Bombay High Court
Ravindra Laxman Borole vs State Of Maharashtra Thr. Revenue … on 28 April, 2025
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2025:BHC-AS:19052
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.2103 OF 2021
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.2105 OF 2021
Ravindra Laxman Borole,
Aged 56 years, Occu.: Business,
R/at: Borole Estate, Dr. R.P. Road,
Ram Nagar, Dombivli, Taluka:
Kalyan, District Thane. ... Petitioner
Digitally
signed by
ATUL
GANESH
ATUL
GANESH
KULKARNI
V/s.
KULKARNI Date:
2025.04.28
14:37:03
+0530
1. The State of Maharashtra
(through Hon'ble Revenue Minister,
Mantralaya, Mumbai 400 032
2. The Additional Collector,
District Thane.
3. The Sub-Divisional Officer,
Kalyan Sub-Division, Kalyan,
Taluka Kalyan, District Thane.
4. The Tahsildar, Kalyan
Taluka Kalyan, District Thane.
5. Anjani Bhaskar Bhole
6. Vatsalabai Vishnu Choudhary
7. Kiran Bhaskar Bhole
8. Sushila Namdeo Dhake
9. Bharti Yogesh Attarde,
Nos.5 to 9 through their Constituted
Attorney Dinesh Ramsundar
Vishwakarma, residing at Room No.
C-101, Sarvodaya Park, Nandivali
Road, Near Swami Samarth Math,
Dombivli, Taluka Kalyan,
District Thane.
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10. Pandharinath Savlaram Mhatre,
since deceased through legal heirs
10A. Anjani Pandharinath Mhatre
10B. Leena Vinayak Bhoir
10C. Pooja Gajanan Patil
10D. Kunal Pandharinath Mhatre
10E. Amar Pancharinath Mhatre
deceased through legal heirs
10E1. Swati Amar Mhatre
10E2. Pruthvi Amar Mhatre
10E3. Ayushi Amar Mhatre,
Nos.10A to 10E3, residing at
Lina Chhaya Bungalow, Tahkurwadi,
Kalu Nagar, Pandit Dindayal Cross
Road, Dombivli (W), District Thane. ... Respondents
Mr. Sunil G. Karandikar with Ms. Ankita P. Pandit, Mr.
Abhijit Kadam, Mr. Jayesh Joshi, Mr. Ashish Chavan
i/by Ms. Sonali Sase for the petitioner.
Mr. Anil Anturkar, Senior Advocate with Ms. Gargi
Warunjikar, Ms. Shweta Jadhav, and Ms. Kashish
Chelani i/by Mr. Aditya Thorat for respondent Nos.5 to
9 in WP/2103/2021.
Dr. Uday Warunjikar i/by Mr. Aditya Thorat for
respondent Nos.5 to 9 in WP/2105/2021.
Mr. Vaibhav D. Kadam with Ms. Vedika Bhoir i/by Mr.
Shrinath Badade for respondent No.10.
Ms. Savita A. Prabhune, AGP for the State.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 28 MARCH 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 28 APRIL 2025
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JUDGMENT:
1. The present case raises an important question concerning the
appellate and revisional remedies under the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code, 1966 (“MLRC”). During the hearing, it became
apparent that there is a direct conflict of interpretation in the
judgments of this Court regarding the scope of appeal and revision
against an order condoning delay and admitting an appeal under
the MLRC. The conflicting views expressed in several decisions by
coordinate Benches have created uncertainty in the application of
Sections 251, 252, 255, 257, and 259 of the MLRC.
2. Mr. Karandikar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended
that the judgments delivered in Writ Petition No. 5716 of 2024 and
Writ Petition No. 12965 of 2023 have failed to properly appreciate
the legal position arising under Section 252 of the Maharashtra
Land Revenue Code, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”).
According to him, Section 252 merely bars the remedy of an
appeal from certain orders enumerated therein. However, the said
section does not declare such orders as final and conclusive for all
legal purposes. He argued that a mere bar on appeal does not ipso
facto clothe the order with the attribute of finality. In contrast, the
Legislature has, in several provisions of the Code, expressly
employed the expressions “final” and “conclusive” while declaring
the effect of certain orders. In this regard, reliance was placed on
Section 259 of the Code, which, according to learned counsel,
comes into operation only when the provision under which the
order or decision is passed expressly declares it to be “final” or
“conclusive.” It was pointed out that Section 252 does not contain
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the said expressions. Therefore, the inference drawn in the earlier
decisions equating bar of appeal with finality and conclusiveness is
legally untenable. Learned counsel submitted that Sections 21(5),
137(4), and 162(2) of the Code clearly specify that the orders
passed under those provisions are final, whereas Sections 23,
52(2), 175, 218(5), and 270(2) declare the orders passed therein
to be conclusive. In contrast, Section 252 does not use either of
these expressions, thereby indicating the legislative intent to
merely bar an appeal without conferring absolute finality.
3. He further submitted that Section 259, which appears to
operate as a limitation on the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by
the State Government under Section 257, has been erroneously
interpreted in a restrictive sense. It was argued that Section 259 is
essentially a clarificatory provision and not a source of power. Its
purpose is to clarify that even where a provision declares an order
or decision to be final or conclusive, the revisional power under
Section 257 may still be exercised unless expressly excluded. He
contended that Section 257 confers a wide power of revision on
the State Government and revenue officers, which includes
scrutiny of not only the legality but also the propriety and
regularity of proceedings. Hence, to say that Section 259 limits
Section 257 in the absence of the words “final and conclusive” is a
misreading of the scheme of the Code. Referring to Section 255,
learned counsel urged that the said provision merely outlines the
stages at which the appellate authority may pass orders. It has no
bearing on the revisional powers under Section 257. The revisional
jurisdiction under Section 257 is independent, both in character
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and purpose, and cannot be curtailed merely by reference to
procedural sections such as Sections 251 or 255. He emphasized
that amended Section 257(4) makes it clear that revisional
jurisdiction is conferred concurrently on revenue officers and the
State Government, and such jurisdiction can be exercised by either,
though only once. Moreover, the order condoning delay does not
become immune from revision merely because it is procedural. The
power under Section 257(1) permits examination even of such
orders for their legal correctness, propriety, and procedural
regularity.
