Suhana Roy*
Source: Indian Express
This article examines the tragic death of a three-year-old girl allegedly subjected to Santhara, a religious fast-unto-death, through the lens of child rights and constitutional law. It argues that no parental or religious consent can override the fundamental rights of a child, especially the right to life and dignity. Drawing on Indian jurisprudence, statutory provisions, and international obligations like the UNCRC, the article highlights legal gaps and calls for greater accountability. It also explores the role of parens patriae and constructive liability in such cases. The need for sensitization of authorities to distinguish cultural practices from child harm is emphasized.
Introduction
On 25th March 2024, news broke out from Indore that a three-year-old girl named Viyana Jain had died after participating in the Jain ritual of Santhara, a voluntary fast unto death. Reports suggest she was in the company of her grandmother and initiated into the religious observance by a monk. The child’s death was glorified in some quarters, including entries in record books. However, civil society, legal commentators, and child rights advocates have been alarmed. Is it possible for a child to take part in such rituals? Can the freedom of religion be used to override the fundamental right to life and protection of a minor?
This tragedy brings back to the fore the highly contentious debate around Santhara/Sallekhana, its constitutionality, and harmony with child rights and criminal law. In this blog, we explore the intersection of religion, law, and bioethics through the lens of this incident, asking whether India’s legal framework adequately safeguards the rights of children when placed in the crosshairs of faith and tradition.
What Is Santhara/Sallekhana?
Santhara, also known as Sallekhana, Samlehnā, or Samādhi-Maraṇa, is a ritual fasting to death observed within Jainism. It involves a voluntary and gradual reduction of food and water intake, undertaken to purify the soul, detaching from worldly desires, and destroying karma. Viewed as a spiritual practice rather than an act of suicide, Santhara is seen by Jain scholars as a peaceful, passionless way of embracing death, distinct from self-harm or violence. While historically practiced by both ascetics and laypersons, including women and royalty, Santhara remains rare in contemporary times.
The practice was put under the judicial limelight in Nikhil Soni v. Union of India, in which the Rajasthan High Court in 2015 ruled that Santhara was tantamount to suicide and hence infringed Sections 108 (abetment of suicide) and Section 226 (attempt to commit suicide) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). In the ruling, the ritual was compared to self-destruction under criminal law. The Supreme Court, however, stayed the High Court’s judgment, thus failing to decide on the legal status of Santhara.
As opposed to euthanasia, which in most cases is initiated when the patient is in the last stages of his or her suffering, Santhara is commonly carried out even if the person is not sick; it is a voluntary spiritual exit. This distinction makes it especially challenging to analyze in the framework of the traditional conceptions of bioethics and law within the parameters of suicide or medical aid-in-dying.
Santhara and the Indian Constitution
In the legal argument, there is a conflict between Article 25, which guarantees the freedom of conscience and religion, and Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.
Article 25, religious freedom is not absolute- it is limited by public order, morality, and health. Where the practices are said to be essential religious practices, the State may regulate or prohibit them where they contradict these grounds. This was confirmed by rulings like Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), which struck down triple talaq although it is of religious origins. Furthermore, in children’s situations, the State takes the role of parens patriae, which is a guardian of all minors. This means that no parental or religious consent is superior to the fundamental rights of a child or can subject a child to irreparable damage. As the Supreme Court held in Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, the welfare of the child must be the paramount consideration in such matters, and every effort should be made to ensure that the child grows up in an atmosphere of love and affection, free from neglect or moral and emotional abandonment. The Court, acting as parens patriae, must protect the interests of the child.
The Supreme Court’s judgments in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996) and Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) reiterate that the right to die is not part of the right to life, except under narrowly tailored safeguards in passive euthanasia cases. Santhara, as a religious practice involving intentional death, thus occupies a precarious legal position, especially in the case of minors who are incapable of informed consent.
Can a Child Choose Death?
The inclusion of a three-year-old child in the said practice, even if it was to be accepted as a legitimate religious act by consenting adults, presents a legal, ethical, and constitutional dilemma. A toddler lacks the cognitive and legal capacity to comprehend the finality of death or consent to it. According to Indian law, minors cannot provide consent for cases that involve serious bodily harm or death, as such consent is deemed legally void.
Furthermore, the consent of the parents in life-and-death decisions involving a child is not absolute. Indian courts have intervened before where parents, basing on religious reasons, denied life-saving treatments to their children. For example, when it comes to matters of Jehovah’s Witnesses, courts have allowed blood transfusions against parental wishes to save the child’s fundamental right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. This judicial approach places a greater weight on the interest of the child, even where religious or parental claims come into play.
This stance is supported by multiple legal frameworks. Under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the State is obliged to protect children from all sorts of harm, such as neglect and mental or physical abuse. Although the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 is concerned with sexual offences, its underlying idea, i.e., minors are incapable of providing valid consent to high-risk bodily acts, can be applied to fatal rituals such as Santhara. Indian law and child protection jurisprudence lay a special emphasis on the “best interest of the child“, one that stems from both domestic law as well as India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Exposing a minor to a religious ceremony that leads to death, however draped in cultural or spiritual justification, is contrary to this child-centric standard.
Crime or Custom? Criminal Law Dimensions of a Child’s Ritual Death
The legal system must confront a crucial question: Can any person be criminally responsible for the death of the child in this case? A number of the provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) can be applied. Section 106 on causing death by negligence may be applicable if it is proved that the parents or religious mentors were lacking in the duty of care to the child. Section 108, which tackles abetment of suicide, can apply if the child was in any manner encouraged or conditioned, in the subtlest of ways, to believe that voluntary death was a virtuous or necessary act.
Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act criminalizes cruelty to children, including acts that are likely to cause physical or mental harm or even death. Notably, the provision does not require proof of a specific intent to harm; the statute covers wilful assault, neglect, abandonment, or omission, and courts have interpreted that even negligent or reckless conduct that endangers a child’s life or well-being may attract liability under this section. In the case that this ritual was performed without medical oversight, and particularly if the child was sick or unable to resist, this would be a culpable omission if not even reckless endangerment. The concept of constructive liability may also apply, under which the people who facilitated or silently encouraged the act – be they religious leaders, elders in the community, or relatives of the perpetrator – can be made jointly liable.
Evidence supporting such liability could include witness testimonies that religious or community figures endorsed or celebrated the child’s fast; public sermons or discourses portraying voluntary death as a virtuous act; and digital communications, such as messages or social media posts, that glorify or plan such events. Even omissions to act can be significant, for example, where adults were aware of the child’s deteriorating condition or physical unfitness but failed to intervene. Participation in rituals, logistical support for the fast, or the use of community premises can also indicate facilitation. Moreover, family or community pressure that psychologically conditioned the child to believe the act was mandatory or noble may show indirect coercion. Legally, such evidence can help establish common intention, abetment, or even culpable negligence.
There is a specific concern for the public glorification of the incident. The reports of including the child in the “Golden Book of Records” indicate an active normalization and celebration of harm to children. This is potential complicity and an institutional failure to acknowledge and respond to a crime committed against a vulnerable person. The law must examine if such glorification is an act of abetment, inducement, or neglect in relation to the criminal and child protection laws.
Where Were the Guardians? Institutional Lapses and Child Rights Violations
As a reaction to the incident, the Madhya Pradesh Commission for Protection of Child Rights is said to have taken cognizance of the matter. However, the Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005 provides the State and National Commissions with investigative and recommendatory powers but without prosecutorial powers. This institutional barrier emphasizes the necessity of implementing an enhanced statutory and procedural mechanism to handle such occurrences.
The incident requires the establishment of mandatory reporting procedures when it comes to religious or cultural practices that may cause bodily harm to minors. It further calls for active surveillance by child welfare authorities in communities where such practices might be common. To avoid future tragedies, the state may think of providing guidelines that govern religious rituals involving minors, particularly irreversible or life-threatening ones. These guidelines might require medical control or judicial review before any of these rituals are conducted on a child.
Also, the situation is a good example of a case that requires judicial intervention. Public interest litigation (PIL) could be employed to seek court-supervised investigations and make authorities take measures in line with child protection laws. Courts may also be encouraged to create jurisprudence in religious practices that conflict with the rights of the child and as a result, establish preventive structures as well as accountability mechanisms.
Beyond Borders: How Other Democracies Respond to Harm in the Name of Faith
Comparative constitutional and human rights jurisprudence continues to affirm that religious freedom cannot justify harming children. In the United States, courts have repeatedly overruled parental religious opposition to life-saving medical treatment for minors. A landmark case, Prince v. Massachusetts (1944), held that the State has more powers to control the activities of guardians and parents if the life or welfare of a child is in danger, even with religious claims.
In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has also supported State intervention in cases where religious practices threaten the best interests of a child. In the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia (2010), the ECHR confirmed that a State can limit religious freedom if it is necessary to ensure the health and rights of others, and in particular minors. Such decisions are a part of a common international consensus: that the best interest of the child must be the paramount consideration, and that cultural relativism cannot be used in justification or excuse of practices that threaten life or development.
India’s ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, its developing jurisprudence on child rights and bodily autonomy, has created a constitutional and moral obligation to ensure that religious freedom is not abused to normalize child harm.Article 3 of the UNCRC specifically mandates that the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private institutions, including religious bodies. This principle reinforces that neither parental consent nor religious doctrines can override the child’s fundamental rights to life, health, and dignity. Given this global jurisprudential trend, the legal lacuna currently in existence when dealing with fatal rituals involving children has to be addressed.
Concluding Thoughts: A Moment of Reckoning
Viyana Jain’s death is not just a personal tragedy; it is also a breakdown in the legal, institutional, and moral systems that should protect defenseless lives. It reveals the lack of regulatory controls that govern religious practices with children and the vagueness in the Indian law when such practices lead to death. This incident has to be a moment of reckoning.
It is a matter of urgency that the legal status of Santhara needs to be clarified, especially with the issue pending before the Supreme Court. The law needs to develop to include child-specific protections such as minimum age limits, independent medical review, and judicial review of any religious rite that has the potential to cause death or permanent disability. At the very minimum, such kind of oversight should be made a requirement when minors are involved.
In addition, there is a need to train and sensitize the law enforcement personnel, child welfare authorities, and judiciary to ensure that acts of religious exploitation against children are not characterized as mere cultural or religious expression. The death of a three-year-old should not be viewed as something which is carried out by tradition – it should be regarded as a possible crime against a child. The balancing act between religious freedom and the protection of life and childhood is colossal in a pluralistic democracy. However, in that balance, where the subject is a voiceless child, the law needs to be an active guardian and not a passive spectator. This can be operationalized through proactive guidelines, mandatory reporting mechanisms, and institutional accountability to intervene at the earliest signs of ritualistic or religious harm to children.
*Suhana Roy is a 3rd-year B.A.LL.B (Hons) Student at Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur.