Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shri Ishtiaq Hussain Siddiqui vs Registrar Companies Ministry Of … on 20 December, 2024
Author: Sanjay Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Dwivedi
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY DWIVEDI
ON THE 20th OF DECEMBER, 2024
MISCELLANEOUS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6919 OF 2024
SHRI ISHTIAQ HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI
Versus
REGISTRAR, COMPANIES, MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS
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Appearance :
Shri S.A. Saud - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Pushpendra Yadav - Deputy Solicitor General for the respondent.
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Reserved on : 10/12/2024
Pronounced on : 20/12/2024
ORDER
By filing the instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure [for short ‘Cr.P.C.’], the petitioner is invoking
jurisdiction of this Court for quashing of complaint case bearing
Registration No.SC/12/2021.
2. The challenge is founded mainly on the grounds that on the basis of
complaint and allegations made therein, an offence has been registered
against the petitioner under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 [in
short ‘the Act of 2013’] and that the allegations made against the
petitioner in the complaint clearly reveal that the alleged offence was
committed during the period from year 2006 and as such, offence could
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have been registered under the provision i.e. Section 186(7) and the
petitioner can be punished under Section 186(13) of the Act of 2013. The
provision of Section 447 of the Act of 2013 was inserted in the Act itself
by way of amendment made in the year 2013 and to the offence which
was committed prior to enforcement of said provision, the same cannot be
applied and the petitioner cannot be tried under the said offence because it
is a settled principle of law that the provisions cannot be made applicable
retrospectively and it has only prospective effect. He submits that even
otherwise, if the allegations made in the complaint are considered to be
true at their face value, the offence alleged to have been committed by the
petitioner falls within the ambit of Section 185 of the Act of 2013,
therefore, no offence can be registered under Section 447 alleging fraud
against the petitioner because the whole allegations made in the complaint
do not fall within the definition of fraud as has been prescribed in the
proviso appended with Section 447 itself. He further submits that merely
because the petitioner’s earlier petition [M.Cr.C. challenging the
proceedings] has been dismissed by the High Court and that order has
been affirmed by the Supreme Court in SLP, it does not mean that the
second petition under Section 482 is not maintainable. He submits that it
is a trite law that the point, if any, is not argued in the petition preferred
before the Court, the second petition under Section 482 can be
entertained. He submits that the applicability of the provisions of Sections
185, 188 and 186 has not been considered by the Court on earlier
occasion and even not argued that when separate provisions are there,
under which allegations and offence alleged to have been committed by
the petitioner falls, then there was no occasion for the authority to try the
present petitioner under Section 447 of the Act of 2013. He also submits
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that in view of the law laid-down by the Supreme Court in the case of
State of Haryana & Others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992
SC 604 and the yardstick laid-down therein, the proceedings can be
quashed.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposes the
submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that
in view of the settled legal position, when earlier petition got decided by
the Court and that observation got affirmed by the Supreme Court, second
petition is not maintainable. Pointing-out to paragraphs-22, 23 and 24, he
submits that the applicability of Section 447 of the Act of 2013 has been
considered by the Court and the contention of learned counsel for the
petitioner was rejected, therefore, the same ground cannot be raised again
in the present petition. According to him, the petition is not maintainable.
He also submits that looking to the allegations made against the present
petitioner, when the offence was committed in the year 2018 and was a
continuous offence and currency period of said offence started from year
2006 and ended in year 2018, then it is clear that the offence has been
committed after enforcement of Section 447 of the Act of 2013, and
therefore, according to the respondent, nothing wrong has been
committed by the authority. He submits that looking to the facts and
circumstances of the case, it is for the trial Court to see whether fraud has
been committed or not and offence of Section 447 is applicable or not, but
at this stage, this Court cannot consider this aspect and the same should be
left for the trial Court and petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. seeking
quashment of complaint, is not maintainable. He further submits that as
per the allegations made against the present petitioner, it is not only a
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violation of the provisions of Sub section-7 of Section 186, but the
conduct of the petitioner moves beyond the said provision and it is
nothing but a fraud as has been specified and prescribed under Section
447 of the Act of 2013, therefore, nothing wrong has been committed
while registering the offence under Section 447 of the Act of 2013. He
submits that when the Supreme Court, while dismissing the SLP, has
already observed that the petitioner is at liberty to raise the objections
before the trial Court, then there is no reason for filing the present petition
and the petitioner can raise all these grounds before the trial Court.
4. Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of record, the preliminary question with regard to
maintainability of petition as has been raised by learned counsel for the
respondent saying that earlier also a petition i.e. M.Cr.C. No.41956 of
2023 was filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in which quashing of
complaint case registered as Complaint Case No.SC/12/2021 was sought
to be quashed and similar relief is being claimed in this petition, therefore,
this petition is not maintainable because the order of dismissal of previous
petition passed by the High Court, was also affirmed by the Supreme
Court. In the order of the Supreme Court, liberty was granted to the then
petitioner to raise all the grounds before the trial Court and as such,
declined to interfere in the order passed by the High Court.
5. Shri Pushpendra Yadav, Deputy Solicitor General has raised
objection that in such a circumstance, this petition is not maintainable
whereas learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to impress the Court
that it is a settled principle of law and in number of cases, Hon’ble
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Supreme Court has observed that dismissal of petition under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. does not debar the petitioner or other accused persons to file
second petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the earlier
petition, present petitioner was not the party and that petition had been
filed by some other person. It is also pointed out that the said petition
which got dismissed by the High Court was affirmed by the Supreme
Court and the point which is being raised in the present petition had not
been considered and no opinion was expressed by the High Court because
the said point was never argued and raised before the Court. As per the
submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner in a case of Anil
Khadkiwala vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another
passed in Criminal Appeal NO(s) 1157 of 2019, the Supreme Court has
held that the previous petition if does not contain a specific factual plea
then second petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. would not be treated to
be a repeat application and also not barred to entertain the second petition.
In the judgment passed in Anil Khadkiwala (supra), the Supreme Court
has dealt with the following question :-
“The application preferred by the appellant under
Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the summons issued in
complaint case no.3403/1/2015 was dismissed by the
High Court opining that since the earlier Crl.M.C.
No.877 of 2005 for the same relief had already been
dismissed, the second application was not
maintainable.”
7. To answer the aforesaid question, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed
as under :-
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“3. The appellant then preferred a fresh application
under Section 482 giving rise to the present
proceedings. The High Court noticing the reliance on
Form 32 issued by the Registrar of Companies, under
the Companies Act, 1956, in proof of resignation by the
appellant prior to the issuance of the cheques, issued
notice, leading to the impugned order of dismissal
subsequently.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
there was no bar to the maintainability of a second
application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case, relying on
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs,
West Bengal vs. Mohan Singh and Ors., AIR 1975 SC
1002.
5. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 relied upon
order dated 06.05.2019 of this Court in Atul Shukla vs.
The State of Madhya Pradesh and another (Criminal
Appeal No.837 of 2019) to contend that such an
application was not maintainable. The cheques being
post-dated, the appellant cannot escape its
answerability.
6. We have considered the respective submissions on
behalf of the parties and are of the opinion that the
appeal deserves to be allowed for the reasons
enumerated hereinafter.
7. The complaint filed by respondent no.2 alleges
issuance of the cheques by the appellant as Director on
15.02.2001 and 28.02.2001. The appellant in his reply
dated 31.08.2001, to the statutory notice, had denied
answerability in view of his resignation on 20.01.2001.
This fact does not find mention in the complaint. There
is no allegation in the complaint that the cheques were
-7-post-dated. Even otherwise, the appellant had taken a
specific objection in his earlier application under
Section 482, Cr.P.C. that he had resigned from the
Company on 20.01.2001 and which had been accepted.
From the tenor of the order of the High Court on the
earlier occasion it does not appear that Form 32 issued
by the Registrar of Companies was brought on record
in support of the resignation. The High Court dismissed
the quashing application without considering the
contention of the appellant that he had resigned from
the post of the Director of the Company prior to the
issuance of the cheques and the effect thereof in the
facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court in
the fresh application under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
initially was therefore satisfied to issue notice in the
matter after noticing the Form 32 certificate. Naturally
there was a difference between the earlier application
and the subsequent one, inasmuch as the statutory
Form 32 did not fall for consideration by the Court
earlier. The factum of resignation is not in dispute
between the parties. The subsequent application,
strictly speaking, therefore cannot be said to a repeat
application squarely on the same facts and
circumstances.
8. In Mohan Singh (supra), it was held that a successive
application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. under changed
circumstances was maintainable and the dismissal of
the earlier application was no bar to the same,
observing:
“2. …… Here, the situation is wholly different. The
earlier application which was rejected by the High
Court was an application under Section 561A of the
CrPC to quash the proceeding and the High Court
rejected it on the ground that the evidence was yet to be
-8-led and it was not desirable to interfere with the
proceeding at that stage. But, thereafter, the criminal
case dragged on for a period of about one and half
years without any progress at all and it was in these
circumstances that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were
constrained to make a fresh application to the High
Court under Section 561-A to quash the proceeding. It
is difficult to see how in these circumstances it could
ever be contended that what the High Court was being
asked to do by making the subsequent application was
to review or revise the Order made by it on the earlier
application. Section 561-A preserves the inherent
power of the High Court to make such Orders as it
deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court
or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court
must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having
regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point
of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be
invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances
entitled to entertain the subsequent application of
Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and consider whether on the
facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance
of the proceeding against the respondents constituted
an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was
necessary to secure the ends of justice. The facts and
circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent
application of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were clearly
different from what they were at the time of the earlier
application of the first respondent because, despite the
rejection of the earlier application of the first
respondent, the prosecution had failed to make any
progress in the criminal case even though it was filed
as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where
it was for a period of over one and a half
years…………”
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9. In Harshendra Kumar D. vs. Rebatilata Koley Etc.,
2011 Crl.L.J. 1626, this Court held :
“22. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects
the liberty of a person. No greater damage can be done
to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a
criminal case. In our opinion, the High Court fell into
grave error in not taking into consideration the
uncontroverted documents relating to Appellant’s
resignation from the post of Director of the Company.
Had these documents been considered by the High
Court, it would have been apparent that the Appellant
has resigned much before the cheques were issued by
the Company. As noticed above, the Appellant resigned
from the post of Director on March 2, 2004. The
dishonoured cheques were issued by the Company on
April 30, 2004, i.e., much after the Appellant had
resigned from the post of Director of the Company. The
acceptance of Appellant’s resignation is duly reflected
in the resolution dated March 2, 2004. Then in the
prescribed form (Form No. 32), the Company informed
to the Registrar of Companies on March 4, 2004 about
Appellant’s resignation. It is not even the case of the
complainants that the dishonoured cheques were issued
by the Appellant. These facts leave no manner of doubt
that on the date the offence was committed by the
Company, the Appellant was not the Director; he had
nothing to do with the affairs of the Company. In this
view of the matter, if the criminal complaints are
allowed to proceed against the Appellant, it would
result in gross injustice to the Appellant and tantamount
to an abuse of process of the court.”
10. ……
11. The Company, of which the appellant was a
Director, is a party respondent in the complaint. The
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interests of the complainant are therefore adequately
protected. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances
of the case, we are unable to hold that the second
application for quashing of the complaint was not
maintainable merely because of the dismissal of the
earlier application.
8. Further reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the
petitioner on a decision of Supreme Court reported in (1975) 3 SCC 706,
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs.
Mohan Singh and others wherein the Supreme Court has considered the
issue of entertaining the second application in a changed set of
circumstances under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and observed as under :-
“2. The main question debated before us was whether
the High Court had jurisdiction to make the order dated
April 7, 1970 quashing the proceeding against
Respondents 1, 2 and 3 when on an earlier application
made by the first respondent, the High Court had by its
order dated December 12, 1968 refused to quash the
proceeding. Mr Chatterjee on behalf of the State
strenuously contended that the High Court was not
competent to entertain the subsequent application of
Respondents 1 and 2 and make the order dated April 7,
1970 quashing the proceeding, because that was
tantamount to a review of its earlier order by the High
Court, which was outside the jurisdiction of the High
Court to do. He relied on two decisions of the Punjab
and Orissa High Courts in support of his contention,
namely, Hoshiar Singh v. State [AIR 1958 Punj 312 :
60 Punj LR 438 : 1958 Cri LJ 1093] and Namdeo
Sindhi v. State [AIR 1958 Ori 20 : 1958 Cri LJ 67 :
ILR 57 Cut 355] . But we fail to see how these
decisions can be of any help to him in his contention.
– 11 –
They deal with a situation where an attempt was made
to persuade the High Court in exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction to reopen an earlier order passed by it in
appeal or in revision finally disposing of a criminal
proceeding and it was held that the High Court had no
jurisdiction to revise its earlier order, because the
power of revision could be exercised only against an
order of a subordinate court. Mr Chatterjee also relied
on a decision of this Court in U.J.S. Chopra v. State of
Bombay [AIR 1955 SC 633 : (1955) 2 SCR 94 : 1955
Cri LJ 1410] where N.H. Bhagwati, J., speaking on
behalf of himself and Imam, J., observed that once a
judgment has been pronounced by the High Court
either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional
jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained
against that judgment and there is no provision in the
Criminal Procedure Code which would enable the High
Court to review the same or to exercise revisional
jurisdiction over the same. These observations were
sought to be explained by Mr Mukherjee on behalf of
the first respondent by saying that they should not be
read as laying down any general proposition excluding
the applicability of Section 561-A in respect of an order
made by the High Court in exercise of its appellate or
revisional jurisdiction even if the conditions attracting
the applicability of that section were satisfied in respect
of such order, because that was not the question before
the Court in that case and the Court was not concerned
to inquire whether the High Court can in exercise of its
inherent power under Section 5 61 A review an earlier
order made by it in exercise of its appellate or
revisional jurisdiction. The question as to the scope and
ambit of the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 561-A vis-a-vis an earlier order made by it was,
therefore, not concluded by this decision and the matter
– 12 –
was res integra so far as this Court is concerned. Mr
Mukherjee cited in support of this contention three
decisions, namely, Raj Narain v. State [AIR 1959 All
315 : 1959 Cri LJ 543 : 1959 All LJ 56], Lal Singh v.
State [AIR 1970 Punj 32 : 1970 Cri LJ 267 : ILR
(1970) 1 Punj 177] and Ramvallabh Jha v. State of
Bihar [AIR 1962 Pat 417 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 625 : 1962
BLJR 553]. It is, however, not necessary for us to
examine the true effect of these observations as they
have no application because the present case is not one
where the High Court was invited to revise or review
an earlier order made by it in exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction finally disposing of a criminal proceeding.
Here, the situation is wholly different. The earlier
application which was rejected by the High Court was
an application under Section 561-A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to quash the proceeding and the
High Court rejected it on the ground that the evidence
was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere
with the proceeding at that stage. But, thereafter, the
criminal case dragged on for a period of about one and
a half years without any progress at all and it was in
these circumstances that Respondents 1 and 2 were
constrained to make a fresh application to the High
Court under Section 561-A to quash the proceeding. It
is difficult to see how in these circumstances, it could
ever be contended that what the High Court was being
asked to do by making the subsequent application was
to review or revise the order made by it on the earlier
application. Section 561-A preserves the inherent
power of the High Court to make such orders as it
deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court
or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court
must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having
regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point
– 13 –
of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be
invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances
entitled to entertain the subsequent application of
Respondents 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts
and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of
the proceeding against the respondents constituted an
abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was
necessary to secure the ends of justice. The facts and
circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent
application of Respondents 1 and 2 were clearly
different from what they were at the time of the earlier
application of the first respondent because, despite the
rejection of the earlier application of the first
respondent, the prosecution had failed to make any
progress in the criminal case even though it was filed
as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where
it was for a period of over one and half years. It was for
this reason that, despite the earlier order dated
December 12, 1968, the High Court proceeded to
consider the subsequent application of Respondents 1
and 2 for the purpose of deciding whether it should
exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A.
Thus the High Court was perfectly entitled to do and
we do not see any jurisdictional infirmity in the order
of the High Court. Even on the merits, we find that the
order of the High Court was justified as no prima facie
case appears to have been made out against
Respondents 1 and 2.”
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar, IAS vs. Union of
India & others, Writ Petition(s) (Criminal) No(s). 255/2021 relying
upon the decision of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal
Affairs (supra) has observed as under :-
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“The law on point as held by this Court in
“Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs,
West Bengal Vs. Mohan Singh & Ors.” reported in
SCC (1975) 3 706 is clear that dismissal of an earlier
482 petition does not bar filing of subsequent petition
under Section 482, in case the facts so justify. Needless
to say that as and when any appropriate application
under the Code is preferred by the petitioner, the same
shall be dealt with purely on its own merits without
being influenced by the dismissal of the instant writ
petition.”
