Nilu @ Pramod Kumar vs State Of Odisha on 15 May, 2025

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Orissa High Court

Nilu @ Pramod Kumar vs State Of Odisha on 15 May, 2025

Author: S.K. Sahoo

Bench: S.K.Sahoo

                                                IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK

                                                                  JCRLA No.80 OF 2018

                                   An appeal under section 374 Cr.P.C. from the judgment and
                                   order dated 29.06.2018 passed by the Sessions Judge, Jajpur in
                                   C.T. (Sessions) No.486 of 2013.
                                                                      -----------------------------

                                          Nilu @ Pramod Kumar
                                          Swain                                  .......                           Appellant

                                                                              -Versus-

                                          State of Odisha                        .......                           Respondent



                                                 For Appellant:                     -             Sk. Zafarulla
                                                                                                  Amicus Curiae

                                                 For Respondent:                    -             Mr. Jateswar Nayak
                                                                                                  Addl. Govt. Advocate
                                                                      -----------------------------

                                   P R E S E N T:

                                               THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.K.SAHOO

                                                                                AND

                                          THE HONOURABLE MISS JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO
                                   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Date of Judgment: 15.05.2025
                                   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

               S.K. SAHOO, J.:                      Suspicion is far more to be wrong than right; more

                                   often unjust than just. A hundred suspicions don‟t make a proof.

                                   Suspicion per se may be entirely in the realm of speculation or

Signature Not Verified             imagination and may also be without any basis, whereas grave
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SIPUN BEHERA
Designation: Senior Stenographer
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF
ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 15-May-2025 11:07:09




                                   JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                                                Page 1 of 44
 suspicion is something which arises on the basis of some

acceptable material or evidence. Suspicion is a belief or feeling

that someone has done something wrong, while proof is concrete

evidence that something is true or has happened. Suspicion is

based on doubt and can be subjective, whereas proof is objective

and requires evidence to be established. Suspicion indicates a

possibility, whereas legal proof requires a complete chain of

evidence that leaves no reasonable doubt about the guilt of the

accused. The basic rule of the criminal jurisprudence is that

suspicion against an accused, howsoever strong, coincidence and

grave doubt cannot be a substitute of proof. Always a duty is

cast upon the courts to ensure that suspicion does not take the

place of legal proof.

             The case against the appellant, which in absence of

direct evidence, stands wholly on circumstantial evidence, the

prosecution comes up with some circumstances to prove the guilt

of the appellant, whereas the defence rebuts the same and urges

that those circumstances might raise grave suspicion, but the

appellant cannot be convicted solely on the basis of suspicion,

even if it is grave.

2.          The appellant Nilu @ Pramod Kumar Swain along

with two others, namely, Deba @ Basudev Das and Rabindra




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                  Page 2 of 44
 Kumar Dhala faced trial in the Court of learned Sessions Judge,

Jajpur in C.T. (Sessions) No.486 of 2013 for commission of

offences punishable under sections 449/302/34 of the Indian

Penal Code (hereinafter the „I.P.C.‟) for committing house

trespass by entering into the house of the informant Pramod

Lenka (P.W.12) in between 11.00 a.m. of 17.06.2013 and

morning of 18.06.2013 in village Ichhapur under Jajpur police

station in the district of Jajpur and committed murder of the

mother of the informant, namely, Sumitra Lenka (hereinafter

„the deceased‟). That apart, the co-accused Rabindra Kumar

Dhala also faced charge for the offence punishable under section

212/34 of I.P.C. on the accusation that he harboured the

appellant along with co-accused Deba @ Basudev Das knowing

that at the time of said harbouring, those two persons had

already committed the murder of the deceased.

            The learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and

order   dated   29.06.2018,   while   acquitting   the   co-accused

persons, namely, Deba @ Basudev Das and Rabindra Kumar

Dhala of all the charges, found the appellant guilty under

sections 449/302 of the I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for life on both the counts for such

offences and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (rupees five thousand)




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                      Page 3 of 44
 on each count, in default, to undergo R.I. for a further period of

six months and both the sentences of imprisonment were

directed to run concurrently.

Prosecution Case:


3.          The prosecution case, as per the First Information

Report (Ext.3) (hereinafter „F.I.R.‟) lodged by Pramod Lenka

(P.W.12), the son of the deceased before the Inspector in-charge

of Jajpur police station on 18.06.2013, in short, is that on

16.06.2013, P.W.12 had been to the house of his father in-law

along with his wife (P.W.9) and stayed there for two days i.e. on

Sunday and Monday. It is further stated that on Tuesday

morning, P.W.12 received information that his mother was

murdered. Getting such information, P.W.12 along with his wife

(P.W.9) returned back to their house and found that the

deceased was raped and murdered. It is further stated in the

F.I.R. that about a year back, P.W.9 was raped by the appellant

by entering into the house of P.W.12 during night time for which

a rape case was pending against him. The appellant after being

released on bail from jail, had threatened P.W.12 to kill his

family members unless the rape case was withdrawn by him. The

companions of the appellant were arranging a feast till late night

in a club house. On arrival of P.W.12 in his village, he came to



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                   Page 4 of 44
 know that the appellant along with his companions were

organizing a feast till 11.00 p.m. on the previous night and they

had killed the deceased after committing rape on her. The

appellant and the co-accused Deba Gouda @ Basudev Das had

threatened to kill the deceased.


            On the basis of such F.I.R., P.W.22 Asit Ranjan

Mohanty, Inspector in-charge of Jajpur police station registered

the same as Jajpur P.S. Case No.123 dated 18.06.2013 under

sections 457/376/302/34 of the I.P.C. against the appellant and

others and he himself took up investigation of the case.

