Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Soma Bhaduri vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 1 May, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
(CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION)
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee
WPA 24895 of 2023
Soma Bhaduri
-Vs.-
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Sukanta Chakraborty,
Mr. Roumyadip Saha.
For the State : Mr. Supriyo Chattopadhyay, Ld. AGP,
Mr. Suman Dey.
For the Respondent School Authority : Dr. Chapales Bandhopadhyay,
Ms. Anandamayee Dutta,
Mir Anuruzzaman.
Heard on : 10.04.2025 Judgment on : 01.05.2025 ParthaSarathiChatterjee, J.:-
1. The conundrum posited in this writ petition is whether disciplinary
action taken by the Managing Committee of an unaided private educational
institution against its teaching staff is amenable to writ jurisdiction, on the
ground that the staff has no alternative remedy, since the West Bengal
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Administrative (Adjudication of School Disputes) Commission is yet to
commence its operations.
2. For the resolution of the conundrum, the key facts that require to be
adumbrated are as follows:
a) The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in Music
on a permanent basis at Bidya Bharati Girls’ High School
(hereinafter referred to as “the school”), an unaided private
educational institution, pursuant to a letter of appointment dated 1 st
July, 2016, issued by the Secretary of the school.
b) On 21st February 2023, while on her way to school, the
petitioner met with an accident when her saree became entangled
while alighting from a bus, resulting in injuries that rendered her
unable to wear a saree comfortably. Consequently, the petitioner
submitted a representation before the Managing Committee,
seeking permission to wear an alternative attire, such as a salwar
kameez or similar.
c) Despite receiving the petitioner’s representation, the Managing
Committee did not take any decision on the matter. Under the
impression that her request had been accepted, the petitioner began
wearing a salwar kameez in the school from 4th March 2023.
However, on 7th March 2023, she discovered that the Managing
Committee had engaged another teacher in her place.
d) The petitioner thereafter expressed her grievance regarding the
actions of the Managing Committee to various authorities, including
the jurisdictional police, the President of the West Bengal Board of
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Secondary Education (W.B.B.S.E.), the District Inspectors of
Schools, Kolkata, the Chairperson of the West Bengal Commission
for Women, both via e-mails and by submitting written
representations.
e) Ultimately, the Managing Committee terminated her service
following its decision taken on 16th May 2023 w.e.f. 31.05.2023,
citing its decision to discontinue Music as a subject in the junior
middle section, based on the claim that Music was not a compulsory
subject under the curriculum prescribed by the West Bengal Board
of Secondary Education.
f) These incidents generated considerable public uproar and
attracted attention from print, electronic, and social media.
Nevertheless, the Managing Committee adhered to its decision,
which compelled the petitioner to approach this Court by filing the
present writ petition.
3. At the very outset, the school authorities and the State jointly raised the
issue of maintainability of the writ petition and contended that it is liable to be
dismissed in limine.
4. Dr. Bandyopadhyay, the learned advocate representing the school
authorities, vigorously argued that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution can only be exercised if an element of public law is involved. He
further contended that while an unaided private school may discharge a public
function by imparting education, this alone cannot serve as the basis for
maintaining the writ petition, particularly when the contract between the
teaching and non-teaching staff and the school’s managing committee is a
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purely private contract. According to him, since the petitioner’s rights arise
from a private contract, she cannot seek redress for her grievances in the writ
jurisdiction of this Court. To support his submission, he cited two unreported
decisions of this Court: one by a Hon’ble Division Benches in MAT 1278 of
2021 (Narayan School, Barasat & Anr. vs. Anisur Rahaman & Ors.) and the
other by a Coordinate Bench in WPA 19024 of 2014 (Rita Ghoshdastidar vs.