4. On the strength of these submissions, learned counsel urged
that certain important legal questions arise, which require
authoritative determination by a larger Bench, including:
(a) Whether a provision barring appeal (like Section 252) can be
treated as equivalent to a provision rendering an order final or
conclusive, thereby foreclosing the revisional jurisdiction under
Section 257;
(b) Whether the act of “admission” of an appeal under Section
251 is merely administrative or has quasi-judicial implications,
especially in light of the appellate procedure under Section 255;
and
(c) Whether Section 259 is a source of jurisdiction or merely a
clarificatory provision which does not curtail the revisional
jurisdiction otherwise vested under Section 257(1).
5. Per contra, Mr. Anturkar, learned counsel opposing the
reference, submitted that the expressions “decision” and “order”
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are employed distinctly and advisedly in the Code. According to
him, a decision is a quasi-judicial determination, whereas an order
is more in the nature of an executive directive. He drew attention
to Section 259 to point out that the Legislature has maintained this
distinction with consistency, and that an “inquiry” under Section
257 typically results in a “decision” whereas a “proceeding” may
culminate in an “order.” He submitted that since Section 251
covers both orders and decisions, the bar under Section 252
applies with equal force to both, and cannot be read down merely
due to absence of the words “final and conclusive.” It was further
submitted that Section 259 cannot be interpreted to expand the
revisional power. Rather, it imposes a limitation that where an
order is expressly made final or conclusive by a provision in the
Code, no revision shall lie. It was reiterated that Section 259 does
not itself confer jurisdiction but merely restricts its exercise in
specified circumstances.
6. In support of his submission, he referred to various
provisions such as Sections 21(5), 28(2), 34(3), 49(4), 49(7),
50(6), proviso to Section 83, 100(3), 124(1), 137(4)(b), and the
proviso to Section 155, which expressly declare certain orders to
be final. Likewise, Sections 23, 52(2), 175, and 218(2) declare the
conclusiveness of orders passed therein. These provisions
demonstrate that when the Legislature intended to exclude
revisional or appellate remedies, it did so expressly.
7. Relying upon the principle of judicial discipline and the
constitutional convention laid down by the Supreme Court in
Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane, (1989) 3 SCC 396,
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learned counsel submitted that if a coordinate Bench finds itself
unable to agree with an earlier view, it must refer the matter to a
larger Bench rather than take a divergent view. In paragraphs 18
to 20 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized that
consistency, certainty, and judicial propriety demand adherence to
the precedents laid down by coordinate Benches unless overruled
by a larger Bench.
8. Mr. Warunjikar, learned counsel for the State, submitted in
reply that no such reference is required. He contended that the
judgment in Praveen Thakur rightly interprets the scheme of the
Code. He also submitted that the order dated 31st December 2019
passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer was a composite order, and in
that context, the question of revisional jurisdiction did not arise in
the manner suggested. According to him, the matter has been
rightly decided and does not call for reference.
Factual Context:
9. In the case at hand, the Sub-Divisional Officer (“SDO”) –
acting as the first appellate authority under the MLRC – condoned
a significant delay in filing an appeal and admitted the appeal for
hearing on merits. The aggrieved Petitioner (original respondent in
the revenue appeal) sought to challenge that condonation order
before the next higher revenue authority (the Additional
Collector). The Additional Collector, however, declined to entertain
the challenge, observing that under the MLRC no appeal lies from
the SDO’s order admitting the appeal after condoning delay, and
that such an order is final, amenable only to the State
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Government’s revisional power. The Petitioner has therefore
invoked this Court’s writ jurisdiction, contesting the correctness of
the Additional Collector’s refusal. This scenario squarely calls for
an interpretation of the MLRC’s appellate scheme, and it brings
into focus the conflicting High Court precedents on the point.
Statutory Framework under the MLRC:
10. Section 251 – Admission of Appeal after Limitation: Section
251 empowers an appellate authority to admit an appeal (or
application for review) even after the prescribed limitation period,
if the appellant shows sufficient cause for the delay. In effect, this
provision allows condonation of delay and permits a belated
appeal to be heard on merits. An order under Section 251 does not
decide the merits of the appeal; it only removes the time-bar by
admitting the appeal late.
11. Section 252 – Bar on Certain Appeals: Section 252 then
imposes an explicit bar on filing an appeal against certain kinds of
orders. Relevant here, Section 252(a) provides that “No appeal
shall lie from an order admitting an appeal or an application for
review under Section 251.” Section 252 further bars appeals
against an order rejecting an application for revision or review, and
against an order on a stay application. The legislative intent is to
prevent interminable litigation over interlocutory orders in the
revenue hierarchy.
12. Section 255 – Powers of Appellate Authority: Section 255
describes the powers and procedure of the appellate authority.
Under Section 255(1), upon receiving an appeal the appellate
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authority may either admit the appeal for full hearing or
summarily reject it after calling for the record and hearing the
appellant (except in certain cases like time-barred appeals). If the
appeal is admitted, Section 255(2) mandates fixing a date for
hearing and issuing notice to the respondent. After hearing both
sides, the appellate authority can confirm, vary or reverse the
order under appeal, or pass such orders as needed (including
remand) as per Section 255(3). In the present context, Section 255
underscores that once an appeal (even a delayed one) is admitted,
it proceeds to hearing on merits, implying that the condonation of
delay under Section 251 is essentially a step leading to admission
of the appeal for decision.
13. Section 257 – Revisional Jurisdiction: Section 257 confers
revisional powers on certain revenue authorities. In essence, it
enables specified officers and the State Government to call for the
record of any subordinate revenue officer and examine the legality
or propriety of any decision or order. The provision is structured in
sub-sections delineating who may exercise revision and in what
circumstances. Notably, Section 257(1) permits revision
applications within a prescribed time to certain authorities; Section
257(4) reserves a residuary revisional power to the State
Government. In particular, where no appeal lies against a
subordinate officer’s order, the revision may lie to the State
Government. (This aspect is reinforced by Section 259, discussed
next.) Thus, Section 257 establishes a hierarchical supervisory
jurisdiction to correct errors in orders of subordinate revenue
officers, either by departmental superiors or ultimately by the
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Government.
