[ad_1]
Supreme Court of India
Umashankar Yadav vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh Home … on 8 May, 2025
Author: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
Bench: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
Reportable
2025 INSC 653
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.439 OF 2018
Umashankar Yadav & Anr. .… Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh,
Through Chief Secretary & Anr. …. Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Joymalya Bagchi, J.
1. Appellants have assailed a cryptic order dated 02.07.2015
whereby the High Court refused to quash Crime No.93 of 2014
under Sections 186 and 353 of Indian Penal Code1.
2. Guria is a well known and reputed organization fighting against
human trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
INDU MARWAH
girls/children in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Due to its relentless
Date: 2025.05.08
17:57:28 IST
Reason:
1
For short, ‘IPC’
Page 1 of 13
efforts a number of minor girls have been rescued from the
clutches of traffickers. While the pioneering efforts of the
organization received accolades at national and international
levels, its foot soldiers i.e. the appellants have suffered the
ignominy of being branded as “criminals” for alleged
overzealousness in course of a raid to rescue bonded labour/minor
children from a brick kiln at Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh.
3. The unfortunate saga commenced when the first appellant, a
Project Coordinator at Guria submitted an application before the
District Magistrate, Varanasi alleging bonded/child labourers
were engaged in a brick kiln at Varanasi and prayed that the
exploited labourers including children be rescued. In response to
the application, Deputy District Magistrate, Varanasi ordered
Assistant Labour Commissioner to take necessary action.
4. Pursuant to the directions of the Assistant Labour Commissioner,
on 06.06.2014 at 10 am, one Raja Ram Dubey2, Ram Avatar
Sharma and Ram Lakhan Swarnkar (Labour Employment
Officers), Inspector Ajit Kumar Singh of Anti Human Trafficking
Force (AHTF) and two constables of Lohta Thana Varanasi
2
Informant
Page 2 of 13
proceeded to inspect the spot. Appellants also accompanied the
team.
5. Appellants contend they found children and labourers at the brick
kiln who were brought to the Police Station. At that time the owner
of the brick kiln intervened and took away the labourers. First
appellant submitted a faxed message disclosing these facts to the
District Magistrate.
6. On the other hand, informant lodged a complaint at Lohta Police
Station though no child was found working at the spot, alleging
when his team had reached Shakti Mark Brick Kiln, appellants
along with others forcibly put the labourers and the children in
dumpers and took them away. Appellants did not obey the
instructions of the joint team and did not let them record their
statements before taking away the labourers. Thereby they
obstructed and hampered their discharge of official duty.
7. On his complaint, FIR came to be registered under Sections 186,
8. On further statement of one of the labourers, namely, Om
Prakash, Section 363 IPC was dropped. Statements of other
witnesses were recorded and charge sheet under Sections 186 and
Page 3 of 13
353 IPC came to be filed. Magistrate took cognizance of the
chargesheet which was assailed before the High Court. The High
Court by the impugned order refused to quash the chargesheet
holding as follows :-
“From the perusal of the material on record and looking into the
facts of the case at this stage it cannot be said that no offence is
made out against the applicants. All the submission made at the
bar relates to the disputed questions of fact, which cannot be
adjudicated upon by this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. At this
stage only a prima facie case is to be seen in the light of the law
laid down by the Supreme Court in cases of R.P. Kapur Vs. State
of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal,
1992 SCC (Cr.) 426, State of Bihar Vs. P.P. Sharma, 1992 SCC
(Cr.) 192 and lastly Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Vs. Mohd.
Saraful Haq and another (Para-10) 2005 SCC (Cr.) 283. The
disputed defence of the accused cannot be considered at this
stage. Moreover, the applicants have got a right of discharge
under section 239, 245(2) or 227/228, Cr. P.C. as the case may
be through a proper application for the said purpose and they are
free to take all the submissions in the said discharge application
before the trial Court.”
9. Above quoted paragraph shows the High Court did not advert
either to the facts of the case or the contentions raised on behalf
of the appellants. In a perfunctory manner it observed the issues
involved disputed questions of fact which could not be adjudicated
before the court under Section 482 Cr.PC. It also observed the
appellants have right to seek discharge before the trial court.