St. Joseph & Mary‘s School & Ors.). He also relied on a decision, reported in
2024 SCC OnLine Cal 2923 (Pinaki Dhar vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.) and
2025 SCC OnLine SC 177 ( S. Shobha vs. Muthoot Finance Ltd.).
5. Mr. Dey, the learned advocate for the State, concurred with the
submissions made by Dr. Bandyopadhyay. He further argued that a writ court
cannot issue a mandamus to an unaided private school regarding matters
related to the service conditions of its staff. According to him, a private right
arising from a contract cannot be enforced through the issuance of a writ. In
support of his contention, he referred to the decisions reported in (2011) 13
SCC 760 (Satimbla Sharma & Ors. vs. St. Paul‘s Senior Secondary School &
Ors.) and 2019 (1) CHN (Cal) 521 (Sonia Maheswari vs. State of West Bengal
& Ors.).
6. Per contra, Mr. Chakraborty, the learned advocate representing the
petitioner, while narrating the facts that led to the filing of this writ petition,
argued that in light of Article 21A of the Constitution of India, the right to
education has been recognized as a fundamental right. To give effect to this
fundamental right, the legislature enacted the Right of Children to Free and
Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (in short, RTE Act), and the State of West
Bengal also framed the West Bengal Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
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Education Rules, 2012 (in short, 2012 Rules). Therefore, according to him, an
unaided private school, while imparting education to children in the State,
discharges statutory duties. He asserted that a private body discharging public
functions would inevitably be amenable to writ jurisdiction.
7. He submitted that an unaided private school would fall within the
definition of a “school” under Section 2(n) of the RTE Act, and as such, the
duties performed by such a school are statutory duties. Consequently, an
unaided private school would qualify as an “authority” within the meaning of
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Referring to the provisions of Section
24(2) of the RTE Act, which stipulates that any teacher who defaults in the
performance of their duties shall be liable to disciplinary action under the
applicable service rules, he argued that disciplinary action taken by an unaided
private school, being a matter of the statutory obligations of the school, would
be amenable to writ jurisdiction.
8. Mr. Chakraborty drew my attention to Rule 17 of the 2012 Rules, which
provides that any grievance of a teacher in any school shall be addressed by the
Managing Committee. If the Managing Committee fails to address the
grievance or if the teacher is dissatisfied with the decision of the Managing
Committee, an appeal may be made to the West Bengal Administrative
(Adjudication of School Disputes) Commission. He argued that, since this
Commission has yet to commence its operations, the petitioner currently has
no efficacious alternative remedy. Therefore, he contended that, in the present
case, the disciplinary action taken by the Managing Committee of the school
would be subject to the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
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9. To bolster his submissions, he cited the decisions, reported in (2023) 4
SCC 498 (St. Mary’s Education Society & Anr. vs. Rejendra Prasad Bhargava
& Ors.), (2023) 4 SCC 539 (S.K. Varshney vs. Principal, Our Lady of Fatima
Higher Secondary School & Ors.), (2019) 16 SCC 303 (Ramkrishna Mission &
Anr. vs. Kago Kunya & Ors.), 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 362 (Jayanti Mandal vs.
State of West Bengal & Ors.) and three unreported decisions, one by a
Coordinate Bench of High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 15997/2024 (Jayati
Mozumder vs. Managing Committee Sri Sathya Sai Vidya Vihar & Anr.), two
by two different Coordinate Benched of this Court in WPA 25382 of 2017
(Madhurima Das vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) & WPA 5544 of 2021
(Bineeta Patnaik Padhi vs. Union of India & Ors.).
10. Undeniably, a writ of mandamus or the remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is pre-eminently a public law remedy. A writ is typically
issued to compel the statutory/public authority to discharge their duties, and
to act within their bounds. However, the scope of mandamus is determined not
by the identity of the authority against whom it is sought, but by the nature of
the duty to be enforced. Accordingly, a writ may also be issued against a private
body that discharges public functions or is under a positive obligation of a
public nature. Furthermore, it may be directed against any person or body
obligated under a statute to perform a public or statutory function, compelling
them to fulfil such duties.
11. In Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 657 [referred to in
the judgment of Ramkrishna Mission (supra)], the Supreme Court observed
that it is often difficult to draw a definitive line between public and private
functions when such functions are discharged by a purely private authority.
