Chattisgarh High Court
Raju Prasad Kewat vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 1 May, 2025
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2025:CGHC:20004
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 100 of 2005
1 - Raju Prasad Kewat 1, S/o Ram Ratan Kewat, aged about 26 years, R/o village Munund P.
S. Janjgir Tahsil & District Janjgir- Champa.
... Appellant
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant : Mr. Leekesh Kumar & Mr. Avishek Bharti, Advocates
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Abhishek Singh, P. L.
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judgment on Board
01/05/2025
1. This is an appeal preferred by the accused/appellants under Section 374 (2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment impugned dated
25.01.2005 passed by learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) Janjgir
(CG) in Sessions Trial No. 305/2004. By the impugned judgment, the
appellant was convicted under Section 304-B of IPC and sentenced him to
undergo RI for 7 years.
2. Fact of the case in nutshell is that the marriage of the deceased was
solemnized with the appellant about a year before the incident. On 10.06.2004,
at noon, the deceased was burnt in her house in a fire. She was taken to
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District Hospital, Janjgir. From where, the Police was informed thereafter the
doctor advised to get deceased treated in Bilaspur. While taking her to
Bilaspur, the deceased died on the way. She was again taken back to Janjgir
Hospital. On the basis of the information from the hospital, the Police went to
the place of the incident and sealed the room. The panchanama of the dead
body was prepared by the Executive Magistrate and dead body was examined
by the doctor. The deceased died due to burning. During the investigation, it
was found that the deceased was subjected to cruelty on account of demand of
dowry, therefore, a case was registered against the appellant. The completion of
investigation resulting in filing of charge-sheet followed by framing of charge
under Section 304-B IPC. The accused/appellants however, denied the charge
framed against him and claimed for trial.
3. So as to establish its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 18
witnesses and exhibited 25 documents. The statement of the accused/appellant
under Section 313 CrPC was also recorded where he pleaded his innocence
and false implication in the case.
4. By the judgment impugned learned Court below has held the
accused/appellant guilty and imposed the sentence as described above which is
challenged before this Court by the appellant.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the prosecution was not able to
bring home the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. He
submits that in order to establish the guilt under Section 304-B IPC, the
prosecution was required to establish that the allegation of harassment on
account or in connection with demand of dowry has to be in close proximity
leading to the unnatural death of the deceased. In the case in hand, the
prosecution miserably failed to establish the same, therefore, the presumption
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under Section 113-B of Evidence Act (for short “Evidence Act“) will not come
into play even otherwise the appellant has been able to rebut the presumption.
He submits that learned trial Court placed reliance upon the statement of
brother of the deceased (PW-6) to sustain conviction and gave a finding of
conviction which is absolutely perverse and contrary to the record. He also
submits that until and unless the ingredients to constitute offence under
Section 304-B IPC is proved, no presumption can be drawn against the
appellant, therefore, the appeal may be allowed by acquitting the appellant.
6. Per contra learned counsel for the State supports the impugned judgment and
submits that from the evidence of PW-6, the allegations of cruelty meted out to
the deceased Sonmati on account of demand of dowry soon before her death is
clearly established. He submits that soon before the death would not ipso facto
mean that immediately before the death. He submits that there has to be
proximity and nearness from the cruelty meted out and the death of the
deceased. The prosecution was able to bring home the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record
including the impugned judgment.
8. Death of the deceased within 7 years of marriage is not in dispute and she died
an unnatural death by burning is also not in dispute. It has to be seen that
whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty on account of demand of dowry
soon before her death has been proved or not. The learned trial Court has
basically relied upon the statement of Mannu (PW-6) brother of the deceased
who in his statement stated that he was told by the deceased in a marriage that
the appellant says about dowry and commits Marpeet with her, thereafter the
trial Court applied presumption of Section 113 A and 113 B of Evidence Act
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and came to a conclusion that the deceased died an unnatural death within one
year of marriage and held that the case of prosecution was proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Karan Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 2025
INSC 133 held as under:-
6. The following are the essential ingredients of Section 304-B:
a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or
bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal
circumstances;
b) The death must have been caused within seven years of her
marriage;
c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or
harassment by the husband or any relative of her husband; and
d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry.
7. If the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the death can be called
a dowry death, and the husband and/or husband’s relative, as the case may
be, shall be deemed to have caused the dowry death. Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides that dowry means any property or
valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by
one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the parents
of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to the other party to
the marriage or to any other person. The dowry must be given or agreed to
be given at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the
marriage of the said parties. The term valuable security used in Section 2
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has the same meaning as in Section 30
of IPC.
8. In this case, there is no dispute that the death of the appellant’s wife
occurred within seven years of the marriage. Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act reads thus:
“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is
whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman
5and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been
subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume
that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-For
the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same
meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
The presumption under Section 113-B will apply when it is established that
soon before her death, the woman has been subjected by the accused to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.