10. Thus, considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the
petitioner in response to the objection raised by learned counsel for the
respondent and looking to the legal position as has been enumerated
above and also on perusal of earlier order of High Court, it is clear that
the present petitioner was not a party in the said petition and he was not
the petitioner in the same.
11. From the order and the facts considered therein, it is clear that the
quashing of the complaint case was solely on the ground that the ex post
facto application of penal provision is proper or not. The High Court
while dismissing the petition observed that at the relevant point of time, it
was not proper for the Court to enter into the factual aspect of the matter
because Court was of the opinion that prima facie only on the basis of
inter-departmental communication, if any summary is prepared, that
summary note cannot be considered the opinion and it has no legal
sanctity prima facie. The Court at that time refused to enter into the
factual aspect of the matter and observed that it can be unveiled only after
conducting the trial.
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12. It is clear from the order of High Court that the points raised before
this Court in the present petition have not been discussed and no opinion
was given by the Court on this aspect which has been argued before this
Court. Accordingly, in view of the legal position, the objection raised by
learned counsel for the respondent about maintainability of this petition,
in my opinion, is not sustainable and accordingly it is rejected and
therefore, this petition is held maintainable.
13. Further, in support of his submissions and grounds raised for
quashing the complaint case, reliance has been placed by learned counsel
for the petitioner upon a view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of
State of Haryana & Others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others reported in
AIR 1992 SC 604 in which the Supreme Court has laid down the
yardstick specifying as to under which circumstance the power under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised and criminal proceeding can be
quashed. The yardstick laid down by the Supreme Court is as under :-
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
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of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
14. As per the counsel for the petitioner, it is a case in which allegations
made against the present petitioner, though available on record but do not
constitute any offence under the provision for which offence has been
registered. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that when the allegations made against the petitioner and material
collected by the prosecution, a specific offence could have been registered
under the respective provision which is available under the Act of 2013
then there was no reason to register an offence under Section 447 of the
– 17 –
Act of 2013, especially, when allegations and material collected do
disclose that the main allegations are relating to the period when Section
447 of the Act of 2013 had no application and therefore, instead of
Section 447, the offence could have been registered under the respective
provisions which are available under the Act itself i.e Sections 185, 186
and 188 of the Act of 2013. The F.I.R. is available on record which has
been prepared on the basis of inspection done by the authority of Central
Government exercising the power provided under Section 206(5) of Act
of 2013 and at the time of inspection of books of accounts of the
company, following irregularities and illegality have been noticed :-
“WHEREAS, during the inspection of books of
accounts and financial statements of the company, it is
observed by the IO that from 30.11.2000 to 25.07.2006,
Alliance Industries Limited (a foreign entity) has made
investment of Rs. 144.18 crore by way of purchase of
shares at premium. (Out of which, Share Capital
amount is Rs.14.66 crore and Premium amount is
Rs.129.52 crore.) Further, the company under
inspection has given loans to related parties namely
P.G.H. International Pvt. Ltd and Sarvajanik
Jankalayan Parmarthik Nyas at the terms which are not
in the interest of the shareholders/company. It is
observed that 66% funds were transferred by the
company in F.Y. 2003-04 and from F.Y. 2005-06
onwards, more than 88% funds were transferred by the
company to related parties. 100% funds from the Net
worth of the company were transferred as on
31.03.2018. The rate of interest was much lesser than
the prevailing market price or the company has given
interest free loans to related parties instead of carrying
on its main business activity. Loans given to
Sarvajanik Jankalyan Parmarthik Nyas, a trust
– 18 –
registered under The M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951 are at
the interest rates 1% to 3% during 2003-04 to 2017-18
whereas prevailing market rates at that time was around
6% to 8%. Further, the loans given to related parties
namely P.G.H. International Pvt. Ltd. were Interest
free. In this manner, company has given wrongful gain
to the other related party which includes the
management of the company and wrongful loss to the
shareholders/company which tantamount to fraud.
Thus, there appears violation of Section 447 of the
Companies Act, 2013.”
15. From the aforesaid alleged irregularities, it is clear that the
provision of Section 185 of Act of 2013 is available under which it is
permissible to give loan to the directors. Section 185 of Act of 2013 reads
as under :-
“185. Loans to directors, etc. – (1) No company
shall, directly or indirectly, advance any loan,
including any loan represented by a book debt to, or
give any guarantee or provide any security in
connection with any loan taken by,–
(a) any director of company, or of a company which
is its holding company or any partner or relative of
any such director; or
(b) any firm in which any such director or relative
is a partner.
(2) A company may advance any loan including any
loan represented by a book debt, or give any
guarantee or provide any security in connection with
any loan taken by any person in whom any of the
director of the company is interested, subject to the
condition that–
(a) a special resolution is passed by the company in
general meeting:
– 19 –
Provided that the explanatory statement to the
notice for the relevant general meeting shall disclose
the full particulars of the loans given, or guarantee
given or security provided and the purpose for
which the loan or guarantee or security is proposed
to be utilised by the recipient of the loan or
guarantee or security and any other relevant fact;
and
(b) the loans are utilised by the borrowing company
for its principal business activities.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this sub-section,
the expression “any person in whom any of the
director of the company is interested” means–
(a) any private company of which any such director
is a director or member;
(b) any body corporate at a general meeting of
which not less than twenty-five per cent. of the total
voting power may be exercised or controlled by any
such director, or by two or more such directors,
together; or
(c) any body corporate, the Board of directors,
managing director or manager, whereof is
accustomed to act in accordance with the directions
or instructions of the Board, or of any director or
directors, of the lending company.
