Chattisgarh High Court
Xyz vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 24 April, 2025
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2025:CGHC:18672
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ORDER RESERVED ON 21.02.2025
ORDER DELIVERED ON 24.04.2025
CRR No. 141 of 2025
1 - Xyz Nil
... Applicant (s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- District Magistrate, Bemetara,
District- Bemetara, C.G.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s) : Shri Hemant Gupta, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Ms. Laxmeen Kashyap,PL
(Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma )
C A V Order
The present revision has been preferred under Section 102 of
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (in short
‘the Act 2015’) read with Sections 438 CrPC and Section 442 of the
Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 against the order dated
10.12.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.91/2024 by the First
Additional Sessions Judge Bemetara (Children Court) whereby the
learned Additional Sessions Judge has dismissed the appeal arising
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out of order dated 28.11.2024 passed in Crime No.151/2024 by the
Principle Judge, Juvenile Justice Board, Bemetara dismissing the bail
application of the present applicant.
2. This revision petition has been filed by the accused, who is
juvenile. The prosecution story, in brief, is that on the date of incident
ie. 18.06.2024, at about 3.00 am, four unknown persons committed
the murder of Mehtaru Jagat Singh with sharp edged weapon while
snatching the mobile and cash of Rs. 4500/- from Dujram and
assaulted Raghavendra Singh Jagat and thereafter fled away from the
spot. The incident was reported to the police station Nandghat and
Crime No. 151/2024 was registered against four persons including the
present revisionist for the offence punishable under Sections
341,394,397 and 302 IPC. The present applicant/juvenile in conflict
with law has been arrested and kept in the observation home. Since
the revisionist was involved in heinous offence, therefore, he was
produced before the Juvenile Justice Board for preliminary
assessment under Section 12 of J.J. Act, 2015. However, the same
was dismissed.
3. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the revisionist
is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case due to
ulterior motive. The revisionist was 17 years old at the time of the
incident. He submits that the charge sheet has been filed by the police
on 17.09.2024 and there are 42 witnesses in all. He submits that there
is every possibility that the trial may take long time for its conclusion
and therefore he may be granted bail. It is further submitted that the
finding recorded by the court below is against the social information
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report and is based on surmises and conjectures. It has been further
submitted that there is no evidence to show that if the revisionist is
released on bail, his release is likely to bring him into association with
any known criminal, or expose him to moral, physical, or
psychological danger, or that his release would defeat the ends of
justice. No such findings were recorded as to how he will come in
contact with known criminals and how he will be exposed to moral,
physical, or psychological danger, or that his release would defeat the
ends of justice.
4. It has been further submitted that the Juvenile Justice Board as
well as the trial Court have not appreciated the Social Information
Report of the Probation Officer in its right perspective and passed the
impugned judgment and order in a cursory manner without
considering the position of law and have declined bail to the
revisionist. The bare perusal of the impugned orders demonstrates
that the same has been passed on flimsy grounds, which have
occasioned a gross miscarriage of justice. The judgment and order
passed by the learned courts are illegal, contrary to law, and is based
on the erroneous assumption of facts and law.
5. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned
judgment and order passed by the trial Court as well as the Juvenile
Justice Board and contended that the revisionist has committed a
heinous crime. Considering the gravity of the offence, the present
criminal revision is liable to be dismissed.
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6. I have heard learned counsel both the parties and perused the
material available on record.
7. The bail application under Section 12 of “JJ Act, 2015” has
been rejected by the Juvenile Justice Board vide order dated
28.11.2024 observing that there appears a reasonable ground for
believing that the guardian of the juvenile has no effective control over
the revisionist and there is a possibility of re-occurrence of the offence
after his release. Furthermore, he has committed the heinous offence
and indulged in this activity due to lack of discipline. The appellate
court has also affirmed the order passed by the Juvenile Justice
Board. The appellate court without considering the social information
report of the Probation Officer in its right perspective as well as
without returning to any finding on the three exceptions declined the
bail to the revisionist and rejected the appeal after observing that the
parents of the juvenile are unable to keep the juvenile under control.