4.          During the course of investigation, on 18.06.2013

P.W.22 examined the informant (P.W.12), visited the spot and

prepared a rough spot map vide Ext.6 and he utilized the dog

squad and scientific team in the investigation of the case. On the

same day, he conducted inquest over the dead body of the

deceased at the spot and prepared the inquest report (Ex.1/3) in

presence of the witnesses. P.W.22 seized one steel Khadika

(M.O.I), a split bamboo stick (M.O.II), a mosquito net (M.O.III),

blood-stained earth (M.O.VI) and sample earth (M.O. VII) at the

spot i.e. inside the house of the deceased and prepared the

seizure list at the spot in presence of the witnesses vide Ext.2/1.

P.W.22 issued dead body challan and made a query to the doctor



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 5 of 44
 to ascertain whether death of the deceased could be caused by

the weapon of offence i.e. M.O.I and M.O.II and whether there

was any sign and symptoms of sexual assault on the deceased

vide Ext.7 while sending the dead body of the deceased to

D.H.H, Jajpur for post mortem examination. P.W.22 also seized

saline extract of blood stained cloth of the deceased after being

collected by the scientific team, broken bangles and sample cloth

and prepared the seizure list vide Ext.8. P.W.22 also seized one

red colour saree (M.O.IV) and faded yellow colour petty coat

(M.O.V), vaginal swab of the deceased on production by P.W.18

after being collected from the Medical Officer, D.H.H, Jajpur as

per seizure list Ext.5. During course of investigation, P.W.22

found that the appellant had a motive to commit murder of the

deceased as a criminal case vide Jajpur P.S. Case No.156 dated

25.06.2011 was initiated against him by her daughter-in-law

(P.W.9) on the allegation of commission of rape on her in which

the deceased was an eye witness. On 20.06.2013, P.W.22

arrested the appellant and forwarded him to the Court. On

28.06.2013, P.W.22 sent the exhibits to S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh,

Bhubaneswar for chemical examination and opinion as per the

forwarding letter of the learned S.D.J.M., Jajpur vide Ext.9.

P.W.22 also took the photographs of the deceased at the spot




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                  Page 6 of 44
 vide Ext.10. On completion of investigation, P.W.22 submitted

charge sheet on 02.09.2013 against the appellant and the two

co-accused persons under sections 449/302/212/34 of the I.P.C.


Framing of charge:


5.          After submission of charge sheet, the case was

committed to the Court of Session after complying due committal

formalities. The learned trial Court framed charges against the

appellant along with the two co-accused persons as aforesaid

and since the accused persons refuted the charges, pleaded not

guilty and claimed to be tried, the sessions trial procedure was

resorted to prosecute them and establish their guilt.

Prosecution Witnesses & Exhibits:

6.          During course of the trial, in order to prove its case,

the prosecution examined as many as twenty two witnesses.

            P.W.1 Mahendra Swain stated that on 05.08.2011,

Friday in the midnight about 1.00 a.m., the appellant trespassed

into the house of the deceased and forcibly raped Ritu Lenka, the

wife of P.W.12. He further stated that the inmates of the house

of Ritu Lenka called them and they went and in that regard, a

police case was registered and the appellant was arrested and

sent to jail. He further stated that after being released on bail,




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                     Page 7 of 44
 the appellant threatened the deceased to withdraw the case

otherwise she would be murdered. He further stated that the

deceased used to tell him about the threatening given by the

appellant and on 17.06.2013, the appellant in absence of P.W.12

and his wife (P.W.9), entered into the house of the deceased. He

further stated that the appellant had told him near their

Panchayat office that he would murder the deceased. He is a

witness to the inquest conducted over the dead body of the

deceased. However, he was declared hostile.

            P.W.2 Pramod Kumar Parida stated that during the

night on 05.08.2011, the deceased came to his house, called him

and told him that the appellant raped her daughter in-law and on

her protest, the appellant escaped. He is a witness to the inquest

conducted over the dead body of the deceased.

            P.W.3 Arun Kumar Jena stated that prior to 15 days

of the incident, the deceased told him that the appellant had

threatened to kill her, if she would not withdraw the case. He is a

witness to the seizure of some articles at the spot of occurrence.

            P.W.4 Ghanasyam Parida stated that prior to six

months of the murder of the deceased, P.W.12 had told him that

the appellant raped his wife and thereafter, the appellant

remained in custody and after being released on bail, the



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 8 of 44
 appellant threatened the deceased to withdraw the case or else

she would be murdered. He further stated that on 16th, the

appellant had threatened to kill her and on the next day, the

appellant murdered the deceased. He further stated that he went

and saw the dead body of the deceased in her house.

            P.W.5 Dilip Kumar Muduli stated that one year back,

the deceased was killed and at that time, he was working in his

agricultural filed and on being called by his wife, he went to the

spot and saw a mob of around five hundred villagers gathered at

the spot. He further stated that one year prior to the occurrence,

the appellant had committed rape on the daughter in-law of the

deceased and after being detained in jail around eight to ten

months and released from custody, he threatened the deceased

to   withdraw    the     case   otherwise   she   would    face   dire

consequences. He further stated that due to previous long

dispute between the deceased and the appellant, all the villagers

stated that the        appellant was instrumental in killing the

deceased.

            P.W.6 Ananda Behera stated that one year back after

the Raja Festival, the deceased was killed by the appellant due

to previous ill-feeling. He further stated that he had seen the

appellant standing near the house of the deceased in the night of




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                       Page 9 of 44
 occurrence and he was inside the jail custody for the charge of

rape to the daughter in-law of the appellant and after being

released on bail, he killed the deceased.

              P.W.7 Basanta Kumar Mohanty stated that as per the

instruction of P.W.12, he scribed the F.I.R. and the same was

read over and explained to him. He proved the F.I.R. (Ext.3).