Therefore, even for attracting Section 113-B, the prosecution must establish
that the deceased was subjected by the appellant to cruelty or harassment
for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death.
Unless these facts are proved, the presumptions under Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act cannot be invoked.
10. The star witness which the learned trial Court is relied upon is the brother of
the deceased (PW-6). Prior to this, prosecution examined Shukvara Bai (PW-
1)- the mother of the victim. In her statement she simply stated that whenever
the deceased used to come to her house she used to state that the appellant
suspects on her character, thereafter nothing has been stated about cruelty on
account of demand of dowry soon before her death. PW-2 Sukhiram is the
brother-in-law of the deceased who also not speaks anything against the
appellant and this witness has not supported the case of the prosecution with
regard to demand of dowry. PW-3 is Rambai who is the Kotwar also does not
throw any light on the factum of any cruelty. PW-4 Dhananjay Rathore stated
that when he reached to the place of incident, deceased has already burnt, she
was in critical condition and PW-3 asked the deceased as to how she got burnt,
she replied that she does not want to live. Thereafter the deceased was taken to
hospital where she died.
11. This leads me to important witness PW-6- brother of the deceased. In Para 2
he stated that when the deceased Sonmati met him in younger brother’s
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marriage, then she told that the appellant says about the dowry and commits
marpeet with her. In cross examination he is not able to tell as to what date and
time the marriage of younger brother took place. He also stated that the factum
of beating the deceased on account of demand of dowry has not been disclosed
by him to anybody. He also admits that in the marriage of his brother, the
appellant and her sister (deceased) had also come and he never asked the
appellant with regard to Marpeet done with her sister. He also admits that he
never made any complaint in the Police Station with regard to assault and
demand of dowry from her sister. Basically as reading of the statement it
appears that in one particular instance it is stated by the deceased to him that
the appellant says about demand and commits the assault but this witness is
not particular as to when the demand was done and simply one line statement
would not sufficient enough to constitute a cruelty on account of demand of
dowry. Even the mother, brother-in-law and another persons have not spoken
anything against the appellant with regard to demand of dowry. Therefore, the
prosecution was not able to prove the ingredients of Section 304 B of IPC,
once it is failed to prove the presumption drawn by learned trial Court cannot
be drawn by it and the conviction of the appellant on such flimsy evidence
cannot sustain.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Tarsem Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported
in (2008) 16 SCC 155 in Para 21 held as under:-
“21. What the High Court failed to notice in arriving at the said findings is that
no evidence was brought on record to show that the cruelty or harassment was
meted out to her for bringing insufficient dowry, in absence whereof the
ingredients of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code cannot be said to have
been proved. The legal fiction sought to be created must be raised only on
fulfillment of the conditions precedent therefor. All the requisite ingredients of
the offence must be brought home before the presumptive evidence is put to use
by the court for holding the accused guilty of an offence under Section 304B of
the Indian Penal Code.”
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13. Likewise in the case of Kaliyaperumal and Another Vs. State of Tamil
Nadu reported in (2004) 9 SCC 157 Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 5 held as
under:-
“5. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and
Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon
before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment.
The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or
accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the “death
occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances”. The expression
“soon before” is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is
obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or
harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in
that regard has to be led in by the prosecution. “Soon before” is a
relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case
and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would
constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be
hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the
importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry
death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act. The expression “soon before her death” used in the
substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been
indicated and the expression “soon before” is not defined. A reference
to the expression “soon before” used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of
the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume
that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is
either the thief who has received the goods knowing them to be stolen,
unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the
period which can come within the term “soon before” is left to be
determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of
each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression “soon
before” would normally imply that the interval should not be much
between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in
question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between
the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned.
If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale
enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned,
it would be of no consequence.”
14. In the case of Charan Singh Alias Charanjit Singh Vs. State of
Uttarakhand reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 454, allegations with regard
to demand of motorcycle and some land was made against the husband by
which deceased therein was subjected to harassment, it has been observed by
Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:-
“21. ….It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and
land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the
8prosecution does not fulfill the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under
Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. Even the
ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out for the same reason as there
is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her
death.”
15. In view of above legal pronouncements, considering the facts and
circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, also considering
that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the judgment impugned is liable to be set aside by
allowing the appeal.
16. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, judgment impugned is set aside and the
accused/appellant is acquitted of charge leveled against him. Appellant is
reported to be on bail, his bail bond will remain in force for six months in
view of section 481 of BNSS, 2023.
17. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back
immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.
Digitally
signed by
Sd/-
PARUL
PARUL MITTAL
MITTAL Date:
2025.05.08
13:30:27
(Sachin Singh Rajput)
+0530JUDGE
Parul
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