Sanjeev Kumar & Ors vs State Of H.P. & Anr on 14 May, 2025

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Himachal Pradesh High Court

Sanjeev Kumar & Ors vs State Of H.P. & Anr on 14 May, 2025

( 2025:HHC:13814 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No.340 of 2023
Reserved on: 24.04.2025
Date of Decision: 14.05.2025.

Sanjeev Kumar & Ors. …Petitioners

Versus

State of H.P. & Anr. …Respondents

Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.

For the Petitioners : Mr. Aditya Thakur, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Additional
Advocate General, for
respondent No.1.

M/s. Suchitra Sen, Legal Aid
Counsel & Deepa, Advocate,
for respondent No.2.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioners have filed the present

petition for quashing of F.I.R. No.54/2022, dated

22.03.2022, registered at Police Station Barmana,

Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. for the

commission of an offence punishable under Section

1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the
judgment? Yes.

…2… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (“in

short IPC“) and the consequential proceedings

arising therefrom.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the

present petition are that the informant had gone to

Anandpur on 10.03.2022 with the Truck bearing

registration No. HP-24D-1272. He returned to his

home on 12.03.2022 at 10:30 pm. He was informed by

Anil Kumar that Savitri Devi (since deceased) had

called him and told him that petitioners – Sanjeev

Kumar, Kala Devi and Anjana Kumari had given

beatings to her. They also threatened and abused her.

The informant was told by his father at about 07:00

am that Savitri Devi had been missing since

13.03.2022. Search was made for Savitri Devi, but she

could not be found. The matter was reported to

police, and a missing report was registered on

14.03.2022. The dead body of Savitri Devi was found

on 22.03.2022. The police registered the FIR and

conducted the investigation. The postmortem
…3… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

examination of the dead body was conducted, and a

report was issued stating that the hanging pattern

was symptomatic and consistent with partial suicidal

hanging. The viscera were preserved and sent for

chemical analysis. However, no alcohol or poison was

detected in the viscera. As per the final report, the

death had taken place due to strangulation caused by

compression of the neck. The petitioners had abused

and threatened Savitri Devi, and she committed

suicide due to the threats and abuses. Hence, the

charge sheet was filed before the Court.

3. Being aggrieved by the filing of the

charge-sheet, the petitioners have approached this

Court, asserting that they are innocent and were

falsely implicated. The petitioners had a verbal

altercation with the deceased over keeping the

woods, which lasted for less than five minutes.

Petitioner No.1 intervened and took the other

petitioners inside the house. The deceased also went

to her home. She left her home on 13.03.2022. A
…4… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

missing report was lodged on 14.03.2022, and the

dead body was recovered on 22.03.2022. The time

lapse between the incident and the recovery of the

dead body rules out the abetment of suicide. Police

did not conduct a proper investigation. A false case

for the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 306 and 34 of the IPC was made out against

the petitioners. The statements of the witnesses

recorded by the police do not show that the

petitioners had beaten, abused and threatened the

deceased. There are material contradictions in the

statements of the witnesses. The dead body

recovered by the police did not belong to Savitri Devi.

No DNA analysis was conducted. There is no evidence

to show that the petitioners had abetted the

commission of the suicide by the deceased. Hence, it

was prayed that the present petition be allowed and

the FIR be quashed.

4. The petition is opposed by respondent

No.1 by filing a reply. The contents of the FIR were
…5… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

reproduced in the reply. It was asserted that the

informant had specifically stated that Savitri Devi

committed suicide due to a quarrel with the

petitioners. A supplementary charge sheet has been

filed, which shows that the DNA profile obtained

from the tooth of Savitri Devi matched the DNA

profile of Subhash Chand. Therefore, it was prayed

that the present petition be dismissed.

5. A separate reply was filed by respondent

No.2 denying the contents of the petition. It was

asserted that a thorough investigation was conducted

by the police, and the charge sheet was filed against

the petitioners. There is sufficient material before the

Court to connect the petitioners to the commission of

a crime. The deceased remained in shock after

12.03.2022. There is no material contradiction in the

statements recorded by the police. Therefore, it was

prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

6. I have heard Mr. Aditya Thakur, learned

counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned
…6… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1 -State

and M/s. Suchitra Sen, Legal Aid Counsel and Deepa,

learned counsel for respondent No.2.

7. Mr. Aditya Thakur, learned counsel for the

petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are

innocent and they were falsely implicated. There is

nothing on record to connect the petitioners with the

commission of crime. No eyewitness reported the

exact words used during the quarrel. The time

elapsed between the incident and the recovery of the

dead body would rule out the abetment by the

petitioners. Therefore, he prayed that the present

petition be allowed and the FIR be ordered to be

quashed. He relied upon Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar

Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) AIR(SCW) 2023 &

Shabir Hussain Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.,

(2021) 3 Apex Court Judgments (SC) 250 in support of

his submission.

8. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate

General, for respondent No.1/State, submitted that
…7… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

the police conducted the investigation and found

sufficient material to file a charge-sheet against the

petitioners. The deceased had called Anil Kumar and

informed him about her mental condition, which

shows that the deceased was stressed due to the

quarrel with the petitioners. The quarrel was the

proximate cause of the commission of suicide. He

prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

9. M/s Suchitra Sen, Legal Aid Counsel &

Deepa, learned counsel, for respondent No.2, adopted

the submission of learned Deputy Advocate General,

and prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

10. I have given considerable thought to the

submissions made at the bar and have gone through

the records carefully.

11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was

explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John

v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is
concerned, it is now more or less well settled
…8… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

as regards the principles to be applied by the
court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal
, 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335, wherein this Court has summarised
some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be
quashed in the following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the
interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226
or the inherent powers under Section
482
of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases
by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to
lay down any precise, clearly defined
and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae
and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even
if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.

…9… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make
out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do
not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the
FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the
…10… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him
due to a private and personal grudge.”

(emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4)
and (6) would be of relevance to us in this
case.

In clause (1) it has been mentioned that
where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused, then the FIR or the
complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in
the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the
Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a
situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if
there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the CrPC or the
concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings
can be quashed.”

…11… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik

v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185,

wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in
exercising its extraordinary powers under
Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to
prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice.

These inherent powers are neither controlled
nor limited by any other statutory provision.
However, given the broad and profound
nature of this authority, the High Court must
exercise it sparingly. The conditions for
invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear
abuse of process or where intervention is
essential to uphold the ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over
the course of several decades, has laid down
the principles and guidelines that High
Courts must follow before quashing criminal
proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-
empting the Prosecution from building its
case before the Trial Court. The grounds for
quashing, inter alia, contemplate the
following situations : (i) the criminal
complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii)
the FIR represents an abuse of the legal
process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made
out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the
complaint contains vague and omnibus
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to
settle and compound the dispute amicably
…12… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

(State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335)”

13 It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT

of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the power to

quash a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly

and not routinely. It was observed: –

“29. It is settled law that the power of
quashing of a complaint/FIR should be
exercised sparingly with circumspection,
and while exercising this power, the Court
must believe the averments and allegations
in the complaint to be true and correct. It has
been repeatedly held that, save in
exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in miscarriage of justice, the
Court and the judicial process should not
interfere at the stage of investigation of
offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers
of the Court should not be used in a routine
manner according to its whims or caprice.”

14. The present petition is to be decided as

per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court.

15. The FIR was registered for the

commission of an offence punishable under Section

306 of the IPC. Section 306 of the IPC provides for the

abetment of suicide. This section was explained by
…13… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kumar @ Shiva Kumar

v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 216: [2024] 3

S.C.R. 329: 2024 INSC 156 as under:

“64. Suicide is distinguishable from homicide
since it amounts to the killing of self. This
Court in M. Mohan v. State (2011) 3 SCC
626 went into the meaning of the word
suicide and held as under:

37. The word “suicide” in itself is
nowhere defined in the Penal Code,
however, its meaning and import are
well known and require no explanation.

“Sui” means “self” and “cide” means
“killing”, thus implying an act of self-
killing. In short, a person committing
suicide must commit it by himself,
irrespective of the means employed by
him in achieving his objective of killing
himself.

65. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh
(2001) 9 SCC 618, this Court delved into the
meaning of the word ‘instigate’ or
‘instigation’ and held as under:

20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward,
provoke, incite or encourage to do “an
act”. To satisfy the requirement of
instigation though it is not necessary
that actual words must be used to that
effect or what constitutes instigation
must necessarily and specifically be
suggestive of the consequence. Yet a
reasonable certainty to incite the
consequence must be capable of being
spelt out. The present one is not a case
…14… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

where the accused had by his acts or
omission or by a continued course of
conduct created such circumstances
that the deceased was left with no other
option except to commit suicide in
which case an instigation may have
been inferred. A word uttered in a fit of
anger or emotion without intending the
consequences to actually follow cannot
be said to be instigation.

66. Thus, this Court held that to ‘instigate’
means to goad, urge, provoke, incite or
encourage to do ‘an act’. To satisfy the
requirement of ‘instigation’, it is not
necessary that actual words must be used to
that effect or that the words or act should
necessarily and specifically be suggestive of
the consequence. But, a reasonable certainty
to incite the consequence must be capable of
being spelt out. Where the accused by his act
or omission or by his continued course of
conduct creates a situation in that the
deceased is left with no other option except to
commit suicide, then instigation may be
inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or
emotion without intending the consequences
to actually follow cannot be said to be
instigation.

67. Again, in the case of Chitresh Kumar
Chopra v. State
(2009) 16 SCC 605, this Court
elaborated further and observed that to
constitute ‘instigation’, a person who
instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge
or encourage the doing of an act by the other
by ‘goading’ or ‘urging forward’. This Court
held as follows:

…15… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

17. Thus, to constitute “instigation”, a
person who instigates another has to
provoke, incite, urge or encourage the
doing of an act by the other by
“goading” or “urging forward”. The
dictionary meaning of the word “goad”

is “a thing that stimulates someone
into action; provoke to action or
reaction” (see Concise Oxford English
Dictionary); “to keep irritating or
annoying somebody until he reacts”

(see Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary, 7th Edn.).

18. Similarly, “urge” means to advise
or try hard to persuade somebody to do
something or to make a person to move
more quickly and or in a particular
direction, especially by pushing or
forcing such a person. Therefore, a
person who instigates another has to
“goad” or “urge forward” the latter
with the intention to provoke, incite or
encourage the doing of an act by the
latter.

68. Thus, this Court has held that in order to
prove that the accused had abetted the
commission of suicide by a person, the
following has to be established:

(i) the accused kept on irritating or
annoying the deceased by words, deeds
or wilful omission or conduct which
may even be a wilful silence until the
deceased reacted or pushed or forced
the deceased by his deeds, words or
wilful omission or conduct to make the
deceased move forward more quickly in
a forward direction; and
…16… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

(ii) that the accused had the intention
to provoke, urge or encourage the
deceased to commit suicide while
acting in the manner noted above.

Undoubtedly, the presence of mens
rea is the necessary concomitant of
instigation.

69. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of
West Bengal
(2010) 1 SCC 707, this Court after
referring to some of the previous decisions
held that it has been the consistent view that
before holding an accused guilty of an offence
under Section 306 IPC, the court must
scrupulously examine the facts and
circumstances of the case and also assess the
evidence adduced before it in order to find out
whether the cruelty and harassment meted
out to the victim had left the victim with no
other alternative to put an end to her life. It
must be borne in mind that in a case of
alleged abetment of suicide, there must be
proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement
to the commission of suicide. Merely on the
allegation of harassment without there being
any positive action proximate to the time of
occurrence on the part of the accused which
led or compelled the deceased to commit
suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306
IPC would not be sustainable. Thereafter, this
Court held as under:

13. In order to bring a case within the
purview of Section 306 IPC there must
be a case of suicide and in the
commission of the said offence, the
person who is said to have abetted the
commission of suicide must have
played an active role by an act of
…17… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

instigation or by doing certain act to
facilitate the commission of suicide.

