Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
State vs Kamal Kumar And Ors. … on 23 May, 2025
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 230/2008
State of Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
1. Kamal Kumar son of Mangal Chand r/o House No. 158,
Meera Vihar, Ashok Nagar, Sri Ganganagar.
2. Ratan Chand son of Mangal Chand, R/o House No. 158,
Meera Vihar, Sri Ganganagar.
3. Mangal Chand son of Munshi Ram Soni, R/o Ward No. 35,
Meera Chowk, Sri Ganganagar.
4. Smt. Rajrani @ Raj Kumari wife of Mangal Chand Soni, R/o
Ward no. 35B Ashok Nagar, Sri Ganganagar.
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rajesh Bhati, PP
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shreyash Ramdev, Amicus Curiae
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL
Order
23/05/2025
1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 378 (iii) & (i) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the appellant-State
laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 28.07.2007
passed by the learned Special Additional District & Sessions Judge
(Women Atrocities and Dowry Cases), Sri Ganganagar, in Sessions
Case No.33/2005 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Kamal Kumar and Ors.),
whereby the accused-respondents, namely, Kamal Kumar and
Ratan Chand were acquitted of the charges against them under
Sections 498-A & 304-B IPC; accused-respondents, namely,
Mangal Chand and Rajrani were acquitted of the charges against
them under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC.
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[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (2 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]
2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the
year 2005 and the present appeal has been pending since the year
2008.
3. The brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court, are
that PW-7, Raj Kumar, lodged a report on 15.08.2005 at around
5:45 PM, stating that his daughter, Kanchan Rani, was married to
Kamal Kumar Soni approximately five years earlier, according to
Hindu customs and rituals. He alleged that his daughter was being
harassed by her husband Kamal Kumar, father-in-law Mangal
Chand, mother-in-law Rajrani, and brother-in-law Ratan Chand for
the demand of a Hero Honda motorcycle. Subsequently, for the
purpose of purchasing a second-hand motorcycle, Rs. 10,000/-
were given by the complainant to the accused persons’ family.
However, despite the payment, the harassment continued, and
ultimately, on the night of 14.08.2005, after prolonged cruelty, the
complainant’s daughter was killed.
3.1 Based on the aforementioned information, an FIR was
registered at the concerned Police Station against the accused-
respondents for offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC), and investigation commenced
accordingly. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge sheet
was filed against the accused-respondents, and the trial began.
3.2 During the course of the trial, the prosecution examined 15
witnesses (PW-1 to PW-15) and submitted documents (Ex.P-1 to
Ex.P-34) into evidence. In defence, three witnesses were
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[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (3 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]
produced. Thereafter, the accused-respondents were examined
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.),
during which they denied the allegations and claimed innocence
and false implication in the case.
3.3 After hearing the arguments of both parties and considering
the material and evidence on record, the learned Trial Court
acquitted the accused-respondents by the impugned judgment of
acquittal dated 28.07.2007. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the
present appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State.
4. Mr. Rajesh Bhati, learned Public Prosecutor representing the
appellant-State, at the outset, submits that the husband, Kamal
Kumar, father-in-law, Mangal Chand, and mother-in-law, Rajrani,
have already passed away. The report submitted by the learned
Public Prosecutor, along with the respective death certificates, is
taken on record. Accordingly, the adjudication by this Court is now
confined only to the extent of the surviving accused, the brother-
in-law, Ratan Chand (acquitted under Sections 498-A & 304-B
IPC).
4.1 The learned Public Prosecutor has drawn the attention of this
Court to the statement of PW-7, Raj Kumar, the father of the
deceased, who reiterated the version stated in the FIR. He has
also relied upon the statement of PW-8, Darshana Devi, the
mother of the deceased, who likewise supported the FIR, though
the allegations made by both witnesses were omnibus in nature
and directed generally at the entire family.
