Vijay Singh vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 14 May, 2025

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Vijay Singh vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 14 May, 2025

( 2025:HHC:13815 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr.MP(M) No.219 & 220 of 2025
Reserved 02.05.2025
Date of Decision: 14.05.2025.

1. Cr.MP(M) No.219 of 2025
Vijay Singh
….Petitioner
Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation
….Respondent

2. Cr.MP(M) No.220 of 2025
Jyoti Chaudhary
….Petitioner
Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation
….Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? No.

For the Petitioner : M/s. Amrinder Singh & Kamlesh
Kumari, Advocates, in both the
petitions.

For the Respondent/ CBI : Mr. Janesh Mahajan, Advocate,
Special Public Prosecutor, in both
the petitions.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

These petitions arise out of the same FIR; therefore,

they are being taken up together for disposal.
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2 ( 2025:HHC:13815 )

2. The petitioners have filed the present petitions

seeking pre-arrest bail. It has been asserted that the petitioners

are accused in RC0962025A0004, dated 13.01.2025, registered at

CBI, Shimla (H.P), for the commission of offences punishable

under Sections 120-B, 409, 420 of Indian Penal Code (“in short

IPC“) & Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(A) of Prevention of

Corruption Act (PC Act), 1988. The petitioners were falsely

implicated. They apprehend their arrest. The petitioners are the

partners of M/s. Devang Sales Corporation. They applied for the

loan in the year 2019-20, which was sanctioned on 06.03.2020.

The world was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in the year

2020, and a complete lockdown was imposed after March 2020.

The business of the petitioners closed, and the petitioners could

not pay the loan instalments. Proceedings are also pending before

the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh. A complaint was

made regarding the transaction to the CBI. A team of CBI searched

the petitioner’s house and the Office, however, nothing

incriminating was found. The dispute between the parties is civil

and pertains to the recovery of the amount. As per the guidelines

framed by the Government, the CBI can investigate a complaint

when the loan is above ₹6 Crore. However, in the present case, the

loan amount is ₹3 Crore only. The petitioners are innocent, and
3 ( 2025:HHC:13815 )
they were falsely implicated. They would abide by the terms and

conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition.

3. These petitions are opposed by filing a reply asserting

that a written complaint was made by the Chief Manager, Punjab

National Bank, Circle Office, Shimla, against M/s. Devang Sales

Corporation, a registered partnership firm through its partners,

i.e. Vijay Singh Chaudhary & Jyoti Chaudhary, unknown public

servants and unknown private persons. It was asserted that M/s.

Devang Sales Corporation approached the Branch Office of PNB,

Kala Amb, for a Cash Credit Limit of ₹300 Lacs. The proposal was

sanctioned by PNB, CLPC Parwanoo. M/s. Devang Sales

Corporation failed to return the amount, and the loan was

classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on May 2, 2022,

effective from March 31, 2022, with an outstanding balance of

₹3.34 Crores. The bank initiated recovery proceedings under the

Securitisation & Reconstruction of Financial Assets &

Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002. The

borrower misutilized the bank funds. Several irregularities were

discovered during the internal investigation conducted by the

bank. It was found that the funds were transferred from the Cash

Credit (CC) account of the firm to unrelated parties, followed by

subsequent cash withdrawals. The original title deeds were not

submitted to the Bank. The Bank was taking regular Departmental
4 ( 2025:HHC:13815 )
Action (RDA) against the Officials found accountable in the Staff

Accountability Examination. However, the details of the Officers

were not provided by the Bank in the complaint. The accused were

asked to return the public money, but they did not respond. The

addresses given by the borrower were verified, and it was found

that the unit premises were vacated. Search warrants were

obtained, and searches were conducted on 17.01.2025. It was

found that the premises of M/s. Devang Sales Corporation was

sealed by the Punjab & Sindh Bank. The investigation is at the

initial stage. The petitioners are the main accused in the case.

They can influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence in

case of their release on bail. The allegations against the

petitioners are serious. Therefore, it was prayed that the present

petitions be dismissed.

4. Separate rejoinders denying the contents of the replies

and affirming those of the petitions were filed.

5. I have heard M/s. Amrinder Singh Rana & Kamlesh

Kumari, learned counsels for the petitioner and Mr. Janesh

Mahajan, learned counsel, Special Public Prosecutor, for the

respondent-CBI.

6. Mr. Amrinder Singh Rana, learned counsel for the

petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they

were falsely implicated. They borrowed the money in the year
5 ( 2025:HHC:13815 )
2020. A lockdown was imposed in the same year, which caused

huge losses to the petitioners. They could not repay the money,

and proceedings were initiated against them under the SARFAESI

Act, 2002. The initiation of Criminal Proceedings for the recovery

of the money is not permissible. Therefore, he prayed that the

present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on

pre-arrest bail.

7. Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned counsel, Special Public

Prosecutor, for the respondent-CBI, submitted that the

investigation is at the initial stage. The petitioners can influence

the witnesses in the case of their release on bail. The offences

alleged against the petitioners are serious. Therefore, he prayed

that the present petitions be dismissed.