Therefore, the act of abetment by the
person charged with the said offence
must be proved and established by the
prosecution before he could be
convicted under Section 306 IPC.

70. Similar is the view expressed by this court
in Ude Singh (supra).

71. In Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2020) 15 SCC
359, this Court after referring to Sections 306
and 107 of the IPC held as follows:

9. Conviction under Section 306 IPC is
not sustainable on the allegation of
harassment without there being any
positive action proximate to the time of
occurrence on the part of the accused,
which led or compelled the person to
commit suicide. In order to bring a case
within the purview of Section 306 IPC,
there must be a case of suicide and in
the commission of the said offence, the
person who is said to have abetted the
commission of suicide must have
played an active role by an act of
instigation or by doing certain act to
facilitate the commission of suicide.

Therefore, the act of abetment by the
person charged with the said offence
must be proved and established by the
prosecution before he could be
convicted under Section 306 IPC.

72. Reverting back to the decision in M.
Mohan
(supra), this Court observed that
abetment would involve a mental process of
instigating a person or intentionally aiding a
…18… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

person in doing of a thing. Without a positive
act on the part of the accused to instigate or
aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot
be sustained. Delineating the intention of the
legislature and having regard to the ratio of
the cases decided by this Court, it was
concluded that in order to convict a person
under Section 306 IPC there has to be a
clear mens rea to commit the offence. It would
also require an active act or direct act which
led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no
other option and that this act of the accused
must have been intended to push the
deceased into such a position that he
committed suicide.

73. Sounding a note of caution, this Court
in State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1
SCC 73 observed that the court should be
extremely careful in assessing the facts and
circumstances of each case as well as the
evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose
of finding whether the cruelty meted out to
the victim had in fact induced her to end her
life by committing suicide. If it transpires to
the court that the victim committing suicide
was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance,
discord and differences in domestic life quite
common to the society to which the victim
belonged and such petulance, discord and
differences were not expected to induce a
similarly circumstanced individual to commit
suicide, the conscience of the court should
not be satisfied for basing a finding that the
accused charged of abetting the offence of
suicide should be found guilty.”

…19… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

16. This position was reiterated in Rohini

Sudarshan Gangurde v. State of Maharashtra, 2024

INSC 519:2024 SCC OnLine SC 1701 wherein it was

observed:

“8. Reading these sections together would
indicate that there must be either an
instigation or an engagement or intentional
aid to the ‘doing of a thing’. When we apply
these three criteria to Section 306, it means
that the accused must have encouraged the
person to commit suicide or engaged in a
conspiracy with others to encourage the
person to commit suicide or acted (or failed
to act) intentionally to aid the person to
commit suicide.

9. In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan
(2010) 12 SCC 190, this court explained the
concept of abetment along with the
necessary ingredient for an offence under
Section 306 of IPC as under:

“25. Abetment involves a mental
process of instigating a person or
intentionally aiding a person in doing
of a thing. Without a positive act on the
part of the accused to instigate or aid in
committing suicide, conviction cannot
be sustained. The intention of the
legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by this Court is clear that in
order to convict a person under
Section 306 IPC there has to be a
clear mens rea to commit the offence. It
also requires an active act or direct act
…20… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

which led the deceased to commit
suicide seeing no option and that act
must have been intended to push the
deceased into such a position that he
committed suicide.”

10. In Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B. (2010) 1
SCC 707, this court explained the parameters
of Section 306 in the following words:

“12. Thus, this Court has consistently
taken the view that before holding an
accused guilty of an offence under
Section 306 IPC, the court must
scrupulously examine the facts and
circumstances of the case and also
assess the evidence adduced before it in
order to find out whether the cruelty
and harassment meted out to the
victim had left the victim with no other
alternative but to put an end to her life.
It is also to be borne in mind that in
cases of alleged abetment of suicide,
there must be proof of direct or indirect
acts of incitement to the commission of
suicide. Merely on the allegation of
harassment without there being any
positive action proximate to the time of
occurrence on the part of the accused
which led or compelled the person to
commit suicide, conviction in terms of
Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

13. In order to bring a case within the
purview of Section 306 IPC there must
be a case of suicide and in the
commission of the said offence, the
person who is said to have abetted the
commission of suicide must have
played an active role by an act of
…21… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

instigation or by doing certain act to
facilitate the commission of suicide.
Therefore, the act of abetment by the
person charged with the said offence
must be proved and established by the
prosecution before he could be
convicted under Section 306 IPC.”

11. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh
(2001) 9 SCC 618, while explaining the
meaning of ‘Instigation’, this court stated
that:

“20. Instigation is to goad, urge
forward, provoke, incite or encourage
to do “an act”. To satisfy the
requirement of “instigation”, though it
is not necessary that actual words must
be used to that effect or what
constitutes “instigation” must
necessarily and specifically be
suggestive of the consequence. Yet a
reasonable certainty to incite the
consequence must be capable of being
spelt out. Where the accused had, by his
acts or omission or by a continued
course of conduct, created such
circumstances that the deceased was
left with no other option except to
commit suicide, in which case, an
“instigation” may have to be inferred.
A word uttered in a fit of anger or
emotion without intending the
consequences to actually follow, cannot
be said to be instigation.”

12. These principles and necessary
ingredients of Section 306 and 107 of the
Penal Code, 1860 were reiterated and
summarized by this court in the recent case
…22… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

of Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab (2020)
10 SCC 200.”

