Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
The State Of West Bengal vs Sraddhananda Basu on 8 May, 2025
Author: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
Bench: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
The Hon'ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon'ble Justice Uday Kumar
F.A.T. No.516 of 2019
+
CAN 4 of 2023
The State of West Bengal
Vs.
Sraddhananda Basu
With
F.A.T. No.3 of 2019
+
CAN 2 of 2022
Sraddhananda Basu
Vs.
Land Acquisition Collector, Hooghly
For the appellant in
FAT No.516 of 2019
and
for the opposite party in
FAT No.3 of 2019 : Mr. Soumitra Bandyopadhyay, Sr. Govt. Adv.
Mr. Aniruddha Sen
For the respondent in
FAT No.516 of 2019
and
For the appellant in
FAT No.3 of 2019 : Mr. Saptangsu Basu, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Ayan Banerjee,
Ms. Debjani Sengupta,
Ms. Poulami Ghosh
Heard on : 24.04.2025 and 01.05.2025.
Hearing concluded on : 01.05.2025
Judgment on : 08.05.2025
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Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. The present appeals have been filed respectively by the State, through
the Land Acquisition Collector, Hooghly, and by the referral claimant.
In the appeals, the judgment and decree passed by the learned
Additional District Judge, First Court at Hooghly Sadar, District –
Hooghly, in a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1894 Act”) has been challenged by
both sides.
2. Bereft of unnecessary details, a land at Mouza Bhadrakali at Uttarpara
was acquired by the State for the public purpose of rehabilitation of
squatters-refugees of the Bhadrakali Women‟s Home. A Notification was
issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act, and a hearing was given under
Section 5(A) of the said Act by the District Collector. At that stage, in
connection with a writ petition, a learned Single Judge of this Court
was pleased to direct fresh hearing under Section 5(A) and annulled all
steps taken from the initial hearing under the said provision till
subsequent steps.
3. In the meantime, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, (for short, “the
2013 Act”) came into force with effect from April 1, 2024. Accordingly,
the calculation of compensation for the acquisition was required to be
done under Section 26 of the 2013 Act. Accordingly the matter was
taken up for hearing and an award was passed, in respect of which a
reference was initiated on the application of the claimant under Section
18 of the 1894 Act. By the order of another learned Single Judge of this
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Court, since Rules had not yet been framed under the 2013 Act by the
State, it was directed that the reference would continue under Section
18 of the 1894 Act.
4. Thus, although the reference continued under the 1894 Act, the
calculation of compensation was supposedly made under the 2013 Act.
Subsequently, by the impugned judgment and decree dated September
20, 2018, the reference case was disposed of, being aggrieved by which
both sides have preferred their respective appeals.
5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State argues that the
impugned judgment and decree were passed on the basis of five Sale
Deeds produced by the claimant. However, out of the said Deeds, at
least two were post-notification. It is relevant to mention here that the
date of notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act, as published in the
Extraordinary Gazette, was September 20, 2011. Both parties agree
that for the purpose of calculation of compensation, the said date
would be the relevant date.
6. Learned senior counsel for the State next argues that whereas the
acquired lands were of „Bastu’ nature, those were without any
structures, whereas the lands covered by the said Sale Deeds produced
by the claimant all contains structures. As such, the said Deeds could
not be a reasonable basis for the assessment of compensation.
However, the learned Referral Court relied on the said documents to
come to its findings.
7. Thirdly, it is argued that the plots covered by the Sale Deeds are far
away from the suit plot and adjacent to a 25-ft wide road and, as such,
4
could not be a reasonable basis for valuation. On the other hand, sale
data was produced by the State in respect of the self-same cluster of
lands as acquired, which should have formed the basis of the
assessment of compensation.
8. It is next contended by the State that the Referral Court relied on one of
the Deeds produced by the claimant which contained an absurdly high
market value as opposed to the other Deeds. It is argued that the well-
settled proposition of law is that if there is a marked difference between
the sale price/market value shown in one of the Deeds and that shown
in the others, the different deed should be discarded for the purpose of
assessing compensation.
9. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State relies on the application
for production of documents filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code
of Civil Procedure by the State seeking to produce e-assessment slips of
March 26, 2012 which, according to him, reflected the correct market
price of adjacent plots in respect of Sale Deeds executed during the
relevant period. It is submitted that those ought to have been taken
into consideration for assessing the correct market value of the
properties in question.
