G.Deepak Rao And Anr vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 7 May, 2025

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Chattisgarh High Court

G.Deepak Rao And Anr vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 7 May, 2025

Author: Ramesh Sinha

Bench: Ramesh Sinha

                                         1




                                                         2025:CGHC:20911-DB


                                                                          NAFR



           HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                            ACQA No. 178 of 2014

1 - Ravindra Nath Mukharji S/o Late Shailendra Nath Mukharji Aged About 63
Years R/o Qtr. No. 9/a Road, No. 43 Sector-7, Bhilai Nagar C.G. Ciovil And
Revernue Distt. Durg C.G. , Chhattisgarh
                                                                 --- Appellant(s)


                                     versus


1 - G. Deepak Rao And Ors. S/o G. Soma Rao Telgu Aged About 26 Years R/o
Sector-4, Road No. 26, Qtr. No. 2 E, Bhilai P.S. Bhatti Distt. Durg C.G. ,
Chhattisgarh


2 - Ajay Prakash S/o Vishal Das Satnami Aged About 22 Years R/o Sector -3,
Road No. 10, Quter No. -2-E, Bhilai P.S. Bhatti Distt. Durg C.G. , District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh


3 - State Of C.G. S/o Through Aarakshi Kendra Rajhara Distt. Balod C.G. ,
District : Balod, Chhattisgarh
                                                              -- Respondent(s)

CRA No. 609 of 2014

1 – G.Deepak Rao And Anr. S/o G. Soma Rao Telgu Aged About 22 Years R/o
Sector Sadak No. 26, Qtr. No. 17e, Bhilai, Ps Bhatti, Distt. Durg C.G. ,
Chhattisgarh
2

2 – Ajay Prakash S/o Vishal Das Satnami Aged About 22 Years R/o Sector – 3,
Sadak 10 Qtr. No. 2e, Bhilai, Ps Bhatti, Distt. Durg C.G. , District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh

—Appellant(s)
Versus

1 – State Of Chhattisgarh S/o Through Sho, Police Of Ps Rajhara, Distt. Balod
C.G. , Chhattisgarh
…Respondent(s)

In ACQA No. 178 of 2014
For Appellant-complainant : Mr. Vikas A. Shrivastava, Advocate.

             For Respondent/State      :         Mr. Malay Jain, P.L.

             In CRA No. 609 of 2014
             For Appellants-accused        :     Mr. B.P. Singh, Advocate
             For Respondent/State          :     Mr. Malay Jain, P.L.

                            Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
                            Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma Judge

                                        Judgment on Board

             Per Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge

             07.05.2025


1. Heard Mr. Vikas A. Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellant-

complainant in ACQA No. 178/2024 and Mr. B.P. Singh, learned counsel

for appellants-accused in CRA No. 609 of 2014. Also heard Mr. Malay

Jain, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the respondent/State.

2. Acquittal Appeal No. 178 of 2014 has been filed on behalf of the

complainant, challenging the legality, validity and propriety of judgment

dated 28.06.2014 passed by the Session Judge Balod Chhattisgarh in

Sessions Trial No78/2013, whereby the learned Sessions Judge has

acquitted the accused/respondents from the charges 302, 450, 302/34,

Digitally
signed by
JYOTI JHA
Date:

2025.05.16
13:29:31
+0530
3

394 r/w Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code ( for short ‘the IPC‘),

however, convicted him under Section 411of IPC and sentenced to

undergo RI for 03 years and to pay fine of Rs.50,000/-, in default of

payment of fine, additional RI for 06-06 months.

3. Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2014 has been filed by the

appellants-accused, challenging the legality, validity and propriety of very

same judgment dated 28.06.2014 passed by the learned Session Judge,

Balod District Balod Chhattisgarh in Sessions Trial No. 78/2013, whereby

the learned Sessions Judge convicted accused/appellants under Section

411 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for 03 years and to pay fine

of Rs.50,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for 06-06

months

4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 17.03.2023, one

Deverndar Kumar Purohit has been informed at about 11:50 by the

Principal of Chikhlakasa that the door of the deceased was opened and

after that Devendra Kumar Purohit has tried to contract to the deceased

with her mobile which was found silent and thereafter he reached near the

house of deceased where he has found that the articles in the house are

kept disturbed and thereafter he has informed to the Police Station

Rajhara and the dead body of the deceased was found into the bad room

of the house. Police has lodged merg intimation (Ex.P-32) and FIR

bearing crime No. 55/13 was lodged against the unknown person (Ex.P-

33). A spot map (Ex.P/015) was prepared by the Patwari. The accused

was taken into custody vide Ex.P/ 25 & 26, and Property seizure memo

vide Ex.P/9 to 13. A crime details form was prepared by the Police vide
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Ex.P/31. The seized property was sent to the State Forensic Laboratory

for examination and the report was received vide Ex.P/30.

5. Dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to PHC

Chikhalakasa District Balod (C.G.), where Dr. R. Ramteke (PW-9)

conducted postmortem over the body of the deceased vide Ex.P/9 and

found following injuries:-

Injuries:

1. Injuries on neck:- (I) cut injuries four numbers discrete
multiple curved, spindle shaped skin deep present on
lower part of neck, base filled with clotted blood in size of
10-13 mmm X 3-4 mm are simple injuries. Multiple
abrasion with contused borders Dots line, 5 numbers
sizes 3-4 mm width not penetrating the skin foiled with
clotted blood.

2. Two injuries on right chest, abrasion with contused
boarders measuring 3-4 mm width.

3. Cut Injury on right lower waist measuring 3cm x 0.5
cm, spindle shaped skin deep filled with clotted blood.

4. Abrasion 2cm x 5cm on right wrist.

5. Abrasion four dots in size of 3-4 mm on abdomen on
front.

6. Injuries on chin 4 Numbers dots like abrasion and
contused borders with clotted blood.

All the above injuries were antemortem (before death).

Dr. R. Ramteke (PW-9) opined that all the injuries were ante-

mortem. The mode and cause of the death is asphyxia due to suffocation

caused by smothering. Homicidal in nature.

The death of the deceased occurred within 18-48 hours of the
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examination.

6. After due investigation, the Police filed charge-sheet against the

appellants before the trial Court. The trial Court has framed charges

against the appellants for the offences punishable under Section 450, 302

of IPC and 302 r/w34, 394 r/w397 of IPC and proceeded on trial. The

appellants abjured the guilt and entered into defence stating that he has

not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated.

7. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as

many as 12 witnesses and exhibited 33 documents. The

appellants/accused examined none in their defence.

8. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence

available on record, by its judgment dated 28.06.2024, convicted the

accused/appellants for the offence punishable under Sections 411 of the

IPC and sentenced them as aforementioned, against which, this criminal

appeal has been filed.

9. In CRA No. 609/2014, learned counsel for the appellants submits

that the case is based on circumstantial evidence and in this case, there is

no any connecting link, therefore after six months of the incident, the

properties were seized and on that basis conviction has been passed

under Section 411 of IPC which is not according to law. The learned trial

Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for the offence

punishable under Sections 411 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to

prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that the

stolen property has been defined in Section 410 of Indian Penal Code and

any person dishonestly receiving stolen property is guilty of the offence
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under Section 411 of IPC and where there is no evidence to identify the

property seized from the accused person to be stolen property, conviction

against the accused under Section 411 of IPC cannot be sustained. In this

case, the property in question are not properly identified. The seizure of

the ornaments is alleged from the appellant No. 1 has not properly proved

and not properly identified. He further submits that mobile phone which is

alleged to be seized from the appellant No. 2 Ajay Prakash, but no call

detailed of the mobile were found and no any mobile of appellant No. 2

was also seized from him, even no any prosecution witness has stated

about the mobile number of appellant No. 2. The articles seized from the

open place, therefore seizure is doubtful and the memorandum is also

doubtful, therefore conviction under Section 411 of IPC is not sustainable

according to the law.