              P.W.8 Braja Kishore Muduli stated that two years

prior to the incident, the appellant alleged to have raped the

daughter in-law of the deceased for which he was arrested and

taken into judicial custody and after being released on bail, the

appellant terrorized the     deceased   and pressurized    her   to

withdraw the case or else her family would be killed. He further

stated that at the time of occurrence, he was working in his filed

and on hearing about the murder of the deceased, he came and

saw a huge gathering and in all probabilities, the appellant might

have killed the deceased as the deceased was under a threat

perception.

              P.W.9 stated that the occurrence took place on the

last day of Raja Festival in the year 2013 and in the year 2011,

the appellant forcibly raped her for which she lodged an F.I.R.

against the appellant. She further stated that after lodging of the

F.I.R., the appellant remained behind the bar for about eight




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 10 of 44
 months and after being released on bail, he started threatening

her, the deceased and her husband (P.W.12). She further stated

that the appellant threatened her and her family members to

withdraw the case against him or else he would kill each one of

them and set fire to their house. She further stated that on the

date of occurrence, the appellant came to her house and

threatened her and at that time, she got the news of sickness of

her father for which they went to her father‟s house leaving the

deceased alone. She further stated that during her stay in her

father‟s house, she got news that somebody had killed her

mother in-law (deceased) and on returning to her house, she

found her mother in-law lying dead having bleeding injuries on

her head, face and other parts of the body. She further stated

that since the appellant was threatening them before the

occurrence,    she    apprehended   that   the   appellant   was   the

perpetrator of the crime.

              P.W.10 Soumitra Nayak stated that the deceased

died one year back and he heard from the villagers that the

deceased was subjected to torture and ill-treated at the hands of

the appellant and others. He was declared hostile and was cross-

examined by the prosecution.




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                      Page 11 of 44
             P.W.11 Abhimanyu Muduli stated that the deceased

died one year back and he heard from the villagers that the

deceased was subjected to torture and ill-treated at the hands of

the appellant and others. He was declared hostile and was cross-

examined by the prosecution.

            P.W.12 Pramod Lenka is the son of the deceased and

informant in the case and he stated about the threat given by

the appellant to withdraw the rape case against him and further

stated to have received the news about the murder of the

deceased while he was in his father in-law‟s house.

            P.W.13    Hunda   @   Sudarsan   Swain    pleaded   his

ignorance about the incident for which he was declared hostile by

the prosecution.

            P.W.14 Utkal Keshari Das, who is a social worker,

has stated that on getting information about the killing of the

deceased, he went near the spot and in presence of the police,

he found marks of assault all over the body of the deceased. He

also stated that in the year 2011, the appellant committed rape

on the daughter in-law of the deceased and in the said case, the

appellant was arrested and thereafter he was released on bail.

He further stated that one day, while the deceased was

proceeding to receive her old day‟s pension, she stated before




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 12 of 44
 him that the appellant was pressurizing on her to withdraw the

case   against    him,   otherwise   she   would   face    with   dire

consequences. He is a witness to the inquest report marked as

Ext.1/3.

              P.W.15 Sashikant Nayak and P.W.16 Rasika Naik

though stated that they knew the appellant in the dock, but

denied to have any knowledge about the occurrence.

              P.W.17 Dr. Sibasis Moharana, who was the Asst.

Surgeon of D.H.H., Jajpur, conducted postmortem examination

over the dead body of the deceased and proved the P.M. report

vide Ext.4.

              P.W.18 Prasant Kumar Mallick, was working as

constable at Jajpur police station, who escorted the dead body of

the deceased to the D.H.H., Jajpur for post-mortem examination

and produced the vaginal swab, clothing of deceased obtained

from the doctor before the I.O.

              P.W.19 Sarat Chandra Jena, who was the constable

working at Jajpur Town police station, is a witness to the seizure

of four items of the deceased as per the seizure list Ext.5.

              P.W.20 Ajay Jena, who was the Home Guard working

under Jajpur police station, has been declared hostile by the

prosecution.




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                       Page 13 of 44
             P.W.21 Padmanav Das has been declared hostile by

the prosecution.

            P.W.22 Asit Ranjan Mohanty, who was the Inspector

in-charge of Jajpur police station, was the Investigating Officer of

the case.

            The prosecution exhibited twelve documents. Ext.1/3

is inquest report, Exts.2, 5, and 8 are the seizure lists, Ext.3 is

the written F.I.R., Ext.4 is the post mortem report, Ext.6 is the

spot map, Ext.7 is the dead body challan, Ext.9 is the office copy

of forwarding letter of exhibits, Ext.10 is the photograph of dead

body of the deceased, Ext.11 is the C.E. report and Ext.12 is the

certified copy of judgment in C.T.(Sess.) 343/2011.

            The prosecution also proved seven material objects.

M.O.I is the steel Khadika, M.O.II is the split bamboo, M.O.III is

the mosquito net, M.O.IV is the saree, M.O.V is the petty coat,

M.O.VI is the blood-stained earth and M.O.VII is the sample

earth.

Defence Plea:


7.          The defence plea of the appellant is one of complete

denial and it is stated that on suspicion, he has been falsely

implicated in the case due to political rivalry. The defence neither

examined any witness nor exhibited any document.



