Anam Khan vs Consortium Of National Law … on 6 June, 2025

June 7, 2025

Delhi High Court

Anam Khan vs Consortium Of National Law … on 6 June, 2025

1. Present batch of writ petitions have been filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, 1950, seeking direction to the
respondent/Consortium of National Law Universities (hereinafter referred
to as “Consortium”) to rectify the errors in the final answer key of the
Common Law Admission Test, PG (hereinafter referred to as “CLAT PG”)
for the year 2024-25, and to re-issue the results after the necessary
corrections. The petitioners further seek direction to the Consortium to re-
consider the excessive fee of Rs. 1,000/- per question for raising the
objection to the provisional answer key of the CLAT PG examination.

2. The petitioners have challenged certain questions which were part of
the CLAT PG for the year 2024-25. At the outset it may be noted that the
petitioners had not submitted objections to these questions, which are
subject matter of the writ petitions, before the competent authority i.e.
‘examination conducting authority’ during the window period which was
open for lodging of such objections. The petitioners have submitted that on
account of excessive fee to the extent of Rs.1000/- per question which is
sought to be objected to, the excessive fee was subject matter of a challenge

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by way of a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950
before the Supreme Court in W.P.(C).No. 812/2024 titled “Anam Khan &
Anr. vs. Consortium of National Law Universities”. They contend that
since the challenge itself was made to the fee on the ground of it being
highly disproportionate and excessive, the petitioners herein were unable to
lodge their objection with the competent authority within the window
period.

3. In view of the aforesaid submissions, we deem it appropriate to
proceed with examining the issues on (i) the decision on the questions
objected to; and (ii) the issue as to whether the fee of Rs.1000/- per
question objected to, is excessive.

4. So far as issue no. (i) is concerned, we would prefer to traverse the
same as per the questions objected to, which would make the consideration
more convenient and precise. For the purpose of convenience and oneness,
we propose to consider each question, numbered according to the Master
Booklet rather than the individual Question Sets as attempted by each
petitioner. Thus, according to the Master Booklet, the questions objected to
by the petitioners are Question Nos.11, 21, 52, 56, 57, 89, 90 and 98. It has
been brought to the notice of this Court that vide the special meeting of the
Executive Committee of the Consortium held on 04.04.2025, Question
Nos. 52, 89, 90 and 11 of the Master Booklet have already been resolved,
and therefore need not detain us. In fact, the learned counsel for the
petitioners restricted their submissions in respect of Question Nos. 21, 56,
57 and 98.

5. At the outset it may be noted that the learned counsel for the
Consortium submitted that so far as Question No. 56 of the Master Booklet
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is concerned, owing to a discrepancy between the four options in the
Master Booklet (which was the subject of Expert Committee Review) and
the options contained in the Question Paper Sets attempted by the
candidates in print, the said Question No.56 has been withdrawn.
Resultantly, according to him, the Question No.56 shall not be reckoned for
the purposes of evaluation of Answer Sheets of any candidate across all
four Sets. This direction would also be in conformity to the directions
contained in para 55 of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Siddhi Sandeep Ladda vs. Consortium of National Law Universities and
Anr; Civil Appeal No.006907/2025 where similar challenges to questions
were raised in respect of CLAT UG Examination. Paragraph 55 of the
Siddhi Sandeep Ladda (supra) reads thus:

“55. Shri Rao, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent No.1 submits that
the finding of the Division Bench of the High Court is correct but the
consequential direction is not appropriate. It is further fairly submitted
that Respondent No.1 is willing to withdraw the question across all four
sets so as to ensure that all candidates are scored out of the same total
number of questions.”

In Re Question No. 21 of the Master Booklet

6. Question No.21 is relatable to passage (V) which is stated to be an
extract from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bangalore
Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa and Ors., 1978 (2)
SCC 213. For convenience, the passage and Question No.21 is extracted
hereunder:-

“V. The landmark judgment of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage
Board v. A. Rajappa & Others, delivered by the Supreme Court of India
in 1978, significantly influenced the interpretation of the term ‘industry’
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case cantered on whether
the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board, a statutory body,
could be classified as an industry under the Act, thereby making its
employees eligible for certain protections and benefits. Prior to this case,
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the definition of ‘industry’ had been subject to varied interpretations,
leading to confusion and inconsistency in its application. The Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, broadly defined ‘industry’ to include any business,
trade, undertaking, manufacture, or calling of employers and any
calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or
avocation of workmen. However, this expansive definition left room for
ambiguity, especially concerning statutory bodies and non-profit
organizations. In this case, the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage
Board argued that it was not an industry, emphasizing its statutory duties
and public welfare objectives. The Board contended that its primary
purpose was to provide essential services, not to engage in profit-making
activities typical of private enterprises. On the other hand, the
respondents, including A. Rajappa, argued that the Board’s activities fell
within the scope of an industry as defined by the Act, and thus, its
employees should be entitled to the benefits and protections accorded to
workers in industries. The Supreme Court, in its judgment, undertook a
comprehensive analysis of the term ‘industry.’ The bench, led by Chief
Justice M. Hameedullah Beg, laid down a broad and inclusive definition
of ‘industry’. The Court asserted that what mattered was the nature of the
activity and the relationship between the employer and the employees.
This interpretation aimed to ensure that a wide range of workers,
including those employed in public utility services, statutory bodies, and
even some non-profit organizations, would be covered under the
protective umbrella of the Industrial Disputes Act. The decision in
Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa & Others had far-reaching
implications. It extended the scope of labour protections to a broader
spectrum of workers, ensuring that more employees could benefit from
the dispute resolution mechanisms and other safeguards provided under
the Industrial Disputes Act. This judgment underscored the judiciary’s
role in interpreting labour laws to promote social justice and protect
workers’ rights in a rapidly industrializing nation.
(Extract from Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa & Others, 1978 2
SCC)
Q.21. According to the Supreme Court’s judgment, what is the most
important factor in determining whether an activity constitutes an
industry?

(A) The profit-making motive of the employer.

(B) When there are multiple activities carried on by an establishment,
its dominant function has to be considered. If the dominant function is
not commercial, benefits of a workman of an industry under Industrial
Dispute Act may be given.

(C) The nature of the activity and the authority of the employer over its
employees.

(D) When there are multiple activities carried on by an establishment, all
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the activities must be considered. Even if one activity is commercial, the
employees will not get the benefit of workman of an industry under the
Industrial Dispute Act.”

As per the Consortium, the correct answer in respect of the aforesaid
Question is option ‘B’ whereas the petitioners contended that option ‘C’ is
the correct answer. Learned counsel for the parties had copiously referred
to various paragraphs of the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
to support their contentions. According to learned counsel for the
petitioners, Question No.21 was concerning the most important factor to
determine whether an activity constitutes “an industry” and the Consortium
contended that option ‘B’ as noted above, is the correct answer which
indicates that it is a ‘dominant function’ of an establishment.

Whereas, learned counsel for the petitioners forcefully contended
that option ‘C’, i.e., which indicates the nature of activity and the authority
of the employer over its employees is the determinative factor as to whether
an establishment would fall within the definition of ‘an industry”.

7. We have seen the justification provided by the Subject Experts, who
on review of the material before them, had opined that there is no scope to
interfere with the answer indicated by the question paper setter. The subject
experts rely on para 143 of the Supreme Court judgment in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) to construe that it lays down the ‘dominant function’
test. Thus, according to the Subject Experts, irrespective of the nature of
activity of an individual employee, the ‘dominant function’ of the industry
is the most important factor for determining what constitutes “an industry”.
Learned counsel for the Consortium thus submits that the nature of activity
or the authority of the employer over its employees is subservient to the
‘dominant functions’ of the overall undertaking in which he works. Thus,
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option ‘B’ is the correct answer.

8. Concededly, the passage (V) is not an actual extract from the
judgment in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) but appears to be from a
Commentary or from a Digest. The passage clearly uses the sentence “The
Court asserted that what mattered was the nature of the activity and the
relationship between the employer and the employees”. This on the face of
it appears to be a conclusion or an opinion of the Court. Other than that, the
passage does not refer to “Dominant Function Test”. Infact, the Subject
Expert Committee appears to have misdirected itself by referring to para
143 of the said judgment to conclude that option ‘B’ is the correct answer.
Though, in an overall perspective, the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) may have laid down general tests to determine whether an
establishment is “an industry” by determining what is called “Dominant
Function Test”, yet the passage is bereft of any such reference. It is not
disputed that the candidates who had appeared in the examination were not
previously provided with any list of judgments that they were to be ready
with. That apart, it is not disputed that the passage (V) is not an extract
from the judgment. In that view of the matter, it would be unreasonable to
expect the candidates to look for any answer beyond what is provided in
the passage itself. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the answer in
option ‘B’ is incorrect and option ‘C’ is the correct answer. Resultantly, the
Consortium shall accord marks to the candidates accordingly.

In Re Question No. 57 of the Master Booklet

9. This Question is in relation to passage (XII) which is stated to be an
extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs.
Mohit Minerals (P) Ltd., reported in 2022 (10) SCC 700. Here too, learned
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counsel for the Consortium fairly admits that passage (XII) is not an extract
from the aforesaid judgment. Apparently, this passage too is from a
Commentary or a Digest. In order to appreciate the submissions of the
parties, we deem it apposite to extract the passage (XII) as also the
Question No. 57 of the Master Booklet, which read thus:-

“XII. In the present case, the levy of IGST on the supply of ocean freight
services under the reverse charge mechanism on the importer, when the
value of such service is already included in the transaction value of
imported goods, amounts to double taxation. The concept of double
taxation implies that the same subject matter is taxed twice when it
should be taxed only once. The GST law, as framed, does not envisage
taxation of a transaction twice, and the fundamental principles of GST do
not support such an imposition. Further, the importer, who is not the
recipient of the service but is treated as a deemed recipient under the
reverse charge mechanism, cannot be made liable to pay tax on a service
that they have not directly availed. This stretches the scope of reverse
charge mechanism beyond its intended purpose, which is to simplify tax
collection by shifting the liability to pay tax from the service provider to
the service recipient, particularly in cases where the service provider is
located outside India and does not have a presence within the taxable
territory. Moreover, the constitutional framework requires that a tax
should be levied with legislative competence and should not contravene
any fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The
imposition of IGST on ocean freight under the reverse charge mechanism
without proper legislative backing undermines the very essence of
taxation principles enshrined in the Constitution of India.
(This extract is taken from Mohit Minerals v. Union of India CA No.
1390/2022)

57. Assertion (A): The importer should not be liable to pay GST on ocean
freight under the reverse charge mechanism if they are not the direct
recipient of the service.

Reason (R): The reverse charge mechanism is intended to shift the tax
burden from service providers located outside India to the service
recipients within India.

a) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.

b) Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A.

c) A is true, but R is false.

d) A is false, but R is true.”

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According to the Consortium, option ‘a’ is the correct answer,
whereas according to the petitioners, option ‘b’ is the correct answer. The
Consortium sought to justify option ‘a’ as the correct answer on the basis
that the judgment itself noted that the “intended purpose” of the “reverse
charge mechanism” is to “simplify tax collection by shifting the liability to
pay tax from the service provider to the service recipient, particularly in
cases where service provider is located outside India”. According to the
Consortium, both Assertion (A) and Reason (R) are true and Reason (R) is
the correct explanation of Assertion (A). Thus, option ‘a’ is the correct
answer.

Whereas, learned counsel for the petitioners has staunchly argued
and sought to support the submissions as to why option ‘b’ is the correct
answer. According to learned counsel for the petitioners though the
Assertion (A) and Reason (R) both are true, yet Reason (R) is not the
complete and correct explanation of Assertion (A).

10. In order to support his submissions, learned counsel for the
petitioners, referred to various relevant paragraphs of Mohit Minerals
(supra) particularly para 153, 164 till 167. By referring to the aforesaid
paragraphs learned counsel sought to demonstrate that though the Assertion
(A) and Reason (R) are true but the Reason (R) is not the complete
explanation of Assertion (A). Though after some argument, learned counsel
contended that option ‘c’ could also be the correct answer.

11. To the contrary, Mr. Sri Kumar, learned counsel for the Consortium,
drew our attention to para 169 of the judgment in Mohit Minerals (supra)
to submit that in para 169, the Supreme Court has extracted the paragraph
nos. 133, 134, 135 and 216 of the Gujarat High Court judgment, which was
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in challenge before it, to submit that the Supreme Court after analysing the
ratio laid down by the Gujarat High Court agreed that the tax on the supply
of a service which has already been included by the legislation as a tax on
the composite supply of goods cannot be allowed. On that basis, learned
counsel emphasizes “Assertion (A)” and the “Reason (R)” are true and
Reason (R) is the correct explanation of Assertion (A) as provided as
option (a), is the correct answer. Predicated thereon, he also contended that
option (b) wherein it is provided that the “Reason (R)” is not the correct
explanation of “Assertion (A)” could not be the correct answer.