10. In ACQA No. 178/2014, learned counsel for the appellant-

complainant submits that the PW-03 Amit Jain fully supported prosecution

case as well as seizure and memorandum of accused. On the basis of

recovery, it can be held that accused persons were present at the place of

occurrence. Further Durgesh Kumar Bhavgadhe PW-10 clearly depose in

his court statement that the mobile which recovers from the possession of

accused No. 1 was traced at the place of occurrence at the point of time,

which clearly shows that the accused persons were present at the spot at

the point of time. Learned counsel for the appellant-complainant submits

that learned trial Court has erred in convicting the accused persons under

Section 411 whereas the recovery of robbed article was seized from the

possession of accused persons and they have not given any explanation

about possession. Therefore, the appellants-accused may also be
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convicted under Section 302 of IPC.

11. On the other hand, learned Penal Lawyer would support the

judgment, finding and sentence passed by the trial Court mainly

contending that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable

doubt and the appellant has rightly been convicted for the offence

committed by him which does not warrant interference by this Court.

12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,

considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went

through the records with utmost circumspection.

13. The entire case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence,

as there is neither any eye-witness nor any judicially admissible

confession. It is well settled law that where the case rests entirely on

circumstantial evidence, the chain of evidence must be so far complete,

such that every hypothesis is excluded but the one proposed to be proved

and such circumstances must show that the act has been done by the

Appellant-accused within all human probability, this has been held by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hanumant vs. State of Madhya

Pradesh, (1952) 2 SCC 71). And also in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda

vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, this Court outlined five

essential principles, often referred to as five golden principles, which must

be satisfied for circumstantial evidence to conclusively establish the guilt

of the Appellant-accused:

“(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be

drawn should be fully established……

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
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hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should

not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the

accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and

tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one

to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave

any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the

innocence of the accused and must show that in all human

probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

14. To prove the charges, the prosecution has laid emphasis on

recovery of gold ornaments (four gold bangles, gold chain, gold ring, gold

earnings and two chain of ear) belonging to the deceased, on the basis of

memorandum statement (Ex. P-7) given by the appellant- G. Deepak Rao

and on recovery of mobile phone belonging to the deceased, on the basis

of memorandum statement (Ex.P-9) given by the appellant – Ajay

Prakash.

15. Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act stipulate that confession

made to a police officer is not admissible. However, Section 27 is an

exception to Sections 25 and 26 and serves as a proviso to both these

sections.

16. This Court is of the view that Section 27 lifts the ban, though

partially, to the admissibility of confessions. The removal of the ban is not

of such an extent so as to absolutely undo the object of Section 26. As
9

such the statement whether confessional or not is allowed to be given in

evidence but that portion only which distinctly relates to discovery of the

fact is admissible. A discovery of a fact includes the object found, the

place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the Appellant-

accused as to its existence.

17. The essential ingredients of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are

three-fold:

i. The information given by the accused must led to the

discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such

information.

ii. Only such portion of the information given as is distinctly

connected with the said recovery is admissible against the

accused.

iii. The discovery of the facts must relate to the commission of

such offence.

18. The question as to whether evidence relating to recovery is

sufficient to fasten guilt on the accused was considered by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court Court in Bodhraj Alias Bodha & Ors. v. State of Jammu &

Kashmir, (2002) 8 SCC 45, wherein it has been held as under:-

“18… Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in

short “Evidence Act“) is by way of proviso to Sections 25

to 26 and a statement even by way of confession made in

police custody which distinctly relates to the fact

discovered is admissible in evidence against the
10

accused. This position was succinctly dealt with by this

Court in Delhi Admn v. Balakrishan [(1972) 4 SCC 659]

and Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 1

SCC 828]. The words “so much of such information” as

relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, are very

important and the whole force of the section concentrates

on them. Clearly the extent of the information admissible

must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to

which such information is required to relate. The ban as

imposed by the preceding sections was presumably

inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under

police influence might be induced to confess by the

exercise of undue pressure. If all that is required to lift the

ban be the inclusion in the confession of information

relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems

reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the

police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in

practice the ban will lose its effect. The object of the

provision i.e. Section 27 was to provide for the admission

of evidence which but for the existence of the section

could not in consequence of the preceding sections, be

admitted in evidence. It would appear that under Section

27 as it stands in order to render the evidence leading to

discovery of any fact admissible, the information must

come from any accused in custody of the police. The

requirement of police custody is productive of extremely
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anomalous results and may lead to the exclusion of much