14. Section 259 – Finality of Orders and Exclusive Revision by
State: Section 259 is a crucial finality clause in the MLRC. It
provides that whenever the Code declares a decision or order to be
“final” or “conclusive,” the effect is that no appeal lies from such
decision or order; however, the State Government may still modify
or set it aside in revision under Section 257. In full, Section 259
states: “Whenever in this Code it is provided that a decision or
order shall be final or conclusive, such provision shall mean that
no appeal lies from any such decision or order; but it shall be
lawful to the State Government alone to modify, annul or reverse
any such decision or order under the provisions of Section 257.”
This section makes it clear that where the Code bars an appeal
(thereby making the order final in the appellate sense), the
revisional jurisdiction is restricted exclusively to the State
Government. Lower revenue officers cannot exercise revision in
such cases, since the finality clause “shall mean” only the State
Government can interfered.
Older View – Appeal or Revision to Immediate Superior Allowed:
15. Earlier decisions of this Court had taken the view that an
affected party could seek recourse against an order of the SDO
admitting a delayed appeal by approaching the next higher
revenue authority. In Balwant Narayan Thale v. Pushplata V. Patil
(W.P. No. 8673 of 2016, decided 9 January 2017) a learned Single
Judge upheld the maintainability of an appeal to the Additional
Collector against the SDO’s order condoning delay.
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16. Similarly, in Kanchanbai Baburao Sukalkar v. Addl.
Commissioner, Aurangabad (W.P. No. 6966 of 2017, decided 13
February 2019) the same approach was reiterated. These
judgments drew a fine distinction between the act of condoning
delay and the formal admission of the appeal, reasoning that the
aggrieved party should have an opportunity to challenge the
condonation decision immediately (in effect treating it as if it were
a separate “decision” open to second appeal or revision).
Consequently, under this view, while no direct appeal lay under
Section 252, the higher revenue authority could treat the challenge
as a revision under Section 257 (or in some cases as a second
appeal if the hierarchy permitted) and intervene in the SDO’s
order.
17. In Ahmad (Abdul) Ambir Shaikh (decided in 2020), another
coordinate Bench similarly entertained a revision by the Additional
Collector against an SDO’s delay-condonation order. All these
decisions in substance allowed the aggrieved party a remedy
before an intermediate revenue authority (Additional
Collector/Commissioner), thereby tempering the strict language of
Section 252.
Rationale of Older View:
18. The underlying rationale in the above cases was that a
decision to condone a long delay affects valuable rights of the
opposing party (by resurrecting a stale claim), and hence fairness
demanded a corrective oversight at the earliest stage. The Courts
in Balwant Thale and Kanchanbai Sukalkar recognized a
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distinction between the merits of the appeal and the threshold
question of delay. They opined that while Section 252 bars an
“appeal” in a technical sense, the Code did not intend to leave a
party remediless against an unjustified condonation of delay.
Therefore, those Benches permitted the challenge through the
revisional route to the immediate superior, effectively construing
Section 257 as allowing an Additional Collector or Commissioner
to step in. In doing so, however, the earlier judgments did not
explicitly address the restraining effect of Section 259’s finality
clause on the locus of revisional powers. Notably, Balwant Thale
(supra) held that “the Additional Collector is the revisionary
authority over the order passed by the SDO”, thus implying that
Section 259 was not seen as confining the power to the State
Government in that context.
Contrary View in Sadanand Tukaram Suroshe (2024):
19. A divergent view was forcefully expressed by a later Single
Judge in Sadanand Tukaram Suroshe v. Ashok Gajanan Suroshe &
Ors. (W.P. No. 12965 of 2023, decided 28 March 2024). In that
case, Co-ordinate Bench examined the scheme of Sections 251,
252, 255 and 259 closely and held that the MLRC does not permit
any appeal to the Additional Collector against an order of the SDO
admitting an appeal after condoning delay. The Court concluded
that by virtue of Section 252, “the order of SDO admitting the
appeal after condoning the delay is not appealable”, and “the only
remedy available to the petitioner is the remedy of revision.
Further, addressing the proper forum for such revision, the
judgment held that “by virtue of Section 259 of the MLRC, the
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order admitting the appeal being final as no appeal lies from such
decision, the revision would lie before the State Government.” In
other words, Sadanand Suroshe decided that an aggrieved party
must approach the State Government in revision and cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the immediate appellate/revisional
officer (such as an Additional Collector). This marked a clear
departure from the Balwant Thale line of cases.
Reasoning in Sadanand Suroshe:
20. In the detailed reasoning, it is observed that Section 252’s
bar on appeals is unequivocal and applies squarely to an order
made under Section 251. The Code prescribes no separate
procedure for “admission” of an appeal after delay is condoned –
effectively, once delay is condoned, the appeal stands admitted and
Section 252(a) attaches. The Court noted that earlier co-ordinate
decisions (such as Ahmad Ambir Shaikh and Balwant Thale) had
been decided without considering the impact of Section 259. In
paragraph 29 of the judgment, the learned Judge expressly held
Ahmad Ambir Shaikh to be per incuriam for having been rendered
“without noticing the provisions of Section 259 of the Code,” and
similarly found that Balwant Narayan Thale had “ignored the
provisions of Sections 255 and 259”. Those earlier cases had
drawn a “fine distinction” between admission of appeal and
condonation of delay; but Sadanand Suroshe “obliterated” that
distinction as artificial. The Court reasoned that even if the appeal
is formally posted for hearing on merits after condonation, any
further appeal by the aggrieved party is statutorily barred by
Section 252, and finality attaches to the condonation/admission
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order. The only recourse is the special revision contemplated by
Section 259, which lies exclusively to the State Government. Thus,
Sadanand Suroshe aligns the interpretation strictly with the text of
Sections 252 and 259 – no intermediate challenge is permitted; the
structure intentionally centralizes the revisional remedy with the
State to avoid multiple tiers of challenge on interlocutory orders.
This view gave primacy to the finality clause and the intention to
avoid fragmenting the appellate process.
