Madhya Pradesh High Court
Narendra Nath Tripathi vs State Transport Authority Madhya … on 25 April, 2025
Author: Sanjay Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Dwivedi
1 MP No.5720-2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY DWIVEDI
ON THE 25th OF APRIL, 2025
M.P. No.5720 of 2023
NARENDRA NATH TRIPATHI
Vs.
STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER
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Appearance
Shri Ravindra Nath Tripathi - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri N.K. Sharma - Advocate for respondent No.2.
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Reserved on : 18.11.2024
Pronounced on : 25.04.2025
ORDER
With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the petition is
finally heard.
2. Since in this petition challenge to the impugned order is made
basically on the ground of locus of respondent No.2 to file a revision
before the revisional authority, therefore, this Court is confining itself to
decide the issue of locus standi of respondent No.2 so as to determine
whether the revision preferred on behalf of said respondent before the
revisional authority that too against the order of renewal of permit granted
in favour of the petitioner was maintainable or not.
3. By means of this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India, the petitioner is assailing the validity of order dated 06.09.2023
(Annexure-P/1) passed in Revision No.71/2023 by the M.P. State
Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior, which was preferred by respondent
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No.2 under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short the ‘Act,
1988’).
4. As per the facts of the case, the petitioner was granted permit for
plying his buses on the route Jabalpur to Nagpur, vide Regular Stage
Carriage Permit No.1325/STA/STG/2012 which was renewed from time to
time.
(4.1) In pursuance of renewal of permit granted in favour of the petitioner
vide order dated 03.01.2023, respondent No.2 preferred a revision before
the revisional authority saying that renewal of permit has been obtained by
the petitioner by suppressing material facts with regard to outstanding dues
and, in turn, the revisional authority vide impugned order dated
06.09.2023 has allowed the revision and set aside the order of renewal of
permit dated 03.01.2023 granted in favour of the petitioner, hence, this
petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the challenge
made before the revisional authority was opposed by the present petitioner
on two counts; firstly, that the revision was filed belatedly that too without
assigning any cogent reason for condoning the delay and secondly, that
respondent No.2 had no locus to challenge the order of renewal of permit
passed in favour of the petitioner because he does not fall within the ambit
of aggrieved person to whom right has been given to exercise the power of
revision provided under Section 90 of the Act 1988. According to learned
counsel for the petitioner, respondent No.2 being a route operator though
plying his buses, but he has no locus to challenge the order of renewal of
permit granted in favour of the petitioner. In support of his submissions,
learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon various
decisions of the Supreme Court saying that on each and every occasion,
the competitor cannot be said to be an aggrieved person. To bolster his
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3 MP No.5720-2023
submissions, he has placed reliance upon a case of Supreme Court
reported in AIR 1992 SC 443 [Mithlesh Garg Vs. Union of India and
others], wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
‘5. The Parliament in its wisdom has completely effaced the above
features. The scheme envisaged under Sections 47 and 57 of the old Act has
been completely done away with by the Act. The right of existing operators
to file objections and the provision to impose limit on the number of permits
have been taken away. There is no similar provision to that of Section 47
and Section 57 under the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Act shows that the purpose of bringing in the Act was to liberalise the grant
of permits. Section 71(1) of the Act provides that while considering an
application for a stage carriage permit the Regional Transport Authority
shall have regard to the objects of the Act. Section 80(2), which is the
harbinger of liberalisation, provides that a Regional Transport Authority
shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind
made at any time under the Act. There is no provision under the Act like that
of Section 47(3) of the old Act and as such no limit for the grant of permits
can be fixed under the Act. There is, however, a provision under Section
71(3)(a) of the Act under which a limit can be fixed for the grant of permits
in respect of the routes which are within a town having population of more
than five lakhs.’
Reliance has further been placed upon a case reported in (1970) 1 SCC
575 [Nagar Rice & Floor Mills and others Vs. N. Teekappa Gowda &
Bros. And others], wherein the Supreme Court dealing with the issue of
locus has observed as under:-
’10. But Mr Gokhale for the respondents contended that in granting
the permission under Section 8(3)(c) the authority was bound to take into
account matters which govern the issue of a permit under Section 5(4) of the
Act. Counsel submitted that sub-section (3)(c) of Section 8 was enacted with
a view to ensure adequate milling facilities and to prevent unfair
competition and on that account it is provided that when the location of an
existing rice mill has to be shifted, the authority had to take into
consideration the number of rice mills operating in the locality; the
availability of power and water supply for the rice mill in respect of which a
permit is applied for; whether the functioning of the rice mill in respect of
which a permit is applied for would cause substantial unemployment in the
locality; and such other particulars as may be prescribed. According to
counsel, since the Act was intended to regulate the carrying on of business
of rice mills in the country, it was implicit in Section 8(3)(c) that the
authority sanctioning the change of location of a rice mill shall consider
whether another person was by the shifting likely to be prejudiced thereby.