12. It is to be emphasized that the Consortium has, concededly, made yet
another error by referring to passage (XII) as extract from the judgment of
Mohit Minerals (supra), while this passage too appears to be a
commentary or an extract from some Digest. From a plain and literal
reading of the said passage, which is based on the judgment in Mohit
Minerals (supra), it is clear that the Importer is not liable to pay GST on
Ocean Freight under the “reverse charge mechanism” if they are not the
recipient of the service. In other words, the said “reverse charge” is
supposed to be levied as tax upon the service recipient within India and not
on the service provider who are located outside India. This construction
aligns with the Question No.57 of the Master Booklet and on that basis, we
conclude that the option (a) is the correct answer. The justification as
provided by the Consortium also conforms to our interpretation. The
Consortium shall proceed to award marks to the candidates accordingly.

In Re Question No. 98 of the Master Booklet

13. We now proceed to consider the objections raised in respect of
Question No.98 of the Master Booklet which is relatable to passage (XX).

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It would be appropriate to extract passage XX and Question No.98
hereunder:

“XX. Jurisprudence progresses as well as regresses. The late nineteenth-
century analysis of rights which Hohfeld brought to completion makes a
notable advance in clarity. But rights of each of the four Hohfeldian
types are spoken of by Aquinas, as well as by the civilian lawyers of his
age (and indeed of earlier ages). The word ‘right’ translates the Latin ius
or jus, the root of the words ‘justice’, ‘jurist’, ‘juridical’, and
‘jurisprudence’. Though Aquinas does not use the plural forms of the
word ius as often as we use the plural ‘rights’, it is a sheer mistake to
claim, as some have, that he lacked or repudiated the concept of rights in
the modern sense, in which a right is ‘subjective’ in the sense of
belonging to someone (the subject of the right). When he defines just- ice
as the steady willingness to give to others what is theirs, Aquinas
immediately goes on to treat that phrase as synonymous with their right
(ius suum); hence he treats a right/rights (ius/iura) as subjective. He also
uses the word to speak of ‘objective’ right, that is, what interpersonal
action or relationship is right-morally or legally, depending upon the
context. Hobbes, who got inspired much in Benthamite and Austinian
positivism, spurned the classical juristic tradition and defined ‘right’ as
liberty in the sense of sheer absence of duty. So people have most rights
in the state of nature where they have no duties. This move exemplifies
regression in legal and, more generally, in political and moral
philosophy. Fortunately, the mistake is quite obvious. If no one has any
duties to or in respect of others, it will be more accurate to say that no
one has any rights at all. For everyone, in such a state of affairs, is
subject to being destroyed or abused by every- one and anyone else, and
everyone’s actions can be impeded as much as any person or group
cares, and is able, to arrange. The truth is that the concept of a right
makes little sense save as (the Hohfeldian claim-right) a correlative of
someone else’s duty, or (the Hohfeldian liberty) as protected by someone
else’s duty of non interference, or (the Hohfeldian power) as promoted by
the duty of officials and others to recognize and effectuate one’s acts-in-
the-law (or their ethical counterparts), or (the Hohfeldian immunity) as
protected by a similar duty of officials and others not to recognize
another’s juridical acts as it purportedly bears on my position.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from The Oxford Handbook of
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Edited by Jules L. Coleman,
Kenneth Einar Himma, and Scott J. Shapiro)

98. Who said, “Right is an interest which is to be recognised, protected
and enforced by law”?

a) Roscoe Pound

b) Salmond
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c) Holland

d) Bentham”

14. Ms. Kaadambari Puri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner in W.P.(C) No.2558/2025 submitted that the question as posed
and the options provided as answers do not correlate. According to her, the
option (a) stated to be the correct answer by the Consortium is not borne
out from the passage. By referring to judgment passed by the Mumbai High
Court in Major General Shanta Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana v.
Kamani Brothers Private Limited, reported in 1958 SCC OnLine Bom 63,
particularly to para 33 to 37, as also the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Mr ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z‘, reported in 1998 8 SCC 296,
paragraph 15, learned senior counsel asserted that it is beyond any doubt
that the correct answer to Question No.98 would be “Salmond” and not
“Roscoe Pound”. Drawing out attention to the justification provided by the
Consortium, Ms. Puri stoutly contended that the reasons provided are not at
all relatable to the passage (XX). In fact, according to her, the reasons
provided are nothing but conjectures and surmises of the Consortium.