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[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (4 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]
5. On the other hand, Mr. Shreyash Ramdev, learned Amicus
Curiae appearing on behalf of accused-respondents, while
opposing the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the
appellant-State, has taken this Court to para 55 of the impugned
judgment, which reads as follows :-
‘ 55- tgka rd vfHk;qDr jrupan dk iz”u gS og eqyfte e“rdk dapu
dk nsoj gS] eksVjlkbZfdy ;k ngst dh ekax esa ifr dk viuh iRuh
ls ;k vius llqjky okyksa ls ekax djus esa :fp gksrh gS bl
eksVjlkbZfdy dk mi;ksx nsoj }kjk fd;k tkuk laHko ugha FkkA blfy;s
jrupan dk vius HkkbZ deypan dh iRuh dapu ls deydqekj ds fy;s
eksVjlkbZfdy dh ekax djuk o mls rax ijs”kku djuk o ?kVuk ds fnu
dapu ds lkFk ekjihV djus esa lfEefyr gksus dk rF; Hkh fo”oluh; o
LokHkkfod izrhr ugha gksrk gSA ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd nsoj dks Hkh bl
ekeys esa cukoV fyIr fd;k tkuk ik;k tkrk gSWA ?kVuk ds le;
eqyfte deydqekj vius ?kj ij ekStqn Fkk vkSj mldh iRuh Hkh ekStwn
Fkh vkSj mldh ekStwnxh esa mldh iRuh dapu }kjk Qkalh ij yVddj
vkRegR;k dh xbZ Fkh] bl ckr dh tkudkjh vfHk;qDr deydqekj dks
FkhA fo”ks’k rF; dh tkudkjh gksus dk Li’Vhdj.k eqyfte
deydqekj }kjk fn;k tkuk pkfg, FkkA bl rF; dks lkfcr djus dk
vfHk;qDr deydqekj ij Fkk fd mldh iRuh us fdl dkj.k ls vkRegR;k
dhA ;|fi vfHk;kstu i{k }kjk izLrqr lk{khx.k us ;g izdV fd;k gS fd
fnukad 14-8-05 dks e`rdk dapu us vius edku esa vius firk jktdqekj
dks eksckby ij Qksu fd;k fd pkjksa eqyfteku }kjk eksVjlkbZfdy dh
ekax dks ysdj lqcg ls ;k nksigj ls mlds lkFk ekjihV fd;s tk jgs gS]
ftlds dkj.k ls mlus ckn esa vkRegR;k dj yh Fkh] ysfdu vfHk;kstu
i{k }kjk ml eksckbZy Qksu dh fMVsy lk{; esa is”k ugha dh xbZ gS]
ftlls ;g lkfcr ugha gksrk fd e`rdk us e`R;q ls iwoZ viuh e`R;q ds
dkj.k ds rF; dks vius firk dks crk;k gksA xokgksa ds c;ku ls vkSj
iksLVekVZe fjiksVZ ls o QnZ lwjrgky yk”k ds rF;ksa ls ;g dgha izdV
ugha gksrk gS fd e`rdk ds xys esa Qkalh ds Qans ds fu”kku ds vykok]
mlds “kjhj ij fdlh izdkj dh ekjihV djus ds fu”kku ekStwn gksA
tcfd vfHk;kstu i{k }kjk izLrqr lk{khx.k us ;g dgk fd e`rdk us
viuh e`~R;q ls iwoZ vius firk ih-Mh- 7 jktdqekj dks ;g Qksu fd;k fd
eqyfteku }kjk dkQh ekjihV dh xbZ gksrh] ftlls e`rdk blrh
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[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (5 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]fopfyr vkSj ekufld :i ls ijs”kku gks xbZ gksrh ftlls mlus vius
vki dks lekIr djuk mfpr le>k gksA ,slk rHkh fd;k tk ldrk gS