Renewed Divergence in Ashokrao Ganpati Ghatge (2024):
21. Shortly after Sadanand Suroshe, another coordinate Bench
weighed in with a conflicting approach. In Ashokrao Ganpati
Ghatge & Ors. v. Madhavrao R. Ghatge & Ors. (W.P. No. 5561 of
2022, decided 27 September 2024), a learned Single Judge
disagreed with the constraints adopted in Sadanand. In Ashokrao
Ghatge, the Court held that nothing in the MLRC imposed an
“embargo” on filing an appeal against an order condoning delay.
The judgment explicitly noted that it had considered the ratio of
Sadanand Suroshe, yet it arrived at the opposite conclusion that an
appeal (or at least a challenge) to the immediate superior was
maintainable despite Section 252. Effectively, Ashokrao Ghatge
realigned with the earlier Balwant/Kanchanbai view, allowing an
aggrieved party to contest the SDO’s delay-condonation order
before the Additional Collector. It appears that Ashokrao Ghatge
interpreted the scheme to mean that Section 252 bars a formal
“appeal” in name, but does not bar the higher authority’s oversight
altogether. By doing so, this decision created a direct conflict with
the holding in Sadanand Suroshe.
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Position in Ashokrao Ghatge:
22. The submissions recorded in the papers indicate that the
Court took guidance from the earlier precedents of Balwant Thale
and Kanchanbai Sukalkar (which Sadanand had distinguished),
and preferred their rationale over Sadanand’s. Ashokrao Ghatge
found that the Code did not expressly forbid a challenge by way of
revision/appeal to the next officer and that Section 259 did not
prevent such officer from exercising revisional powers in that
scenario. In doing so, the Bench implicitly gave a narrower reading
to Section 259 – possibly treating the SDO’s condonation order as
not falling under an order “expressly made final” or otherwise not
invoking the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Government. This
interpretation, whether on account of a different understanding of
“final/conclusive” or the nature of the order, stands in stark
contrast to the Sadanand line. As a result, by late 2024 there were
two inconsistent lines of authority within the Bombay High Court:
one funneling the remedy only to the State, the other permitting
an intra-departmental challenge to the Additional
Collector/Commissioner.
Most Recent View in Pravin Gajanan Thakur (2025):
23. The cleavage in opinions prompted yet another detailed
examination in Pravin Gajanan Thakur & Ors. v. Sou. Kalpana V.
Raut & Ors. (W.P. No. 5716 of 2024, decided 21 February 2025). In
that judgment, the learned Judge acknowledged the “series of
judgments” by coordinate Benches and the confusion caused
thereby. Upon an exhaustive analysis, the Court in Pravin Gajanan
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Thakur affirmed the reasoning of Sadanand Suroshe as the correct
interpretation of the statutory scheme. The learned judge agreed
that Section 252, read with Section 259, bars any second appeal to
the departmental appellate authority if the first appellate authority
has admitted the appeal after condoning delay. The judgment
notes that Sadanand Suroshe “correctly interpreted” Sections 251
and 252 after noticing Section 255, holding that even when an
appeal is admitted upon condonation, further appeal is barred. It
further observes that the prior coordinate decisions in Ahmad
Ambir Shaikh and Balwant Thale had overlooked Section 259, and
were thus not binding. In fact, Pravin Thakur goes so far as to hold
those earlier contrary decisions to be made per incuriam or
distinguishable. The Court emphasizes that learned judge in
Sadanand Suroshe had “obliterated the fine distinction” that
Balwant Thale and Kanchanbai tried to draw between ‘admission’
and ‘condonation’, thereby aligning the practice with the letter of
the law.
Outcome of Pravin Gajanan Thakur:
24. In Pravin Thakur, the learned Judge ultimately followed the
Sadanand Suroshe view and allowed the writ petition, setting
aside the Additional Collector’s refusal and directing that the
challenge to the SDO’s order be addressed in accordance with law
(which, by that logic, would mean referring the petitioner to
pursue revision before the State Government). Importantly, Pravin
Thakur underscored the need to avoid confusion and maintain
consistency.
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Distinction between ‘Decision’ and ‘Order’ under the Code
25. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to record a significant
legal aspect which appears to have escaped consideration in the
earlier judgments rendered by coordinate Benches, whether they
espouse the older view or the contrary view as expressed in
Sadanand Suroshe, Ashokrao Ghatge, and Pravin Gajanan Thakur.
Upon a careful reading of the respective pronouncements, it is
evident that neither line of authority has undertaken a detailed or
deliberate analysis of the jurisprudential difference between the
expressions ‘decision’ and ‘order’ as employed under the Code. The
distinction between these two expressions is neither incidental nor
merely a matter of phraseology. The Code, at several places, uses
the terms ‘decision’ and ‘order’ together, and in some places
distinctly, thereby indicating a conscious legislative intent to
distinguish between the two. It is a well-settled principle of
statutory interpretation that the Legislature does not indulge in
superfluity, and each word used in a statute must be given its due
meaning and effect. In the context of the Code, the expression
‘decision’ ordinarily refers to a substantive adjudication — a
determination of rights, obligations, or liabilities of parties after
consideration of evidence and application of mind to the issues at
hand. On the other hand, the expression ‘order’ generally refers to
a procedural or interlocutory direction, regulating the course of
proceedings without finally adjudicating upon substantive rights. It
is unfortunate that neither the judgments supporting the older
view nor the judgments taking the contrary position, including
Sadanand Suroshe, Ashokrao Ghatge, and Pravin Thakur, have
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paused to consider whether the act of condoning delay under
Section 251 of the Code and admitting the appeal thereafter
amounts to a ‘decision’ or merely an ‘order’ for the purposes of
Section 252 read with Section 259 of the Code. Had this
distinction been examined in detail, it may have led to a different
or a more nuanced understanding of the effect of Sections 251,
252, 255, 257, and 259 of the Code, particularly regarding the
availability of remedies by way of appeal or revision. The lack of
focused consideration on the legal import of the terms ‘decision’
and ‘order’ has resulted in a situation where coordinate Benches
have interpreted the statutory scheme based primarily on the
perceived legislative policy behind finality clauses, without
engaging with the foundational difference in the nature of
adjudications contemplated under the Code. In view of the above,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the distinction between
‘decision’ and ‘order’ is not merely a symbolic one but is of
substantive consequence, and a failure to appreciate this
distinction has materially contributed to the existing divergence of
judicial opinion. Therefore, while addressing the conflict between
the lines of authority, and in particular while framing the questions
for reference to a larger Bench, it would be imperative that the
larger Bench examines, in the first instance, the true scope and
meaning of the expressions ‘decision’ and ‘order’ as used in the
Code, and thereafter proceeds to determine the consequences
flowing therefrom.