15. On the other hand, Mr. Sri Kumar, learned counsel for the
Consortium opposed the submission of the petitioner and stated that from a
harmonious reading of the passage in question, it stands to reason that the
answer at option (a) is the only correct choice. Referring to the justification
provided by the Consortium, he submitted that the book “Spirit of the
Common Law (1921)” and the article “Jurisprudence” of Roscoe Pound
and published in the Harvard Law Review (1911), brings out how legal
rights are deeply connected to societal interest. He emphasized that the
school of sociological jurisprudence is undoubtedly traceable to Pound and
is an examination on the connections between law, society and individual
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interest. Lastly, he submitted that these issues have been closely examined
by the Subject Matter Experts and in terms of the trite law, the Court
should not interfere with the conclusions nor should the Court substitute
their own opinion to that rendered by the Subject Matter Expert. He thus
submitted that the objections on this score may be rejected.

16. Having considered the arguments of learned counsel for the parties,
we deem it appropriate to extract hereunder the relevant paragraphs
referred to by Ms. Puri of judgments of the Bombay High Court as also the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. The same are extracted hereunder:

(i) Major General Shanta Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana v. Kamani
Brothers Private Limited,1958 SCC OnLine Bom 63:

“33. According to Holland (Holland’s Elements of Jurisprudence, 12th
edn., p.82) a right:

“….is one man’s capacity of influencing the acts of another, by means,
not of his own strength, but of the opinion or the force of society”.

34. Now, what is a “legal right”?

35. According to Salmond (p.230):

“A legal right is an interest recognised and protected by a rule of legal
justice- an interest the violation of which would be a legal wrong done to
him whose interest it is, and respect for which is a legal duty”.

36. According to Holland (p. 83):

“(A legal right)…. is a capacity residing in one man of controlling, with
the assent and assistance of the State, the actions of others”.

37. Therefore, according to both Salmond and Holland, every interest or
right which is recognised and protected by the State, i.e., by the laws of the
State, is a legal right and every such legal right involves a legal duty or
obligation.”

(ii) Mr ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z‘, 1998 8 SCC 296:

“15. “Right” is an interest recognised and protected by moral or legal
rules. It is an interest the violation of which would be a legal wrong.
Respect for such interest would be a legal duty. That is how Salmond has
defined “right”. In order, therefore, that an interest becomes the subject
or a legal right, it has to have not merely legal protection but also legal
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recognition. The elements of a “legal right” are that the “right” is vested
in a person and is available against a person who is under a
corresponding obligation and duty to respect that right and has to act or
forbear from acting in a manner so as to prevent the violation of the right.
If, therefore, there is a legal right vested in a person, the latter can seek its
protection against a person who is bound by a corresponding duty not to
violate that right”

17. Plainly, we do not see how the Consortium can take a stand that it is
Roscoe Pound and not Salmond who has given the statement posed in
Question No.98 of the Master Booklet. The Bombay High Court as also the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has, after examining the relevant material, quoted
the statement of Salmond which aligns with and conforms to the statement
posed as Question No.98. In that view of the matter, we are unable to
accede to the submissions of Mr. Sri Kumar. Thus, clearly, it is option (b)
i.e. Salmond and not option (a) i.e. Pound, which is the correct answer.
Resultantly, the Consortium shall award marks to the candidates
accordingly.

18. The issue (ii) raised in the present batch of writ petitions is in respect
of the challenge to the levy of Rs.1,000/- as fee per question objected to by
the candidates being excessive and prohibitive. According to the learned
counsel for the petitioners, the charges of Rs.1,000/- is not only excessive,
exorbitant, disproportionate and prohibitive but also arbitrary and
whimsical and ought to be quashed and set-aside.

19. Learned counsel submitted that the Consortium has changed the rules
of the game mid-way which is impermissible in law as settled by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. They contended that the publication of levy of the
fee per question objected to, was on the day when the results were
announced and not contained in the brochure at the time of commencement

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of the CLAT PG Examination process. They submitted that the petitioners
had immediately filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India, 1950, challenging the excessive, disproportionate and prohibitive fee
of Rs.1,000/- per question.

20. Learned counsel for the petitioners also invited attention of this
Court to the compilation of Annexures and referred to the comparison chart
of objection fee charged by various institutions/organisations holding
National Exams and placed at page 769 of the Paper Book. Learned
counsel was at pains to demonstrate as to how other organisations of
National repute, which hold Entrance Examinations at the National level
including UGC NET, JEE/JEE (Mains), NEET (UG-2024) etc., levy fee
which range between Rs.100/- to Rs.200/- per question while it was the
Consortium alone which had charged a fee of Rs.1,000/- per question.