tc fd eqyfteku }kjk ?kVuk ds iwoZ mlds lkFk ekjihV dh xbZ Fkh]
ftldh otg ls mlus vkRegR;k dj yh xbZ] bl rF; lkfcr ugha
gksrkA vr% eqyfte deydqekj }kjk ?kVuk ls iwoZ viuh iRuh dapu dks
eksVjlkbZfdy dh ekax dks ysdj ekjihV djus dk rF; izdV ugha gksrk
gS] ftlds dkj.k ls rax o ijs”kku gksdj dapu us vkRegR;k dh
gksA ;gka ij dapu dh e`R;q ls rqajr iwoZ bl “kCn dks bl ekekys ds
rF; vkSj ifjfLFkfr dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, fnukad 14-8-05 ls ysdj
fnukad 15-8-05 dks mldsh e`R;q ds le; dks gh mldh e`R;q dk rqjar iwoZ
dk le; ekuk tk,xk] D;ksafd blh nkSjku vfHk;kstu i{k ds vuqlkj
eqfyteku }kjk e`rdk dapu dks eksVjlkbZfdy dh ekax dks ysdj
ekjihV dh xbZ Fkh] ftlds dkj.k ls mlus vkRegR;k dh Fkh] ysfdu
vfHk;kstu i{k }kjk izLrqr lk{; ls ;g lkfcr ugha gksrh gS fd vfHk;qDr
deypan us viuh iRuh ls eksVjlkbZfdy dh ekax dks ysdj ?kVuk ds
rqajr iwoZ ekjihV dh gks]ftlds dkj.k ls mlus ijs”kku gksdj vkRegR;k
dj yh gksA bl ekeys esa “kknh ds rqajr i”pkr~ ls ysdj mldh e`R;q
i;Zur rd rks vfHk;kstu i{k us eqyfteku }kjk eksVjlkbZfdy dh ekax
dks yxkrkj cuk;s j[kus dk tks rF; izdV fd;k gS og ekeys dh
ifjfLFkfr dks ns[krs gq, LokHkkfod izrhr ughas gksrk gSA vr% ,slh
ifjfLFkfr esa eqyfteku }kjk eksVjlkbZfdy dh ekax djus ds fy;s mldks
rax o ijs”kku djuk lkfcr ugha gSA bl ekeys esa ih-M-7 jktdqekj
e`rdk dapu ds firk us izfrijh{kk esa Lohdkj fd;k gS fd “kknh djus
rd vfHk;qDr i{k ifjokj vPNk yxk FkkA “kknh ds le; ngst dh ekax
djus dh dksbZ ckr ugha Fkh rFkk “kknh ds le; Hkh ngst dh ekax djus
dh dksbZ lk{; vfHk;kstu }kjk is”k ugha dh xbZ gS] cfYd “kknh ds ckn
vfHk;qDr }kjk eksVjlkbZfdy dh ekax fd;k tkuk izdV fd;k x;k gSA
^^ngst izfr’ks/k vf/kfu;e 1961 dh /kkjk 2 ds rgr^^ ngst
ls dksbZ ,slh lEifr;ka ewY;oku izfrHkwfe vfHkizsr gS] tks fookg ds
le; ;k mlls iwoZ ¼;k i”pkr~ fdlh le; ½
¼d½ fookg ds ,d i{kdkj }kjk fookg ds nwljs i{kdkj dks ;k
¼[k½ fookg ds fdlh Hkh i{kdkj ds ekrk firk }kjk ;k fdlh vU; O;fDr
}kjk fookg ds fdlh Hkh i{kdkj dks ;k fdlh vU; O;fDr dks]
¼mDr i{kdkjksa ds fookg ds laca/k esa ½ ;k rks izR;{kr% ;k vizR;{kr% nh
xbZ ;k nh tkus ds fy;s djkj dh xbZ gS] fdUrq mu O;fDr;ksa ds laca/k esa(Downloaded on 30/05/2025 at 10:27:04 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (6 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]ftUgsa eqfLye Loh; fof/k ¼”kjh;r½ ykxw gksrh gS] esgj blds vUrxZr ugha
gSA
bl izdkj bl ekeys esa ngst ds iwoZ] ngst ds le; eqyfteku }kjk
ngst dh ekax dh xbZ Fkh rFkk “kknh ds i”pkr~ Hkh mDr i{kdkjksa ds
fookg ds laca/k esa eksBjlkbZfdy dh ekax ugha dh xbZ Fkh] cfYd dsoy