8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

9. The parameters for granting bail were considered by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768:

2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed as under page

783: –

“Relevant parameters for granting bail

26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal
offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like
the nature of the accusations made against the
accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to
6 ( 2025:HHC:13815 )
have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the
role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of
tampering of the witnesses and repeating the
offence, if the accused are released on bail, the
likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the
event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing
the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and
the overall desirability of releasing the accused on
bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman
Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri)
1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528:
2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of
U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 :
(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3
SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC
(Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)
[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12
SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 :
(2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]

10. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of

M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:-

“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the
accused’s presence during the investigation and trial.
Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and
directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez
Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020)
10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court
is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose
“any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections
437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court
has to be guided by the need to facilitate the
administration of justice, secure the presence of the
accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is
not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the
7 ( 2025:HHC:13815 )
witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The
relevant observations are extracted herein below:

“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which
uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in
the interest of justice” has been construed in
several decisions of this Court. Though the
competent court is empowered to exercise its
discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of
bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the
discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to
facilitate the administration of justice, secure the
presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of
the accused is not misused to impede the
investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the
course of justice. Several decisions of this Court
have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which
can legitimately be imposed both in the context of
bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied)

13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15
SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the
discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on
the grant of bail and observed in the following terms:

—

“15. The words “any condition” used in the
provision should not be regarded as conferring
absolute power on a court of law to impose any
condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition
has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition
acceptable in the facts permissible in the
circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense,
and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We
are of the view that the present facts and
circumstances of the case do not warrant such an
extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis
supplied)

14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be
taken into consideration while deciding the bail
application and observed:

“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of
this Court that criminal proceedings are not for
8 ( 2025:HHC:13815 )
the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a
court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory
bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case. The factors to be taken into
consideration while considering an application for
bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity
of the punishment in the case of conviction and the
nature of the materials relied upon by the
prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering
with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the
complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable
possibility of securing the presence of the accused at
the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence;
character, behaviour and standing of the accused;
and the circumstances which are peculiar or the
accused and larger interest of the public or the State
and similar other considerations. A criminal court,
exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory
bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to
realise the dues of the complainant, and that too,
without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied)

11. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus

State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.

12. The present petitions have to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

13. A perusal of the record shows that the loan was

disbursed to the petitioners in March 2020. The lockdown due to

COVID-19 was imposed soon thereafter. The petitioners asserted

that they sustained a loss due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Therefore, they could not repay the loan amount. This submission

has to be prima facie accepted as correct. Admittedly, the loan was

taken for business purposes, and when the business was closed
9 ( 2025:HHC:13815 )
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is difficult to see how the

petitioners could have generated the profits to enable them to

repay the loan. Further, there is no allegation in the FIR that the

intention of the petitioners was dishonest from the beginning,

and they never intended to return the loan after taking it.

Therefore, prima facie, there is insufficient material to connect the

petitioners with the commission of offences punishable under

Section 420 of the IPC.

14. The CBI has also added Section 409 of the IPC. Prima

facie, the offences punishable under Sections 409 & 420 of the IPC

cannot co-exist in respect of the same transaction as they require

different mens rea. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

in Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171 that the

same act of transaction cannot result in an offence of cheating

and criminal breach of trust. It was observed: –

10. The chargesheet also refers to Section 406 of
the IPC, but without pointing out how the ingredients of
said section are satisfied. No details and particulars are
mentioned. There are decisions which hold that the same
act or transaction cannot result in an offence of cheating
and criminal breach of trust simultaneously. Wolfgang
Reim v. State, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3341; Mahindra and
Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. v. Delta Classic (P.)
Ltd., (2011) 6 Gau LR 604; Mukesh Sharma v. State of
Himachal Pradesh, 2024: HHC: 35. For the offence of
cheating, dishonest intention must exist at the inception
of the transaction, whereas, in case of criminal breach of
trust there must exist a relationship between the parties
whereby one party entrusts another with the property as
10 ( 2025:HHC:13815 )
per law, albeit dishonest intention comes later. In this
case, entrustment is missing; in fact, it is not even alleged.

It is a case of the sale of goods. The chargesheet does refer
to Section 506 of the IPC, relying upon the averments in
the complaint. However, no details and particulars are
given, when and on which date and place the threats were
given. Without the said details and particulars, it is
apparent to us that these allegations of threats, etc., have
been made only with an intent to activate police
machinery for the recovery of money.

15. This position was reiterated in Delhi Race Club (1940)

Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2024) 10 SCC 690, and it was held that an

offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust is independent

and distinct. They cannot coexist in the same set of facts. It was

observed: –

“43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of
trust and cheating. For cheating, the criminal intention is
necessary at the time of making a false or misleading
representation, i.e. since inception. In a criminal breach of
trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in
case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully
entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly
misappropriated the same. Whereas, in the case of
cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces
a person by deceiving him to deliver any property. In such
a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.
xxxxx

55. It is high time that police officers across the country are
imparted proper training in law to understand the fine
distinction between the offence of cheating vis-à-vis
criminal breach of trust. Both offences are independent and
distinct. The two offences cannot coexist simultaneously in
the same set of facts. They are antithetical to each other.
The two provisions of IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins,
and they cannot survive without each other.”

11 ( 2025:HHC:13815 )

16. It was submitted in the replies that the petitioners can

influence the witnesses in case of their release on bail. No

material was placed on record to justify this apprehension. This

apprehension can be removed by laying down the conditions, and

it is not sufficient to deny bail to the petitioners.

17. Keeping in view the nature of the allegations against

the petitioners, the pre-trial incarceration of the petitioners is not

justified. The status report does not show that custodial

interrogation of the petitioners is required. Therefore, the present

petitions are allowed, and the order dated 10.02.2025 are made

absolute till the disposal of the case.

18. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the

disposal of this petitions and will have no bearing, whatsoever on

the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
14th May, 2025
(Shamsh Tabrez)