17. A similar view was taken by this Court in

Devender Singh (supra) wherein it was observed:

39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vipin
Jaiswal Versus State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 3
SCC 684, held that the prosecution is required
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
deceased was subjected to cruelty and
harassment by the accused. It was observed
from the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses and in particular PW-1 and PW-4
therein that they had made general
allegations of harassment by the accused
towards the deceased and had not brought
any evidence and specific acts of cruelty or
harassment by the accused on the deceased. It
was held that the onus was on the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC.

The relevant portion of the judgment reads as
under: –

“7. In any case, to hold an accused
guilty of both the offences under
Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC, the
prosecution is required to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the deceased was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by
the accused. From the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, and in
particular PW 1 and PW 4, we find that
they have made general allegations of
harassment by the appellant towards
the deceased and have not brought into
…23… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

evidence any specific acts of cruelty or
harassment by the appellant on the
deceased.

16. In our considered opinion, the
evidence of DW 1 (the appellant) and
Ext.D-19 cast a reasonable doubt on the
prosecution story that the deceased
was subjected to harassment or cruelty
in connection with the demand for
dowry. In our view, the onus was on the
prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the ingredient of
Section 498-A IPC and the essential
ingredient of offence under Section
498-A
is that the accused, as the
husband of the deceased, has subjected
her to cruelty as defined in the
Explanation to Section 498- A IPC.
Similarly, for the Court to draw the
presumption under Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act that the appellant had
caused dowry death as defined in
Section 304-B IPC, the prosecution has
to prove besides the demand of dowry,
harassment or cruelty caused by the
accused to the deceased soon before her
death. Since the prosecution has not
been able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt this ingredient of harassment or
cruelty, neither of the offences under
Sections 498- A and 304-B IPC has
been made out by the prosecution.”

40. As per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Vipin Jaiswal‘s case (supra),
in the absence of any specific allegation, like,
the date, or time of the incident much
credence to the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-

…24… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

3 cannot be given, as the prosecution has
failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the deceased was treated with cruelty
and harassment by the accused persons in
connection with demand of dowry.

Xxxx

56. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions
reveals that to justify the framing of charges
under Section 306 IPC, the following
ingredients must be established: (i) death due
to suicide ; (ii) accused abets the commission
of suicide.

57. The word ‘suicide’ is not defined in IPC.
However, the meaning and import thereof
was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Gangula Mohan Reddy vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh
(2010) 1 SCC 750 wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the
word ‘suicide’ is not defined in the Indian
Penal Code
. However, its meaning and import
is well known. The word ‘sui’ means ‘self’
and ‘cide’ means ‘killing’. In other words, the
act must have been so intended to push the
deceased into a situation that the deceased is
driven to commit suicide. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in para 17 held as under:

“17. Abetment involves a mental
process of instigating a person or
intentionally aiding a person in doing
of a thing. Without a positive act on the
part of the accused to instigate or aid in
committing suicide, conviction cannot
be sustained. The intention of the
Legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by this court is clear that in
order to convict a person under section
…25… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea
to commit the offence. It also requires
an active act or direct act which led the
deceased to commit suicide seeing no
option and this act must have been
intended to push the deceased into
such a position that he committed
suicide.”

58. What is abetment, was considered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.S. Chheena vs.
Vijay Kumar Mahajan and another
(2010) 12
SCC 190 and elaborated the meaning of
‘abetment’ in paras 25 of the judgment as
under:

“25. Abetment involves a mental
process of instigating a person or
intentionally aiding a person in doing
of a thing. Without a positive act on the
part of the accused to instigate or aid in
committing suicide, conviction cannot
be sustained. The intention of the
legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by this Court is clear that in
order to convict a person under Section
306
IPC there has to be a clear mens rea
to commit the offence. It also requires
an active act or direct act which led the
deceased to commit suicide seeing no
option and that act must have been
intended to push the deceased into
such a position that he committed
suicide.

26. In the instant case, the deceased
was undoubtedly hypersensitive to
ordinary petulance, discord and
differences which happen in our day-
to-day life. The human sensitivity of
…26… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

each individual differs from the other.
Different people behave differently in
the same situation”.

59. What is ‘instigation’, was considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar
vs. State of Chattisgarh
, (2001) 9 SCC 618, and
defined the meaning of instigation in para 20
of its report, which reads thus:

“20. Instigation is to goad, urge
forward, provoke, incite or encourage
to do “an act”. To satisfy the
requirement of instigation though it is
not necessary that actual words must
be used to that effect or what
constitutes instigation must
necessarily and specifically be
suggestive of the consequence. Yet a
reasonable certainty to incite the
consequence must be capable of being
spelt out. The present one is not a case
where the accused had by his acts or
omission or by a continued course of
conduct created such circumstances
that the deceased was left with no other
option except to commit suicide in
which case an instigation may have
been inferred. A word uttered in the fit
of anger or emotion without intending
the consequences to actually follow
cannot be said to be instigation.”

60. In Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State
of M.P.
(2002) 5 SCC 371, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court gave interpretation to the words
‘abetment’ and ‘instigation’ in the following
manner:

…27… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

“6. Section 107 I.P.C defines abetment
to mean that a person abets the doing
of a thing if he firstly, instigates any
person to do that thing; or secondly,
engages with one or more other person
or persons in any conspiracy for the
doing of that thing, if an act or illegal
omission takes place in pursuance of
that conspiracy, and in order to the
doing of that thing; or thirdly,
intentionally aids, by any act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing.

9. In Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P.,
1995 Supp.(3) SCC 731, the appellant was
charged for an offence under Section
306
I.P.C basically based upon the
dying declaration of the deceased,
which reads as under: (SCC p.731,
para1)
“My mother-in-law and
husband and sister-in-law
(husband’s elder brother’s wife)
harassed me. They beat me and
abused me. My husband
Mahendra wants to marry a
second time. He has illicit
connections with my sister-in-
law. Because of these reasons and
being harassed, I want to die by
burning.”