26. In the domain of administrative and revenue law, a
substantive decision is one that finally adjudicates upon the rights,
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obligations, or civil consequences affecting a party. Such a decision
is taken after evaluating the facts, applying the law, and
considering the evidence, and it usually results in a conclusive
determination of the dispute. In contrast, a procedural or
interlocutory order is passed during the course of proceedings to
regulate the process, control the conduct of parties, or ensure
smooth adjudication. Such orders do not finally settle the rights of
parties but are necessary steps towards eventual adjudication.
27. In legal usage, especially within administrative law, courts
have long recognized the difference between ‘decisions’ and
‘orders’. The difference between ‘decision’ and ‘order’ is not a
matter of mere terminology. It has important legal consequences
concerning the rights of parties and the jurisdiction of revenue
authorities under the Code. This distinction indicates the
legislature’s intention to design a revenue adjudication system that
provides both legal finality and procedural flexibility. Although
both decisions and orders may be subjected to appellate or
revisional scrutiny–except where expressly declared final–the
scope and standard of such scrutiny can vary. Procedural orders
are often afforded greater immunity from interference so that the
progress of proceedings is not hindered, whereas substantive
decisions affecting rights are subject to more thorough judicial
review.
28. The classification of various provisions of the Maharashtra
Land Revenue Code, 1966 can be made into two broad categories
— (i) those which result in a substantive adjudication, finally
resolving the rights or liabilities of parties on merits, and (ii) those
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which are procedural or interlocutory in nature, designed to
regulate the manner of proceedings or facilitate adjudication
without finally determining substantive entitlements. This
distinction has a direct bearing on questions of maintainability of
appeal, applicability of finality clauses, and exercise of supervisory
or revisional jurisdiction. The Code itself employs both expressions
— decision and order — at various places, and judicial exposition
has shown that these terms carry distinct meanings depending on
the context.
29. The following provisions may be classified as resulting in
substantive adjudication:
(A) Section 100 – Mutation entries after inquiry- Under
Section 100(3), after following the prescribed procedure, the
revenue officer passes an order mutating the record of rights.
Though such mutation does not itself create or extinguish
rights, the inquiry often leads to a determination based on
possession or inheritance. It may have binding effect unless
challenged.
(B) Section 124 – Partition by revenue officer-Section 124
permits partition of agricultural holdings among co-sharers.
The decision of the Tahsildar in this regard is a substantive
order finally determining the shares and boundaries between
parties.
(C) Section 135 – Record of Rights: Disputed entries –
Where a dispute arises during the recording of rights, and an
order is passed under Section 135D after inquiry, such an
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order can be said to have the effect of substantively declaring
possession or entitlement as per revenue records.
(D) Section 200 – Boundary Disputes -Orders passed under
this section, especially after holding formal inquiries and
map verifications, result in adjudication of boundary lines,
which is a final determination affecting property rights.
(E) Section 216 – Encroachment proceedings – If the
competent authority, after following the procedure under
Sections 214-216, passes an order of removal of
encroachment, that order is not merely procedural but finally
determines the right to occupy land.
(F) Section 219 – Regularisation of unauthorised
occupation- An order passed under this section, either
granting or refusing regularisation, conclusively affects the
rights of the occupier and therefore constitutes a substantive
determination.
(G) Section 231 – Assessment of land revenue-
Determination of land revenue assessment has fiscal
consequences and impacts rights and liabilities of the
landholder. Hence, such orders are substantive in character.
(H) Sections 246, 247, 255 – Final appellate orders – Any
appellate or revisional order which confirms, modifies or
reverses an original determination — after hearing the
parties and applying mind — is undoubtedly a substantive
adjudication.
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(I) Section 258 – Review resulting in modification of
rights- A review order that alters the rights previously
determined is also substantive.
30. The following provisions are primarily procedural or
interlocutory, not resulting in final determination of rights:
(A) Section 121 – Requisition of documents -This is a
procedural tool empowering the revenue officer to call for
documents. It does not decide rights.
(B) Section 127 – Procedure for inquiry- This section lays
down the general manner in which revenue inquiries are to
be conducted. It regulates proceedings.
(C) Section 251 – Admission of appeal after limitation- As
held by this Court in multiple judgments, the order admitting
an appeal by condoning delay is not a decision on merits. It
is a procedural step to facilitate the hearing of appeal.
(D) Section 252 – Non-appealable procedural orders- This
section bars appeal from orders of purely procedural
character — such as condonation of delay, interim stay, or
refusal of review.
(E) Section 255(1) – Admission or summary rejection of
appeal- Whether the appellate authority admits the appeal or
summarily rejects it for non-maintainability, the act is
procedural. It does not decide substantive rights unless the
appeal is heard and finally disposed.
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(F) Section 256 – Stay orders-This section allows stay of
execution of an order pending appeal. Such orders are
interim and regulatory in nature.
(G) Section 257 – Calling records for revision-The act of
calling for records is procedural. Only when revision is
decided, it becomes substantive.
(H) Section 259 – Declaration of finality-This section is not
a source of decision-making power, but a clarification of
consequences. It does not itself determine rights.
Similarly, mutation proceedings are generally procedural, but
where there is a contested inquiry and finding, it becomes
quasi-substantive.
31. This Court is therefore of the opinion that under the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code substantive provisions are those
which affect ownership, possession, liability, fiscal obligations, or
boundary rights and procedural provisions are those which deal
with admission of proceedings, conduct of inquiry, issuance of
notices, interim orders, or mode of execution. Classification of any
particular provision must be guided by its legal effect, not merely
its form.
32. This conceptual distinction finds reflection in the Code’s
provisions.