eksVjlkbZfdy dh ekax ek= ls ngst dh ekax fd;k tkuk lkfcr ugha
ekuk tk ldrkA’
5.1 Counsel for the respondents thereafter has taken this Courtto para Nos. 60 and 68 of the impugned judgment, which read as
follows :-
’60- blhizdkj eqyfte jrupan us Hkh vius li’Vhdj.k esa ;g
ckr crkbZ gS fd fnukad 15-8-05 dks lqcg fte ij dke djus
x;k gqvk Fkk] tc mls irk pyk rks ?kj ij vk;kA mlus dHkh Hkh
LdwVj dh ekax ugha dh vkSj uk gh mlds ifjokj us o dey us
dapu ls eksVjlkbZfdy dh ekax dhA68- bl izdkj mijksDr xokgksa ds c;ku ls fu’d’kZ ;g gS
fd ;g rF; lkfcr gS fd eqyfte deypan dh “kknh e`rdk
dapu ls fnukad 6-12-2001 dks gqbZ Fkh vkSj mlds lkr o’kZ ds
Hkhrj fnukad 15-8-05 dks lkekU; ifjfLFkfr;ksa ls vU;Fkk
dapu }kjk Qkalh yxkdj vkRegR;k dj yh Fkh] ysfdu ;g rF;
lkfcr ugha gS fd eqyfteku us e`rdk dapu dh e`R;q ls dqN
le; iwoZ dapu ds ifr deydqekj] mlds nsoj jrupan] mlds
lkl&llqj eaxypan o jktjkuh }kjk ngst dh ekax dh xbZ
gks ;k mls rax o ijs”kku fd;k x;k gks rFkk mlds lkFk
funZ;rkiwoZd O;ogkj fd;k gks] ftlls mlus vkRegR;k dh gksA
vr% ;g ngst e`R;q dh rkjhQ esa ugha vkrk gS] D;ksafd fnukad 14-
8-05 dks e`rdk dapu }kjk vius firk dks eksckbZy ij ;g lwpuk
fn;k tkuk lkfcr ugha gS fd eqyfte us eksVjlkbZfdy dh ekax
dks ysdj mls fnuHkj ;k nksigj ls rax ijs”kku o ekjihV fd;k
gksA e`rdk ds “kjhj ij ekjihV ds dksbZ pksVksa ds fu”kku ugha ik;s
x;s] ekjihV fd;k tkuk lkfcr ugha gSA vr% mldh e`R;q dks
ngst e`R;q ugha ekuk tk ldrkA /kkjk 113¼d½ lk{; vf/kfu;e ds
rgr mldh ngst e`R;q dh mi/kkj.kk ugha dh tk ldrhA’(Downloaded on 30/05/2025 at 10:27:04 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (7 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]5.2 Counsel for the respondents further submits that at best the
father-in-law, mother-in-law and husband could have been
pressed upon by the Public Prosecutor but, once they are not
surviving, then having any independent proceedings under Section
304-B of IPC, cannot be pursued for the accused-respondent No.2
Ratan Chand.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the
record of the case.
7. This Court after considering the record of the case, finds that
the principal accused i.e. the husband Kamal Kumar, father-in-law
Mangal Chand, mother-in-law Rajrani, have already expired. In
the limited adjudication to be made in the appeal, the role of the
brother in law has been such that the brother in law has been
alleged upon by the complainant and his wife with omnibus
allegations along with other family members regarding the
demand of motorcycle which would definitely, if at all fulfilled,
would have come to the benefit of the husband Kamal Kumar.