10. It is argued that the learned Referral Judge erred in law in overlooking
the sale data provided by the State and placing reliance solely on the
deeds produced by the claimant.
11. Learned senior counsel appearing for the claimant contends that the
impugned judgment and decree are perverse inasmuch as the learned
Referral Judge arrived at a finding that the average value of the Sale
5
Deeds was Rs.4,50,000/-, thereby going by the initial statement made
in the pleadings of the claimant. However, even if an average value of
the Sale Deeds are taken, the same comes to around Rs.5,49,694/-.
12. Learned senior counsel argues that the settled legal proposition is that,
out of various exemplars, the highest is to be taken while calculating
compensation. The highest market value reflected in the Deeds
produced by the claimant was found in Deed No.07282 dated
September 29, 2011, which is to the tune of Rs.6,36,666/-. In support
of the proposition that the comparable deed showing highest valuation
should be taken for calculating compensation, the claimant relies on
the following Judgments:
(i) Sri Ram M. Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur Ranee of Vuyyur v.
Collector of Madras, reported at (1969) 1 MLJ (SC) 45;
(ii) Meherawal Khewaji Trust (Registered), Faridkot and Others v.
State of Punjab and Others, reported at (2012) 5 SCC 432;
(iii) Himmat Singh and Others v. State of M.P. and Another, reported
at (2013) 16 SCC 392;
(iv) Anjani Molu Dessai v. State of Goa and Another, reported at
(2010) 13 SCC 710.
13. Learned senior counsel appearing for the claimant submits that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Court has to assess just
and fair compensation in respect of land acquisition irrespective of the
amount actually claimed by the claimant. In support of such
proposition, learned senior counsel cites Ashok Kumar and Others v.
State of Haryana, reported at (2016) 4 SCC 544 and Bhimasha v.
6
Speical Land Acquisition Officer and Another, reported at (2008) 10 SCC
797.
14. It is further argued by the claimant that Section 26(1)(a) of the 2013 Act
provides the market value for the registration of sale deeds or
agreements to sell in the area where the land is situated to be one of
the tests for determining the market value of the land. Although in
Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 26 average sale price has been
mentioned, the said sub-section clearly specifies that whichever is the
higher of the criteria laid down therein is to be followed. Going by the
same, it is the market value (the higher value), and not the average sale
price, which ought to have been looked into.
15. The sale data provided by the State in the Referral Court, it is
contended, did not reflect the market value but the set-forth value for
the sales and, as such, could not have been looked into for the purpose
of assessment of compensation.
16. Learned senior counsel contends that in Section 2(13) of the West
Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 „Mouza” has been defined as the smallest
unit of area of land. Since the Sale Deeds produced by the claimant
were all pertaining to the Bhadrakali Mouza, which is the same Mouza
where the acquired lands are situated, the said deeds provided an
accurate measure of the compensation, as the market value as
determined by the Registration Office were mentioned in each of the
Deeds.
17. Learned senior counsel appearing for the claimant further argues that
the interest has been calculated on the market value till the date when
7
the award was actually passed, that is, July 30, 2015. However, in the
reply to a query made by the claimant under the Right to Information
Act, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Hooghly enclosed a Memo
which reveals that the Governor was pleased to approve the award in
connection with the said acquisition on February 23, 2016. The said
document is sought to be brought on record by way of additional
evidence in the claimant‟s application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the
Code. Thus, according to the claimant, the interest on the market
value as per Section 64 of the 2013 Act should have been calculated till
February 23, 2016.
18. Learned senior counsel further argues that the Referral Court ought to
have granted additional compensation in terms of the Section 72 and
interest in terms of Section 80 of the 2013 Act as well.
19. Lastly, it is argued that the State did not file any written objection to
the referral application under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. As such, no
evidence adduced by the State can be looked into at all. In support of
the proposition that evidence cannot be looked into without pleadings,
learned senior counsel cites Ratanlal Alias Babulal Chunilal Samsuka v.
Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka (Dead) Through Legal
Representatives and Others, reported at (2018) 11 SCC 119 and
Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and Another, reported at (2008) 17 SCC
491.
20. Upon considering the arguments of parties, certain broad issues are
found to be germane in adjudicating the matter, which are as follows:
8
(i) Basis of valuation;
(ii) Whether compensation should have been granted till the date
of the Governor's approval of the award;
(iii) Whether the claimant is entitled to get interest on excess
compensation in terms of Section 72 of the 2013 Act;
(iv) Whether the claimant is entitled to interest under Section 80
of the 2013 Act.