There is a lack of availability of a consultant and if the juvenile is
released on bail, he is likely to go into association with known
criminals.
8. To examine the validity of the impugned order, it is useful to
note the relevant provisions of the Act as well as the case laws
relating to the subject.
9. On perusal of the record, it demonstrates that the juvenile in
conflict with law has left his studies and was in association of bad
company, his brother had also remained in observation home in a
theft case. There is no denial of the fact that the provisions of Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection) Act would allow the juvenile offenders to
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be tried as adults only after the Board along with psychologists,
psycho-social workers or others has assessed them on certain factors
such as the juvenile’s capability to commit a murder circumstances in
which the murder was committed, and an offender’s ability to
understand the consequences of an offence. It is the responsibility of
the learned Juvenile Justice Board to complete the assessment within
three months and after this they may transfer the juvenile offender to
the Children’s Court if he committed the offence with knowledge of the
consequence of the offence. The Juvenile Board has dismissed the
application considering the fact that the appellant may repeat the
crime in future in association with the bad company. Thereafter
considering the above facts, the learned Sessions Judge, after
cumulative study of the surrounding facts and circumstances of the
case as well as the social investigation report, had found that there
are reasonable grounds available against the juvenile in conflict with
law and there was likelihood that his release may bring him into
association with any known criminal or expose him to moral,physical
or psychological danger or the person’s release would defeat the ends
of justice. Therefore, the learned trial court dismissed the appeal.
10. It is a settled position of law that the use of the word ‘shall’ in
sub-section (1) of Section 12 of “JJ Act, 2015” is of great significance.
The use of the word ‘shall’ raises a presumption that the particular
provision is imperative, but this prima facie inference may be rebutted
by other considerations such as the object and scope of the
enactment and the consequences flowing from such construction. The
word ‘shall’ has been construed as ordinarily mandatory, but is
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sometimes not so interpreted if the context or intention otherwise
demands.
11. Provisions of Section 12 of “JJ Act, 2015” manifest that
ordinarily, the Juvenile Justice Board is under obligation to release the
juvenile on bail with or without surety. The juvenile shall not be
released in certain circumstances as the latter part of the section also
uses the word ‘shall’ imposing certain mandatory conditions
prohibiting the release of the juvenile by the Juvenile Justice Board. If
there are any reasonable grounds for believing; (a) that the release is
likely to bring him into association with any known criminal; (b) that
release is likely to expose him to moral, physical, or psychological
danger and (c) that release of the juvenile is in conflict with law and
would defeat the ends of justice. he gravity of the offence is not a
relevant consideration for declining the bail to the juvenile. A juvenile
can be denied the concession of bail if any of the three contingencies
specified under Section 12(1) of “JJ Act, 2015” is available.
12. The term ‘known criminal’ has not been defined in “the Juvenile
Justice Act” or Rules framed thereunder. It is a well-settled rule of
interpretation that in the absence of any statutory definition of any
term used in any particular statute the same must be assigned
meaning as is commonly understood in the context of such statute as
held by Supreme Court in Appasaheb Vs. State of Maharashtra,
(2007) 9 SCC 721 in para 11 as under:
(SCC p. 726 para 11) “11……It is well settled
principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act
is passed with reference to a particular trade,
business or transaction and words are used
which everybody conversant with that trade,
7business or transaction knows or understand to
have a particular meaning in it, then the words
are to be construed as having that particular
meaning. [See: Union of India V. Garware Nylons
Ltd., (1996) 10 SCC 413: AIR 1996 SC 3509 and
Chemical and Fibers of India v. Union of India,
(1997) 2 SCC 664: AIR 1997 SC 558]…”
13. In the proviso of Section 12 of Juvenile Justice Act, observed
that “as regards the first exception, before it can be invoked to deny
bail to a juvenile there must be a reasonable ground for believing that
his release is likely to bring him into association with any known
criminal. The expression known criminal is not without significance
when the liberty of a juvenile is sought to be curtailed by employing
the exception, the exception must be construed strictly. Therefore,
before this exception is invoked, the prosecution must identify the
‘known criminal’, and then the court must have reasonable grounds to
believe that the juvenile if released would associate with this ‘known
criminal’. It cannot be generally observed that the release of the
juvenile would bring him into association with criminals without
identifying the criminals and without returning a prima facie finding
with regard to the nexus between the juvenile and such criminal.”