10. However, prior to arriving at such finding it is the duty of the High
Court to ascertain whether the uncontroverted allegations in the
FIR/Chargesheet constitute an offence, or continuation of the
Page 4 of 13
proceeding suffers from a legal bar or is wholly vexatious and anabuse of process of law.
11. Summoning of an accused is a serious matter which affects liberty
and dignity of the individual concerned. Judicial intervention
under Section 482 Cr.PC to weed out vexatious proceedings is of
pivotal importance in order to protect individuals from untelling
harassment and misery and to ensure unmerited prosecutions do
not crowd overflowing dockets of criminal courts and yield space
for deserving cases. Faced with the agony of a lame prosecution,
it is of little solace to a litigant to be told that inherent powers are
shut out as he is entitled to approach the trial court and pray for
discharge. The inherent power of the High Court to prevent abuse
of process of court is much wider in amplitude than the discharge
powers and cannot be whittled down on the plea of existence of
such remedy3.
12. As the High Court had not adverted to the facts of the case at all
and mechanically recorded a finding that the case did not merit
3
Ashok Chaturvedi & Ors. vs. Shitul H. Chanchani & Anr., (1998) 7 SCC 698.
Page 5 of 13
intervention at the preliminary stage, we have ourselves
undertaken such exercise.
13. What emerges from scanning the allegations in the chargesheet
and statements of witnesses is that the appellants had
accompanied a team of Labour Enforcement Officers to verify the
allegation that bonded/child labour were employed at the brick
kiln. During inspection, a difference of opinion cropped up
between the labour officers and the appellants as to the manner
in which the inspection was to be conducted. While the appellants
wanted the workmen and children to be brought to the Police
Station for interrogation, the members of the labour officers
intended to record their statements at the site before taking
further action.
14. In this backdrop, the appellants had put the labourers and the
children in a Dumper and carried them away from the site before
their statements could be recorded. Thereby, it is alleged they had
obstructed discharge of official duties.
15. Appellants have a counter version. Even prior to lodging of FIR,
first appellant through a faxed message had informed the District
Magistrate that at the intervention of the brick kiln owner the
Page 6 of 13
labourers and children who had been taken to the Police Station
were illegally released.
16. We need not detain ourselves with regard to truthfulness of the
rival versions.
17. The moot issue is do the uncontroverted allegations as narrated in
the chargesheet disclose the ingredients of offences under Sections
186 and 353 IPC ?
18. Essential ingredients of offence under Section186 are as follows:-
(i) Obstruction of a public servant in discharge of public
functions
(ii) Such obstruction is done voluntarily and with the intention
to prevent discharge of official duties.
19. Section 353 is attracted when the following ingredients are
satisfied:-
(i) Use of assault or criminal force on a public servant during
execution of his duty.
(ii) With the intention :-
(a) to prevent or deter discharge of such duty; or
(b) as a consequence of anything done or attempted to be
done in the lawful discharge of his duty.Page 7 of 13
20. The words force and criminal force are defined in Sections 349 and
356 IPC and ‘assault’ is defined in Section 351 of the said Code.
21. A person is said to use force when :
(i) He causes motion, change in motion or cessation of motion of
another person by :
(a) use of bodily power; or
(b) using a substance which comes in contact of the body,
wearing apparel etc or with anything which affects the other
person’s senses; or
(c) inducing any animal to move or change its motion or
cease to move.
22. Criminal force is defined as use of force by a person in order to
commit an offence or done with the intention that such force is to
cause or likely to cause injury, fear and annoyance to other
person.
23. Assault involves any gesture or preparation which is done with
the intention that such gesture or preparation will cause an
apprehension about use of criminal force. Use of criminal force or
assault on a public servant is essential to attract Section 353 IPC.
Page 8 of 13
24. Coming to the facts of the case, uncontroverted allegations in the
chargesheet do not disclose use of force or holding out threatening
gestures giving rise to an apprehension of use of force towards
public servant. Physical movement of the labourers would not
amount to use of force far less criminal force on a public servant.