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This, counsel says, the Director did not consider, and on that account the
order is liable to be set aside because the right of the respondents is
infringed. This argument was not advanced before the High Court, and, in
our judgment, has no substance. The consideration which are prescribed by
sub-section (4) of Section 5 only apply to the grant of a permit in respect of
a new rice mill or a defunct rice mill. They have no application in
considering the shifting the location of an existing rice mill. In respect of a
new or defunct rice mill a permit and a licence are both required; in respect
of an existing rice mill only a licence is required. The conditions prescribed
by sub-section (4) of Section 5 only apply to the grant of a permit and not to
a licence. By Section 8(3)(c) it is made one of the conditions of the licence
that the location of the rice mill shall not be shifted without the previous
permission of the Central Government. It is true that the appropriate
authority clothed with the power must consider the expediency of permitting
a change of location. But there is no statutory obligation imposed upon him
to take into consideration the matters prescribed by sub-section (4) of
Section 5 in granting the permission to change the location.
11. The appellants had been carrying on business in milling rice for
more than 30 years and the mill was by reason of the proposal to submerge
the site in the Sharavathi Hydro-Electric Project had to be shifted from its
location. The State allotted another piece of land to the appellants and did
not acquire their machinery and permitted erection of their rice mill building
on the new location, this was done with a view to cause minimum hardship
to the appellants arising in consequence of the proposed construction of the
dam resulting in submerger of their land. The State also granted permission
to the appellants to change the location under the Rice Milling Industry
(Regulation) Act, 1958. The permission cannot be said to be granted without
consideration of the relevant circumstances.’
He has also placed reliance upon a case reported in (1976) 1 SCC 671
[Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and
others], in which, the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
’45. Having seen that the appellant has no standing to complain of
injury, actual or potential, to any statutory right or interest, we pass on to
consider whether any of his rights or interests, recognised by the general law
has been infringed as a result of the grant of no-objection certificate to the
respondents? Here, again, the answer must be in the negative.
46. In para 7 of the writ petition, he has stated his cause of action,
thus:
“The petitioner submits that … he owns a cinema theatre in
Mohmadabad which has about a small population of 15,000 persons
as stated above and there is no scope for more than one cinema
theatre in the town. He has, therefore, a commercial interest in seeing
to it that other persons are not granted a no-objection certificate inSignature Not Verified
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5 MP No.5720-2023violation of law.”
47. Thus, in substance, the appellant’s stand is that the setting up of a
rival cinema house in the town will adversely affect his monopolistic
commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from
competition. Such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law, because it
does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the
business competition causing it being a lawful activity. Juridically, harm of
this description is called damnum sine injuria, the term injuria being here
used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. [ Salmond on Jurisprudence,
12th Edn. by Fitzgerald, p. 357, para 85] The reason why the law suffers a
person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without
holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a
gain to society at large.
* * *
49. It is true that in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article
226 in general, and certiorari in particular is discretionary. But in a country
like India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the
thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of
the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must
be insisted upon. The broad guidelines indicated by us, coupled with other
well-established self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an
alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc. can go a long way to
help the courts in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial
stage with consequent saving of public time and money.’
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2 opposing the
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner has placed
reliance upon a case reported in (2005) 3 SCC 683 [Sai Chalchitra Vs.