(i) Section 247 establishes the framework for appeals and
identifies appellate authorities. It states that an appeal shall
lie from any decision or order passed by a revenue or survey
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officer under this Code or any other law for the time being in
force, to the immediate superior of the officer who passed
such “decision” or “order”, unless otherwise expressly
provided. This section establishes the framework for appeals
and identifies appellate authorities. The section uses both
terms, suggesting a potential distinction in their application.
(ii) Section 251 deals with the admission of appeals after
the period of limitation has expired. The provision appears to
treat the admission of an appeal as an “order” rather than a
“decision.”
(iii) Section 252 specifically prohibits appeals against
certain “orders,” notably including orders admitting appeals
under Section 251. This suggests that the term “order” is
used for procedural determinations.
(iv) Section 255 outlines the powers of appellate
authorities, including the power to confirm, modify, or
reverse the “decision or order” appealed against. The use of
both terms in conjunction suggests they may have distinct
meanings. Section 255 empowers appellate authorities to
confirm, modify, or reverse both “decisions” and “orders,”
recognizing that both types of determinations may be subject
to appellate review.
(v) Section 257 grants revisional powers to the State
Government and certain revenue officers to call for and
examine records of subordinate officers and to modify,
annul, or reverse any “decision or order.” Again, both terms24
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over both “decisions” and “orders,” suggesting that both are
subject to higher review despite potential differences in their
nature.
(vi) Section 259, which is of paramount importance,
specifically addresses both “decisions” and “orders” that are
expressly made final or conclusive under the Code. It states
that whenever in this Code, it is provided that a decision or
order shall be final or conclusive, such provision shall mean
that no appeal lies from such decision or order. It clarifies
that such finality means no appeal lies from such decisions or
orders. Section 259 addresses finality clauses applicable to
both “decisions” and “orders,” indicating that both types of
determinations can be given finality under the Code.
33. A plain reading of these provisions shows that the legislature
has deliberately used both terms–‘decision’ and ‘order’–in various
contexts. The consistent use of the phrase “decision or order”
indicates these terms are not synonymous but represent different
types of determinations.
34. Moreover the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966
(MLRC) contains several provisions that use terms such as ‘final’,
‘conclusive’, and ‘final and conclusive’ to describe certain decisions
and orders. It is therefore necessary to examine these finality
clauses, particularly in the context of Sections 247, 251, 252, 255,
257, and 259, to understand their legal implications and how they
affect the distinction between ‘decision’ and ‘order’.
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35. Section 259 of the MLRC is the fundamental provision
regarding finality clauses, titled “Rules as to decisions or orders
expressly made final”. This section states:
“Whenever in this Code, it is provided that a decision or
order shall be final or conclusive, such provision shall mean
that no appeal lies from such decision or order.”
36. This provision is crucial for understanding the legal effect of
finality clauses throughout the Code. It explicitly addresses both
‘decisions’ and ‘orders’, indicating that the legislature recognized a
distinction between these terms while applying similar
consequences to both when declared final.
37. While Section 259 establishes that “final” or “conclusive”
means no appeal lies, this does not completely insulate decisions
or orders from all forms of review. Section 247 establishes the
framework for appeals against decisions and orders that are not
expressly made final. Section 257 grants revisional powers to the
State Government and certain revenue officers to “modify, annul,
or reverse any decision or order”. Legislative scheme suggests that
even when a decision or order is declared “final” under Section
259, it may still be subject to revision under Section 257,
particularly by the State Government.
38. The Code appears to establish different gradations of finality.
Regular Decisions/Orders which are subject to appeal under
Section 247 and revision under Section 257. Final
Decisions/Orders which are not subject to appeal (per Section
259) but may be subject to revision under Section 257. Final and
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Conclusive Decisions/Orders which are given the highest degree of
finality, though the State Government may still have revisional
powers in limited circumstances.
39. In my opinion these finality clauses need to be interpreted to
mean that finality under Section 259 bars appeals but not
necessarily revision. The State Government retains ultimate
revisional authority even over “final” decisions or orders. Finality
clauses must be interpreted in the context of the hierarchical
structure of revenue authorities. The distinction between ‘decision’
and ‘order’ remains relevant even when both are subject to finality
clauses. The finality clauses in the Code create a system where
both ‘decisions’ and ‘orders’ can be declared final or conclusive.
Such finality primarily bars appeals rather than all forms of review.
The State Government retains supervisory powers through revision
even over “final” determinations. The procedural-substantive
distinction between ‘orders’ and ‘decisions’ influences how finality
clauses are applied in practice.
Doctrinal Concerns for Reference:
40. Meaning of “Decision” vs “Order”: A doctrinal issue
underlying the reference is the interpretation of the terms
“decision” and “order” within the MLRC, especially as used in the
finality clause (Section 259). One line of thought is that an
interlocutory order (such as condonation of delay) should not be
treated as a final decision that forecloses intermediate review. The
earlier decisions appeared to implicitly assume that the SDO’s act
of condoning delay was not a “final decision” on rights but merely
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an interim order, thus arguably outside the strict bar of Section
259. However, Section 259 by its plain text applies whenever the
Code provides that a “decision or order shall be final or
conclusive”, and equates that to no further appeal with only State
revision allowed. In the present context, Section 252 in effect
makes the SDO’s order “final” by prohibiting any appeal from it,
even though it does not use the word “final” explicitly. There is
room for debate whether Section 259 is triggered by Section 252’s
bar (since Section 252 does not literally say “final”), or whether
Section 259 only covers provisions that expressly use such
terminology elsewhere in the Code. The Sadanand/Pravin view is
that Section 252’s bar indeed invokes Section 259’s principle –
treating the condonation order as final for purposes of appeal and
hence revisable only by the State. In contrast, the Ashokrao view
may be premised on treating the condonation order as an
interlocutory step not falling under an express “final or conclusive”
provision, thereby allowing an appeal-like revision by a
subordinate authority. This divergence raises the need to clarify the
scope of the words “decision or order” in Section 259 and whether
they encompass an order under Section 251.
41. Scope of Finality Clause vis-à-vis Revision: The core doctrinal
concern is whether a finality clause (no appeal) in the MLRC
impliedly ousts all revisional jurisdiction except that of the State
Government. Section 259’s mandate that it shall be lawful for the
State Government “alone” to modify or reverse a final
decision/order suggests an exclusivity of revisional power at the
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exercise revision in such cases, which sits uneasily with the word
“alone” in Section 259.
