Punam Kumari Sharma vs The State Of Bihar on 2 May, 2025

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Supreme Court – Daily Orders

Punam Kumari Sharma vs The State Of Bihar on 2 May, 2025

Bench: J.K. Maheshwari, Aravind Kumar

     ITEM NO.29                             COURT NO.6                SECTION XVI

                                 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
                                           RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

                         Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 5722/2025

     [Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 20-01-2025
     in IA No. 46/2019 in SA No. 502/2018 passed by the High Court of
     Judicature at Patna]

     PUNAM KUMARI SHARMA                                                 Petitioner(s)

                                                    VERSUS

     THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.                                           Respondent(s)

     (FOR ADMISSION)
     (IA No. 49183/2025 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)

     Date : 02-05-2025 This matter was called on for hearing today.

     CORAM :
                             HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.K. MAHESHWARI
                             HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR

     For Petitioner(s):
                                       Mr. Aditya Shankar Prasad, Adv.
                                       Mr. Vatsalya Vigya, AOR
                                       Mr. Shahrukh Ahmad, Adv.
                                       Ms. Poorvi Shukla, Adv.

     For Respondent(s):

                              UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                                                 O R D E R

1. Application for condonation of delay which has been allowed by

the High Court has been challenged in these proceedings.

2. Having considered the submissions made by the learned Advocate

appearing for the petitioner, we are not inclined to entertain this
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
NIDHI AHUJA
special leave petition for the simple reason that the High Court
Date: 2025.05.07
17:26:45 IST
Reason:

while exercising the discretionary relief by condoning the delay

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SLP (C) No. 5722/2025
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred

to as ‘1963 Act’) has found sufficient and cogent reasons has been

offered by the applicants. The Courts while examining the plea for

condonation of delay, would not consider the length of delay, but

the cause shown for such delay. If the cause shown is sufficient,

irrespective of the period of delay, same would be condoned. On the

other hand, if the cause shown would not fall within the definition

of sufficient cause, irrespective of the length of delay, same

would not be condoned.

3. At this juncture, we are reminded of the judgment of this

Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and

Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others (1987) 2 SCC 107 whereunder this

Court held:

“3. The legislature has conferred the power to
condone delay XXX in the hierarchy. And such a
liberal approach is adopted on principle as it
is realized that: –

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in
a meritorious matter being thrown out at
the very threshold and cause of justice
being defeated. As against this when delay
is condoned the highest that can happen is
that a cause would be decided on merits
after hearing the parties.

3. “Every day’s delay must be explained”
does not mean that a pedantic approach
should be made. Why not every hour’s delay
every second’s delay? The doctrine must be
applied in a rational common sense
pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each
other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in
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SLP (C) No. 5722/2025
injustice being done because of a non-
deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is
occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of mala
fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit
by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a
serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to
legalize injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.

4. No litigant would stand to benefit by approaching the Courts

belatedly. In the instant case, when the facts on hand are

examined by applying the principles enunciated by this Court

referred to supra, it would emerge from the records that the cause

shown for delay is that the applicant not having been made a party

to the suit and in the appellate proceedings and also feigning,

ignorance about knowledge of judgment and decree or in other words

it was contended that the applicant had no knowledge about the

impugned judgment and decree. Hence, applicant sought for condoning

the delay in filing second appeal. It was also contended that

plaintiffs being conversant with the fact that the applicant was a

necessary and proper party to the suit, yet they had not arrayed

the applicants as party to the proceedings in the original suit as

well as in the appeal before the High Court. In this factual

background the High Court has accepted the cause shown for delay in

filing the second appeal by condoning the delay. Hence, it would

not detain us too long to reject the present special leave petition

and also for the simple reason that undisputably Public Works

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SLP (C) No. 5722/2025
Department (road construction department) was made a party and only

in the execution proceedings or in other words was impleaded as

additional judgment debtor. This Court in order to ascertain as to

whether at the first instance namely even prior to the institution

of suit while issuing legal notice under Section 80 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 plaintiff had got issued notice to the

applicant we had extended an opportunity to the petitioner herein

to place the same on record. However, it has not seen the light of

the day. In the absence thereof and in view of the fact that

applicant before the High Court in second appeal was neither a

defendant nor the respondent before the trial Court and the

appellate Court respectively seems to have shown good and

sufficient cause for not having filed second appeal on time. Hence,

we have no hesitation to hold that the delay that has been condoned

by the High Court is for just and sufficient cause as envisaged

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

5. The said discretion which has been exercised by the High Court

is based on sound principles of law and the facts obtained in the

instant case would not call for interference at the hands of this

Court. Hence the special leave petition is dismissed. Pending

application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(NIDHI AHUJA)                                           (NAND KISHOR)
  AR-cum-PS                                          ASSISTANT REGISTRAR




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