(3) Nothing contained in sub-sections (1) and (2)
shall apply to–
(a) the giving of any loan to a managing or whole-
time director–
(i) as a part of the conditions of service extended by
the company to all its employees; or
(ii) pursuant to any scheme approved by the
members by a special resolution; or
(b) a company which in the ordinary course of its
business provides loans or gives guarantees or
– 20 –
securities for the due repayment of any loan and in
respect of such loans an interest is charged at a rate
not less than the rate of prevailing yield of one year,
three year, five year or ten year Government
security closest to the tenor of the loan; or
(c) any loan made by a holding company to its
wholly owned subsidiary company or any guarantee
given or security provided by a holding company in
respect of any loan made to its wholly owned
subsidiary company; or
(d) any guarantee given or security provided by a
holding company in respect of loan made by any
bank or financial institution to its subsidiary
company:
Provided that the loans made under clauses (c)
and (d) are utilised by the subsidiary company for
its principal business activities.
(4) If any loan is advanced or a guarantee or security
is given or provided or utilised in contravention of
the provisions of this section,–
(i) the company shall be punishable with fine which
shall not be less than five lakh rupees but which
may extend to twenty-five lakh rupees;
(ii) every officer of the company who is in default
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months or with fine which
shall not be less than five lakh rupees but which
may extend to twenty-five lakh rupees; and
(iii) the director or the other person to whom any
loan is advanced or guarantee or security is given or
provided in connection with any loan taken by him
or the other person, shall be punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to six months or
with fine which shall not be less than five lakh
– 21 –
rupees but which may extend to twenty-five lakh
rupees, or with both.”
16. Further, the Act itself provides and made permissible for the
company to provide loan and make investment. As such, Section 186 also
provides the rate of interest on which loan can be granted and as pointed
out by learned counsel for the petitioner that if any violation and
contravention of the prescribed procedure for granting loan and
investment by the company is done, the Section itself provides
mechanism to punish the defaulter and penal provision i.e. sub section 13
of section 186 is very specific. It is also apt to reproduce Section 186 of
Act of 2013, which reads as under :-
“186. Loan and investment by company.–(1)
Without prejudice to the provisions contained in this
Act, a company shall unless otherwise prescribed,
make investment through not more than two layers of
investment companies:
Provided that the provisions of this sub-section shall
not affect,–
(i) a company from acquiring any other company
incorporated in a country outside India if such other
company has investment subsidiaries beyond two
layers as per the laws of such country;
(ii) a subsidiary company from having any
investment subsidiary for the purposes of meeting the
requirements under any law or under any rule or
regulation framed under any law for the time being in
force.
(2) No company shall directly or indirectly–
(a) give any loan to any person or other body
corporate;
– 22 –
(b) give any guarantee or provide security in
connection with a loan to any other body corporate or
person; and
(c) acquire by way of subscription, purchase or
otherwise, the securities of any other body corporate,
exceeding sixty per cent of its paid-up share capital,
free reserves and securities premium account or one
hundred per cent of its free reserves and securities
premium account, whichever is more.
[Explanation.–For the purposes of this sub-section,
the word “person” does not include any individual who
is in the employment of the company.]
[(3) Where the aggregate of the loans and
investment so far made, the amount for which
guarantee or security so far provided to or in all other
bodies corporate alongwith the investment, loan,
guarantee or security proposed to be made or given by
the Board, exceed the limits specified under sub-
section (2), no investment or loan shall be made or
guarantee shall be given or security shall be provided
unless previously authorised by a special resolution
passed in a general meeting:
Provided that where a loan or guarantee is given or
where a security has been provided by a company to its
wholly owned subsidiary company or a joint venture
company, or acquisition is made by a holding company,
by way of subscription, purchase or otherwise of, the
securities of its wholly owned subsidiary company, the
requirement of this sub-section shall not apply:
Provided further that the company shall disclose the
details of such loans or guarantee or security or
acquisition in the financial statement as provided under
sub-section (4).]
(4) The company shall disclose to the members in the
financial statement the full particulars of the loans
– 23 –
given, investment made or guarantee given or security
provided and the purpose for which the loan or
guarantee or security is proposed to be utilised by the
recipient of the loan or guarantee or security.
(5) No investment shall be made or loan or guarantee
or security given by the company unless the resolution
sanctioning it is passed at a meeting of the Board with
the consent of all the directors present at the meeting
and the prior approval of the public financial institution
concerned where any term loan is subsisting, is
obtained:
Provided that prior approval of a public financial
institution shall not be required where the aggregate of
the loans and investments so far made, the amount for
which guarantee or security so far provided to or in all
other bodies corporate, alongwith the investments,
loans, guarantee or security proposed to be made or
given does not exceed the limit as specified in sub-
section (2), and there is no default in repayment of loan
instalments or payment of interest thereon as per the
terms and conditions of such loan to the public
financial institution.
(6) No company, which is registered under Section 12
of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act,
1992 (15 of 1992) and covered under such class or
classes of companies as may be prescribed, shall take
inter-corporate loan or deposits exceeding the
prescribed limit and such company shall furnish in its
financial statement the details of the loan or deposits.
(7) No loan shall be given under this section at a rate of
interest lower than the prevailing yield of one year,
three year, five year or ten year Government Security
closest to the tenor of the loan.
(8) No company which is in default in the repayment of
any deposits accepted before or after the
– 24 –
commencement of this Act or in payment of interest
thereon, shall give any loan or give any guarantee or
provide any security or make an acquisition till such
default is subsisting.
(9) Every company giving loan or giving a guarantee or
providing security or making an acquisition under this
section shall keep a register which shall contain such
particulars and shall be maintained in such manner as
may be prescribed.
(10) The register referred to in sub-section (9) shall be
kept at the registered office of the company and —
(a) shall be open to inspection at such office; and
(b) extracts may be taken therefrom by any member,
and copies thereof may be furnished to any member of
the company on payment of such fees as may be
prescribed.