10. This Court, considering the
definition of ‘abetment’ under Section
107
I.P.C., found that the charge and
conviction of the appellant for an
offence under Section 306 is not
sustainable merely on the allegation of
harassment to the deceased. This Court
…28… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

further held that neither of the
ingredients of abetment is attracted on
the statement of the deceased.

11. In Ramesh Kumar V. State of
Chhattisgarh
(2001) 9 SCC 618, this
Court while considering the charge
framed and the conviction for an
offence under Section 306 I.P.C. on the
basis of dying declaration recorded by
an Executive Magistrate , in which she
had stated that previously there had
been quarrel between the deceased and
her husband and on the day of
occurrence she had a quarrel with her
husband who had said that she could go
wherever she wanted to go and that
thereafter she had poured kerosene on
herself and had set fire. Acquitting the
accused this Court said: (SCC p.620)
“A word uttered in a fit of anger
or emotion without intending the
consequences to actually follow
cannot be said to be instigation.
If it transpires to the court that a
victim committing suicide was
hypersensitive to ordinary
petulance, discord and
differences in domestic life quite
common to the society to which
the victim belonged and such
petulance, discord and
differences were not expected to
induce a similarly circumstanced
individual in a given society to
commit suicide, the conscience
of the court should not be
satisfied for basing a finding that
…29… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

the accused charged for abetting
the offence of suicide should be
found guilty.”

12. Reverting to the facts of the case,
both the courts below have erroneously
accepted the prosecution story that the
suicide by the deceased is the direct
result of the quarrel that had taken
place on 25th July 1998 wherein it is
alleged that the appellant had used
abusive language and had reportedly
told the deceased ‘to go and die’. For
this, the courts relied on a statement of
Shashi Bhushan, brother of the
deceased, made under Section 161
Cr.P.C. when reportedly the deceased,
after coming back from the house of
the appellant, told him that the
appellant had humiliated him and
abused him with filthy words. The
statement of Shashi Bhushan, recorded
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is annexed as
annexure P3 to this appeal and going
through the statement, we find that he
has not stated that the deceased had
told him that the appellant had asked
him ‘to go and die’. Even if we accept
the prosecution story that the appellant
did tell the deceased ‘to go and die’,
that itself does not constitute the
ingredient of ‘instigation’. The word
‘instigate’ denotes incitement or
urging to do some drastic or
unadvisable action or to stimulate or
incite. The presence of mens rea,
therefore, is the necessary concomitant
of instigation. It is common knowledge
…30… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

that the words uttered in a quarrel or a
spur of the moment cannot be taken to
be uttered with mens rea. It is in a fit of
anger and emotion. Secondly, the
alleged abusive words, said to have
been told to the deceased were on 25th
July 1998 ensued by quarrel. The
deceased was found hanging on 27 th
July 1998. Assuming that the deceased
had taken the abusive language
seriously, he had enough time in
between to think over and reflect and,
therefore, it cannot be said that the
abusive language, which had been used
by the appellant on 25th July 1998 drove
the deceased to commit suicide. Suicide
by the deceased on 27th July 1998 is not
proximate to the abusive language
uttered by the appellant on 25th July
1998. The fact that the deceased
committed suicide on 27th July 1998
would itself point out that it is not the
direct result of the quarrel taking place
on 25th July 1998 when it is alleged that
the appellant had used abusive
language and also told the deceased to
go and die. This fact had escaped the
notice of the courts below.”

61. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Govt. of
NCT of Delhi) (2009) 16 SCC 605, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that there should be
an intention to provoke, incite or encourage
the doing of an act by the latter. Each person
has his own idea of self-esteem and self-
respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay
down any straitjacket formula in dealing with
such cases. Each case has to be decided on the
…31… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

basis of its own facts and circumstances. It is
apt to reproduce paras 16 and 17 of the
judgment which read thus:-

“16. Speaking for the three-Judge
Bench, in Ramesh Kumar case (2001) 9
SCC 618, R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship
then was) said that instigation is to
goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or
encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the
requirement of “instigation”, though it
is not necessary that actual words must
be used to that effect or what
constitutes “instigation” must
necessarily and specifically be
suggestive of the consequence. Yet a
reasonable certainty to incite the
consequence must be capable of being
spelt out. Where the accused had, by his
acts or omission or by a continued
course of conduct, created such
circumstances that the deceased was
left with no other option except to
commit suicide, in which case, an
“instigation” may have to be inferred.
A word uttered in a fit of anger or
emotion without intending the
consequences to actually follow, cannot
be said to be instigation. 17. Thus, to
constitute “instigation”, a person who
instigates another has to provoke,
incite, urge or encourage the doing of
an act by the other by “goading” or
“urging forward”. The dictionary
meaning of the word “goad” is “a thing
that stimulates someone into action:

provoke to action or reaction” (See:
Concise Oxford English Dictionary); “to
…32… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

keep irritating or annoying somebody
until he reacts” (See: Oxford Advanced
Learner’s Dictionary – 7th Edition).”

62. In Praveen Pradhan vs. State of Uttaranchal
and another
(2012) 9 SCC 734, it was held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the offence
of abetment by instigation depends upon the
intention of the person who abets and not
upon the act which is done by the person who
has abetted. The abetment may be by
instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as
provided under Section 107 IPC. A reasonable
certainty to incite the consequences must be
capable of being spelt out. A continued course
of conduct which creates such circumstances
that the deceased was left with no other
option but to commit suicide would satisfy
the ingredients of instigation to commit
suicide or abetment of suicide. It is apt to
reproduce paras 16 to 18 of the judgment
which read as under: –

“16. This Court in Ramesh Kumar v.
State of Chhattisgarh
, while dealing
with a similar situation observed that
what constitutes ‘instigation’ must
necessarily and specifically be
suggestive of the consequences. A
reasonable certainty to incite the
consequences must be capable of being
spelt out. More so, a continued course
of conduct is to create such
circumstances that the deceased was
left with no other option but to commit
suicide.