Commissioner, Meerut Mandal and others], wherein the Supreme Court
has observed as under:-
‘5. After hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the
High Court clearly erred in dismissing the writ petition filed by the
appellant on the ground of locus standi. The appellant being in the same
trade as Respondent 3 has a right to seek the cancellation of the licence
granted to Respondent 3 being in violation of the Act and the Rules. ‘
He has further placed reliance upon a case reported in (2006) 3 SCC 413
[Kanchan and others Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and
others], in which, the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
‘4. We do not consider this to be a fit case for interference. The
findings of the High Court about the mala fides of the STA are clearlySignature Not Verified
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6 MP No.5720-2023borne out from the records seen by the Tribunal. It is to be noted that the
Tribunal and the High Court have recorded categorical findings that there
were not even applications for grant of permits in such cases. It baffles one
as to how the permits could be granted even without application. The STA
for reasons best known to it, did not produce all the 48 files relating to the
grant of permits. A plea was taken that some of the files were taken by the
Vigilance Authorities inquiring into the allegations of corruption. Be that as
it may, the fact remains that in some cases elaborated by the Tribunal and
the High Court, the applications were not there. The stand of learned
counsel for the appellants that relief may be denied to only those persons, is
clearly unacceptable. While deciding the question of mala fides, the very
fact that in certain cases, the authorities have acted without application of
mind, is itself sufficient to attach vulnerability to the action. Therefore, we
do not think it necessary to go into the other questions and the appeals are
dismissed. All the interim orders consequently passed stand vacated. The
contempt proceedings initiated shall stand quashed.’
Further, he has placed reliance upon an order passed by this Court in Writ
Petition No.4908 of 2014 [M/s Parihar Transport Company Vs. The
State Transport Appellate Tribunal and others], in which, the Court has
observed as under:-
‘Shri Subodh Pandey, learned counsel also argued that Respondent
No.3 does not have a regular Stage Carriage or any vehicle, therefore, he
has no locus to file the petition. We are not impressed with the aforesaid
submission. Once we have taken note of the fact that the application for
grant of permit has to be submitted after formulation of the route in
question and as the tribunal has rightly interfered into the matter on such
consideration, we see no reason to interfere into the matter.
Accordingly, finding no ground, the petition is dismissed.’
However, learned counsel for respondent No.2 has filed several other
decisions so as to satisfy the Court that the revisional Court has rightly
entertained the revision filed by respondent No.2 and there is nothing
illegal in the same.
7. I have heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.
8. Before deciding the dispute involved in the case, it is apt to see the
language used in Section 90 of the Act, 1988, which reads thus:-
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’90. Revision.–The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may, on an
application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has
been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority
against which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or
Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit
and every such order shall be final:
Provided that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not
entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a State
Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, unless the application
is made within thirty days from the date of the order:
Provided further that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may
entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it
is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause
from making the application in time:
Provided also that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not
pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him
a reasonable opportunity of being heard.’
A plain reading of aforesaid provision makes it amply clear that the
revision application shall not be entertained by the STAT if it is not filed
by the aggrieved person. As per the petitioner, though respondent No.2
being a competitor is plying his buses, but for renewal of permit of the
petitioner, he cannot be said to be an aggrieved person before the STAT.
According to the petitioner, when he moved an application for grant of
renewal of permit, neither respondent No.2 filed any objection nor moved
any application seeking permit for the same route and even for same
timing. According to him, from the aforesaid, it is apparent that respondent
No.2 has nothing to do with the permit granted in his favour.
9. However, in a case reported in AIR 2021 SC 2637 [Sesh Nath
Singh and another Vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank
Limited and another], the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
’62. A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes it amply clear
that, it is not mandatory to file an application in writing before relief can be
granted under the said section. Had such an application been mandatory,
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would have expressly provided so. Section 5Signature Not Verified
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8 MP No.5720-2023would then have read that the court might condone delay beyond the time
prescribed by limitation for filing an application or appeal, if on
consideration of the application of the appellant or the applicant, as the case
may be, for condonation of delay, the court is satisfied that the appellant
applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the
application within such period. Alternatively, a proviso or an Explanation
would have been added to Section 5, requiring the appellant or the applicant,
as the case may be, to make an application for condonation of delay.
However, the court can always insist that an application or an affidavit
showing cause for the delay be filed. No applicant or appellant can claim
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as of right,
without making an application.’
In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court has in fact clarified that a person
aggrieved is the person who has denied certain rights which were granted
to him by law, but on the other hand, a person who is complainant and his
legal rights are not being curtailed or violated, cannot be said to be an
aggrieved person.
10. In Civil Appeal No.7728 of 2012 [Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan
Vs. State of Maharashtra], the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
‘7. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted
to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he
falls within the category of aggrieved persons.
Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can
challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of
enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the
appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the
Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available
for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The
Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public
body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such
person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such
performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for
invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of
such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to
enforce a legal right. Infact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of
the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be
enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who
complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as
regards the same. (Vide : State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952
SC 12; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728; CalcuttaSignature Not Verified
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9 MP No.5720-2023Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1962
SC 1044; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2736;
and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C.