21. He also referred to the Report of the Committee constituted to look
into the matter of improper conduct of CLAT-2018 to submit that though
the Report was confined to the fee charged for the examinations, yet the
Report disclosed the unreasonable and highly inflated profit margin that the
Consortium was earning out of the fee charged for the examinations.
Dilating further, he emphasized that there has been no change in the
attitude of the Consortium even in respect of the fee charged for the
objected questions. In that view of the matter, he contended that the fee as
charged be held as excessive, prohibitive, arbitrary and whimsical and as
such, be quashed and set aside.

22. Learned counsel for the petitioners, vehemently contended that apart
from the above, there is no statutory power with the Consortium to levy
such hefty fee. He emphasized that the Consortium is a loose
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conglomeration of National Law Universities and do not have any power or
any charging Sections under which such fee can be levied. Moreover, the
Notice calling upon eligible candidates to participate in CLAT PG
Examinations did not contain any such information taking the candidates
by surprise on the day of publication of the result. Predicated thereon, he
submitted that the fee of Rs.1,000/- per question objected to, is without
authority of law and beyond the jurisdiction of Consortium.

23. Per Contra, Mr. Sri Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the
Consortium submitted that the fee as charged per question which is
objected to is neither excessive nor prohibitive or even arbitrary. He
contended that for those challenges to the questions which are upheld by
the Consortium or the Subject Matter Expert, the fee which is charged is
refunded to such candidates. He thus, stated that there is no arbitrariness or
whimsicalness to such levy and it has a reasonable nexus to the objective
sought to be achieved.

24. Another argument raised by the Consortium is in respect of such levy
being justifiable to keep frivolous objections at bay. According to learned
counsel, unless and until the Consortium charges such a fee, it cannot
prevent frivolous and bogus elements from bombarding the Consortium
with frivolous objections which would tend to delay and protract the
declaration of results. This in turn, would also delay the admission process
of the successful candidates resulting in interference with the academic
schedule too. As an example, he submitted that the innumerable coaching
institutes present all over the country put up bogey candidates with
frivolous objections which tend to waste time and delay the entire
admission process. He stated that the Consortium has learnt this bitter truth

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:MADHU SARDANA W.P.(C) 2364/2025 & connected matters
Signing Date:06.06.2025
Page 16 of 18
15:15:16
by way of experience in the past many years and is charging such fees only
to ensure genuine candidates submit their genuine objections.

25. Having heard learned counsel for the parties on issue (ii), we are of
the considered opinion that there has to be a fine balance which needs to be
resolved between two sets of, what appears to be, genuine grievances. On
one hand, while comparing the fee charged for objected questions by other
organisations/institutions of National level with that charged by the
Consortium appears to be excessive and disproportionate, while
appreciating the concerns of the Consortium which too does not appear to
be fanciful or imaginative, rather appears to be a measure which may be
required in order to keep frivolous individuals and more so, the coaching
institutes at bay. It would also be relevant to note that the time and efforts
spent and made by the Subject Matter Experts or the Oversight Review
Committee and the Consortium as a whole in resolving these objections, in
case they are in large number, frivolous, may entail huge, unnecessary and
avoidable delay and/or protraction of the admission process, affecting or
impacting the academic schedule too.

26. Notwithstanding the above observations, and keeping in mind that
most of the candidates have already paid such fees, quashing such levy at
this point in time may entail obstacles which may be unnecessary and may
result in litigations which are not required. However, we expect that the
aforesaid observations would be sufficient for the Consortium to take heed
of and take appropriate steps to avoid such excessive fee in the next
examinations, scheduled for the following years. In our considered opinion,
it may be advisable for the Consortium to place this issue before the
committee headed by Justice G. Raghuram (Retd.) for his valuable opinion

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Digitally Signed
By:MADHU SARDANA W.P.(C) 2364/2025 & connected matters
Signing Date:06.06.2025
Page 17 of 18
15:15:16
which may be adhered to by it.

27. In that view of the matter, we dispose of the writ petitions without
any order as to costs directing the Consortium to comply with the aforesaid
directions forthwith and declare the results with expedition.

TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J

DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ
MAY 27, 2025/rl

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:MADHU SARDANA W.P.(C) 2364/2025 & connected matters
Signing Date:06.06.2025
Page 18 of 18
15:15:16

Source link

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Dhannu @ Dhansagar Barman vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 23 June, 2025

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Prasanjeet Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand … Opp. Party(S) on 23 June, 2025

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Author: Tushar Rao Gedela

Bench: Tushar Rao Gedela

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