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                     Page 14 of 44
 Circumstances available against the appellant:


8.          The learned trial Court has noted down the following

circumstances to have been relied upon by the prosecution:


            (i) There was strong motive of the accused namely

            Nilu Swain to kill the deceased due to launching of

            prosecution of a rape case against him;


            (ii) The accused Nilu Swain was threatening the

            deceased again and again to murder her unless a

            rape case filed against him was withdrawn;


            (iii) P.W.6 had seen the accused Nilu standing near

            the house of the deceased at about 1.30 a.m. in the

            relevant night of occurrence;


            (iv) P.W.1 has stated that on 17.06.2013, in absence

            of Ritu Lenka and her husband, accused Nilu Swain

            had entered into the house of the deceased;


            (v)   Accused   Nilu   Swain    had   told   P.W.1   near

            Panchayat Office that he would murder the deceased;


            (vi) The Medical Officer (P.W.17) who conducted

            autopsy, while issuing the postmortem report (Ext.4)

            categorically stated that the death of the deceased


JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                      Page 15 of 44
             was homicidal which was due to neurogenic shock as

            a result of severe trauma to vital organ like brain;


            (vii) Ext.4 reveals that on a query being made by

            the   Investigating   Officer   (P.W.22),   the   doctor

            conducting post mortem opined that the injuries

            found on the persons of the deceased could be

            possible by weapon of offence i.e. bamboo stick and

            steel Khadika;


            (viii) There was a stain of blood on the seized

            weapons of offence;


            (ix) There was failure of the said accused to offer

            any explanation in respect of the incriminating

            circumstances as narrated above, which, according to

            the prosecution, can be counted as providing missing

            links for completing the chain of circumstances;


            (x) The seized weapons of offence (M.O.I & II) and

            other articles (M.O. III to VII) were produced in the

            Court and the same were identified by the I.O. during

            course of his evidence.




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                     Page 16 of 44
 Findings of the Trial Court:


9.            The learned trial Court after assessing the oral as

well as documentary evidence on record came to hold that the

prosecution has successfully established and proved the vital

incriminating circumstances against the appellant. It further held

that there was initiation of rape case against the appellant on

F.I.R. being filed by P.W.9 and the appellant was continuously

pressurizing the deceased with the threat of murder for

withdrawal of that case and neither the victim nor the deceased

had withdrawn the said case. In spite of threat of murder by the

appellant, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the

strong motive on the part of the appellant for committing the

murder of the deceased.


              The learned trial Court has further held that the

prosecution      has   successfully   established    the    circumstance

relating to the conduct of the appellant as to his presence near

the house of the deceased at about 1.30 a.m. on the relevant

night of occurrence as per the evidence adduced by P.W.1 and

P.W.6 respectively and the time gap between the appellant being

seen near the spot and the death of deceased is so proximate,

the   possible    inference   would    be   that    the    appellant   was

responsible for commission of murder of the deceased.


JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                           Page 17 of 44
             The learned trial Court has further held that from the

evidence of P.W.17, the death of the deceased was proved to be

homicidal in nature and stain of blood of human origin was found

on the wearing apparels of the deceased and as per the Ext.4,

the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased could be

possible by the seized weapons. It was held that missing link to

connect the appellant with the alleged crime is complete by his

not explaining the incriminating circumstances pointed out

against him.


            The learned trial Court further held that prosecution

has succeeded in proving the circumstances and those proved

circumstances are sufficient to form a chain, so complete that

there was no escape from the conclusion that the appellant had

committed the murder of the deceased on the relevant night of

occurrence. The learned trial Court further held that the murder

of the deceased was committed after trespassing into her house

with intention to commit such offence.


            The learned trial Court further held that there is lack

of sufficient evidence to hold the accused persons, namely, Deba

Gouda and Rabindra Kumar Dhal guilty of the alleged offences

and there is no substantive evidence to reveal that the murder

was committed in consequence of common intention of the


JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 18 of 44
 accused persons and such ingredients of common intention

under section 34 of the I.P.C. are not made out in the case to

hold vicarious liability of the accused persons for the offence

committed by the appellant.


            The learned trial Court further held that there is no

material whatsoever to show that the co-accused Rabindra

Kumar Dhal had the knowledge or that he reasonably believed

that he was harbouring or concealing a person who was an

offender. The essential feature of secrecy is totally absent and

there is also no allegation in the F.I.R. or any specific evidence

on record on this aspect and therefore, it was held that the

prosecution has failed to prove the offence under section 212

I.P.C. against the accused Rabindra Kumar Dhal.


Contentions of the Parties:


10.         Sk. Zafarulla, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant submitted that the circumstance nos.(vi), (vii), (viii)

and (x) as jotted down by the learned trial Court in the

impugned judgment are not disputed. However, he submitted

that the motive on the part of the appellant to kill the deceased

due to the launching of the rape case against him is very difficult

to be accepted. He argued that so far as the rape case is



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 19 of 44
 concerned, the occurrence in question took place in the

intervening night of 5/6.08.2011 and the appellant faced trial in

the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Jajpur in C.T. Case No. 343

of 2011 and vide judgment and order dated 02.02.2017, he was

found guilty under sections 450/376 of the I.P.C. and sentenced

accordingly. In the said case, the appellant was taken into

judicial custody in the year 2011 and after eight months, he was

released on bail and there is no clinching evidence on record that

soon before the occurrence in this case, the appellant was giving

any threat to the deceased to withdraw the rape case against

him. Moreover, in the rape case, the victim (P.W.9) and her

husband (P.W.12) were the main witnesses and it would appear

from the judgment of that case which has been marked as

Ext.12 that the conviction of the appellant was based on the

evidence of those two witnesses and therefore, the threat given

by the appellant to the deceased and commission of her murder

in the absence of those two vital witnesses in the house in the

occurrence night is not believable.


            Mr. Zafarulla further argued that even though P.W.1

stated that appellant entered into the house of the deceased on

17.06.2013, but he has not stated to have seen it and further

not stated about the time of such entry. Similarly, the evidence



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                   Page 20 of 44
 of P.W.6 that he had seen the appellant standing near the house

of the deceased in the night of occurrence at about 1.30 a.m. in

the night, is not sufficient by itself to hold the appellant guilty.