7.1 This Court also finds that, at the time of the incident, only
the husband, Kamal Kumar, was present in the house, and it was
in his presence that the suicide in question was committed. The
learned Trial Court further concluded that the alleged last call
made by the deceased to her father was not supported by the call
detail records. Upon examining the medical records–which this
Court has also reviewed–the Trial Court rightly observed that
there were no injury marks on the body of the deceased that
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[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (8 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]would indicate any form of violence prior to her death, except for
signs consistent with suicide.
7.2 This Court further notes that the learned Trial Court recorded
the explanation provided by the present accused, Ratan Chand
(the brother-in-law), that on the date in question, i.e.,
15.08.2005, he was at the gym, and that he arrived at the scene
only after coming to know about the incident.
8. This Court, upon perusing the record, is not convinced that
any interference with the impugned order is warranted. A conjoint
consideration of the facts reveals that on 15.08.2005, only the
deceased and her husband were present at the home. Moreover,
there are no specific allegations made by PW-7 and PW-8, the
father and mother of the deceased, against the present accused;
rather, only general and omnibus allegations were levelled against
the family members. The medical record does not indicate any
role of the family members in causing physical violence to the
deceased. The presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence
Act, 1872, has been rightly rebutted by the Trial Court for valid
reasons, particularly in relation to the present surviving accused,
the brother-in-law.
9. In view of the discussion made above, the prosecution has
utterly failed to prove that there was any cruelty or harassment
soon before death or there was consistent dowry demand, which is
the pre-requisite to bring the accused in the four-corners of the
offence under Section 304-B of IPC as has been held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the recent rendition in the case of Karan
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[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (9 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]
Singh Vs. State of Haryana [Criminal Appeal No.1076/2014,
decided on 29.01.2025], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held
that if the four ingredients of Section 304-B of IPC are established,
the death can be called a dowry death, and the husband and/or
husband’s relative, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have
caused the dowry death. The following are the essential
ingredients of Section 304-B of IPC:-
“(a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any
burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than
under normal circumstances;
(b) The death must have been caused within seven years of
her marriage;
(c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to
cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of her
husband; and
(d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with,
any demand for dowry.”
10. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce
the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of
Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on
12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors.
Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010,
decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-:
Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):
“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the
promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the
safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are
intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which
come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be
summarized as:
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial
and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all
evidence, oral or documentary;
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[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (10 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a
miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two
views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall
ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere
possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of
acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in
appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically
address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and
must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate
Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or
fact in the decision of the Trial Court.”
Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):
“38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the
principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of
CrPC as follows:
“8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the
presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against
acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and
documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the
evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion
which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record
was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”
39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of
acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused
has to be exercised within the four corners of the following
principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission
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[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (11 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]
to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two
reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with
the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available
on record.”
11. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court
passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-
respondents under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 IPC, which in
the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the
settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of
the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it
demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in
arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial
Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each
and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analyzed
the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of
the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned
judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as
to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
12. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the
acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,
and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court
demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a
contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and
thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no
interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
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[2025:RJ-JD:25285-DB] (12 of 12) [CRLA-230/2008]
13. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into
the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the
aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit
case warranting any interference by this Court.
14. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.
14.1 Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A
Cr.P.C./Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
(B.N.S.S.), 2023, the accused-respondent No.2 is directed to
furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs.25,000/- and a surety bond
in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be
made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the
event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or
for grant of leave, the accused-respondent No.2, on receipt of
notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as
soon as he would be called upon to do so.
14.2 All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. Record of
the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
14.3 This Court is thankful to Mr. Shreyash Ramdev, who has
rendered his assistance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of the
accused-respondents, in the present adjudication.
(SUNIL BENIWAL),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
42-ajayS/abhishek-
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