42. This raises a significant question: Does Section 259 limit the
revisional oversight in cases of orders made final by the Code
solely to the State Government, thus barring revision by any
departmental authority? The conflicting judgments answered this
differently. A larger Bench would need to squarely address whether
an Additional Collector (or any revenue officer below the
Government) has jurisdiction under Section 257 to revise an order
against which no appeal lies, or whether only the State
Government can do so. In other words, is an order “expressly made
final” (here by the effect of Section 252) immune from any
interference by intermediate authorities? The resolution of this
issue has broad ramifications for the structure of revenue
adjudication and the distribution of powers between the
departmental appellate and revisional levels.
43. Distinction between Condonation and Merits – Impact on
Remedies: Another subtle point of law is whether the act of
condoning delay and admitting an appeal can be conceptually
separated from the appeal itself for purposes of appealability. The
older judgments treated the delay-condonation as a distinct
decision that could be challenged without infringing the bar on
appeal on the merits. Sadanand Suroshe rejected this separation,
essentially holding that once delay is condoned, the two cannot be
divorced – the appeal stands admitted and Section 252’s bar
squarely applies. The larger Bench may have to consider if the29
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and “order admitting appeal”) has any legal validity. This ties into
the textual analysis of Section 252(a): it forbids an appeal from an
order “admitting an appeal … under Section 251.” Does this
encompass the scenario where the appellate authority issues an
order saying “delay is condoned and the appeal is admitted for
hearing”? The Sadanand view is yes, it squarely does. Any contrary
view would require carving out a nuance that perhaps the appeal
isn’t “admitted” until the Section 255(2) process (notice for
hearing) is undertaken – a nuance that was propounded in
Balwant/Kanchanbai but found to be unpersuasive later.
Clarification on this doctrinal point will eliminate confusion as to
whether two separate remedies (one against condonation, one
against final appellate decision) exist, or a party must await the
final outcome and then challenge the whole matter in one go (via
revision to State if necessary).
Reasons for reconsideration of Pravin Gajanan Thakur:
44. Section 252 bars an appeal from certain orders specified in
clauses (a), (b), and (c). However, the judgment in Pravin Gajanan
Thakur appears to have read this bar as synonymous with the
order being “final and conclusive,” thereby impliedly ousting
revisional jurisdiction under Section 257. This reasoning requires
reconsideration for the following reasons:
(i) The construction adopted in Pravin Gajanan Thakur
treats the act of “admitting” an appeal under Section 251 as a
purely administrative act, and not as a judicial order.
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However, Section 255 and the scheme of Chapter XIII
indicate that admission of an appeal is a stage in a quasi-
judicial proceeding, particularly where limitation is
contested and condonation of delay is required. Therefore,
the view that an order admitting an appeal after condoning
delay is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section
257 is arguably flawed and warrants reconsideration.
(ii) Section 252 of the Code merely bars an appeal against
certain orders mentioned in clauses (a), (b), and (c), but it
does not use the expressions “final” or “conclusive”. In
contrast, several other sections in the Code explicitly declare
the finality or conclusiveness of orders (e.g., Sections 21(5),
137(4)(b), 162(2), 175, 218(5), 270(2), etc.).
(ii) Section 259 clarifies that an order or decision can be
said to be final and conclusive only if the Code expressly so
provides. Therefore, the absence of such words in Section
252 indicates that the legislative intent was not to render
orders under Section 252 final or beyond the purview of
revisional jurisdiction under Section 257(1). The Pravin
Gajanan Thakur judgment arguably overlooked this statutory
structure and wrongly treated the bar on appeal as
synonymous with finality or conclusiveness, which would
unduly restrict revisional jurisdiction. By equating the
absence of appellate remedy under Section 252 with the
finality of the order, Pravin Gajanan Thakur effectively
bypasses the carefully constructed legislative scheme
reflected in Section 259.
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(iv) The Code envisages concurrent revisional powers
under Section 257(1), exercisable by the State Government
and revenue officers. This jurisdiction is not conditioned
upon whether the order under challenge is appealable.
Rather, it exists independently and in addition to appellate
powers. Section 257 uses broad expressions: “to satisfy itself
as to the legality or propriety of any such order or as to the
regularity of the proceedings.” The 2005 amendment to
Section 257(4) reinforces the independent and concurrent
nature of these revisional powers. The amendment to
Section 257(4), which distinguishes between State
Government revisional powers and those of revenue officers,
clarifies that revenue officers also possess independent
revisional jurisdiction. This further strengthens the argument
that revisional power under Section 257 is not ousted unless
expressly excluded.Pravin Gajanan Thakur fails to
adequately appreciate this distinction and instead reads
implied limitations into the scheme of revisional powers. The
interpretation in Pravin Gajanan Thakur virtually nullifies
the supervisory function under Section 257, thereby
defeating the legislative intent.
(v) The term “admit” in Section 251 cannot be read as a
purely administrative act. The exercise of admitting an
appeal or condoning delay has significant judicial content,
especially where limitation is contested. Pravin Gajanan
Thakur seems to hold that an order of condonation of delay
or admission of appeal is not susceptible to revision.
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However, the power under Section 257 includes examining
both orders and the propriety of the proceedings. Therefore,
admission orders, including condonation of delay, would fall
within its ambit.
(vi) Section 259 is not a source of power but a restrictive
provision to prevent review or revision only where the Code
specifically declares an order or decision to be final or
conclusive. It must be interpreted strictly. As correctly
argued, the section is clarificatory and cannot be invoked to
curtail powers under Section 257(1) unless such curtailment
is specifically provided. Therefore, Pravin Gajanan Thakur’s
use of Section 259 as a bar on revision lacks textual support.
Section 259 is essentially clarificatory and not a disabling or
ousting provision. It merely reaffirms that where the Code
declares a decision or order to be final or conclusive, such
order shall not be called into question in any Court. But it
does not curtail the revisional jurisdiction of revenue officers
or the State Government under Section 257(1), unless such
jurisdiction is expressly excluded. Reading Section 259 as
disabling revisional powers, as held in Pravin Gajanan
Thakur, reverses the legislative intent and negates the
concurrent revisional jurisdiction under Section 257(1)
which is preserved even after the 2005 amendment.