According to him, the learned trial Court was not justified in

holding the appellant guilty of the offences charged as the

circumstances taken together do not form a complete chain and

therefore, benefit of doubt should be extended in favour of the

appellant.


             The learned counsel relied upon the ratio laid down in

the case of Sharad Birbhichand Sarda -Vrs.- State of

Maharashtra reported in A.I.R. 1984 Supreme Court 1622,

Gambhir -Vrs.- State of Maharashtra reported in A.I.R.

1982 Supreme Court 278 and Gedu @ Paramaswar Patra

-Vrs.- State of Orissa reported in (2016) 65 Orissa

Criminal Reports 159.


11.          Mr.   Jateswar   Nayak,   learned   Addl.   Government

Advocate, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment

and argued that when the prosecution has established a strong

motive on the part of the appellant to commit the crime and the

appellant was continuously threatening the deceased to withdraw

the rape case filed against him which is deposed to by a number

of witnesses, in view of the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.6 that on


JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                      Page 21 of 44
 the night of occurrence, the appellant was present near the

house of the deceased while her son (P.W.12) and daughter in-

law (P.W.9) were not present in the house and entered into the

house and that the dead body was found on the next day

morning and it was a case of homicidal death as per the doctor‟s

evidence and the appellant has not offered any satisfactory

explanation regarding these incriminating circumstances in his

accused statement, the learned trial Court is wholly justified in

holding the appellant guilty.


Whether the death of the deceased was homicidal:


12.         Adverting to the contentions raised by the learned

counsel for the respective parties, let us first discuss the

evidence on record as to whether the prosecution has proved

that the deceased met with a homicidal death.


            P.W.22, the I.O. conducted inquest over the dead

body of the deceased at the spot and prepared inquest report in

presence of the witnesses and the inquest report has been

marked as Ext.1/3.


            P.W.17, the doctor who conducted post mortem

examination has       noticed number of lacerated wounds on

different parts of the body of the deceased and haematoma on


JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                  Page 22 of 44
 the right side of the head extending from right eye brow to right

temporoparietal region, comminuted fracture of temporal bone

on the right side so also bleeding from both the ears suggesting

intracranial bleeding and the injuries were opined to be ante

mortem in nature and caused by hard and blunt object. The

cause of death has been opined due to neurogenic shock as a

result of severe trauma to vital organ like brain and the nature of

death was homicidal.


            Though there was an allegation for commission of

offence of rape on the deceased at the time of lodging of F.I.R.

for which the case was also registered under section 376 of the

I.P.C., but the doctor found that there was no external injury on

vaginal wall, thigh and vaginal canal and no material also came

during the course of investigation regarding commission of rape

on the deceased for which the offence under section 376 of

I.P.C. was deleted from the charge sheet.


            P.W.17 proved the post-mortem examination report

as Ext.4. There is no challenge to the findings of the doctor by

the learned counsel for the appellant.


            On the basis of the inquest report, evidence of the

doctor and post mortem examination report, I am of the view



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 23 of 44
 that the learned trial Court rightly held the death of the deceased

to be homicidal in nature.


            One bamboo stick and one steel khadika were seized

by the I.O. (P.W.22) inside the house of the deceased and those

were sent to the doctor (P.W.17) for his examination and opinion

regarding possibility of injuries sustained by the deceased with

such weapon and the doctor has opined the same to be in

affirmative in the post mortem report (Ext.4).


Motive:


13.         The prosecution case is that a rape case was

instituted against the appellant in the year 2011 for commission

of rape on P.W.9, the daughter in-law of the deceased and the

appellant was taken into judicial custody in connection with the

said case. After being released on bail in that case, the appellant

was putting pressure on the deceased and her family members

to withdraw the case, but since the pressure did not yield any

fruitful result, he committed murder of the deceased. In view of

the certified copy of the judgment in C.T. (Sess.) No. 343 of

2011 as well as the evidence of the victim (P.W.9) and her

husband (P.W.12), the learned trial Court came to hold that the

prosecution has established the motive behind the commission of



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 24 of 44
 the crime. I am also of the view that the finding of the learned

trial Court that there was motive behind the crime has been

satisfactorily proved against the appellant.


            Law is well settled that motive indicates high degree

of probability of commission of offence by the person concerned.

It provides foundational material to connect the chain of

circumstances. Of course, motive alone would not be sufficient to

hold an accused guilty. Proof of motive for doing a criminal act is

generally a difficult area for the prosecution as one cannot

normally see into the mind of another. Absence of motive or

existence of inadequate motive is not very much important

where there exists absolutely cogent evidence that a crime has

been committed by an accused.


            Therefore, even if it is held that the prosecution has

proved the motive on the part of the appellant to commit the

crime, but since it is a case based on circumstantial evidence, it

is to be carefully scrutinised what further materials are brought

on record by way of clear and cogent evidence by the

prosecution to complete the chain of circumstances and to

establish the guilt of the appellant.




JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 25 of 44
 Threat given by the appellant to the deceased and her
family members:

14.         It is the prosecution case that since the rape case

which was initiated against the appellant was not withdrawn,

even though the appellant put pressure in that respect on the

deceased and her family members, he was threatening the

deceased with dire consequences.


            P.W.1 has stated that the appellant threatened the

deceased to withdraw the case, otherwise she would be

murdered and the deceased used to tell him about the same. In

the cross-examination, he has stated that prior to one month of

the murder of the deceased, the appellant had told him that he

would murder the deceased, however, he did not inform about

the threatening at the police station.


            P.W.4 has stated that after the appellant was

released on bail in the rape case, he threatened the deceased to

withdraw the case, otherwise, she would be murdered and the

deceased had told him about the same and on 16th, the appellant

threatened the deceased to kill her. In the cross-examination,

P.W.4 has stated that on 16th, the deceased told him in his house

in presence of his wife and daughter-in-law that the appellant

had threatened her to kill.


JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                  Page 26 of 44
              P.W.5 has also stated about the threat given by the

appellant to the deceased.


             P.W.9, the daughter in-law of the deceased has

stated that on the last day of Raja festival in the year 2013, the

appellant came to her house and threatened her to withdraw the

case or he would kill each of the family members. In the cross-

examination, she has stated that no one was present when the

appellant threatened her and her family members.


             P.W.12, the son of the deceased has also stated

about the threat given by the appellant on the last day of Raja

by coming to his house to withdraw the case or he would kill the

family members.


             P.W.14 has stated that appellant met him and told

him to ask the deceased to withdraw the case or else she would

face dire consequences.


             In view of the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses,

which have remained unchallenged, I am of the view that the

learned trial Court has rightly came to the conclusion that the

appellant was threatening the deceased again and again to

commit her murder unless the rape case filed against him was

withdrawn.


JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                   Page 27 of 44
 Presence of the appellant near the house of the deceased:


15.         The evidence of two witnesses, i.e., P.W.1 and P.W.6

are very relevant on this aspect.


            P.W.6 has stated that he had seen the appellant

standing near the house of the deceased in the night of

occurrence. In the cross-examination, he has stated that while

going to attend call of nature in the night at about 1.30 a.m., he

had seen the appellant and there was none else with the

appellant. In the 313 Cr.P.C. statement, the appellant was

questioned regarding this circumstance which was deposed to by

P.W.6 against him, but the appellant denied the same.


            P.W.1 has stated that in the absence of P.W.9 and

her husband (P.W.12), the appellant entered into the house of

the deceased on 17.06.2013. However, he has not stated that he

was present near the house of the deceased and had seen the

appellant entering into the house of the deceased. He has also

not stated at what time, the appellant entered into the house of

the deceased. From his evidence, it does not appear that he had

any direct knowledge about the entry of the appellant into the

house of the deceased. If he had no direct knowledge about the

same and he has not stated from which source, he came to know



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                   Page 28 of 44
 about this aspect, it would be very difficult to place any reliance

on such evidence. Though in the cross-examination, P.W.1 has

stated to have disclosed about the threat given by the appellant

to kill the deceased before number of persons including the

Sarpanch and Ward Member, but he has not stated to have

disclosed before anyone to have seen the appellant entering into

the house of the deceased on 17.06.2013.


            Therefore, the evidence of P.W.1 that the appellant

entered into the house of the deceased in the occurrence night is

not acceptable. No one else has stated about the appellant

entering into the house of the deceased in the occurrence night.

No proof was found from inside the house of the deceased that

the appellant had entered into the house.


            Needless to say, the initial case of the prosecution

was that all the three accused including the appellant in

furtherance of their common intention, entered inside the house

of the deceased and committed the crime, even the charge was

also framed under section 449/34 of I.P.C., which has been

given a go-bye during trial, rather it has been put forth through

the evidence of P.W.1 that it was the appellant alone who

entered into the house of the deceased in the occurrence night,

which is not acceptable as has been discussed above.


JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 29 of 44
             Section 449 of I.P.C. deals with house-trespass in

order to commit offence punishable with death. The key

elements to establish a charge under this offence is firstly, the

house-trespass as defined under section 442 of I.P.C. and

secondly, the intention of house trespass is to commit any

offence punishable with death. Since from the evidence of P.W.1,

offence of „house-trespass‟ is not established, the conviction of

the appellant under section 449 of I.P.C. is totally misconceived.


            Neither P.W.1 nor P.W.6 has stated to have seen any

weapon in the hands of the appellant particularly the steel

khadika (M.O.I) and split bamboo stick (M.O.II) which were

found inside the spot house and were seized by the I.O. No step

has been taken to collect any finger print from the seized objects

collected at the spot. If the deceased who was an aged lady was

in the house alone in absence of her son (P.W.12) and daughter

in-law (P.W.9), how then the appellant in the dead hour of night

entered into her house? The I.O. has not stated to have noticed

any sign of forceful entry by anyone into the house of the

deceased. If P.W.1 and P.W.6 had seen the appellant present at

the odd hour of night near the house of the deceased and on the

next day morning, the dead body was found and about five

hundred persons gathered at the spot as stated by P.W.5, it was



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 30 of 44
 expected of them to disclose the same before others. Not a

single witness has stated that either P.W.1 or P.W.6 made any

such disclosure.


            In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda -Vrs.-

State of Maharashtra (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court

while laying down the five golden principles to constitute

panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial

evidence, has emphasized that there must be a chain of

evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for

the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and

must show that in all human probability, the act must have been

done by the accused.


            In the case in hand, even though the prosecution has

proved the motive on the part of the appellant so also the threat

given by him to the deceased and even if the presence of the

appellant at the odd hour of the night near the house of the

deceased on the date of occurrence is taken into account, but in

absence of any other clinching evidence on record, it is very

difficult to hold that the appellant is author of the crime. The

chain of evidence is not so complete to come to an irresistible

conclusion that the appellant alone, and none else, committed

the crime. The circumstances are not proved to be conclusive in


JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                  Page 31 of 44
 nature. As is often said, there is a long mental distance between

„may be true‟ and „must be true‟ and it divides sheer surmises

and conjectures from sure conclusions and the whole of this

distance must be covered by legal, reliable and unimpeachable

evidence before an accused can be convicted.


            In the case of Gambhir (supra), it has been held

that there might be suspicion against the accused, but suspicion

cannot take the place of evidence.


            In the case of Gedu @ Parameswar Patra (supra),

it has been held that while assessing a case based on

circumstantial evidence, the Court has a duty to see that the

circumstances on which the prosecution relies must be proved

beyond all reasonable doubt and such circumstances must be

capable of giving rise to an inference which is inconsistent with

any other hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. It is only in

such an event that the conviction of the accused, on the basis of

circumstantial evidence brought by the prosecution, would be

permissible in law.


            In view of the evidence on record, the presence of

the appellant near the house of the deceased in the dead hour of

night of occurrence so also his motive and threat given to the



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 32 of 44
 deceased previously might raise suspicion, but reasonable

suspicion is a standard lower than probable cause, requiring

specific, articulable facts that, when considered with the totality

of circumstances, lead a reasonable person to believe that a

crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed. Law is

well settled that fouler the crime, the higher should be the proof.

In the absence of legal proof of a crime, on the basis of strong

suspicion and speculation, there can be no legal criminality.

Emotional consideration and moral conviction regarding the

involvement of the appellant in the commission of the crime

cannot be a substitute for a legal verdict based upon facts and

law.


Conclusion:


16.         In view of the foregoing discussions, in the facts and

circumstances of the case, I am not able to agree with the

findings of the learned trial Court and accordingly I hold that the

case against the appellant has not been established beyond all

reasonable doubt.


            In the result, the JCRLA is allowed and the impugned

judgment and order of conviction and the sentence passed

thereunder is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of



JCRLA No.80 of 2018                                    Page 33 of 44
          the charges under sections 449/302 of I.P.C. The appellant is in

         jail custody since 02.08.2013. He is directed to be released

         forthwith, if his detention is not otherwise required in connection

         with any other case.


                      Trial Court records with a copy of this judgment be

         sent to the concerned Court forthwith for information and

         necessary action.


                      Before parting with the judgment, we put on record

         our appreciation to Sk. Zafarulla, learned counsel for the

         appellant for rendering his valuable assistance in arriving at the

         above decision. The learned Amicus Curiae shall be entitled to

         the professional fees which is fixed at Rs.10,000/- (rupees ten

         thousand). This Court also appreciates Mr. Jateswar Nayak,

         learned     Additional   Government   Advocate    for    ably   and

         meticulously presenting the case on behalf of the State.


                                                     .................................
                                                       S.K. Sahoo, J.

Savitri Ratho, J.: I have gone through the judgment of my esteemed

brother Mr. S.K Sahoo, J., setting aside the conviction of the

appellant under Sections 302/449 of the I.P.C., and agree with

the same.

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 34 of 44

2. I have decided to write a separate order

supplementing the well written judgment of my esteemed

brother, as initially in view of the prosecution case and the

circumstances relied upon by the learned trial Court, more

specifically the threats which had been given by the appellant to

kill the deceased and her family members after being implicated

in a rape case by P.W.9, the daughter in-law of the deceased, if

the case against him was not withdrawn and as P.W.1 and P.W.6

had seen the appellant near the house of the deceased on the

night of occurrence, I was of the view that the chain of

circumstances against the appellant is complete, for which he

has been rightly convicted by the learned trial Court for

committing the murder of deceased Sumitra Lenka.

3. My dilemma has been best described by Justice Vinod

Chandran in a recent judgment in the case of Renuka Prasad

vs. State represented by Assistant Superintendent of

Police : 2025 SCC Online Sc 1074 : 2025 INSC 657. The

relevant portions of the judgment are extracted below:

“1. Prevaricating witnesses, turning hostile in
Court and overzealous investigations, done in
total ignorance of basic tenets of criminal law,
often reduces prosecution to a mockery.

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 35 of 44

Witnesses mount the box to disown prior
statements, deny recoveries made, feign
ignorance of aggravating circumstances spoken
of during investigation and eye witnesses turn
blind. Here is a classic case of 71 of the total 87
witnesses including eye-witnesses, turning
hostile, leaving the prosecution to stand on the
testimony of the police and official witnesses.
Even a young boy, the crucial eyewitness, who
saw his father being hacked to death, failed to
identify the assailants.”

xx xx xx xx xx

“47. We quite understand the consternation of
the learned Judges, in the cold-blooded murder
of a person, carried out in front of his own son
where the investigation though elaborate, it
collapsed miserably at the trial, where the
prosecution witnesses; all of them, turned
hostile. We share the consternation of the
learned Judges but that is no reason for us to
rely on Section 161 statements or the story
scripted by the investigating agency based on
the so called voluntary statements and the
recoveries made, which the prosecution failed to
prove to have a nexus with the crime.”

xx xx xx xx xx

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 36 of 44
“49. We cannot but say that the High Court has
egregiously erred in convicting the accused on
the evidence led and has jumped into
presumptions and assumptions based on the
story scripted by the prosecution without any
legal evidence being available. Truth is always a
chimera and the illusion surrounding it can only
be removed by valid evidence led, either direct
or indirect, and in the event of it being
circumstantial, providing a chain of
circumstances with connecting links leading to
the conclusion of the guilt of the accused and
only the guilt of the accused, without leaving
any reasonable doubt for any hypothesis of
innocence. We can only accede to and share the
consternation of the Division Bench of the High
Court, which borders on desperation, due to the
futility of the entire exercise. That is an
occupational hazard, every judge should learn to
live with, which cannot be a motivation to tread
the path of righteousness and convict those
accused somehow, even when there is a total
absence of legal evidence; to enter into a purely
moral conviction, total anathema to criminal
jurisprudence. With heavy heart for the unsolved
crime, but with absolutely no misgivings on the
issue of lack of evidence, against the accused
arrayed, we acquit the accused reversing the
judgment of the High Court and restoring that of
the Trial Court”.

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 37 of 44

4. After careful examination of the evidence of the

witnesses, the judgment of the learned trial Court and the

judgment of my brother, I found that there are some missing

links in the chain of circumstances for which the conviction of the

appellant under Sections 449/302 I.P.C. cannot be sustained.