17. The offence of abetment by
instigation depends upon the intention
of the person who abets and not upon
…33… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

the act which is done by the person who
has abetted. The abetment may be by
instigation, conspiracy or intentional
aid as provided under Section 107 IPC.
However, the words uttered in a fit of
anger or omission without any
intention cannot be termed as
instigation. (Vide: State of Punjab v.
Iqbal Singh
, AIR 1991 SC 1532; Surender v.
State of Haryana
, (2006) 12 SCC 375;
Kishori Lal v. State of M.P., AIR 2007 SC
2457; and Sonti Rama Krishna v. Sonti
Shanti Sree
, (2009) 1 SCC 554.)

18. In fact, from the above discussion it
is apparent that instigation has to be
gathered from the circumstances of a
particular case. No straight-jacket
formula can be laid down to find out as
to whether in a particular case, there
has been instigation which force the
person to commit suicide. In a
particular case, there may not be direct
evidence in regard to instigation which
may have direct nexus to suicide.
Therefore, in such a case, an inference
has to be drawn from the
circumstances and it is to be
determined whether circumstances had
been such which in fact had created the
situation that a person felt totally
frustrated and committed suicide. More
so, while dealing with an application
for quashing of the proceedings, a
court cannot form a firm opinion,
rather a tentative view that would
evoke the presumption referred to
under Section 228 Cr.P.C.”.

…34… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

63. Similar issue came up for consideration
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of
Kerala and others vs. S. Unnikrishnan Nair and
others
AIR 2015 SC 3351 and it was observed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 9,
11, 12, 13 and 17 as under: –

“9. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent
Nos.1 and 2, per contra, would contend
that the High Court has justifiably
quashed the investigation, for
Haridath, the deceased, was holding a
superior rank and there is nothing to
suggest that the respondents had
instigated him or done any activity that
had left the deceased with no option
but to commit suicide. He has placed
reliance upon
Netai Dutta vs. State of
West Bengal
, (2005) 2 SCC 659 and M.
Mohan vs. State, Represented by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, (2011) 3
SCC 626.

11. The aforesaid provision was
interpreted in Kishori Lal v. State of
M.P
[4] by a two-Judge Bench and the
discussion therein is to the following
effect:-

Section 107 IPC defines
abetment of a thing. The offence
of abetment is a separate and
distinct offence provided in IPC.
A person abets the doing of a
thing when (1) he instigates any
person to do that thing; or (2)
engages with one or more other
persons in any conspiracy for the
doing of that thing; or (3)
…35… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

intentionally aids, by act or
illegal omission, the doing of that
thing. These things are essential
to complete abetment as a crime.
The word “instigate” literally
means to provoke, incite, urge on
or bring about by persuasion to
do anything. The abetment may
be by instigation, conspiracy or
intentional aid, as provided in the
three clauses of Section 107.
Section 109 provides that if the
act abetted is committed in
consequence of abetment and
there is no provision for the
punishment of such abetment,
then the offender is to be
punished with the punishment
provided for the original offence.
“Abetted” in Section 109 means
the specific offence abetted.
Therefore, the offence for the
abetment of which a person is
charged with the abetment is
normally linked with the proved
offence.”

12. In Analendu Pal Alis Jhantu v. State of
West Bengal
(2010) 1 SCC 707 dealing
with the expression of abetment the
Court observed:-

“The expression “abetment” has
been defined under Section 107
IPC which we have already
extracted above. A person is said
to abet the commission of suicide
when a person instigates any
person to do that thing as stated
…36… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

in clause Firstly or to do anything
as stated in clauses Secondly or
Thirdly of Section 107 IPC.

Section 109 IPC provides that if
the act abetted is committed
pursuant to and in consequence
of abetment then the offender is
to be punished with the
punishment provided for the
original offence. Learned counsel
for the respondent State,
however, clearly stated before us
that it would be a case where
clause Thirdly of Section 107 IPC
only would be attracted.

According to him, a case of
abetment of suicide is made out
as provided for under Section 107
IPC.”

13. As we find from the narration of
facts and the material brought on
record in the case at hand, it is the
suicide note which forms the fulcrum
of the allegations and for proper
appreciation of the same, we have
reproduced it herein-before. On a plain
reading of the same, it is difficult to
hold that there has been any abetment
by the respondents. The note, except
saying that the respondents compelled
him to do everything and cheated him
and put him in deep trouble, contains
nothing else. The respondents were
inferior in rank and it is surprising that
such a thing could happen. That apart,
the allegation is really vague. It also
baffles reason, for the department had
…37… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

made him the head of the investigating
team and the High Court had reposed
complete faith in him and granted him
the liberty to move the court, in such a
situation, there was no warrant to feel
cheated and to be put in trouble by the
officers belonging to the lower rank.
That apart, he has also put the blame
on the Chief Judicial Magistrate by
stating that he had put pressure on
him. He has also made the allegation
against the Advocate.

17. We have quoted in extenso from the
said judgment
and we have no
hesitation in stating that the suicide
note therein was quite different, and
the Court did think it appropriate to
quash the proceedings because of the
tenor and nature of the suicide note.

Thus, the said decision is
distinguishable regard being had to the
factual score exposited therein.”

64. Thus, what can be taken to be settled is
that the abetment involves a mental process
of instigating a person or intentionally aiding
a person in doing of a thing.

65. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu Versus State of
West Bengal, AIR 2010 Supreme Court 512, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that harassment
must be coupled with some positive action
proximate to the time of occurrence. In the
absence of proof of such proximate action on
the part of the accused, he or she cannot be
convicted under Section 306 IPC. In order to
bring a case within the purview of Section
306
IPC, there must be a case of suicide and
for the commission of such an offence, the
…38… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

person who is said to have abetted the
commission of the offence of suicide must
have played an active role by an act of
instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate
the commission of offence of suicide.
Therefore, the act of abetment by a person
charged with the said offence must be proved
and established by the prosecution before he
could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.
Paragraph 16 of the said report is reproduced
as under: –

“16. In order to bring a case within the
purview of Section 306 of IPC there
must be a case of suicide and in the
commission of the said offence, the
person who is said to have abetted the
commission of suicide must have
played an active role by an act of
instigation or by doing certain act to
facilitate the commission of suicide.
Therefore, the act of abetment by the
person charged with the said offence
must be proved and established by the
prosecution before he could be
convicted under Section 306 IPC.”

66. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Randhir
Singh and another Versus State of Punjab,
(2004) 13 SCC 129 has reiterated the legal
position as regards Section 306 IPC in
paragraphs 12 and 13, which read as thus: –

“12. Abetment involves a mental
process of instigating a person or
intentionally aiding that person in
doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy
also it would involve the mental
process of entering into a conspiracy
for the doing of that thing. The more
…39… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

active role which can be described as
instigating or aiding the doing of a
thing is required before a person can be
said to be abetting the commission of
an offence under Section 306 of IPC.

13. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal
Jaiswal
, AIR (1994) SC 1418 this Court
has observed that the courts should be
extremely careful in assessing the facts
and circumstances of each case and the
evidence adduced in the trial for the
purpose of finding whether the cruelty
meted out to the victim had in fact
induced her to end the life by
committing suicide. If it transpires to
the Court that a victim committing
suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary
petulance, discord and differences in
domestic life quite common to the
society to which the victim belonged
and such petulance discord and
differences were not expected to induce
a similarly circumstanced individual in
a given, society to commit suicide, the
conscience of the Court should not be
satisfied for basing a finding that the
accused charged of abetting the offence
of suicide should be found guilty.”

67. Therefore, what is required is that unless
there is a positive action proximate to the
time of occurrence on the part of the accused
persons, which alone compels the person to
commit suicide, conviction under Section 306
IPC is not sustainable. The legal position has
recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Mariano Anto Bruno and
another Versus Inspector of Police, AIR 2022
…40… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

Supreme Court 4994, wherein, vide
paragraphs 25 and 26, it was observed as
under:-

“25. The ingredients of Section 306 IPC
have been extensively laid out in M.
Arjunan Vs. State
, represented by its
Inspector of Police7 which are as under:

“The essential ingredients of the
offence under Section 306 I.P.C.
are (i) the abetment; (ii) the
intention of the accused to aid or
instigate or abet the deceased to
commit suicide. The act of the
accused, however, insulting the
deceased by using abusive
language will not, by itself,
constitute the abetment of
suicide. There should be evidence
capable of suggesting that the
accused intended by such an act
to instigate the deceased to
commit suicide. Unless the
ingredients of instigation/
abetment to commit suicide are
satisfied, the accused cannot be
convicted under Section 306
I.P.C.”

26. In order to convict an accused under
Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to
commit a particular crime must be
visible with regard to determining
culpability. With regard to the same, a
two-judge bench of this Court in Ude
Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana8

observed as under: –

…41… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

“16. In cases of alleged abetment
of suicide, there must be proof of
direct or indirect act/s of
incitement to the commission of
suicide. It could hardly be
disputed that the question of the
cause of suicide, particularly in
the context of an offence of
abetment of suicide, remains a
vexed one, involving
multifaceted and complex
attributes of human behaviour
and responses/ reactions. In the
case of accusation for abetment
of suicide, the Court would be
looking for cogent and
convincing proof of the act/s of
incitement to the commission of
suicide. In the case of suicide,
mere allegation of harassment of
the deceased by another person
would not suffice unless there be
such action on the part of the
accused which compels the
person to commit suicide; and
such an offending action ought to
be proximate to the time of
occurrence. Whether a person
has abetted in the commission of
suicide by another or not, could
only be gathered from the facts
and circumstances of each case.
16.1. For the purpose of finding
out if a person has abetted the
commission of suicide by
another; the consideration would
be if the accused is guilty of the
…42… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

act of instigation of the act of
suicide. As explained and
reiterated by this Court in the
decisions above referred,
instigation means to goad, urge
forward, provoke, incite or
encourage to do an act. If the
persons who committed suicide
had been hypersensitive and the
action of the accused is otherwise
not ordinarily expected to induce
a similarly circumstanced person
to commit suicide, it may not be
safe to hold the accused guilty of
abetment of suicide. But, on the
other hand, if the accused by his
acts and by his continuous course
of conduct creates a situation
which leads the deceased
perceiving no other option except
to commit suicide, the case may
fall within the four corners of
Section 306 IPC. If the accused
plays an active role in tarnishing
the self-esteem and self-respect
of the victim, which eventually
draws the victim to commit
suicide, the accused may be held
guilty of abetment of suicide. The
question of mens rea on the part
of the accused in such cases
would be examined with
reference to the actual acts and
deeds of the accused and if the
acts and deeds are only of such
nature where the accused
intended nothing more than
harassment or snapshot of anger,
…43… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

a particular case may fall short of
the offence of abetment of
suicide. However, if the accused
kept on irritating or annoying the
deceased by words or deeds until
the deceased reacted or was
provoked, a particular case may
be that of abetment of suicide.
Such being the matter of delicate
analysis of human behaviour,
each case is required to be
examined on its own facts, while
taking note of all the surrounding
factors having bearing on the
actions and psyche of the accused
and the deceased.”

18. It was not disputed in the petition that the

petitioners had quarrelled with the deceased. The

police recorded the statement of Anil Kumar in which

he stated that he had called Savitri Devi, who

revealed that she had a quarrel with her neighbours

on 11.03.2022. She was distressed, and her head was

aching badly. She was sad and wanted to end her life.

She was in litigation with the petitioners. Anil Kumar

counselled her and advised her not to do anything. He

again tried to call her, but his call was not picked up.

