[ad_1]
Chattisgarh High Court
Chhattisgarh Mineral Development … vs Bharat Aluminum Company Limited … on 6 May, 2025
1
SUNITA
GOSWAMI
Digitally signed
by SUNITA
GOSWAMI 2025:CGHC:20693-DB
Date: 2025.05.07
10:39:10 +0530 NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ARBA No. 22 of 2025
Chhattisgarh Mineral Development Corporation Through Its Managing
Director, Having Its Registered Office At Section-724, Office Complex, Block-
7A, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, (C.G.).
... Appellant
versus
Bharat Aluminum Company Limited (BALCO) Balco Nagar, Korba Having Its
Registered Office At Aluminum Sadan, Core-6, Scope Office Complex, Lodhi
Road, New Delhi Through Its Chief Executive Officer And Whole Time
Director, Balco Nagar, P.S.- Balco Nagar, District- Korba, 495684,
Chhattisgarh
---- Respondent
For Appellant : Shri Sharad Mishra, Advocate
For Respondent : Shri Manoj Paranjape, Advocate
appears along with Shri Anshul Tiwari,
Advocate
Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal
Order on Board.
06.05.2025
Per Sanjay S. Agrawal, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant- Chhattisgarh Mineral
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Corporation’)
questioning the legality and propriety of the order dated 14.08.2024
2
passed by the Commercial Court (District Judge Level), Raipur (CG), in
Arbitration MJC No.48 of 2024, whereby, the application preferred by
the Corporation under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1996’), has been rejected.
2. From perusal of the record, it appears that an award was passed by the
Sole Arbitrator on 29.10.2023 and, being aggrieved with the same, an
application under Section 34 (3) of the Act, 1996 was made by the
Corporation on 05.08.2024. It is an undisputed fact that the copy of the
award, delivered on 29.10.2023, was received on the same day by the
Corporation and, therefore, the limitation of three months as provided
under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act, 1996 would commence
from the date when the copy of the same was received by the
Corporation, i.e. 29.10.2023. However, the alleged application was
made by the Corporation on 05.08.2024. It was, thus, delayed by more
than 9 months from the date of receiving the copy of the said Award,
dated 29.10.2023. In view of the provision prescribed under sub-
section (3) of Section 34 of the Act, 1996, the statutory period of three
months would, therefore, come to an end on 28 th January, 2024 and,
by virtue of the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34, the reasons for
delay in filing the said application could be considered at the most for
the further period of 30 days after the expiry of the said statutory period
of three months, “but not thereafter”, as provided under the said
proviso. Since the application was made on 05.08.2024, i.e. much
beyond the further period of 30 days after the expiry of the three
months statutory period provided under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of
3
the Act, 1996, therefore, in the light of the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in the matter of Simplex Infrastructure Limited Vs.
Union of India, reported in (2019) 2 SCC 455, the alleged delay
cannot be considered, as while interpreting the said provision, it was
held at paragraph 18 as under :-
“18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with
the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows
that the application for setting aside the award on
the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 34 could be made within three months and
the period can only be extended for a further
period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause
and not thereafter. The use of the words “but not
thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that the
extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Even if
the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is
given to the respondent, there will still be a delay
of 131 days in filing the application. That is beyond
the strict timelines prescribed in sub-section (3)
read along with the proviso to Section 34 of the
1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be
condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to
breach a clear statutory mandate”.
3. Similar is the view taken recently by the Supreme Court in the matter
of My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. And
Another Vs. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 70, where at paragraph 37, it has been held as under :-
4
“37. Conclusion : For the reasons set forth above,
the application preferred by the appellant under
Section 34 of the ACA stands dismissed as it was
filed beyond the condonable period of 30 days,
which conclusively and absolutely expired on
28.06.2022”.
4. In view of the facts involved in the matter and in view of the principles
laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the above referred matters,
we, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order impugned passed by
the Commercial Court (District Judge Level), Raipur in Arbitration MJC
No.48 of 2024, rejecting the application of the Corporation made under
Section 34 (3) of the Act, 1996 for the condonation of delay in filing the
same, so as to call for any interference in this appeal.
5. The appeal being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed at the
admission stage itself.
No order as to costs)
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal)
Judge Judge
sunita
[ad_2]
Source link