Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Smt Sushila Singhal And Ors vs State Urban Developmentors on 30 May, 2025
Bench: Inderjeet Singh, Anand Sharma
[2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1405/2017
1. Smt. Sushila Singhal W/o Late Shri Girdhari Lal Singhal, aged
about 65 years. (Since Deceased Deleted)
2. Nagendra Singhal S/o Late Shri Girdhari Lal Singhal, aged
about 41 years.
3. Smt. Neetu Singhal D/o Late Shri Girdhari Lal Singhal, aged
about 45 years.
4. Smt. Nalini Singhal D/o Late Shri Girdhari Lal Singhal, All
Residents Of Rupla Paysa, Old Bayana Bus Stand, Bharatpur,
aged about 29 years.
----Appellants
Versus
1. The State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development
and Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan,
Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its
Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.
3. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur.
4. Collector, Bharatpur.
----Respondents
Connected With
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1395/2017
Harviri Devi D/o Shri Hukum Singh aged about 52 years, resident of
Opposite Bank of Baroda, Station Road, Nai Mandi, Bharatpur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development &
Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat,
Jaipur.
2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its
Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.
3. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur.
4. Collector, Bharatpur.
----Respondents
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D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1396/2017
Rajendra Singh S/o Shri Jai Pal Singh, aged about 62 years, resident
of Opposite Bank of Baroda, Station Road, Nai Mandi, Bharatpur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development
and Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan,
Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its
Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.
3. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur.
4. Collector, Bharatpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1408/2017
Suvita Devi D/o Shri Kripal Singh, aged about 67 years, resident of
Opposite Bank of Baroda, Station Road, Nai Mandi, Bharatpur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development &
Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat,
Jaipur.
2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its
Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.
3. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur.
4. Collector, Bharatpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1409/2017
Phulwar Singh S/o Shri Kedar Singh, aged about 62 years R/o
Opposite Bank of Baroda, Station Road, Nai Mandi, Bharatpur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development &
Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat,
Jaipur.
2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its
Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.
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3. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur.
4. Collector, Bharatpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1423/2017
Smt. Shakuntala Devi W/o Uma Shankar, resident of Plot No. 394,
Krishana Nagar, Bharatpur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Secretary, Urban Development &
Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat,
Jaipur.
2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its
Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.
3. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur.
4. Collector, Bharatpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1445/2017
Rameshwar Dayal Tiwari Son of Shri Badri Prasad Tiwari, resident of
546, Krishna Nagar, Bharatpur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development &
Housing Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its
Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.
3. The Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur.
4. Collector, Bharatpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1506/2017
Sanjay Singhal, Advocate Son of Shri Tara Chand Singhal, Advocate,
R/o Opposite Govind Niwas, Krishna Nagar, Bharatpur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through the Secretary, Department of
Urban Development & Housing, Government of Rajasthan,
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Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its
Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.
3. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur.
4. Collector, Bharatpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1533/2017
Smt. Nirmala Devi D/o Shri Ram Babu Garg, wife of Tara Chand
Singhal R/o Opposite Govind Niwas, Krishna Nagar, Bharatpur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development &
Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat,
Jaipur.
2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its
Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.
3. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur.
4. Collector, Bharatpur.
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ashok Bansal with
Mr. Ayush Bansal
Mr. M.C. Taylor
Mr. Saket Pareek
For Respondent(s) : Mr. L.L. Gupta with
Mr. Tanmay Mathur,
Mr. Lakshaya Kumar Sharma,
Ms. Vijeta Jain &
Ms. Pratibha Sharma
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Order
RESERVED ON :: 27.05.2025
PRONOUNCED ON :: 30.05.2025
(Per Hon. Anand Sharma, J.)
1. This common judgment is being rendered in the above batch
of cases, all of which arise out of substantially similar facts and
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raise common questions of law. In view of the overlapping issues
and to avoid repetition, the matters were heard analogously and
are being disposed of together by this consolidated judgment.
2. For narrating the factual matrix with the consent of learned
counsel for both the parties, the facts stated in D.B. Civil
Special Appeal (Writ) No.1405/2017 (Sushila Singhal &
Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) are being taken into
consideration.
3. The petitioners filed writ petition under article 226 of the
Constitution of India before the learned Single Judge with a prayer
to quash the notification dated 06.09.2006 under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter to be referred as, 'the Act
of 1894'); notification dated 10.10.2007 under Section 6 and
award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 with the further prayer
to direct the respondents not to dispossess the petitioners from
their respective piece of land.
4. It has been contended by the petitioners that they own and
possess different small plots of land for residential purposes which
have been carved out over the agricultural land situated in
revenue village Bharatpur Chak No.3. Such plots of land have
been purchased by them from 'Khatedar' of the agriculture land.
5. It has further been submitted by the petitioners that earlier
in the year 1986, one Scheme No.3 was sought to be framed by
the respondent Urban Improvement Trust (hereinafter to be
referred as, 'UIT') in the above revenue village, however, the
Scheme was dropped vide notification dated 20.04.1993. Again,
one new Scheme No.10 was proposed over the said agricultural
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land, yet for the reasons best known to the respondents such
Scheme was again dropped in the year 2002.
6. After dropping the Scheme twice and without preparing a
proper Scheme as per law, the State Government issued one
notification dated 06.09.2006 under Section 4 of the Act of 1894
whereby total 31.24 hectare land falling in revenue village
Bharatpur Chak No.3 was intended to be acquired for
"Multipurpose Scheme". Vide aforementioned notification issued
by Land Acquisition Officer, UIT was also authorized to undertake
the survey of the land sought to be acquired.
7. The said notification under Section 4 was published in Official
Gazette on 12.10.2006 and thereafter in two different daily
newspapers 'Dainik Bhaskar' and 'Dainik Sandhya Jyoti Darpan' on
18.10.2006 and 21.10.2006 respectively. Substance of the
notification under Section 4 was also affixed/pasted at the
conspicuous places in the locality on 17.10.2006.
8. The petitioners further submitted that by way of submitting
different objections, they objected against the intended acquisition
proceedings. However, ignoring the valid and legitimate objections
raised by the petitioners and without giving proper opportunity of
being heard, the Land Acquisition Officer submitted its report to
the State Government on 25.01.2007.
9. The petitioners also submitted that without appreciating the
genuineness of public purpose and the objections raised by the
petitioners, in quite mechanical manner, the State Government
issued declaration dated 10.10.2007 under Section 6 of the Act of
1894.
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10. The said declaration dated 10.10.2007 was published in
Official Gazette on 25.10.2007 as well as into daily newspapers
namely 'Rajasthan Patrika' and 'Dainik Sandhya Jyoti Darpan' on
22.10.2007. Thereafter, in order to give public notice, substance
of the declaration under section 6 was also affixed in the locality
on 05.08.2008.
11. Further notices dated 08.09.2009 under Section 9 of the Act
of 1894 were also issued by the Land Acquisition Officer in order
to require the persons interested to file their claim with regard to
compensation in lieu of acquisition of land.
12. As per petitioners, thereafter the Land Acquisition Officer
passed one undated draft award, which was sent for approval of
the State Government vide letter dated 22.10.2009. The State
Government accorded its approval of the award on 10.11.2009.
13. It has also been informed by learned counsel for the
petitioners that earlier also some of the petitioners challenged the
acquisition proceedings by way of filing different writ petitions, yet
on account of subsequent developments, the earlier petitions were
withdrawn with liberty to file fresh petitions.
14. In the writ petitions before the learned Single Judge, the
acquisition proceedings were challenged by the petitioners inter
alia on following grounds: -
(i) In the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894,
purpose of acquisition was not properly disclosed and the term
"Multipurpose Scheme" used for showing the purpose of
acquisition, was totally vague and not specific.
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(ii) Despite mandate of the Act of 1894, in violation of Section
5A, opportunity of personal hearing was not provided and the
objections raised on behalf of the petitioners have not been
considered and decided objectively.
(iii) Declaration under Section 6 was published after expiry of
more than one year from the date of publication under Section 4
of the Act of 1894, hence the proceedings stood lapsed.
(iv) Since notices under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 were not
served upon the petitioners, therefore, without following the
aforesaid mandatory provision the Land Acquisition Officer could
not have proceeded further to pass award.
(v) In view of Section 11A of the Act of 1894, award can be
passed only within a period of two years from the date of
publication of declaration under Section 6, however, in this case,
the award has been passed after lapse of prescribed limitation of
two years, therefore, the proceedings have lapsed.
(vi) In the light of provisions of Section 24(2) of The Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as, 'the Act
of 2013'), the proceedings are deemed to have been lapsed.
(vii) On account of non-payment of compensation in lieu of
acquisition, the proceedings have vitiated.
(viii) Allegations of discrimination have also been levelled by
stating that the lands of few land-holders were left from
acquisition but the same treatment was not given to the
petitioners.
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(ix) Petitioners have not been allotted equivalent land qua the
land sought to be acquired.
15. By pressing the aforementioned grounds, the petitioners
prayed to quash the acquisition proceedings and to allow the writ
petitions filed by the petitioners.
16. The respondents filed joint reply to the writ petition in which
they categorically denied the averments in the writ petition. In the
reply to the writ petition, the contentions raised by the petitioners
have been countered in following manner by the respondents:-
(i) The Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners suffer from the vice
of delay and latches, for the reason that the notification under
Section 4 was issued on 26.09.2006, followed by declaration
under Section 6 dated 10.10.2007 and award under Section 11 of
the Act of 1894 was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on
22.10.2009, whereas the above writ petitions have been filed in
the year 2012 i.e. almost after three years from the date of
passing of award.
(ii) Merely, the fact that earlier Schemes framed over the land in
question was dropped out on account of some technical reasons
would not give rise to the presumption that the land was not
required for public purposes. In fact, after dropping the earlier
Scheme, the new Scheme has been framed in a better manner by
including so many facilities for the welfare of public at large.
(iii) It cannot be said that the purpose of acquisition shown in
notification dated 26.09.2006 under Section 4, i.e. for
"Multipurpose Scheme" was vague or evasive. It has been
submitted that the aforesaid term "Multipurpose Scheme" is wide
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enough to include so many utilities and facilities of public
importance. It has been submitted that while issuing the
notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, the State
Government is not required to disclose its entire Scheme in detail
and mere indication of public purpose is required to be given.
(iv) The allegation with regard to not providing personal hearing
for the objection under Section 5A were emphatically denied and it
was submitted that after serving public notices, date of hearing
was informed to the persons interested and they were also heard
personally. In reply to the Writ Petition, even the details of filing
Vakalatnama by the advocate on personal interest and
participation in the proceedings have also been given.
(v) It has also been submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer
has properly considered the objections raised by the persons
interested and has given the report in detail. Therefore, the
allegations with regard to non-consideration of the objections have
also been denied.
(vi) It has been submitted in the reply that the last date of
publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was
21.10.2006 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894
was issued on 10.10.2007 i.e. within a period of one year from the
last date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act of
1894, therefore, the objections raised by the petitioner with
regard to their being a gap of more than one year between the
publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 and
issuance of declaration under Section 6 is totally misconceived and
against the facts.
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(vii) It has also been submitted by the respondents that the
contention raised by the petitioners with regard to not issuing
notice under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 are not correct. In fact,
notice under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 was issued on
08.09.2009 and was also served upon the persons interested.
(viii) It has also been submitted that even otherwise issuance of
notice under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 is directory in nature
and merely by raising the grounds of non-issuance of notification
under Section 9 of the Act of 1894, the land acquisition
proceedings cannot be challenged.
(ix) It has also been clarified in the reply that the award was
passed on 22.10.2009 by the Land Acquisition Officer and same
was approved by the Competent Authority of the State
Government on 10.11.2009. Such award was passed within a
period of two years from 05.08.2008, which was the last date of
publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894,
hence it cannot be said that land acquisition proceedings have
lapsed in view of the Section 11A of the Act of 1894.
(x) It has also been submitted by the respondents that application
of Section 24(2) of the Act of the 2013 cannot be pressed into
service by the petitioners for the reason that the aofresaid Act of
2013 has come into force w.e.f. 01.01.2014 and the award in
question has been passed within a period of five years preceding
the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013.
(xi) It has also been emphatically denied that the compensation
pursuant to land acquisition award has not been paid by the
respondents. Respondents clarified that the compensation amount
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has been paid to the persons interested, who have accepted the
award and for the remaining persons, the amount of
compensation has been deposited with Competent Authority on
18.11.2015.
(xii) It has also been stated in the reply that no discrimination
whatsoever has been done with the petitioners. Their land has
been chosen for acquisition as per the Scheme and the
proceedings have been conducted in accordance with the law.
(xiii) It has also been submitted that there is no provision
whatsoever for allotting land having equivalent area qua the land
sought to be acquired. It has been clarified that as per the
Scheme of the State Government, developed land @ 15% or 25%
as the case may be, can be allotted to the person who wish to
surrender their land. In the instant acquisition proceedings also,
so many persons have surrendered their land in order to get
developed land as per the Schemes of the State Government and
even the reservation letters have also been issued to some of
them.
(xiv) It has also been indicated that in one of the writ petitions,
the petitioner has filed reference petition in order to seek
enhancement of compensation, therefore, in such a case writ
petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.
(xv) It has also been submitted on behalf of the respondents that
as per the settled proposition of law, writ petition is not
maintainable after passing an award.
(xvi) It has also been submitted that the respondents have carried
out the entire land acquisition proceedings strictly in accordance
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with the provisions of the Act of 1894 and the petitioners have
utterly failed to point out any manifest and illegality in the
proceedings, therefore, the writ petitions filed by the petitioners
are liable to be dismissed.
17. Learned Single Judge considered the pleadings of the parties,
facts of the case, material on record and the law prevailing at the
relevant time and ultimately dismissed the writ petitions filed by
the petitioners vide judgment dated 10.07.2017.
18. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that while
deciding the writ petitions vide judgment dated 10.07.2017, the
learned Single Judge could not appreciate the Scheme of the Act
of 1894 and the impugned judgment suffers from misappreciation
of facts and misconstruction of law.
19. Learned counsel for the appellants would further submit that
the Act of 1894 is an expropriatory law and therefore its
provisions are to be construed strictly. Even a single non-
compliance of expropriatory law would vitiate the entire land
acquisition proceedings.
20. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the
minimal right prescribed under the Act of 1894 to a person
interested is to object against the acquisition proceedings by way
of submitting objections under Section 5A. Such objections are
required to be considered objectively by the Land Acquisition
Officer after giving personal hearing to the objectors, whereas in
the instant case neither the personal hearing was given to the
appellants-objectors; nor were the objections decided after
analyzing the facts stated in the objections by the appellants.
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Therefore, the provisions of Section 5A of the Act of 1894 have
not been followed in its letters and spirit, consequently, the entire
land acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed and set
aside.
21. Learned counsel for the appellants also submitted that the
learned Single Judge could not properly appreciate the grounds
raised by the appellants with regard to lapse of proceedings on
account of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 being
published by lapse of one year. That apart, it was also not
considered in right perspective that the award passed by the Land
Acquisition Officer was undated and was passed after expiry of
mandatory limitation period of two years from the date of
publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894.
22. Learned counsel further submitted that the question of non-
payment of compensation and deemed lapse of acquisition in view
of the Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 has not been decided in
correct manner by the learned Single Judge.
23. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the
appellants that although plea of discrimination was raised before
the learned Single Judge but no analytical finding had been given
over the said issue by the learned Single Judge.
24. At the end, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted
that appellants are possessing small plots of land, which have
been purchased through hard earned money, therefore, the
respondents may be restrained from acquiring the land in question
and to dispossess them.
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25. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the
judgments of (i) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius
Shapur Chenai & Ors. reported in (2005) 7 SCC 627, (ii)
Laxman Lal (Dead) through LRs. & Anr. Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. reported in (2013) 3 SCC 764, (iii) V.K.M.
Kattha Industries Private Limited Vs. State of Haryana &
Ors. reported in (2013) 9 SCC 338, (iv) Kamal Trading
Private Limited (Now known as Manav Investment and
Trading Company Limited) Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.
reported in (2012) 2 SCC 25, (v) Women's Education Trust &
Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in (2013) 8 SCC
99, (vi) J & K Housing Board & Anr. Vs. Kunwar Sanjay
Krishan Kaul & Ors. reported in (2011) 10 SCC 714, (vii)
Kulsum R. Nadiadwala Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
reported in (2012) 6 SCC 348, (viii) Gandhi Grah Nirman
Sahkari Samiti Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
reported in (1993) 2 SCC 662, (ix) State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
Vs. A. Mohammer Yousef & Ors. reported in (1991) 4 SCC
224, (x) Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. Vs. Bimal
Kumar Shah & Ors. reported in (2024) 10 SCC 533.
26. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has
submitted total 12.55 hectares was included in a declaration under
Section 6 of the Act of 1894 issued by the respondents in the
instant land acquisition proceedings and subsequently award has
been passed and compensation has also been paid to different
persons. So far as, appellants are concerned their total land,
calculated on the basis of all the above writ petitions, comes to
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around 1600 sq. yards, which is very small area in comparison to
a total land sought to be acquired. The other persons have either
accepted the compensation or have surrendered their land in
order to claim allotment of developed land pursuant to the
Scheme in the State Government. Therefore, in the light of above
facts where the persons possessing hardly one percent of the land
under acquisition have filed the instant writ petitions, their
challenge is liable to be ignored in the interest of public at large.
27. Learned counsel for the respondents has also indicated that
the award was passed way back in the year 2009 pursuant to
acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 2006. Only on account
of challenge raised by the petitioners in the instant writ petitions
with regard to their small plots of land, which are falling amidst
the Scheme framed by the respondents, the respondents are not
in a position to properly carry out their Scheme, which was framed
for public purpose.
28. It has been reiterated by the learned counsel for the
respondents that as the writ petitions were filed in the year 2012
i.e. much after passing of the award, hence, no interference is
warranted only on account of delay and latches in the instant
matter.
29. As regards, ground raised by the appellant that opportunity
of personal hearing was not given, it was seriously objected by the
learned counsel for the respondents by submitting that such
ground is totally misleading the against the record. By citing the
example of the lead case of Sushila Singhal & Ors. Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9100/2012, it has
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been submitted that notice for personal hearing on objection was
issued by the Land Acquisition Officer on 08.12.2006, which was
dispatched from the dispatch register having entries from serial
No.221 to 270 and same was delivered to the appellant herself on
13.12.2006. It has also been submitted that even original record
was placed before the learned Single Judge and after examining
the same it has been observed by the learned Single Judge that
even the advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellants before
the Land Acquisition Officer during hearing under Section 5A.
Relevant observations made by learned Single Judge in this regard
are being reproduced hereunder:-
"The other petitioners submitted objections
under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 and orally
alleged denial of opportunity of personal
hearing. It is without making specific pleading
that the notice for hearing was not served.