(i) Basis of valuation
21. Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act provides that notwithstanding anything
contained in the said Act, in case of land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the 1894 Act where no award under Section 11 of the
1894 Act has been made, all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply.
22. It is an admitted position that in the present case, only a notification
was issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act and no award under
Section 11 was passed, since the introduction of the 2013 Act
intervened, and the compensation was awarded on the basis of the
parameters laid down in the 2013 Act. Thus, the premise of calculation
has to be in respect of the 2013 Act in terms of Section 24(1)(a) of the
said Act, more so since on the date of the award, the 1894 Act stood
repealed under Section 114(1) of the 2013 Act.
23. The mode of determination of market value of land by Collector has
been provided in Section 26 of the 2013 Act. As per sub-section (1) of
9
Section 26, three objective criteria have been laid down in assessing
and determining the market value of land.
24. The first, contained in Clause (a), is the market value, if any, specified
in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 for the registration of sale deeds or
agreements to sell, as the case may be, in the area where the land is
situated.
25. The second yardstick is the average sale price for similar type of land
situated in the nearest village or nearest vicinity area, as per Clause (b).
26. Clause (c) provides as a third yardstick the consented amount of
compensation as agreed upon under Section 2(2) in case of acquisition
of lands for private companies or for public-private partnership
projects.
27. Clause (c) does not apply in the present case at all and the conflict
sought to be raised is between Clauses (a) and (b). Whereas the State
seeks to rely on the average sale price as provided for in Clause (b), the
claimant argues that the market value under Clause (a) is applicable.
28. A perusal of Section 26(1) clearly shows that the above three criteria
have been disjuncted by the conjunction “or” and, in no uncertain
terms, sub-section (1) provides that out of the three criteria, whichever
is higher is to be adopted.
29. We find from the sale deeds and other documents produced in
connection with the matter that the market value is admittedly higher
than the sale prices as reflected in the deeds of nearby lands. Thus, it
is the market value which is to be considered in terms of Section 26(1)
for the purpose of assessment of compensation.
10
30. The State admits that the sale data produced in the court below was
not restricted to sale deeds but also contained gift deeds and other
nature of documents. Thus, the said documents could not have been a
reasonable yardstick for calculation of compensation. The e-assessment
slips sought to be produced before this Court were obtained in March,
2012, that is after the date of the notification. We cannot also overlook
the fact that the State did not file any written objection/statement in
the court below and hence, is precluded from producing evidence in the
absence of any pleadings to support the same. The ratio laid down in
Ratanlal Alias Babulal Chunilal Samsuka (supra) and Bachhaj Nahar
(supra) is germane in such context.
31. It is found from the impugned judgment that although initially the sale
deeds produced by the claimant were not exhibited, the Referral Court
observed that since the certified copies of such deeds were not objected
to by the State, those be exhibited and marked as Exhibits. Thus, the
technical objection taken to the marking of the said sale deeds as
exhibits on such count must give way to substantive justice,
particularly keeping in view the nature of the adjudication. Unlike an
ordinary civil suit, where it is for the respective parties to prove their
respective cases, in a compensation matter, it is for the Referral Court
to assess, on the basis of available documents, fair compensation.
32. Going by such yardstick, the market value as mentioned in the sale
deeds produced by the claimant could be validly looked into by the
Referral Court.
11
33. However, the State has raised a valid objection as to two out of the said
deeds pertaining to a period after the notification and, as such, we keep
those deeds beyond our consideration. Going by the three remaining
pre-notification sale deeds of the contemporaneous period, we find that
the highest market value among the same is Rs.6,02,500/- per Cottah,
as enumerated in Deed No.05821. It has been consistently held by the
Supreme Court and different High Courts that while calculating
compensation in respect of land acquisition, the comparable deed
showing highest valuation should be taken into consideration. The
said proposition is reflected in the judgments of Sri Ram M.
Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur Ranee of Vuyyur (supra), Meherawal
Khewaji Trust (Registered), Faridkot (supra), Himmat Singh and Others
(supra) as well as Anjani Molu Dessai (supra) cited by the claimant. It is
a well-settled position of law that the highest exemplar is to be taken as
the basis for calculation of compensation.
34. The only other question left to be decided is whether the market value
shown in the highest exemplar in the present case is absurdly
disproportionate with that as indicated in the other deeds.