Sekar & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 784).
8. A “legal right”, means an entitlement arising out of legal rules.
Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a
person by the rule of law. The expression, “person aggrieved” does not
include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a
person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest
has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji
v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719; and State of
Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1361).
9. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of Mumbai, AIR 2008
SC 1289, a similar view was taken by this Court, observing that, if a person
claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to
be a person aggrieved regarding the election or the selection of other
persons.
* * *
11. This Court, even as regards the filing of a habeas corpus petition,
has explained that the expression, ‘next friend’ means a person who is not a
total stranger. Such a petition cannot be filed by one who is a complete
stranger to the person who is in alleged illegal custody. (Vide: Charanjit Lal
Chowdhury v. The Union of India & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 41; Sunil Batra (II)
v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1579; Mrs. Neelima Priyadarshini v.
State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 2021; Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India,
AIR 1993 SC 280; Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 284;
and Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. & Ors., JT (2012) 10 SC
393).
12. This Court has consistently cautioned the courts against
entertaining public interest litigation filed by unscrupulous persons, as such
meddlers do not hesitate to abuse the process of the court. The right of
effective access to justice, which has emerged with the new social rights
regime, must be used to serve basic human rights, which purport to
guarantee legal rights and, therefore, a workable remedy within the
framework of the judicial system must be provided. Whenever any public
interest is invoked, the court must examine the case to ensure that there is in
fact, genuine public interest involved. The court must maintain strict
vigilance to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of court and that,
“ordinarily meddlesome bystanders are not granted a Visa”. Many societal
pollutants create new problems of non-redressed grievances, and the court
should make an earnest endeavour to take up those cases, where the
subjective purpose of the lis justifies the need for it. (Vide: P.S.R.
Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam & Anr., AIR 1980 SC 856; Dalip Singh v.
State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC 114; State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant
Singh Chaufal & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 402; and Amar Singh v. Union of India
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& Ors., (2011) 7 SCC 69)’
As per the observation made by the Supreme Court in the above case, it is
clear that a person raised grievance must show how he has suffered
irreparable injury. A stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or
property cannot be permitted to interfere into the affairs of others.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court relying upon several decisions has held that
a person not directly affected, cannot be said to be a person aggrieved.
Here in this case, respondent No.2 failed to demonstrate as to why renewal
made in favour of the petitioner is not proper and how it causes prejudice
to him and somehow violating his legal rights. Merely on the ground that
respondent No.2 is a competitor, he is having no right to raise an objection
saying that the renewal of permit has been granted improperly. If at all,
respondent No.2 has any objection with regard to illegality committed,
then he could apprise the respective authority about the said illegality and
then it is for the authority to take note of the fact whether renewal of
permit has been granted properly or not. From the facts and circumstances
of the case, it is clear that respondent No.2 has no legal grievance with the
renewal of permit granted in favour of the petitioner and if that is so, even
though, he is not a party who can approach the authority by availing the
statutory remedy of revision. While exercising the power of revision, it is
his duty to prove violation of his judicial and enforceable rights but mere
personal inconvenience; mental agony or psychological suffering does not
confer any right to him to avail the remedy of revision which restrained
other than an aggrieved person to avail the same. In the case at hand,
respondent No.2 does not show any personal legal right causing any
prejudice to him but only pointing out that certain irregularities were
committed while granting renewal of permit, however, if such type of
person is permitted to avail the remedy of revision, then it may create a
hazardous situation before the authorities because in that case any Tom,
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11 MP No.5720-2023
Dick and Harry, for settling their personal grievance, can challenge each
and every order of statutory authority passed in favour of any person. Now
a days, it has become a fashion to show disagreement with the order of
statutory authority, if any, is passed in favour of any person and challenge
the same so as to keep the holder of the order in trouble and in number of
occasions, such type of practice is being adopted to settle the personal
score. When a word ‘person aggrieved’ is used and confined in the statute
itself, then it has to be construed in a positive manner but it cannot be
allowed to be misused by any other person in any manner whatsoever.
11. From the backdrop of aforesaid discussion, I have no hesitation to
hold that respondent No.2, against the renewal of permit granted in favour
of the petitioner, has no locus to file the revision before the revisional
authority. Since the impugned order passed by the revisional authority on
06.09.2023 (Annexure-P/1) is not sustainable in the eyes of law, therefore,
it is hereby set aside.
12. Resultantly, the petition filed by the petitioner stands allowed.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
dm
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