(vii) The judgment in Pravin Gajanan Thakur, though
detailed in other respects, has skipped to consider the
jurisprudential difference between the expressions ‘decision’
and ‘order’ as employed under the Code, and this oversight
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calls for an authoritative pronouncement by a larger Bench.
45. The questions involved are of significant import not only for
the parties at hand but for revenue litigation at large. The balance
between allowing relief in deserving delayed cases and protecting
parties from stale claims hinges on how these provisions are
construed. A large number of mutation disputes, land title appeals,
and other revenue cases see delays in filing appeals at the taluka
or district level; the availability or unavailability of an intermediate
challenge to condonation decisions affects all such cases.
Moreover, the allocation of revisional power between the
Department and the State Government has institutional
implications. Resolving whether the Additional
Collector/Commissioner has a say, or the power lies solely with
Mantralaya (State Government), will streamline the process and
avoid forum shopping or parallel attempts. Consistency in this area
will ensure that revenue officers apply the MLRC uniformly when
dealing with appeals and revisions.
46. As a constitutional court, the High Court has a duty to
maintain coherence in its jurisprudence. Where two or more
conflicting lines of authority emerge, a larger Bench reference is
the time-honored mechanism to restore singularity of voice. It is
noteworthy that one of the learned Judges (in Pravin G. Thakur)
explicitly remarked on the necessity of clarity “so as to avoid
confusion”. Indeed, it would be prudent at this juncture for a
larger Bench to examine the issue holistically. A Larger Bench
decision would carry the weight of authority to bind all coordinate
Benches in the future, thereby stabilizing the law.
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47. The Appellate Side Rules of the Bombay High Court
expressly contemplate such a reference in situations of conflicting
decisions. Chapter I, Rule 7 and Rule 8 empower this Court to refer
questions to a larger Bench when a Bench of the High Court feels it
cannot follow an earlier decision of a coordinate Bench or sees
conflicting precedents on a point of law. In the present case, the
requirements for reference are met: there are at least two sets of
decisions of equal authority pulling in opposite directions on the
interpretation of the MLRC provisions in question. In view of this
clear divergence, it is both permissible and necessary to invoke the
reference mechanism. This Bench is of the considered opinion that
a larger Bench as the Hon’ble Chief Justice may deem appropriate
should be constituted to settle the questions.
48. Questions Framed for the Larger Bench
In light of the above discussion, the following questions of
law are referred for determination by a larger Bench of this Court:
Q1. Whether an order passed by an appellate authority
under Section 251 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code,
1966, admitting an appeal after condoning the delay,
constitutes a ‘decision’ or an ‘order’ for the purposes of
Section 252 read with Section 259 of the Code?
Q2. Whether the expressions ‘decision’ and ‘order’ as used
in Sections 247, 251, 252, 255, 257, and 259 of the Code are
distinct in meaning and effect, and if so, what are the
consequences of such distinction for maintainability of
appeals and revisions under the Code?
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Q3. Does the finality attached to certain orders by Section
252 (read with Section 259) impliedly bar the revisional
jurisdiction of all authorities except the State Government?
In other words, when the MLRC says no appeal lies from a
given order (here, an order admitting an appeal), is an
Additional Collector or Commissioner precluded from
exercising revision under Section 257(1) in respect of that
order, leaving Section 257(4) (State Government’s revision)
as the sole revisional remedy?
Q4. What is the precise meaning of the term “order
admitting an appeal under Section 251” as used in Section
252(a), and does it encompass the act of condoning delay
and directing the appeal to be heard on merits? Arising from
this, the larger Bench may clarify whether any distinction
can be made between an order that merely condones delay
and an order that formally “admits” the appeal for hearing,
or whether they are one and the same for the purposes of
Section 252’s bar.
Q5. Whether the judgments of this Court in Balwant
Narayan Thale (2017), Kanchanbai B. Sukalkar (2019) and
Ashokrao G. Ghatge (2024) on one hand, and Sadanand T.
Suroshe (2024) and Pravin G. Thakur (2025) on the other,
can be reconciled in light of the statutory scheme of the
MLRC; if not, which of these views lays down the correct
law?
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Q.6. What is the scope of the bar under Section 252(a) of
the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 on filing an
appeal against an order condoning delay and admitting an
appeal under Section 251? In particular, does Section 252
absolutely prohibit a further appeal or challenge before any
departmental authority (such as an Additional Collector or
Commissioner) against an order of the first appellate
authority admitting a time-barred appeal?
Q.7. Upon an order of the appellate authority condoning
delay and admitting an appeal (i.e. an order under
Section251) – what is the correct remedy available to an
aggrieved party under the MLRC? More specifically:
(a) Is the aggrieved party confined to approaching the
State Government in revision under Section 257, by virtue of
Section 259’s finality clause? Or,
(b) Can the aggrieved party seek a revision or second
appeal before an intermediate revenue officer (such as the
Collector/Additional Commissioner) despite the bar on
appeals? This question may require clarification whether the
phrase “it shall be lawful to the State Government alone” in
Section 259 means that only the State Government can
exercise revisional powers in such a case, to the exclusion of
any other authority.
Q.8. Whether the act of “admission” of an appeal under
Section 251 is merely administrative or has quasi-judicial
implications, especially in light of the appellate procedure
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under Section 255?;
Q.9. Whether Section 259 is a source of jurisdiction or
merely a clarificatory provision which does not curtail the
revisional jurisdiction otherwise vested under Section
257(1).
49. For the reasons aforestated, it is evident that an authoritative
decision is required to settle the law on the points enumerated. In
exercise of the powers under Chapter I, Rule 8 of the Bombay High
Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (read with Rule 7 thereof and
Clause 36 of the Letters Patent), the Registry is directed to place
the papers of this case before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. The
Hon’ble Chief Justice may consider constituting appropriate larger
Bench to hear and decide the questions framed in paragraph 48
above. The entire case, along with the formulated questions, is
referred to the larger Bench for authoritative determination.
50. All parties shall await the outcome of the reference.
51. Ad-interim relief granted earlier shall remain in force until
further orders. However, suit may be proceeded.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
38
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