valuable evidence in cases where a person, who is

subsequently taken in to custody and becomes an

accused, after committing a crime meets a police officer

or voluntarily goes to him or to the police station and

states the circumstances of the crime which lead to the

discovery of the dead body, weapon or any other

material fact, in consequence of the information thus

received from him. This information which is otherwise

admissible becomes inadmissible under Section 27 if the

information did not come from a person in the custody of

a police officer or did come from a person not in the

custody of a police officer. The statement which is

admissible under Section 27 is the one which is the

information leading to discovery. Thus, what is

admissible being the information, the same has to be

proved and not the opinion formed on it by the police

officer. In other words, the exact information given by the

accused while in custody which led to recovery of the

articles has to be proved. It is, therefore, necessary for

the benefit of both the accused and prosecution that

information given should be recorded and proved and if

not so recorded, the exact information must be adduced

through evidence. The basic idea embedded in Section

27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by

subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the
12

principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made

on the strength of any information obtained from a

prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the

information supplied by the prisoner is true. The

information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in

nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a

reliable information. It is now well settled that recovery of

an object is not discovery of fact envisaged in the

section. Decision of Privy Council in Palukuri Kotayya v.

Emperor [AIR (1947) PC 67], is the most quoted authority

of supporting the interpretation that the “fact discovered”

envisaged in the section embraces the place from which

the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused

as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to

that effect. [See State of Maharashtra v. Dam Gopinath

Shirde and Ors, (2000) 6 SCC 269]. No doubt, the

information permitted to be admitted in evidence is

confined to that portion of the information which “distinctly

relates to the fact thereby discovered”. But the

information to get admissibility need not be so truncated

as to make it insensible or incomprehensible. The extent

of information admitted should be consistent with

understandability. Mere statement that the accused led

the police and the witnesses to the place where he had

concealed the articles is not indicative of the information

given.

13

19. In the present case, the prosecution has produced Amit Jain (PW-3)

as the panch witnesse to prove the recovery pursuant to the disclosure

made by the Appellant-accused G Deepak Rao.

20. Amit Jain (PW-3) has deposed that memorandum of accused

Deepak Rao was recorded in his presence (Ex.P-7)the question were

asked to the accused in his presence by the Investigation Officer in Police

Station Bhilai Bhatti and accused Deepak Rao had told that he had

hidden jewelry of the deceased in the bushes and thereafter it has been

recovered.

21. Further, a perusal of the disclosure statement made by the

Appellant- accused indicates that the Appellant-accused had allegedly

hidden the gold/ornaments allegedly belonging to the deceased by hiding

them in bushes. The seizure memo states that the police took possession

of the articles after they were taken out by the Appellant-accused in

presence of the witnesses.

22. From perusal of the statements of the memorandum witnesses, it is

apparent that the seized ornaments were identified by Ravindranath

Mukherjee (PW-1) and no proper TIP was conducted. Further the call

details which are produced and said to be of accused G. Deepak Rao, no

mobile or sim has been seized or produced, therefore, this is no chain to

convict this accused on the basis of call details. Ravindranath Mukherjee

(PW-1) has stated that no notice for identifying the sized ornaments and

no other ornaments except the ornaments shown him in the Court were

shown.

23. Therefore, from the above evidence it is apparent that neither the
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prosecution has been able to establish the guilt on the basis of call details

nor the proper TIP was conducted. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has

consistently ruled that a memorandum, like a disclosure statement,

cannot be a standalone, material piece of evidence for conviction unless

it’s supported by other cogent and corroborating evidence. Further, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘n’ number of cases has categorically held that

the memorandum like a disclosure statement cannot be corroborative

piece of evidence for conviction unless it is supported by other cogent and

corroborative evidence.

24. Therefore, on examination of the over all facts and evidence of the

case the following facts emerged:-

1- The Recovery was made after six months that too from a open place.

