Allahabad High Court
Fatima Zehra And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home … on 7 May, 2025
Author: Alok Mathur
Bench: Alok Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH ?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:27069 Court No. - 12 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 1357 of 2025 Applicant :- Fatima Zehra And 2 Others Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Deptt. Lko. And Another Counsel for Applicant :- Alok Pandey,Amit Pandey,Ankit Kumar Sonker,Shashank Singh Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Gufran Siddiqui,Samreen Jahan Hon'ble Alok Mathur,J.
1.Heard Sri Alok Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State.
2. This 482 Cr.P.C. petition has been filed with a payer to quash the complaint case No.2724/2019 U/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. Mohd. Shad Vs. Fatima Zehra and others, pending before Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate (Customs), Lucknow and also to set aside the impugned summoning and NBW order dated 22.1.2025 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate (Customs), Lucknow in the Complaint case No.2724/2019 under Section 156 (3), under Sections 323, 384, 465, 504, 506 IPC, police station Gazipur.
3. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that this matter was sent to mediation centre of this Court vide order dated 10.03.2025 and in pursuance of said orders, both the parties have participated in mediation proceedings which was culminated into successful mediation and the parties have executed an agreement dated 17.04.2025. Copy of the same is available on record along with report of mediation. As per the settlement agreement dated 173.04.2025 executed in mediation centre, both the parties have decided to withdraw all the cases against each other.
4. The terms and conditions of the aforesaid settlement, are being quoted herein below:-
“6. The following settlement has been arrived at between the Parties hereto: –
A. That both the parties solemnized their marriage on 28.2.2019 and they had agreed to live separately in future and dissolve their marriage with mutual consent. Accordingly the parties have executed a divorce agreement with mutual consent.
B. That the Second Party/husband has agreed to pay and teh First Party/wife ha agreed to redeive a total sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only ) towards one time full and final settlemetn of all the claims of First Party against the Second Party including the claim for permanetn alimony.
C. That the second Party has already paid a sum of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand only) to the First Party and receipt of the same is acknowledged by teh First Party.
D. That the Second Party has handed over a Demand Draft No.001376 dated 15.04.2025 amounting to Rs.70,000/- (Rupees Seventy Thousand only) in the name of Factima Zehra to the First party today i.e. 17.04.2025 towards balance payment of Rs.70,000/- (Rupees Seventy Thousand only). The Second Party acknowledges receipt of the said Demand Draft.
E. That the Second Party has agreed that he will have no objection if the Hon’ble Court decides the APPLICATION U/s 482 No.1357 of 2025 (Fatima Zehra and others Vs. State of U.P. & Another) arising out of Complaint Case No.2724 of 2019, U/Ss 323, 384, 465, 504 and 506 IPC P.s. Gazipur, District Lucknow pending before Special Chief Judicial Magistrate (Customs) Lucknow in terms of this settlement agreement.
F. The parties have agreed that apart from aforementioned case, if any other criminal case (s) is pending between teh parties or their family members with regard to the present dispute, both the parties shall get the same disposed of in terms of this Settlement Agreement.
G. that it is also agreed between the parties that henceforth no case will be institute by them against each other or any of their respective family members in future in the form of criminal or civil proceedings in respect of present dispute.
H. That both the parties shall be bound by the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement in strict sense. In case of any default, the party committing default shall b e liable for playing fraud with the Court, hence, for contempt of the Court.
7. By signing this agreement the parties hereto state that they have no further claims or demands against each other with respect to the matter involved in APPLICATION U/s 482 No.1357 of 2025 (Fatima Zehra and others Vs. State of U.P.o and another ) and all disputes and difference in this regard have been amicably settled by teh parties hereto through the process of Conciliation/Mediation.”
5. Learned counsel for the applicants thus submits that since both the parties have entered into compromise and settled their dispute amicably which was also reduced in writing, the aforesaid cases may be quashed.
6. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 as well as learned AGA for the State could not dispute the aforesaid fact.
7. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another; (2012) 10 SCC 303, in paragraph No. 61 of the judgement, observed as under:-
“The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
8. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Laxmi Narayan; (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed as under:-
“15.1. the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
15.2. such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
15.3 similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;”
9. From above noted judgements, it is clear that merely mentioning the section of serious offences will not refrain the court from quashing the proceeding, if on considering the material on record, offences under that section is not made out.
10. Considering the material on record, this Court finds that no serious offence is made out against the petitioners, which falls in the category of mental depravity or serious offences.
11. Considering the fact as well as on perusal of record, it appears that no heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or other offences, which may affect the society in general, are made out and both the parties have amicably settled their dispute through process of mediation before Medication and Conciliation Centrel, High Court, Lucknow as well as in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another ; (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh & Others vs. State of Punjab & Another (2014) 6 SCC 477, State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 and State of M.P. vs. Dhruv Gurjar, AIR 2017 SC 1106,the complaint case No.2724/2019 U/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. Mohd. Shad Vs. Fatima Zehra and others, pending before Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate (Customs), Lucknow and the impugned summoning and NBW order dated 22.1.2025 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate (Customs), Lucknow in the Complaint case No.2724/2019 under Section 156 (3), under Sections 323, 384, 465, 504, 506 IPC, police station Gazipur, are hereby quashed.
12. in view of the aforesaid agreement, the present petition is allowed.
(Alok Mathur, J.)
Order Date :- 7.5.2025
RKM.
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