested in the purchase of disputed building for
cinema. This fact has not only been denied by the opposite
party but it has also been proved by the evidence.
Appellant has not denied this fact that the business in the
name of M/s Radhey Shyam & Sons and M/s Murlidhar &
Gynander Kumar and M/s Ajanta Talkies are not in his
possession. The opposite party/appellant in this respect has
clearly stated and has also proved by the evidence that 40%9
partnership of applicant No. 1 exists in M/s Radhey Shyam
& Sons and applicant No. 2 was a student and unmarried
person at the time of filing of application. Thus the
applicants has admitted that his income is also from other
sources which includes M/s Radhey Shyam and Sons, M/s
Ajanta Talkies, M/s Murlidhar Gyanander Kumar and
income tax is also being paid by him. The opposite
party/appellant also produced important documents
pertaining to income tax department on the file by which it
becomes clear that admittedly respondent is having income
from the business. Therefore, the case of the applicants that
they are not having any business becomes completely (sic)
proved untrue completely. In this respect the judgment
passed by the Ld. Prescribed Authority is wholly against
the facts. The Ld. Prescribed Authority has drawn this
conclusion that the income of the applicants is not
sufficient whereas the applicants have taken this stand that
they do not have any business. In view of this the
Prescribed authority in fact has found an additional new
case as proved contrary to the stand taken by the applicants
which is wholly against the facts available on the file.”
13. We find that this finding is wholly unsustainable. The
Prescribed Authority, after analyzing the documents, has concluded
that the wealth of the applicant was in the negative and the income
was also abysmally low and referred to the documentary evidence as
extracted hereinabove. The only reason given by the Appellate
Authority is that since the appellants took the stand that they have no
other business and the finding of the Prescribed Authority was that the
income is not sufficient, the Prescribed Authority has found a new
10
case wholly against the facts available on record. This finding is
completely untenable. The Prescribed Authority found that while
there was some income from speculative transactions which was
sporadic, the only consistent income for applicant was his salary
income and concluded that the wealth was in the negative as far as the
applicants were concerned. There is no contradiction, much less has
any new case been made out.
14. The other finding is about the fate of the Ajanta Talkies business
after the death of Radhey Shyam Aggarwal, father of Murlidhar
Aggarwal. The Prescribed Authority had found that the respondents
had not established as to how the applicants have a stake in Ajanta
Talkies. The Appellate Authority has recorded the following finding.
“The finding of the lower court that the onus of proving the
fact that the property of late Radhey Shyam was acquired
by applicants in succession, is against the law and cannot
be accepted. And such type of finding cannot be accepted
and the findings made on this basis that the applicants are
not the owners of Ajanta Talkies is against the facts.”
15. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority dealt with the other
businesses run by the tenant and recorded the following finding: –
11
“On the other hand the Ld. Counsel of the appellant
disclosed about the above mentioned business according to
which Regal Talkies was in the ownership of late Thakur
Sehdev Singh wherein Late R.A. Singh is a tenant of Rs.
100/- per month after the death of Thakur Sehdev Singh as
per paper No. 11 List 928 all sons of late Shri R.A. Singh
got this building in succession and between the family
members of opposite party in Suit No. 15 of 1972 by way
of paper No. 19A Annexure 15 partition suit is pending in
the Court. It has also been shown that Gazipur is the
backward area and two other cinema halls Sahni Talkies
and Subhadra Talkies are also opened which are in better
condition and therefore the business of Regal Talkies is
running in loss. In this respect documents were also made
available on the file in which Regal Talkies running in loss
is shown. Besides this it is also worth mentioning that the
business of Mansarovar Cinema situated at Allahabad
cannot be compared with the business of Regal Talkies
Ghaziabad as clear by the comparative table of income
brought on the file.
Likewise in respect of Chitra Talkies situated at Varanasi it
has been proved that it was taken on rent and the contract
has been expired and now this business is not being done
by the opposite party. In the same manner it has been
shown in respect of Chitralok films that no business was
done by this company and now it is not in existence.