[(11) Nothing contained in this section, except sub-
section (1), shall apply–
(a) to any loan made, any guarantee given or any
security provided or any investment made by a banking
company, or an insurance company, or a housing
finance company in the ordinary course of its business,
or a company established with the object of and
engaged in the business of financing industrial
enterprises, or of providing infrastructural facilities;
(b) to any investment–
(i) made by an investment company;
(ii) made in shares allotted in pursuance of clause
(a) of sub-section (1) of Section 62 or in shares allotted
in pursuance of rights issues made by a body corporate;
(iii) made, in respect of investment or lending
activities, by a non-banking financial company
registered under Chapter III-B of the Reserve Bank of
India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934) and whose principal
business is acquisition of securities.]
– 25 –
(12) The Central Government may make rules for the
purposes of this section.
(13) If a company contravenes the provisions of this
section, the company shall be punishable with fine
which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand
rupees but which may extend to five lakh rupees and
every officer of the company who is in default shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to two years and with fine which shall not be
less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may
extend to one lakh rupees.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section,–
(a) the expression “investment company” means a
company whose principal business is the acquisition of
shares, debentures or other securities [and a company
will be deemed to be principally engaged in the
business of acquisition of shares, debentures or other
securities, if its assets in the form of investment in
shares, debentures or other securities constitute not less
than fifty per cent of its total assets, or if its income
derived from investment business constitutes not less
than fifty per cent as a proportion of its gross income;]
(b) the expression “infrastructure facilities” means
the facilities specified in Schedule VI”
17. Section 188 of the Act of 2013 also permits related party
transactions. That provision is also material so far the alleged transactions
of the company referred in the FIR are concerned and the said provision
also provides penal provision. Section 188, thus, prescribes as under :-
“188. Related party transactions.–(1) Except with
the consent of the Board of Directors given by a
resolution at a meeting of the Board and subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed, no company shall
– 26 –
enter into any contract or arrangement with a related
party with respect to–
(a) sale, purchase or supply of any goods or materials;
(b) selling or otherwise disposing of, or buying,
property of any kind;
(c) leasing of property of any kind;
(d) availing or rendering of any services;
(e) appointment of any agent for purchase or sale of
goods, materials, services or property;
(f) such related party’s appointment to any office or
place of profit in the company, its subsidiary company
or associate company; and
(g) underwriting the subscription of any securities or
derivatives thereof, of the company:
Provided that no contract or arrangement, in the case
of a company having a paid-up share capital of not less
than such amount, or transactions not exceeding such
sums, as may be prescribed, shall be entered into
except with the prior approval of the company by a
[resolution]:
Provided further that no member of the company
shall vote on such 295[resolution], to approve any
contract or arrangement which may be entered into by
the company, if such member is a related party:
[Provided also that nothing contained in the second
proviso shall apply to a company in which ninety per
cent or more members, in number, are relatives of
promoters or are related parties:]
Provided also that nothing in this sub-section shall
apply to any transactions entered into by the company
in its ordinary course of business other than
transactions which are not on an arm’s length basis:
[Provided also that the requirement of passing the
resolution under first proviso shall not be applicable for
transactions entered into between a holding company
– 27 –
and its wholly owned subsidiary whose accounts are
consolidated with such holding company and placed
before the shareholders at the general meeting for
approval.]
Explanation.– In this sub-section,–
(a) the expression “office or place of profit” means any
office or place–
(i) where such office or place is held by a director, if
the director holding it receives from the company
anything by way of remuneration over and above the
remuneration to which he is entitled as director, by way
of salary, fee, commission, perquisites, any rent-free
accommodation, or otherwise;
(ii) where such office or place is held by an individual
other than a director or by any firm, private company
or other body corporate, if the individual, firm, private
company or body corporate holding it receives from the
company anything by way of remuneration, salary, fee,
commission, perquisites, any rent-free accommodation,
or otherwise;
(b) the expression “arm’s length transaction” means a
transaction between two related parties that is
conducted as if they were unrelated, so that there is no
conflict of interest.
(2) Every contract or arrangement entered into under
sub-section (1) shall be referred to in the Board’s report
to the shareholders alongwith the justification for
entering into such contract or arrangement.
(3) Where any contract or arrangement is entered into
by a director or any other employee, without obtaining
the consent of the Board or approval by a [resolution]
in the general meeting under sub-section (1) and if it is
not ratified by the Board or, as the case may be, by the
shareholders at a meeting within three months from the
date on which such contract or arrangement was
– 28 –
entered into, such contract or arrangement [shall be
voidable at the option of the Board or, as the case may
be, of the shareholders] and if the contract or
arrangement is with a related party to any director, or is
authorised by any other director, the directors
concerned shall indemnify the company against any
loss incurred by it.
(4) Without prejudice to anything contained in sub-
section (3), it shall be open to the company to proceed
against a director or any other employee who had
entered into such contract or arrangement in
contravention of the provisions of this section for
recovery of any loss sustained by it as a result of such
contract or arrangement.
(5) Any director or any other employee of a company,
who had entered into or authorised the contract or
arrangement in violation of the provisions of this
section shall,–
(i) in case of listed company, be 300[liable to a penalty
of twenty-five lakh rupees]; and
(ii) in case of any other company, be 301[liable to a
penalty of five lakh rupees].”
18. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, Section 447 has been
introduced by way of amendment in the Act of 2013 and in earlier Act,
there was no such provision like Section 447. Therefore, it is apt to
reproduce Section 447, which reads as under :-
“447. Punishment for fraud.– Without prejudice to
any liability including repayment of any debt under this
Act or any other law for the time being in force, any
person who is found to be guilty of fraud, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than six months but which may extend to
ten years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not
– 29 –
be less than the amount involved in the fraud, but
which may extend to three times the amount involved
in the fraud:
Provided that where the fraud in question involves
public interest, the term of imprisonment shall not be
less than three years.