The petitioners have concealed the fact about
the notice of hearing given to them. The
notice for hearing was issued by the Land
Acquisition Officer on 8th December, 2006 to
those, who raised the objections under
Section 5A of the Act of 1894. The petitioners
later on filed affidavit to indicate that service
of notice was not made in person and,
otherwise, they were not knowing English
thus even signatures are forged. An additional
affidavit was also filed on 27th January, 2017
along with exhibit A/1 to show that no notice
for hearing was given. The reply filed by the
respondents along with an affidavit shows
that the objections were submitted on behalf
of Mr. Sanjay Singhal through his Advocate,
who was none else but his father Tarachand
Singhal. The notice for hearing was also given
to his mother Nirmla Devi and was received
by the family members.
In the other writ petition/s also, the fact
pertaining to the issuance of notice has been
narrated and, therein also, the Advocate put
in appearance for hearing. The copy of
"Vakalatnama" has been enclosed to show
appearance of the representative. A copy of
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the dispatch register has been filed by Mr.
Kishan Singh Verma on the direction of this
Court. It is to show issuance of the notice.
The respondents earlier submitted documents
along with the reply to show representation of
the parties. It is to show an opportunity of
hearing. The reply to the writ petition/s
makes a reference of service of notice on the
Khatedar and has not been disputed by the
petitioners while filing rejoinder.
Learned counsel for the respondents
further submitted that the objections were of
no substance as it was nothing but narration
of the fact about conversion of the land and
permission to raise construction, etc.
I have considered the submissions made
by learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
An argument in reference to Section 5A
of the Act of 1894 has been raised. The
argument for it would not be available
to those, who failed to submit objections. It is
in view of the catena of judgments referred by
the respondents. The issue now remains for
those, who raised objections under Section 5A
of the Act of 1894.
It is alleged that the opportunity of
hearing was not given. The documents and
the pleadings of both the parties have been
perused. In the writ petition/s, initially a
specific allegation was not made about denial
of the hearing in absence of service of notice.
The affidavits were submitted subsequently.
The respondents have shown appearance of
the Advocates to represent the parties. The
perusal of the record shows that the
Advocates have appeared on behalf of the
parties, which cannot be in absence of notice.
Once an Advocate or the party put in
appearance then requirement of personal
hearing gets satisfied. As per the direction of
this Court, the respondents have produced
the dispatch register and other documents to
show dispatch of the notices for hearing and
appearance thereupon through the Advocates,
for which, a “Vakalatnama” was filed before
the Land Acquisition Officer.
In the circumstances aforesaid, I am
unable to accept that an opportunity of
personal hearing was not given to those,
who have raised objections under Section 5A
of the Act of 1894. Thus, the second ground
raised by the petitioners is decided against
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the petitioners and in favour of the
respondents.”
30. It has also been submitted that the report under Section 5A
submitted by the land acquisition on 25.01.2007 is explicitly clear,
which shows that the objections raised by every objector have
been considered and decided by the Land Acquisition Officer by
giving specific findings. Hence, the ground regarding violating the
provisions of Section 5A of the Act of 1894 is not tenable in the
eye of law.
31. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondents that from the facts admitted by the appellants in
memo of writ petition, it would reveal that declaration under
Section 6 was issued within a period of one year from last date of
publication of Section 4, hence, no question of lapse of
proceedings can arise on that ground. Similarly, award under
Section 11 has been passed and approved within a period of two
years from the last date of publication of declaration under Section
6 of the Act of 1894, hence, provisions of Section 11A for the
purpose of lapse of proceedings are also not attracted in the
instant case.
32. It has been submitted that the other grounds with regard to
deem lapse of the proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of
2013 are inconceivable in view of specific provisions of the Act of
2013.
33. It has been emphasized by learned counsel for the appellant
that no discrimination whatsoever has been caused while carrying
out the acquisition proceedings and the grounds raised in this
regard are totally vague, unfounded and misconceived.
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34. In the light of importance of the Scheme for the residents of
Bharatpur, in larger public interest, learned counsel for the
respondents has prayed for rejecting the present special appeals.
35. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the
judgments of (i) Aflatoon Vs. L.T. Governor reported in 1975
(4) SCC 285, (ii) Smt. Ratni Devi Vs. Chief Commissioner
reported in AIR 1975 SC 1699, (iii) Sooraram Pratap Reddy
Vs. District Collector reported in 2008 (9) SCC 552, (iv) State
of Tamilnadu Vs. L. Krishnan reported in AIR 1996 SC 497,
(v) Ajay Kishan Singhal Vs. UOI reported in AIR 1996 SC
2677, (vi) Nand Kishore Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of UP & Ors.
reported in AIR 2010 SC 3654, (vii) Jawahar Lal Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. in D.B. SAW No.1283/2014, (viii) State of
Haryana Vs. Eros City Developrs Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR
2016 SC 451, (ix) Abhey Ram Vs. UOI reported in AIR 1997
SC 2564, (x) Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdeen reported in
AIR 1999 SC 3822.
36. We have considered the material on record and heard rival
contentions raised at Bar by both the parties.
37. We have examined the proceedings of acquisition with regard
to land in question, which reveal that notification under Section 4
of the Act of 1894 was initially issued on 06.09.2006. As per
mandatory requirement of Section 4, such notification was
published in Official Gazette as well as in two newspapers in
vernacular language having circulation in the locality and
substance of notification was also affixed at conspicuous place in
the locality. Hence, in view of the provisions of Section 4(1) of the
Act of 1894, the last mode of publication of notification under
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Section 4 would be considered as “date of publication” of Section 4
for the purpose of calculating the limitation of one year in order to
ascertain time gap between the notification under Section 4 and
declaration under Section 6.
38. Provisions of Section 6 of the Act of 1894 were also followed
by the respondents by way of issuing declaration under Section 6
on 10.10.2007, which was published in Official Gazette and later
on in two newspapers. Therefore, substance of declaration was
also affixed in the locality on 05.08.2008.
39. As per proviso appended of Section 6(1) for the purpose of
ascertaining the gap of one year, last date of publication of
notification under Section 4, whereas initial date of issuance of
declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 are relevant. In the
instant case, as observed hereinabove, the last date of publication
of notification under Section 4 was 21.10.2006 and since the
declaration under Section 6 was issued on 10.10.2007, it can
safely be held that the declaration under Section 6 was issued
within the prescribed time limit provided under proviso to Section
6(1) of the Act of the 1894. Hence, the ground raised by the
appellants in this regard is not sustained in the eye of law.
40. In the case of SH Rangappa Vs. State of Karnataka &
Anr. (2002) 1 SCC 538 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
under:-
“9. It is pertinent to note that sub-section
(2) of Section 6 does not prescribe any time
limit within which the declaration made under
Section 6(1) is to be published. It is well
known that after an order or declaration is
made there can be a time gap between the
making of the order or a declaration and its
publication in the Official Gazette. Whereas
the time limit for the making of an order is(Downloaded on 02/06/2025 at 09:51:02 PM)
[2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (22 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017]provided under Section 6(1), the legislature
advisedly did not provide for any time limit in
respect of the steps required to be taken
under sub-section (2) of Section 6. If the
contention of Mr. G.L. Sanghi, the learned
senior counsel for the appellant is correct, the
effect would be that not only the declaration
would have to be published within the time
prescribed under the proviso to Section 6(1)
but all other steps, like publication in the daily
newspaper and the Collector causing public
notice of the declaration to be given at a
convenient places in the locality, must also be
completed within a period of one year of
Section 4 notification. This could certainly not
be a consequence contemplated by the
legislature. As already observed, the purpose
of Section 6 notification being no give a final
declaration with regard to the need of the
land for public purpose, the interest of the
land owners was sufficiently safeguarded with
the requirement of the making of the
declaration under Section 6(1) within a
prescribed period. It is difficult for us to read
into sub-section (2) the provisions of the
proviso to Section 6(1) which relate to the
time limit for issuance of the notification
under Section 6(1).
12. Mr. Sanghi also drew our attention to the
observations of this Court in Sanjeeva Nagar
Medical and Health Employees Co-operative
Housing Society VS. Mohd. Abdul Bawahab
MANU/SC/0919/1996:[1996]2SCR308. While
referring to the various provision of the Act at
page 606, it was observed that “the
declaration should be within one year.” Mr.
Sanghi contends that this is a decision of
three judges which we should follows. We are
unable to accept this for the reason that what
arose for consideration before the Court in
Senjeeva Nagar’s case was the provision of
Section 4 as amended by the State of A.P.
which fixed time limit of 40 days for giving
public notice on the substance of a notification
under Section, 4(1). The Court was called
upon in that case to consider whether a
declaration under Section 6(1) was required
to be published in a Gazette within one year
of the publication of Section 4 Notification.
Therefore, the aforesaid observation is only an
obiter and contrary to the decision of this
Court of a larger Bench in Khadim Hussain’s
case which decision has neither been referred
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to in the Senjeeva Nagar’s case or in the
Krishi Utpadhan Mandi’s case and in
Eugenia’s case.”
41. In the same string, we have also examined the ground of
alleged lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 11A of the
Act of 1894 raised by the appellants. We find that last date of
publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 is
05.08.2008, which is affixation of substance of declaration in the
locality. In order to save the proceedings from being lapsed, the
Land Acquisition Officer was required to pass the award under
Section 11 of the Act of 1894, within a period of two years from
the aforesaid last date of publication of declaration under Section
6 of the Act of 1894.
42. It is a matter of record that the draft award was prepared by
the Land Acquisition Officer and sent for approval of the
appropriate Government vide letter dated 22.10.2009 and
thereafter approval was granted on 10.11.2009. Both the
aforesaid dates fall within the period of two years from the last
date of publication of declaration (i.e. 05.08.2008) under Section
6 of the Act of 1894. Hence, in view of above, by no stretch of
imagination it can be said that provisions of Section 11A would
come into force and hence, the acquisition proceedings have not
lapsed on that ground.
43. In view of the detailed factual aspect given in reply and the
observations made by the learned Single Judge in the impugned
judgment would make it clear that personal notices under Section
5A of the Act of 1894 were duly issued and received by the
appellants. Appellants were also duly represented by their
counsels before the Land Acquisition Officer. Hence, the ground
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with regard to non-compliance of provision with regard to personal
hearing under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 is totally baseless,
unfounded and against the record.
44. Bare perusal of the inquiry report dated 25.01.2007
submitted by Land Acquisition Officer under Section 5A of the Act
of 1894 would also make it clear that the objections raised by the
objectors were duly considered by the Land Acquisition Officer. In
fact, the learned counsel for the appellants have utterly failed to
point our any legitimate objection raised by the appellants in order
to render the acquisition proceedings in valid or illegal. No
procedural defect or violation of Principles of Natural Justice was
alleged in the objections. Hence, the Land Acquisition Officer has
committed no mistake whatsoever in rejecting their objections and
in making recommendation to the appropriate Government for
proceeding further with the acquisition of the land in question.
45. Since compensation pursuant to aforesaid land acquisition
proceedings has either been paid in monetary terms to the
persons interested or request made by them to allot developed
land in lieu of acquired land has been accepted by the respondents
and for remaining, the amount of compensation has been
deposited with the Competent Authority, we find that neither the
provisions of the Act of 1894 nor of Article 300A of the
Constitution of India have been violated by the respondents in
carrying out the acquisition proceedings.
46. As regards the application for Section 24(2) of new
Acquisition Act of 2013, it is suffice to say that the provisions are
abundantly clear. Such provision is applicable only in those cases
where the award was passed at least five years prior to date of
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enforcement of Act of 2013, which is 01.01.2014. Thus provisions
of Section 24(2) are applicable only in respect of awards which
have been passed prior to 01.01.2009. In the instant, since the
award was passed on 22.10.2009 approved on 10.11.2009,
therefore, there is no question of applicability of Section 24(2) of
the Act of 2013.
47. So far as allegations of discrimination raised by the
appellants is concerned, it is observed that for establishing such
allegation the appellants are required to lay proper factual
foundation. However, no sufficient facts have been given by the
appellants in this regard. Hence, there was no occasion to accept
the plea raised by the appellants.
48. One of the submission made by the learned counsel for the
appellants was that since notice under Section 9 of the Act of
1894 was not issued or served prior to passing of award,
therefore, only on that ground that proceedings can be rendered
illegal and can also be quashed.
49. In this regard apart from the denial of this fact by the
respondents, it is sufficient to observe that even otherwise the
provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1894 are directory and not
mandatory in nature, hence, non-compliance thereof would not
render the acquisition proceedings as illegal. In this regard it
would be relevant to refer the judgment of May George Vs.
Tahsildar reported in (2010) 13 SCC 198 where after
examining the provisions of Section 9 qua the Scheme of Land
Acquisition Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as
under:-
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“16. In Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of
Bombay [(1952) 1 SCC 372 : AIR 1952 SC 187:
1952 Cri LJ 955] this Court observed that law
which creates public duties is directory but if it
confers private rights it is mandatory. Relevant
passage from this judgment is quoted below:
(AIR p. 185, para 7)
“7. …..It is well settled that generally
speaking the provisions of a statute
creating public duties are directory and
those conferring private rights are
imperative. When the provisions of a
statute relate to the performance of a
public duty and the case is such that to
hold null and void acts done in neglect of
this duty would work serious general
inconvenience or injustice to persons who
have no control over those entrusted with
the duty and at the same time would not
promote the main object of the
legislature, it has been the practice of the
Courts to hold such provisions to be
directory only, the neglect of them not
affecting the validity of the acts done.”
19. In Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone [(1980)
1 SCC 403 : AIR 1980 SC 303] this Court held
that the difference between a mandatory and
directory rule is that the former requires strict
observance while in the case of latter, substantial
compliance with the rule may be enough and
where the statute provides that failure to make
observance of a particular rule would lead to a
specific consequence, the provision has to be
construed as mandatory.
28. In fact, the land vests in the State free
from all encumbrances when possession is taken
under Section 16 of the Act. Once land is vested
in the State, it cannot be divested even if there
has been some irregularity in the acquisition
proceedings. In spite of the fact that Section 9
notice had not been served upon the person
interested, he could still claim the compensation
and ask for making the reference under Section
18 of the Act. There is nothing in the Act to show
that non-compliance therewith will be fatal or
visit any penalty.”
50. While examining the validity of land acquisition proceedings,
question of delay and latches in filing the Writ Petition plays a vital
role. In the instant case the proceedings were initiated vide
notification dated 06.09.2006 under Section 4 of the Act of 1894,
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which were culminated vide dated 10.11.2009 under Section 11 of
the Act of 1894. However, the writ petitioners filed the writ
petitions in the year 2012 and the reasons assigned for filing the
writ petition with such a delay have also not been sufficiently
explained in the memo of writ petition.
51. In the case of Syed Maqbool Ali Vs. State of U.P. reported
in (2011) 15 SCC 383, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
under:-
“10. But that does not mean that the delay
should be ignored or the appellant should be
given relief. In such matters, the person
aggrieved should approach the High Court
diligently. If the writ petition is belated, unless
there is good and satisfactory explanation for
the delay, the petition will be rejected on the
ground of delay and latches.”
52. Thus, in the light of aforesaid Principles laid down in above
judgments, we have observed that the appeals filed by the
appellants are liable to rejected on the ground on delay and
latches, more so, coupled with the fact with such Writ Petitions
were filed by the appellants much after passing of the award by
the Land Acquisition Officer.
53. This Court in the case of Ajay Pal Singh Vs. State of
Rajasthan, reported in 2015 SCC Online Raj. 10258 has held
as under:-
“8. In view of the aforestated legal position,
the Court is of the opinion that the petitioners
having not come with clean hands and having
not disclosed the true and correct facts, rather
having stated wrong facts to mislead the
Court, the petitions deserve to be dismissed
on that ground alone. The court also finds
much substance in the objection raised by the
learned counsel Mr. Gupta for the respondents
to the effect that the present petitions suffer
from gross delay and latches, having been
filed about eight years after the issuance of
notication under Section 4 and about four(Downloaded on 02/06/2025 at 09:51:02 PM)
[2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (28 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017]years after passing of the award. The
possession of the lands in question have also
been taken over by the respondents on
3/9/2014 as per the document at Annexure-
R/1/2, which has remained unchallenged at
the instance of the petitioners. The learned
counsel for the respondents has rightly placed
reliance upon the decision of Apex Court in
case of Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur v.
Bheru Lal, (2002) 7 SCC 712; Swaika
Properties Pvt. Ltd. v.
State of Rajasthan, 2008 (1) WLC (SC) Civil
654, State of Tamilnadu v. L.
Krishnan, AIR 1996 SC 497, Aflatoon v. L.T.
Governer of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 285 & hands.
Smt. Ratni Devi v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi,
AIR 1975 SC 1699 to submit that the writ
petitions challenging land acquisition
proceedings after gross delay are liable to be
dismissed. It is also held in case of Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial
Devt. Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1996 (11)
Sec.501 that when there is inordinate delay in
filing the writ petition and when all steps taken
in acquisition proceedings have become final,
the Courts should be loath to quash the
notifications. Similar view has been taken by
the Supreme Court in case of State of
Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi, (1996) 6 SCC 445
and in case of Municipal Council Ahmednagar
v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 that
when the award is passed and the possession
is taken, the writ petitions challenging
acquisition notice or proceedings should not be
entertained by the Courts.”
54. So far as question of vagueness of public purpose shown in
the notification, learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the
term “Multipurpose Scheme No.10” referred in the notification
under Section 6 shows specific purpose while coming to such
conclusion the learned Single Judge has relied upon the judgments
of (i) Aflatoon Vs. LT Governor reported in 1975 (4) SCC 285,
(ii) Smt. Ratni Devi Vs. Chief Commissioner reported in AIR
1975 SC 1699, (iii) Sooraram Pratap Reddy Vs. District
Collector reported in 2008 (9) SCC 552, (iv) State of
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Tamilnadu Vs. L. Krishnan reported in AIR 1996 SC 497, (v)
Ajay Kishan Singhal Vs. UOI reported in AIR 1996 SC 2677,
(vi) Nand Kishore Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of UP & Ors.
reported in AIR 2010 SC 3654, (vii) Jawahar Lal Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. in D.B. SAW No.1283/2014.
55. Upon a meticulous evaluation of the factual matrix and the
legal submissions advanced, this Court finds no infirmity in the
acquisition proceedings that would justify the invocation of writ
jurisdiction. The process has been undertaken in adherence to the
statutory mandate and no element of malafide procedural
impropriety or constitutional violation has been demonstrated. The
challenge, therefore, stands on tenuous grounds. Accordingly, the
writ petitions have rightly been dismissed by the learned Single
Judge by giving sound and cogent reasons vide impugned
judgment.
56. While we are not unmindful of the appellants’ concerns and
the implications of land acquisition on their respective individual
rights, yet it must be borne in mind that the process has been
initiated for public purpose and proceedings have been executed in
conformity with law and with due regard to public interest. The
acquisition proceedings reflect procedural fairness and statutory
compliance, leaving no room for judicial interference.
57. Having considered the matter in its entirety and upon careful
scrutiny of the relevant statutory framework and the procedural
steps undertaken by the authorities, this Court finds no justifiable
basis to interfere with the acquisition proceedings. The
contentions urged fail to establish any legal infirmity or procedural
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deviation that would vitiate the acquisition. These intra-court
appeals are accordingly dismissed.
58. There shall be no order as to costs.
59. A copy of this order be placed in each connected file.
(ANAND SHARMA),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J
DAKSH/172-178, 180 & 181
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