Likewise in respect of income derived from agricultural
land it can be said on the basis of available evidence that
this is not such an income shows upon which full
dependency can be attributed. Likewise on behalf of
applicant it has been told about Allahabad Motor Garage
that the same is also running in loss and it was submitted
that Mansarovar Cinema is only the business of opposite
party and his source of income and thus on the basis of
available evidence the need of disputed building by the
opposite party is real bona fide and urgent and the need of
the applicants cannot be said to be bona fide.”
12
16. What is clear is that there are several businesses which the
family of respondents run. All that is mentioned is that partition suits
are pending; that Gazipur is a backward area and that certain other
businesses are either on loss or have since closed down. As far as
agricultural income is concerned, it was concluded summarily that it
was not such an income on which full dependency could be attributed.
Thereafter, the Appellate Authority had found that the respondent
could be put to greater hardship if eviction is ordered.
17. It is this finding which has been affirmed by the High Court.
18. Mr. Balbir Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
contended that the Prescribed Authority having correctly arrived at
the finding of bona fide need by independently analyzing the evidence
in the case and there were no good grounds for the Appellate
Authority to reverse the said finding. It was also brought to the notice
that during the pendency of the proceeding in the High Court,
Murlidhar Aggarwal died and his son Atul Kumar Aggarwal has filed
an affidavit stating that he has no source of income and that he does
not have any other business. Further it is averred that there is no
13
commercial property except this suit property and that Atul Kumar is
crippled on account of the malfunctioning of the hip bone and is
moving with a limp.
19. On the other hand, Mr. Anand Varma, learned Counsel for the
respondents has reiterated the finding of the Appellate Authority. It is
further contended that legal heirs cannot continue the litigation on the
basis of the need of their father and ought to prefer a fresh application
for release in accordance with law, setting up their own requirement
for release of the premises in question. Learned counsel for the
respondents contended that at no stage of the present proceedings
have the legal heirs of the appellant set up their own need and
requirement for the property in question. According to the learned
Counsel, the legal heirs are already well settled and have no need for
the property. According to the learned Counsel, Civil Appeal @
Special Leave Petition, which has been filed on the basis of the need
of the appellant i.e. the original applicant, is thus not maintainable.
20. We have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the
parties and perused the records.
14
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS: –
21. Section 21(1)(a) of the 1972 Act, along with the proviso is
extracted hereinbelow: –
“21. Proceedings for release of building under
occupation of tenant. –
(1) The prescribed Authority may, on an application of the
landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from
the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it
is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists
namely-
(a) that the building is bona fide required either in its
existing form or after demolition and new construction
by the landlord for occupation by himself or any
member of his family, or any person for whose benefit
it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for
purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where
the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for
the objects of the trust;
Provided that where the building was in the occupation of a
tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such
purchase being made after the commencement of this Act,
no application shall be entertained on the grounds,
mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has
elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord
has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than
six months before such application, and such notice may be
given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of
three years:
Provided further that if any application under clause (a) is
made in respect of any building let out exclusively for non-
residential purposes, the prescribed authority while making15
the order of eviction shall, after considering all relevant
facts of the case, award against the landlord to the tenant an
amount not exceeding two years’ rent as compensation and
may, subject to rules, impose such other conditions as it
thinks fit :
Provided also that no application under clause (a) shall be
entertained-
(i) for the purposes of a charitable trust, the objects of
which provide for determination in respect of its
beneficiaries on the ground of religion, caste or place of
birth;
(ii) in the case of any residential building, for
occupation for business purposes;
(iii) in the case of any residential building, against any
tenant who is a member of the armed forces of the
Union and in whose favour the prescribed authority
under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (Act
No. IV of 1925) has issued a certificate that he is
serving under special conditions within the meaning of
section 3 of that Act, or where he has died by enemy
action while so serving, then against his heirs:
Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except in
cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the
likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the
application as against the likely hardship to the landlord
from the refusal of the application and for that purpose
shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed.
Explanation– In the case of a residential building :
(i) where the tenant or any member of his family who has
been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on
him has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or
has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in
the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no16
objection by the tenant against an application under this
sub-section shall be entertained;
Note– For the purposes of this clause a person shall be
deemed to have otherwise acquired a building, if he is
occupying a public building for residential purposes as a
tenant, allottee or licensee.
(ii) [***]
(iii) where the landlord of any building is –
(1) a serving or retired Indian Soldier as defined in
the Indian Soldiers (Litigation), Act, 1925 (IV of
1925) and such building was let out at any time
before his retirement; or
(2) a widow of such a soldier and such building was
let out at any time before the retirement or death of
her husband, whichever, occurred earlier;
and such landlord needs such building for occupation
by himself or the members of his family for
residential purposes, then his representation that he
needs the building for residential purposes for himself
or the members of his family shall be deemed
sufficient for the purposes of clause (a), and where
such landlord owns more than one building this
provision shall apply in respect of one building only.”
22. Rule 16(2) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the
“Rules of 1972”) is set out hereinbelow: –
“16. Application for release on the ground of personal
requirement.-
(2) While considering an application for release under
clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 in respect of a
17
building let out for purposes of any business, the
Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such facts as
the following-
(a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite
party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party
is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the
less the justification for allowing the application;
(b) where the tenant has available with him suitable
accommodation to which he can shift his business
without substantial loss there shall be greater justification
for allowing the application;
(c) the greater the existing business of the landlords own,
apart from the business proposed to be set up in the
leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the
application, and even if an application is allowed in such
a case, the Prescribed Authority may on the application
of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has
available with him other accommodation (whether
subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for his
own proposed business but may serve the purpose of the
tenant, that the landlord shall let out that accommodation
to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the Prescribed
Authority;
(d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or
judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal
descendant of the landlord has, after the building was
originally let out, completed his or her technical
education and is not employed in Government service,
and wants to engage in self-employment, his or her need
shall be given due consideration.
23. We must notice, at the outset, in this case that the bona fide need
was found established by the Prescribed Authority by its judgment of
20.12.1983. Shri Murlidhar Aggarwal died during the pendency of the
18
proceedings in the High Court. We have carefully scanned the finding
and we find that elaborate reasons have been adduced and cogent
finding recorded. Whether we apply the bona fide need as on the date
of the eviction petition or take into account the subsequent events, we
find that the bona fide need of the appellant on the facts of the present
case is made out on both scenarios.
24. Section 21(7) of the 1972 Act is an important provision which
reads as under: –
“21. Proceedings for release of building under
occupation of tenant –
(7). Where during the pendency of an application under
clause (a) of sub-section (1), the landlord dies, his legal
representatives shall be entitled to prosecute such
application further on the basis of their own need in
substitution of the need of the deceased.”
ANALYSIS AND REASONS: –
25. It is well settled that the bona fide requirement for occupation of
the landlord has to be liberally construed and, as such, even the
requirement of the family members would be covered. [See Joginder
Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 and Dwarkaprasad v.
Niranjan and Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 549]
19
26. In this case, we have Section 21(7) additionally to reinforce the
position. In the absence of any denial to the facts that Atul Kumar,
the son of Murlidhar Aggarwal is crippled and has no other source of
income or any other business, the need of the appellant has been
clearly established in this case. Hence, the objection to the
maintainability of the special leave petition is rejected.
27. The repeated reference to the alleged existence of other
businesses of the appellant does not carry the case of respondents any
further. At the outset, the bona fide need of the appellant is clearly
established. No doubt, Rule 16(2)(c) of the Rules of 1972 does
mention that greater the existing business of the landlords own, the
less the justification for allowing the application. It is also true that
comparative hardship is to be appreciated under the proviso to Section
21(1)(a) of the 1972 Act. We have weighed the evidence on record
and found that taking the case of the respondents at its highest, and
even if we believe each and every averment of the respondents at best,
the parties in financial terms could be said to be equally poised. The
respondents who own several businesses have managed to cling on to
the premises for the last 63 years, after the expiry of the 10-year lease.
20
28. In Mohd. Ayub and Anr. v. Mukesh Chand, (2012) 2 SCC 155,
this Court, by relying on Ganga Devi v. District Judge, Nainital and
Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 770 and Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur (Smt) and
Anr., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 300, held that one of the circumstances to
be seen while appreciating the comparative hardship is to examine
whether the tenant has brought on record any material to indicate that
at any time during the pendency of the long drawn-out litigation, he
made any attempt to seek an alternative accommodation and was
unable to get it. This factor will be one of the circumstances to be
taken into consideration while determining whether the claim of the
landlord is bona fide. In this case, nothing is on record to show that
the tenant who has been in the premises for a total of 73 years with 63
years of them after the expiry of the lease, has made any attempt to
seek any alternative accommodation and nothing is brought on record
to show that he was unable to get one.
29. In Sushila v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Banda and Ors.,
(2003) 2 SCC 28, interpreting Rule 16 of the Rules of 1972, it was
held as under:-
21
“10. A bare perusal of Rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, makes it
clear that the Rule only prescribes certain factors which have also
to be taken into account while considering the application for
eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide need. Sub-rule (2)
of Rule 16 quoted earlier relates to the cases of eviction from an
accommodation for business use. Clause (a) of sub-rule (2)
provides, greater the period of tenancy less the justification for
allowing the application; whereas according to clause (b) in case
the tenant has a suitable accommodation available to him to shift
his business, greater the justification to allow the application.
Availability of another suitable accommodation to the tenant,
waters down the weight attached to the longer period of tenancy
as a factor to be considered as provided under clause (a) of sub-
rule (2) of Rule 16. Yet another factor which may in some cases
be relevant under clause (c) is where the existing business of the
landlord is quite huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed
business to be set up, there would be lesser justification to allow
the application. The idea behind clause (c) is apparent i.e. where
the landlord runs a huge business eviction may not be resorted to
for expansion or diversification of the business by uprooting a
tenant having a small business for a very long period of time. In
such a situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to
cause greater hardship to the tenant.
11. In the case in hand we find that even though the period of
tenancy of the respondent is no doubt long but availability of
another shop to him where he can very well shift his business as
found by the prescribed authority, neutralises the factor of length
of tenancy in the accommodation in dispute. We further find that
the landlady has no other shop where she can establish her son
who is married and unemployed. There is nothing on the record
to indicate that the business of the father of Prem Prakash is
so huge or that it is a very flourishing business so as to attract
application of clause (c) of Rule 16(2). As observed earlier it is
clear that the length of the period of tenancy as provided under
clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 is only
one of the factors to be taken into account in context with other
facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be a sole criterion
or deciding factor to order or not the eviction of the tenant.
22
Considering the facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into service
on behalf of the respondent, we find that according to the
guidelines provided therein balance tilts in favour of the
unemployed son of the landlady whose need is certainly bona fide
and has also been so accepted by the respondent before us.”
30. Applying the same, we find that in this case also nothing has
been brought on record to show that the business of the appellant’s
family is so vast as to neutralize their bona fide claim to evict the
respondents from the suit property.
31. In Nidhi v. Ram Kripal Sharma(D.) Thr. LRs, (2017) 5 SCC
640, the landlady had moved away to a different town after marrying
an officer of the Indian Revenue Service. Notwithstanding that the
Court found her bona fide need had subsisted as she wanted the
premise not just for herself but to accommodate her parents &
grandparents like in the present case, the need for the family was
found.
32. In Sheshambal (D.) Thr. LRs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur
Building and Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 470, where the landlady lost
throughout from the Trial Court stage, this Court while confirming the
eviction decree found that none of the married daughters had a bona
fide need for the premises and that the death of the landlady on facts
23
of that case brought to an end the ground of personal requirement.
The said case is wholly distinguishable from the facts that are
established in the present case.
33. We finally bring the “curtains down” on this long drawn out
litigation concerning the cinema hall. For the reasons stated above,
the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court
dated 09.01.2013 in Writ-A No. 8508 of 1999 is set aside. The
respondents are granted time till 31.12.2025 to vacate the premises
and to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises,
subject to the respondents filing the usual undertaking and clearing all
arrears, if any, of rent/use and occupation charges, within 4 weeks
from today. No order as to costs.
……….........................J.
[M. M. SUNDRESH]
.……….........................J.
New Delhi; [K. V. VISWANATHAN]
24th April, 2025.
24
[ad_2]
Source link