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The Court clarified that a body may be considered as performing a “public
function” when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public, or for
a section of the public, and is accepted by that public or section thereof as
having the authority to do so. Such bodies are deemed to exercise public
functions when they intervene in or contribute to social or economic activities
in the public interest.
12. Therefore, an unaided private educational institution, in the course of
imparting education to its students, undoubtedly performs public functions.
However, this does not imply that every dispute involving such an institution,
or every act or omission on its part, is necessarily amenable to writ
jurisdiction. The act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge
of public duty. The maintainability of a writ petition largely depends on the
nature of the dispute and the corresponding right sought to be enforced by an
individual against the institution. Where the right in question arises purely
from a private law obligation such as a contractual or personal dispute, it
cannot ordinarily be enforced through the exercise of writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. [See, the decision of St. Mary Education
Society & Anr. (surpa)].
13. In the decision of S. Shobha (supra), it was emphasized that public
bodies are also entitled to a private sphere of activity. A private body
discharging certain public functions may simultaneously perform private
functions. In this context, when a private educational institution engages staff,
such engagement is fundamentally rooted in a private contract. The
relationship between the institution’s managing committee and its employees
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is, therefore, governed by the terms and conditions of the contract mutually
agreed upon by the parties.
14. In the present case as well, although the school is engaged in
discharging public functions by imparting education to its student in
accordance with the curriculum prescribed by the West Bengal Board of
Secondary Education, and is subject to certain statutory obligations under the
West Bengal Secondary Education Act, the Right of Children to Free and
Compulsory Education Act (RTE Act), and the Rules framed thereunder, the
act of appointing staff remains fundamentally a matter of private contract. It
would not be appropriate to conclude that merely because the institution
complies with certain statutory obligations under the 2012 Rules, all its actions
thereby become subject to writ jurisdiction. For instance, a private nursing
home is similarly required to adhere to statutory duties under the Clinical
Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act and related regulations.
However, compliance with such obligations does not by itself transform the
nursing home into a public authority or body amenable to writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
15. The terms and conditions governing the petitioner’s engagement and
service are rooted entirely in a private contract and are not governed by any
statutory provision. As such, in the absence of any statutory backing or
“statutory flavour” to the contract, the petitioner’s claim is not enforceable
through the writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
16. In a series of decisions, including St. Mary’s Education Society & Anr.,
Satimbla Sharma & Ors., and S.K. Varshney, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as
well as in a long line of judgments such as Pinaki Dhar, Narayan School,
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Barasat & Anr., and others, different Hon’ble Division Benches of this Court
have consistently reiterated this view
17. As noted earlier, Mr. Chakraborty, referring to the provisions of Rule 17
of the 2012 Rules sought to argue that as the West Bengal Administrative
(Adjudication of School Disputes) Commission has yet to commence its
operation, the petitioner has no efficacious alternative remedy and therefore,
according to him, for this reason only, this writ petition would be
maintainable. In the decisions of Narayan School, Barasat & Anr. (supra) and
Sonia Maheswari (supra), it was observed that in similar circumstances, the
aggrieved party would have an appropriate remedy before the civil forum as
such, reliance of Mr. Chakraborty on the decision of Bineeta Patnaik Padhi
(supra) is misplaced. Therefore, the petitioner is at liberty to institute a civil
suit to seek the relief claimed. Thus, it cannot be held that the petitioner has no
remedy.
18. Therefore, based on the propositions laid down in the aforementioned
decisions and the discussions in the preceding paragraphs, the only conclusion
that can be drawn is that the present writ petition, which essentially seeks to
enforce rights arising from a purely private contract, is not maintainable.
Accordingly, the objection raised by the respondents regarding the
maintainability of this writ petition is sustained.
19. The writ petition, consequently, is dismissed. There shall be, however, no
order as the costs.
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20. It is necessary to clarify that nothing in this judgment and/or order shall
preclude the petitioner from seeking appropriate relief before the competent
forum in accordance with law.
(Partha Sarathi Chattejee, J.)
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