35. On a perusal of the three pre-notification deeds produced by the
claimant in the court below, we find that the respective market values
mentioned therein are Rs.5,03,472/- per cottah in Deed No.01192,
Rs.6,02,500/- per cottah in Deed No.05821 and Rs.5,28,333/- per
cottah in Deed No.01294. All the said deeds were registered prior to
executed prior to the notification dated September 20, 2011.
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36. Since the other two deeds produced by the claimant were registered on
September 23 and September 30, 2011, those are kept outside the zone
of consideration.
37. Going by the above, the highest exemplar stipulated the market value
per cottah at Rs.6,02,500/-, which is not absurdly higher than the
market value reflected in the other two pre-notification deeds. Thus,
we cannot find substance in the contention of the State that the highest
exemplar carried an absurdly high figure.
38. Both the State and the Referral Court proceeded on the wrong premise
of taking the average of sale deeds, since Clause (b) of Section 26(1)
does not come into play at all. The Referral Court acted in a perverse
manner in making an arithmetically wrong calculation of the average of
the sale deeds as well. More importantly, it restricted the calculation of
compensation to the market value mentioned in the pleadings of the
claimant without considering the deeds, which goes against the grain of
the settled law in that regard. As mentioned earlier, in cases of
compensation, the Referral Court is not limited to the pleadings but
has, for itself, to assess compensation independently on the basis of
Section 26 of the 2013 Act.
39. The next sub-question which falls for consideration under the broad
issue of the basis of valuation is whether Deed No.05821 can be taken
into consideration, since the subject-land had a structure standing on
it, whereas the acquired properties had none.
40. Exploring the arguments of the parties on the said issue, we find that
the State, in Page 3 of its written notes of arguments filed before this
13
Court, has taken a stand that the lands covered by the three pre-
notification deeds had structures of 100 Sq. Ft. R.T. Sheds. Even as
per the State, the value of the R.T. Sheds should be deducted from the
valuation of the land. The State has contended that after such
deduction, in respect of the first two deeds, the actual value comes to
Rs.1,48,706/- per cottah. The said two deeds, even as per the State,
contain the respective values of Rs.1,76,944/- and Rs.1,98,662/- per
cottah.
41. For arriving at the actual value of the said two deeds as per the State‟s
version, that is, Rs.1,48,706/-, the valuation of the R.T. Sheds were
deducted. Thus, the valuation attributed to the R.T. Sheds in respect
of the two properties by the State can be arrived at if we deduct the
alleged actual value from the value shown in the deeds. Upon such
simple arithmetical calculation, we find that in respect of the two plots,
the structures have been evaluated by the State respectively at
Rs.49,956/- and Rs.28,238/-.
42. The claimant seeks to produce before this Court, by way of additional
evidence, documents which pertain to answers to his RTI queries, as
per which the valuation of the structures come approximately to
Rs.45,000/-. Even if we take the highest value of the structure out of
the three valuations, two given by the State and one by the claimant,
the highest value of the structure comes to Rs.49,956/-, which is the
version of the State itself.
43. Hence, even as per the logic of the State, the valuation of the land
covered by the highest exemplar can be arrived at by deducting the
14
value of the structure (as furnished by the State itself) from the market
value shown in the highest exemplar, that is, Rs.6,02,500/-. Thus, the
actual market value of the land, upon deduction of the value of the
structure standing thereon, would be Rs. (6,02,5000 – 49,956) =
5,52,544/- per cottah.
44. Thus, as we accept the highest value of the structure as per the State‟s
submission, the Order XLI Rule 27 application of neither of the parties
is required to be entertained. The documents sought to be produced by
the State as additional evidence, in any event, would be evidence
beyond its pleadings, since no written statement/objection was filed by
the State in the reference. Even otherwise, no satisfactory explanation
as to why such documents could not be produced in the Referral Court
by exercise of due diligence has been furnished.
45. In view of the above discussions, we come to the conclusion that the
compensation for the land should be in terms of the market value of the
highest exemplar, minus the value of the structure standing thereon,
which comes to Rs.5,52,544/-.
46. Two other factors are so to be taken note of. First, the sale deeds,
including the highest exemplar produced by the claimant, pertain to
the Bhadrakali Mouza (that is, the same Mouza where the acquired
lands are situated) and, as per the definition given in Section 2(13) of
the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, a “Mouza” is the smallest unit of
land. Hence, the land covered by the said sale deed comes within the
purview of Section 26(1)(a) of the 2013 which contemplates, as a
15
parameter of assessment of compensation, the market value for the
registration of sale deeds in the area where the land is situated.
(ii) Whether compensation should have been granted till the date
of the Governor’s approval of the award
47. To ascertain the validity of the claimant‟s argument that it is not the
date of the actual award but that when the Governor gave approval to
the award which is to be considered to be the relevant dats up to which
compensation should be granted, we are to compare certain provisions
of the 1894 and 2013 Acts respectively. In this context, it is important
to keep in mind that in terms of Section 114, read with Section 24(1)(a)
of the 2013 Act, since no award was made under Section 11 of the
1894 Act but the acquisition proceeding was initiated under Section 4
of the 1894 Act, the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply in its entirety, despite the
basis for calculation of compensation being the market value as on the
date of the notification dated November 20, 2011 issued under Section
4 of the 1894 Act.
48. Section 12 of the 1894 Act provides that the award of the Collector
shall be final and binding when it is filed in the Collector‟s Office. The
corresponding provision in the 2013 Act is Section 37, which are rather
similar to Section 12 of the 1894 Act.
49. However, these provisions are respectively circumscribed by Section 11
of the 1894 Act and Section 23 of the 2013 Act, which roughly
correspond with each other. A marked difference, however, between the
16
two can be found in the context of the present arguments of the
claimant. Whereas the first proviso to Section 11(1) of 1894 Act
stipulates that no award shall be made by the Collector under the said
sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government
or of such other Officer as the appropriate Government may authorize
in this behalf, there is no similar corresponding provision in Section 23
of the 2013 Act.
50. The latter Section stipulates that the Collector shall proceed to enquire
into the objections and shall make an award under his hand, without
any further requirement of approval by the Government (as expressed
through the Governor).
51. Hence, whereas the mandate of the 1894 Act is that, for an award to be
made, the same is to be approved first by the appropriate Government
(which will is generally expressed through the Governor in such cases),
there is complete absence of such restriction in the 2013 Act as per
which the award becomes final on the date of its passing.
52. Reverting back to Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, which is applicable
in the instant case, all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply. Thus, although the reference
was construed to be under Section 18 of the 1894 Act by an order of
this Court, since no Rules under the 2013 Act had yet been framed at
that stage, the assessment of compensation was to be in terms of the
2013 Act as per Section 24 (1) (a) of the 2013 Act; as such, all
provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of
17
compensation, including Section 23, read with Section 37, of the said
Act are applicable in the instant case.
53. Thus, it is abundantly clear that whereas the 1894 Act imposes a fetter
in the shape of prior approval by the Government for an award to be
made, the unbridled provisions of the 2013 Act, which is applicable to
the present case, do away with such restriction for an award to be
passed.
54. Hence, the argument of the claimant to the effect that the
compensation should have been granted till the date of the Governor‟s
assent cannot be accepted, as no such assent was required in the first
place for making the present award of compensation, which was passed
in terms of the 2013 Act.
55. Thus, we decide this issue in the negative and come to the conclusion
that the date up to which compensation is to be awarded is the actual
date of passing of the award that is July 30, 2015.
(iii) Whether the claimant is entitled to get interest on excess
compensation in terms of Section 72 of the 2013 Act
56. Section 72 provides that if the sum, which in the opinion of the Referral
Authority the Collector ought to have awarded, is in excess of the sum
which the Collector awards, the said award of the Referral Authority
may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on the excess amount at
the rate of 9% per annum from the date on which he took possession of
the land to the date of payment of such excess to the Authority.
57. The proviso to Section 72 of the 2013 Act stipulates that where such
excess or any part thereof is paid to the Authority after the date or
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expiry of a period of one year from the date of possession, interest at
the rate of 15% per annum is payable from the date of expiry of the said
period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which
has not been paid to the Authority before the date of such expiry.
58. It is relevant to note that both the 1894 Act and the 2013 Act
contemplate possession to be taken after notice. As such, there is no
material difference between the two Acts regarding applicability of the
principle underlying Section 72 of the 2013 Act insofar as the relevant
date being the date of possession. Although the expression “may” has
been used in Section 72, we do not find any conceivable reason as to
why the claimant in the present case should be deprived of such
interest, upon ascertainment of the date on which possession was
taken from the claimant. The date of possession has not been
mentioned clearly in the award. Thus, it is for the Referral Court to
ascertain such date from the evidence and materials available on record
and to grant such interest as mentioned in Section 72 to the claimant.
59. Thus, this issue is decided in principle in the positive, in favour of the
claimant.
(iv) Whether the claimant is entitled to interest under Section 80
of the 2013 Act.
60. By the same logic as above, concerning the grant of interest under
Section 72, the Collector as well as the Referral Court was duty-bound
to direct payment of interest on the compensation at the rate of 9% per
annum from the time of taking possession until it has been paid or
deposited, in the event such compensation was not paid or deposited
19
on or before taking possession of the land. The proviso to Section 80
stipulates that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or
deposited within a period of one year from the date on which
possession was taken, interest at the rate of 15% per annum shall be
payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the
amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or
deposited before the date of such expiry. These mandates are statutory
and no pleading claiming such interest is required to be made by the
claimant, either for payment of interest on the excess or the principal
compensation. As a necessary corollary of grant of compensation, the
referral Court ought to have looked into the said issues and granted
such interest, if payable to the claimant. Hence, the entitlement of the
claimant to get the interest stipulated in Section 80 of the 2013 Act is
in principle decided in the positive, in favour of the claimant.
61. We find from the above discussions that the learned Referral Court did
not advert to the above questions at all or applied erroneous legal
principles and followed invalid legal yardsticks in coming to its
conclusions while passing the impugned award.
62. Accordingly, F.A.T. No.516 of 2019 and F.A.T. No.3 of 2019 are allowed
in part, thereby setting aside the judgment and impugned decree dated
September 20, 2018 passed by the learned Additional District Judge,
First Court at Hooghly Sadar, District – Hooghly in Land Acquisition
Miscellaneous Case No.7 of 2016 and remanding the matter to the
Referral Court for adjudication on the points given hereinbelow:
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(i) The compensation of the acquired land of the claimant is fixed
at Rs.5,52,544/- per cottah;
(ii) The solatium of one hundred per cent of the compensation
amount, as stipulated in Section 30 of the 2013 Act, shall be
calculated by the Referral Court on the basis of the above
compensation and awarded to the claimant;
(iii) The Referral Court shall also award interest at the rate of 12%
per annum on the market value as mentioned above in terms of
sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the 2013 Act.
(iv) The Referral Court shall grant an opportunity to both sides to
adduce evidence, if they so choose, on the limited question of
the date of possession and as to whether the parameters of
Section 72 and Section 80 of the 2013 Act are satisfied in the
present case. In the event the parties or either of them choose
not to adduce evidence or the evidence is not satisfactory, it will
be open to the Referral Court to look into the relevant materials
and/or call for the necessary records from the appropriate
authorities for ascertaining the relevant factual parameters and,
upon such exercise, if it is found that the claimant is otherwise
entitled to the interest contemplated in Section 72 and/or
Section 80 of the 2013 Act, the referral court shall award such
interest(s) to the claimant in terms of the said Sections.
63. For the above considerations, the appropriate multiplier in terms of
sub-section (2) of Section 26 shall be applied by the Referral Court.
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64. It is expected that the court of the learned Additional District Judge
(Referral Court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act) shall complete the
above exercise as expeditiously as the business of the said court
permits and pass a fresh award upon the above considerations,
preferably within eight (08) months from the date of communication of
this judgment and order to the said court.
65. The interim applications, bearing CAN 4 of 2023 in connection with
F.A.T. No.516 of 2019 and CAN 2 of 2022 in connection with F.A.T.
No.3 of 2019, are also disposed of in the light of the above observations.
66. There will be no order as to costs.
67. Urgent certified copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the
parties upon compliance of all necessary formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Uday Kumar, J.)
Later
After the above judgment is delivered, it is submitted by learned
counsel for the claimant that the decretal amount was deposited with
the learned Registrar General, out of which an amount of Rs.
30,00,000/- has been withdrawn by the claimant. Counsel prays for
permission to the claimant to withdraw the balance amount since the
compensation and interest payable to the claimant now, if calculated
22
at the rate as we have directed in our judgment, would come to a
higher amount than the decretal amount in any event.
We find substance in such argument.
Hence, the balance of the decretal amount deposited with the
learned Registrar General by the State, along with interest, shall be
disbursed in favour of the claimant, as and when so approached by
the claimant, by the learned Registrar General of this Court after
deduction of statutory charges.
The entire amount so withdrawn by the claimant shall be
adjusted with the amount to be awarded by the Referral Court after
remand.
(Uday Kumar, J.) (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
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