…44… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

19. This was the statement made by the

deceased regarding her state of mind after the

incident. It clearly shows that the deceased was

distressed due to the quarrel with the petitioner, and

she wanted to end her life. Therefore, there is

sufficient material on record to show the

involvement of the petitioners in the commission of

crime.

20. It was submitted that the allegations in

the FIR and charge sheet are false, and there are

various contradictions in the statements of the

prosecution witnesses. This submission will not help

the petitioners. The Court exercising jurisdiction

under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. cannot conduct a mini-

trial to determine the truthfulness of falsehood of the

allegation. This position was laid down in Maneesha

Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein

it was held: –

“13. As has already been observed
hereinabove, the Court would not be justified
in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
…45… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint
at the stage of quashing of the proceedings
under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if
taken at their face value, must disclose the
commission of an offence and make out a case
against the accused. At the cost of repetition,
in the present case, the allegations made in
the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face
value, do not disclose the commission of an
offence or make out a case against the
accused. We are of the considered view that
the present case would fall under Category-3
of the categories enumerated by this Court in
the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations
of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar
Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of
Home
(2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the
submission of the learned Senior Counsel for
Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is
filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is
untenable. We do not see any merit in this
submission, keeping in mind the position of
this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A.
v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23].

In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State
of Gujarat
, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)
23], this Court while deciding the question of
whether the High Court could entertain the
Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when
the charge-sheet was filed by the police
during the pendency of the Section 482
petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)
…46… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

“16. Thus, the general conspectus of
the various sections under which the
appellant is being charged and is to be
prosecuted would show that the same is not
made out even prima facie from the
complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge sheet
had been filed, the learned Single Judge
[Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC
OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined
whether the offences alleged to have been
committed by the appellant were prima facie
made out from the complainant’s FIR,
charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of

Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC

1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction

under Section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-

trial. It was observed at page 397:

“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has
held that while exercising inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not
supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable
reference can be made to the judgment
in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh,
(2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379].

The relevant paragraph from the judgment is
extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the
stage of discharge and/or quashing of the
…47… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

criminal proceedings, while exercising the
powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is
not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while
exercising the powers under Section
482CrPC, the Court has very limited
jurisdiction and is required to consider
‘whether any sufficient material is available
to proceed further against the accused for
which the accused is required to be tried or
not’.”

22. A similar view was taken in Dineshbhai

Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104:

(2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 6, wherein it

was observed at page 111:

“29 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide
Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018
dated 31-1-2018.]. The High Court, in our
view, failed to see the extent of its
jurisdiction, which it possesses to exercise
while examining the legality of any FIR
complaining commission of several
cognizable offences by the accused persons.
In order to examine as to whether the factual
contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie
cognizable offences or not, the High Court
cannot act like an investigating agency and
nor can it exercise the powers like an
appellate court. The question, in our opinion,
was required to be examined keeping in view
the contents of the FIR and prima facie
material, if any, requiring no proof.

…48… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

30 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide
Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018
dated 31-1-2018.] . At this stage, the High
Court could not appreciate the evidence, nor
could it draw its own inferences from the
contents of the FIR and the material relied on.
It was more so when the material relied on
was disputed by the complainants and vice
versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job
of the investigating authority at such stage to
probe and then of the court to examine the
questions once the charge-sheet is filed
along with such material as to how far and to
what extent reliance can be placed on such
material.

31. In our considered opinion, once the court
finds that the FIR does disclose the prima
facie commission of any cognizable offence,
it should stay its hand and allow the
investigating machinery to step in to initiate
the probe to unearth the crime in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in the Code.

32. The very fact that the High Court, in this
case, went into the minutest details in
relation to every aspect of the case and
devoted 89 pages of judgment to quash the
FIR in part led us to draw a conclusion that
the High Court had exceeded its powers while
exercising its inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code. We cannot concur
with such an approach of the High Court.

33. The inherent powers of the High Court,
which are obviously not defined as being
inherent in its very nature, cannot be
stretched to any extent and nor can such
powers be equated with the appellate powers
…49… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

of the High Court defined in the Code. The
parameters laid down by this Court while
exercising inherent powers must always be
kept in mind, else it would lead to
committing the jurisdictional error in
deciding the case. Such is the case here.

34. On perusal of the three complaints and
the FIR mentioned above, we are of the
considered view that the complaint and FIR,
do disclose a prima facie commission of
various cognizable offences alleged by the
complainants against the accused persons
and, therefore, the High Court instead of
dismissing the application filed by the
accused persons in part should have
dismissed the application as a whole to
uphold the entire FIR in question.”

23. A charge sheet has been filed before the

Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the

matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023

SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has

been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to

appreciate the same. It was observed:

“At the same time, we also take notice of the
fact that the investigation has been
completed and the charge sheet is ready to
be filed. Although the allegations levelled in
the FIR do not inspire any confidence,
particularly in the absence of any specific
…50… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we
are of the view that the appellants should
prefer a discharge application before the
trial court under Section 227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so
because even according to the State, the
investigation is over and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed before the competent court.
In such circumstances, the trial court should
be allowed to look into the materials which
the investigating officer might have
collected forming part of the charge sheet. If
any such discharge application is filed, the
trial court shall look into the materials and
take a call whether any discharge case is
made out or not.”

24. Reliance was placed upon the judgments

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanju @ Sanjay

Singh Sengar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002)

AIR(SCW) 2023 & Shabir Hussain Vs. The State of

Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (2021) 3 Apex Court

Judgment(SC) 250. However, these judgments will not

help the petitioners’ case because of the categorical

statement made by Anil Kumar in the present case.

Thus, no advantage can be derived from the cited

judgments.

25. No other point was urged.

…51… ( 2025:HHC:13814 )

26. In view of the above, the present petition

fails and the same is dismissed. The observation

made hereinabove shall remain confined to the

disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,

whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
14th May, 2025
(Shamsh Tabrez)

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