25. Given this situation, we can safely conclude uncontroverted
allegations in the chargesheet do not disclose the ingredients of
offence under Section 353 IPC.
26. This brings us to Section 186 IPC. It would be argued the
appellants obstructed discharge of official duties by not permitting
the statements of bonded labourers/children to be recorded before
removing them from the site. Obstruction to a public servant must
be done with the requisite mens rea i.e. to prevent the latter from
discharging his official duty.
27. Statements of labourers unequivocally show that no force was
used to take them away and they were promptly released. These
statements do not give an impression that such action was with
the intention to impede discharge of official duty. It appears there
was a genuine difference of opinion between the appellants and
the officials concerned. Members of the social organization were
Page 9 of 13
of the impression that bonded labourers/children ought to be
interrogated at a neutral place i.e. Police Station whereas the
officers wanted to interrogate them at the site.
28. It goes without saying the manner and mode of interrogation was
to be decided by the labour officers but appellants’ endeavours
were not to impede interrogation but to ensure it was conducted
in a more effective manner. Such factual position denudes their
action of the requisite mens rea, i.e. intention to obstruct official
duty. When profile of the allegations emerging from the factual
matrix of the case renders existence of mens rea patently absurd
or inherently improbable, such prosecution is liable to be quashed
as an abuse of process of law.
29. Malicious animus of the labour officials towards the appellants is
evident from the reports annexed to the counter affidavit.
Annexure CA/2 is a report of the Additional Labour Commissioner,
U.P to National Commission for Protection of Child Rights
regarding the incident. In the report, the Additional Commissioner
had gone to the extent of alleging the appellants had offered bribes
to the labourers to make false statements. Such insinuations are
wholly unfounded and not borne out from the statements recorded
Page 10 of 13
during investigation. This hostile stance of the department
fortifies our conclusion that registration of the criminal case was
a product of malice and personal vendetta against the appellants.
30. Even assuming the ingredients under Section 186 are disclosed,
prosecution under the said section simplicitor suffers from various
insurmountable legal hurdles.
31. Firstly, Section 186 is a non-cognizable offence and in absence of
ingredients of Section 353 (cognizable offence) disclosed in the
FIR, prior permission of Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.PC
was necessary to register FIR.4 No such permission was obtained
rendering the registration of FIR and ensuing investigation bad in
law.
32. Secondly, cognizance of offence under Section 186 IPC was taken
on a police report in breach of Section 195 Cr.PC. Section 195,
inter alia, provides no court shall take cognizance of offence under
Section 186 save and except on a complaint in writing by the
aggrieved public servant or his superior. In view of the aforesaid
4
State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 [see Para 102(4)]
Page 11 of 13
legal bar, cognizance taken of the offence under section 186 on a
police report/chargesheet is impermissible in law.
33. It would be argued as FIR was registered for both cognizable
(section 353 IPC) and non-cognizable offences (section 186), even
if Section 353 IPC is quashed, police report under Section 186
may be treated as ‘complaint’ in view of the Explanation to Section
2(d) Cr.P.C.
34. Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. reads as follows:-
“2(d). complaint” means any allegation made orally or in writing to a
Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some
person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but
does not include a police report.”
Explanation.- A report made by a police officer in a case which
discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable
offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by
whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant.”As per the explanation appended to the definition clause, a police
report disclosing a non-cognizable offence (section 186 in the
present case) shall be deemed to be a complaint and the police
officer shall be deemed to be the complainant. Even then, the
legal embargo under section 195 Cr.PC is not dispelled as the legal
fiction deems the police officer and not the aggrieved public
servant as the complainant.
Page 12 of 13
35. Similar view has been taken in B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.5
36. For the aforesaid reasons, impugned prosecution is quashed and
the appeal is allowed. Pending applications, if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……..…..……………………………….J.
(PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA)
….……..…..……………………………….J.
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
New Delhi,
May 08, 2025
5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 7
Page 13 of 13
[ad_2]
Source link