Arriving at this conclusion has taken some time, causing some

anxiety to my brother, which I regret. But I could not have let

the appellant go scot free, without being satisfied that he

deserved to be acquitted.

Circumstances against the deceased:

5. The evidence of the witnesses have been discussed

in extenso by my esteemed brother and the ten circumstances

which have been relied upon by the prosecution have also been

mentioned in the judgment of my esteemed brother, hence I am

not reiterating the same. The important circumstances out of

these are:-

i) The threats given by the appellant to murder the

deceased and her family members if they did not

withdraw the rape case initiated by P.W.9;

ii) The appellant was seen by P.W.6 outside the

house of the deceased on the date of occurrence and

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 38 of 44
the time gap between his presence and her death

was proximate;

iii) Death of the deceased was homicidal in nature;

iv) The injuries on the deceased were possible by the

seized weapon of offence;

v) The appellant did not explain the incriminating

circumstances alleged against him;

Other relevant circumstances:

6. The circumstances which caused slivers of doubt to

enter my mind in order to independently arrive at a conclusion

that the chain of circumstances do not conclusively establish that

it was only the appellant and none else, who could have

committed the murder are as under:-

i) Co-accused Deba @ Basudev Das and Rabindra

Dhala had faced trial along with the appellant and

have been acquitted of all charges;

ii) The appellant and Deba @ Basudev Das had

been charged under Section 449/34 I.P.C. for

committing house trespass by entering into the

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 39 of 44
house of the informant Pramod Lenka in order to

commit the offence of murder in furtherance of their

common intention and under Section 302/34 I.P.C.

for intentionally committing the murder of Sumitra

Lenka in furtherance of their common intention;

iii) Co-accused Rabindra Kumar Dhala had been

charged for the same offences along with the offence

punishable under Section 212/34 I.P.C for harbouring

the appellant and Deba Gouda knowing that they had

committed the murder of deceased Sumitra Lenka in

furtherance of their common intention;

iv) There is therefore no separate charge against

the appellant for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C.

or under Section 449 I.P.C., but he has been

convicted for commission of offences punishable

under Sections 449/302 I.P.C. while co-accused

Rabindra Kumar Dhala and Deba @ Basudev Das

have been acquitted of all charges;

v) P.W.6 had stated that he had seen the appellant

standing outside the house of the deceased at about

1.30 am on the night of occurrence and before the

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 40 of 44
incident he was in jail custody for the charge of rape

of daughter in-law of Sumitra and after his release

from jail, killed Sumitra. He did not tell this to any of

the villagers who had gathered at the spot;

vi) It is forthcoming from the cross-examination of

P.W.1 and P.W.9, that that during investigation, they

had stated about threats given by co-accused Deba

who stays behind the house of the deceased;

vii) P.W.1 has been cross-examined by the

prosecution and denied that he had stated that Deba

stays behind house of the deceased and had

threatened the deceased to go away and that Deba

and the appellant had entered her house and

murdered her by giving successive blows;

viii) P.W.9 the daughter in-law of the deceased in

her cross examination at paragraph 5 has stated as

follows:

“It is not a fact that I have not stated to the
police that both accused Deba and Nilu
threatened to kill us and both of them
sitting in the village club conspired against

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 41 of 44
us to kill us and that both Deba and Nilu
assaulted my husband and killed him.”

Twenty two witnesses have been examined by

the prosecution, but out of them P.Ws.1, 10, 11, 12,

15, 16, 20 and 21 have been declared hostile by the

prosecution case as they did not support the

prosecution case.

ix) P.W.22, the I.O. has stated at paragraphs 17

and 18 that P.W.5 had stated about existence of prior

dispute between the deceased and co-accused Deba,

which are extracted below.

“17. It is a fact that P.W.5 had stated
before me that there was ill feeling between
Deba Das, the immediate neighbour of
Sumitra, who threatened Sumitra to oust
her.

18. There was previous dispute with the
accused Deba Das and the deceased
Sumitra in connection with land. My
investigation not directed to ascertain
ownership of land over which the deceased
had constructed her house.”

7. I deem it apposite to quote from a decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Kewal

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 42 of 44
Krishna
: (2023) 13 SCC 695, where the acquittal of the

accused by the High Court was confirmed by the Supreme Court,

holding as follows :

“22…In a case based on circumstantial evidence
not only do each of the incriminating
circumstances have to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt but those incriminating
circumstances must constitute a chain so far
complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that within all human probability it is
the accused who has committed the crime and
further, cumulatively, they must exclude all
hypotheses consistent with the innocence of the
accused and inconsistent with his guilt. As we
have found that the incriminating circumstances
were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and
otherwise also the circumstance of last seen was
inconclusive, in our view, the High Court was
justified in setting aside the order of conviction
recorded by the Trial Court.

23. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not
absolve the prosecution of discharging its
primary burden of proving the prosecution case
beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the
prosecution has led evidence which, if believed,
will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a
prima facie case, the question arises of

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 43 of 44
considering facts of which the burden of proof
would lie upon the accused (See: Shivaji
Chintappa Patil vs. State of Maharashtra

(2021) 5 SCC 626). Here, as we have
discussed above, firstly, the incriminating
circumstances were not proved beyond
reasonable doubt and, secondly, they do not
form a chain so complete from which it could be
inferred with a degree of certainty that it is the
accused and no one else who, within all human
probability, committed the crime. In these
circumstances, there was no occasion to place
burden on the accused with the aid of section
106
of the Evidence Act to prove his innocence
or to disclose that he parted company of the
deceased before his murder.”

………………………………
Savitri Ratho, J.

Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 15th May 2025/PKSahoo

JCRLA No.80 of 2018 Page 44 of 44

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