14. The age of applicant has been found above 16 years and below
18 years on the date of incident. On perusal of the records and the
social investigation report, it appears that the juvenile in conflict with
law had left his studies and was in association of bad company and
his brother had also remained in the observation home in a case of
robbery. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the provisions of
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act would allow the juvenile
offenders to be tried as adults only after the learned Board along with
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psychologists, psycho-social workers or others has assessed them on
certain factors such as the juvenile’s capability to commit a murder,
circumstances in which the murder was committed, and an offender’s
ability to understand the consequences of an offence. The Juvenile
Justice Board has dismissed the application considering the fact that
the appellant may repeat the crime in future in association with the
bad company. The trial court by the impugned order dated
10.12.2024, dismissed the appeal, holding that the Juvenile Justice
Board had followed due process and relied on the Preliminary
Assessment Report, Social Investigation Report, and Physical-Mental
Drug Assessment Report before concluding that Child in Conflict with
Law should not be tried as an adult and has upheld the bail order,
finding no procedural irregularity.
15. On perusal of the impugned order, it reveals that the learned
ASJ confined its review to assessing procedural and jurisdictional
correctness, finding that the Juvenile Board had acted within its
authority and in accordance with the law. The learned ASJ affirmed
the Board’s determination that CCL lacked the requisite mental and
physical capacity to be tried as an adult, based on expert
assessments and background reports, and upheld the grant of bail,
noting the prosecution’s failure to establish any statutory exceptions
under Section 12. No material irregularity, jurisdictional error, or
miscarriage of justice is evident, and the applicant’s disagreement
with the conclusions does not render the order perverse or
unsustainable.”
16. On the issue of bail, the Court reiterated that Section 12 of the
JJ Act mandates the grant of bail to juveniles unless their release
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would bring them into association with criminals, expose them to
danger, or defeat the ends of justice. The court found that neither
Juvenile Board nor the Additional Sessions Judge had any material
before them suggesting that CCL’s release would lead to such
consequences. The mere seriousness of the offence was not
sufficient to deny bail. The court cited precedent reaffirming the
principle that bail for juveniles is the norm and that exceptions must
be substantiated with evidence. The Court also addressed the
juvenile’s claim of violation of natural justice, arguing that the
complainant had no absolute right to be heard in bail proceedings
under the JJ Act. It held that the legislative scheme prioritizes
rehabilitation over retribution and that the Board’s decision-making
process did not warrant interference.
17. There is no jurisdictional error, procedural irregularity, or legal
infirmity in the impugned order. The trial court after considering the
facts and circumstances of the present case as also the social
investigation report, which reflects that there are reasonable grounds
had dismissed the appeal. The manner in which the incident of murder
has been committed, in itself reveals that the murder of deceased has
been committed by the accused persons wherein role of the applicant
is well established.
18. In the facts and circumstances of the instance case, as far as
the challenge to the impugned orders in the present revision is
concerned, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the
impugned orders, which are wholly impeccable. In view of the
aforesaid discussions, this Court is of the considered view that no
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legal or factual error has been committed by the Courts below in
passing the impugned order.
19. Resultantly, this revision is found sans merit, fails and is hereby
dismissed.
Sd/-
(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge
Digitally signed
SUGUNA by SUGUNA
DUBEY
DUBEY Date: 2025.04.25
10:35:24 +0530
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