[Provided further that where the fraud involves an
amount less than ten lakh rupees or one per cent. of the
turnover of the company, whichever is lower, and does
not involve public interest, any person guilty of such
fraud shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to five years or with fine which may
extend to [fifty lakh rupees] or with both.]
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section–
(i) “fraud” in relation to affairs of a company or any
body corporate, includes any act, omission,
concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed
by any person or any other person with the connivance
in any manner, with intent to deceive, to gain undue
advantage from, or to injure the interests of, the
company or its shareholders or its creditors or any
other person, whether or not there is any wrongful gain
or wrongful loss;
(ii) “wrongful gain” means the gain by unlawful means
of property to which the person gaining is not legally
entitled;
(iii) “wrongful loss” means the loss by unlawful means
of property to which the person losing is legally
entitled.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out that the
element of fraud was introduced first time in the year 2013 and fraud
itself has been defined with the explanation attached with proviso of
Section 447 but looking to the alleged irregularity, offence of fraud is not
– 30 –
made out and secondly for the transaction which took place prior to 2013,
retrospective application under Section 447 cannot be made.
20. Shri Pushpendra Yadav, learned counsel appearing for respondent
has submitted that the transaction which is found to be illegal and Section
447 has been applied, cannot be confined to the period prior to
enforcement of Section 447 but since it continued even after period of
enforcement of Section 447 and that was done for wrongful gain
therefore, offence of Section 447 has rightly been registered against the
petitioner and he submits that it was a question of trial and therefore,
nothing wrong has been done and this Court, at this stage, cannot examine
this aspect.
21. The Karnataka High Court in the case of Srividya C.G. vs. Serious
Fraud Investigation Office (W.P. No.4380 of 2018) has considered the
applicability of Section 447 of the Act of 2013 and put the confusion at
rest and held that no such offence shall be tried under Act of 2013 which
had been committed at the time when Act of 2013 was not even in force
rather such offence shall be deemed to be prosecuted under the old Act
only. The observation made by the Court is as follows :-
“61. The alleged offences were purportedly committed
during the period when the Companies Act of 1956 was
in effect. The initiation of legal proceedings under
Section 36, in conjunction with Sections 447 and 448
of the 2013 Act, lacks legal authority. The petitioners
cannot be prosecuted for actions that were not deemed
punishable under the provisions of the 1956 Act. This
purported action violates Article 20, Sub Clause 1 of
the Constitution of India, which safeguards against
retrospective criminalization.”
– 31 –
The Court also observed that Article 20(1) of the Constitution of
India provides so and prescribes as under :-
“20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences.-
(1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except
for violation of a law in force at the time of the
commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be
subjected to a penalty greater than that which might
have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of
the commission of the offence.”
22. Notably, the pyramid of submissions made on behalf of the
respondent is based on three pillars. Primarily about the maintainability of
the petition; secondarily, about the applicability of Section 447 on the
basis of continuous offence and transactions made as per the complaint
even after enforcement of the Act, 2013 and tertiary, that at this stage this
court should not exercise the powers enshrined under Section 482 of
CrPC and should be left for the trial court.
23. For fathoming the depth of above threefold submissions, on the face
of record and legal position already set at rest, which would definitely
navigate the path, I find it apposite to deal with the submissions one-by-
one in the following manner:-
(i) So far as the submission about maintainability of the petition is
concerned, this court has already observed in foregoing paragraphs that
the petition is maintainable.
(ii) As far as applicability of the provisions of Section 447 of Act, 2013
is concerned, I am not convinced with the submission made at the behest
of the respondent that it is a continuous offence even after the year 2013
and therefore Section 447 has rightly been applied. From the allegations
– 32 –
made, it is clear that the Investigating Officer did take note of transactions
made from 30.11.2000 to 25.07.2006 and also the transactions of
Financial Year 2003-04 and Financial Year 2005-06 and further
transactions made upto the year 2017-18. The allegations made in the FIR
do confirm that it is not a continuous offence inasmuch as the transactions
made in different years. The definition of Financial Year under the old
Companies Act, 1956 is prescribed in Section 2(17), wherein it is
provided that the period in respect of which any profit or loss account of
the body corporate laid before it in annual general meeting is made up,
whether that period is a year or not. Moreso, as per the ‘Financial Year’
as defined under Section 2(41) of Act, 2013, it is clear that the period
ending on 31st of March of every year. Thus, it can profitably be held that
it is not a continuous offence. My view takes strength from the view taken
by the Supreme Court in the case of Udai Shankar Awasthi vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and another (2013) 2 SCC 435, wherein the Supreme
court has considered the aspect of continuous offence and came to
observe as under:-
“Continuing offence
23. Section 472 CrPC provides that in case of a
continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation begins
to run at every moment of the time period during which
the offence continues. The expression “continuing
offence” has not been defined in CrPC because it is one
of those expressions which does not have a fixed
connotation, and therefore, the formula of universal
application cannot be formulated in this respect.
24. In Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree
Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan [AIR 1959 SC 798]
– 33 –
AIR p. 807, para 31 this Court dealt with the
aforementioned issue, and observed that a continuing
offence is an act which creates a continuing source of
injury, and renders the doer of the act responsible and
liable for the continuation of the said injury. In case a
wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there
is no continuing wrong even though the damage
resulting from the said act may continue. If the
wrongful act is of such character that the injury caused
by it itself continues, then the said act constitutes a
continuing wrong. The distinction between the two
wrongs therefore depends upon the effect of the injury.