2- No proper TIP was conducted to identify the seized ornaments.

3- The prosecution has failed to prove that the mobile which was seized

was actually belonging to the deceased.

4- Though the call details of the accused G. Deepak Rao were received,

however, no mobile phone or sim was seized to complete the chain.

5- The appellants have been arrested after six months.

25. Therefore, from the above facts benefit of doubt leans in favour of

the appellants because in the instant case no TIP was conducted and the

ornaments were seized after a gap of six months, which raises a doubt.

26. From the overall consideration of the evidence which have come on

record, it would reveal that there are a lot of broken links in the

prosecution’s case which does not complete the chain of circumstances
15

for conclusively reaching to the conclusion that it was the Appellants alone

to have stolen the ornaments. In the light to all the infirmities in the

prosecution case and in absence of complete chain of events, it would be

difficult for upholding the conviction of the appellants only on the basis of

circumstantial evidence of strong suspicion which have come on record.

In a case of circumstantial evidence, conviction cannot be based on

suspicion.

27. It is settled principles of law that prosecution has Burden to prove its

case beyond reasonable doubt and where two views are possible, arising

on the basis of the same evidence, the view which is favoruable to the

accused should be taken into consideration and the accused should be

given benefit of doubt. In the matter of Digambar Vaishnav vs. The

State of Chhattisgarh it has been held as under :

“It is also well-settled principle that in criminal cases, if two

views are possible on evidence adduced in the case, one

binding to the guilt of the accused and the other is to his

innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused,

should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in

cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be

established by circumstantial evidence

28. It is a settled proposition that when 2-3 views came to fore, the

evidence which favours the accused is required to be admitted. This

proposition has been been laid down in the matter of Kali Ram vs.

State of H.P. reported in (1973) 2 SCC 808 and has been reiterated in

the matter of Pradeep Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in
16

(2023) 5 SCC 350 wherein, relevant para-27 reads as under :-

“27. It is important to note that the cardinal
principles in the administration of criminal
justice in cases where heavy reliance is
placed on circumstantial evidence, is that
where two views are possible, one pointing to
the guilt of the accused and the other towards
his innocence, the one which is favourable to
the accused must be adopted.”

Conclusion

29. Thus, in view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion

that so far as the conviction of accused persons under Section 411 IPC is

concerned, when the recovery of the ornaments itself is doubtful as no

TIP was conducted and there are various components which are

missing from the chain of circumstantial evidence., therefore, the

conviction of the appellants cannot be recorded against them.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The appellants are acquitted of the

charges under Section 411 IPC.

30. The acquittal appeal ACQA No. 178/2014 filed by the complainant

against the order of acquittal of the accused persons from the charge

under Sections 302, 450, 302 read with Section 34, 394 read with Section

397 IPC is concerned, it is a settled law that if, on appreciation of

evidence, two views are possible, the view in favour of the accused has to

be adopted. This proposition has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the matter of Bodhraj alias Bodha & Ors. Vs. State of Jammu

& Kashmir {(2002) 8 SCC 45}. It is also settled law that order of

acquittal should not normally be interfered with unless there are

compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. We do not find any
17

compelling and substantial reasons in the present case so as to interfere

in the order of acquittal of the accused persons of the charge under

Sections 302, 450, 302 read with Section 34, 394 read with Section 397

IPC. Accordingly, the Acquittal Appeal preferred by the complainant

Ravindranath Mukherjee (PW-1) is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.

31. In the result, as regards Acquittal Appeal in respect of the appellant

-complainant Ravindra Nath Mukharji is dismissed and as regards

criminal appeal in respect of the appellants G Deeppak Rao and Ajay

Prakash is allowed.

32. The appellants are reported to be on bail. Their bail bonds shall

remain operative for a period of 6 months in view of Section 437A of CrPC

(now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).

33. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent

back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and

necessary action.

                        Sd/-                                    Sd/-
               (Arvind Kumar Verma)                      (Ramesh Sinha)
                       Judge                              Chief Justice



Jyoti
 



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