In the said case, the Court dealt with a case of a
wrongful act of forcible ouster, and held that the
resulting injury caused was complete at the date of the
ouster itself, and therefore there was no scope for the
application of Section 23 of the Limitation Act in
relation to the said case.
25. In Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. Dundayya
Gurushiddaiah Hiremath [(1991) 2 SCC 141 : 1991
SCC (Cri) 315] this Court dealt with the issue and held
as under :
“7. … According to Black’s Law Dictionary, [5th Edn.
(Special Deluxe)], ‘continuing’ means ‘enduring; not
terminated by a single act or fact; subsisting for a
definite period or intended to cover or apply to
successive similar obligations or occurrences’.
Continuing offence means ‘type of crime which is
committed over a span of time’. As to period of statute
of limitation in a continuing offence, the last act of the
offence controls for commencement of the period. ‘A
continuing offence, such that only the last act thereof
within the period of the statute of limitations need be
alleged in the indictment or information, is one which
– 34 –
may consist of separate acts or a course of conduct but
which arises from that singleness of thought, purpose
or action which may be deemed a single impulse’. So
also a ‘continuous crime’ means ‘one consisting of a
continuous series of acts, which endures after the
period of consummation, as, the offence of carrying
concealed weapons. In the case of instantaneous
crimes, the statute of limitation begins to run with the
consummation, while in the case of continuous crimes
it only begins with the cessation of the criminal
conduct or act.'”
On the anvil of above legal touchstone, it becomes clear like a noon
day that each and every offence committed in different Financial Years,
on the face of allegations made in the complaint, the offence committed
after enforcement of the Act, 2013 cannot be consolidated and tried under
Section 447 of Act, 2013. Ergo, the Financial Year prior to Act, 2013 can
be treated differently to that of Financial Year as defined in the Act, 2013.
Especially, the transactions as have been considered by this court
hereinabove can be tried under specific provision available under Act,
2013 itself and also available in the old Companies Act, 1956 with the
penal provision. As such, it is testified that the respondent has utterly
committed illegality in setting the sails of trial proposing to apply Section
447 retrospectively.
Over and above, the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner
of Income Tax (Central)-1, New Delhi vs. Vatika Township Private
Limited (2015) 1 SCC 1 dealing with the provisions of Income Tax Act,
has observed as under :-
“General principles concerning retrospectivity
– 35 –
27. A legislation, be it a statutory Act or a statutory
rule or a statutory notification, may physically consists
of words printed on papers. However, conceptually it is
a great deal more than an ordinary prose. There is a
special peculiarity in the mode of verbal
communication by a legislation. A legislation is not just
a series of statements, such as one finds in a work of
fiction/non-fiction or even in a judgment of a court of
law. There is a technique required to draft a legislation
as well as to understand a legislation. Former technique
is known as legislative drafting and latter one is to be
found in the various principles of “interpretation of
statutes”. Vis-à-vis ordinary prose, a legislation differs
in its provenance, layout and features as also in the
implication as to its meaning that arise by presumptions
as to the intent of the maker thereof.
28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has
to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a
contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed
not to be intended to have a retrospective operation.
The idea behind the rule is that a current law should
govern current activities. Law passed today cannot
apply to the events of the past. If we do something
today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in
force and not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it.
Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the
bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange
his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not
find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This
principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit :
law looks forward not backward. As was observed in
Phillips v. Eyre [(1870) LR 6 QB 1] , a retrospective
legislation is contrary to the general principle that
legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be
regulated when introduced for the first time to deal
– 36 –
with future acts ought not to change the character of
past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then
existing law.
29. The obvious basis of the principle against
retrospectivity is the principle of “fairness”, which
must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in
L’Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-
Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [(1994) 1 AC 486 :
(1994) 2 WLR 39 : (1994) 1 All ER 20 (HL)] Thus,
legislations which modified accrued rights or which
impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a
new disability have to be treated as prospective unless
the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a
retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose
of supplying an obvious omission in a former
legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need
not note the cornucopia of case law available on the
subject because aforesaid legal position clearly
emerges from the various decisions and this legal
position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In
any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing
this dicta, a little later.”
In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that trying offence by the
respondent under Section 447 applying the same retrospectively, is
apparently illegal and it can be considered to be a malicious prosecution.
Essentially, when the prosecution has come under the shadow of malice,
the Supreme Court has already engrafted yardsticks in the case of Bhajan
Lal (supra). In view of the thoughtful yardsticks formulated by the
Supreme Court, which make me undoubtedly unhesitant to hold that the
prosecution in the case at hand is not sustainable in the eyes of law and
– 37 –
such proceedings can be quashed by this court exercising the power
provided under Section 482 of CrPC.
(iii) So far as the third submission made on behalf of the respondent
about exercising power by this court at this stage is also not sustainable
inasmuch as it is a settled principle of law that if on the basis of
allegations contained in FIR, the court finds considering the same to be
true at its face value, the offence registered is not formulated and
prosecution can be considered to be malicious prosecution, same can be
quashed.
24. In view of the above discourse, this petition is allowed. The
proceedings of Complaint Case No. SC/12/2021 pending in the Court of
XVIII District & Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal are hereby quashed.
25. The petition is, accordingly, allowed.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
PK
PARITOSH
Digitally signed by PARITOSH KUMAR
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, ou=HIGH COURT
OF MADHYA PRADESH,
2.5.4.20=43c946b45c8a66c03b68676e788802a41cc03b5b9567caf9
KUMAR
c2c3b981b8cb6596, postalCode=482001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=678DC301994B496012A9643D92E6C6335F11A93DA
54F2DFB6E44B8B7A45044FC, cn=PARITOSH KUMAR
Date: 2024.12.20 18:45:28 +05’30’