The State Of Jharkhand Through Its Chief … vs Meera Jha on 5 June, 2025

Jharkhand High Court

The State Of Jharkhand Through Its Chief … vs Meera Jha on 5 June, 2025

Author: Rajesh Shankar

Bench: Rajesh Shankar

                                                          2025:JHHC:14483-DB




 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                 I.A. No. 5088 of 2025
                      In / And
                L.P.A. No. 691 of 2023
1. The State of Jharkhand through its Chief Secretary, Project Bhawan,
   P.O. and P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand
2. The Appropriate Committee presided over by the Joint Chief Election
   Officer cum Joint Secretary, Cabinet (Election) Department,
   Government of Jharkhand, P.O. and P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi,
   Jharkhand.
3. The Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of Jharkhand,
   Project Bhawan, P.O. and P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand
4. The Principal Secretary cum Chief Election Officer, Cabinet (Election)
   Department, Government of Jharkhand, Sector-II, P.O. and P.S.-
   Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand
5. The District Election Officer cum the Deputy Commissioner, P.O. and
   P.S.- Chaibasa, District- West Singhbhum, Jharkhand.
6. The Joint Secretary to the Government of Home, Prison and Disaster
   Management, Project Bhawan, P.O. and P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi,
   Jharkhand
                                              ...   Respondents/Appellants
                           Versus
1. Meera Jha, W/o Late Udyanand Jha, R/o Nayatola Dhudhaila
   (Mirzapur), P.O. and P.S.-Nath Nagar, District-Bhagalpur, Bihar-
   812006.
                                        ...       Writ Petitioner/Respondent
2. The Election Commissioner of India through its Principal Secretary,
   Nirwachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, PO & PS- Ashoka Road, New Delhi-
   110001.
3. The State of Bihar through its Chief Secretary, New Secretariat,
   Bailley Road, Bihar, P.O. and P.S.- Sachiwalaya, District - Patna,
   Bihar.
                                          ...      Respondents/Respondents
                           ---------
CORAM:              HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
             HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
                           ---------
For the Appellants:        Mr. Aditya Kumar, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-I
                           ---------
Reserved on: 29.04.2025                 Pronounced on: 5/06/2025
Per M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.

1. This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

by the applicants to condone the delay of 306 days in filing the Letters

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Patent Appeal challenging the judgment dt. 04.01.2023 of the learned

Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6043 of 2019.

2. In the application seeking condonation of delay, it is stated that

after coming to know about the said judgment, the file was put up before

the applicants in the Department of Election Office (Cabinet), Election

Department for taking further steps; the file was then forwarded to the

concerned District of the Election Department; and on 24.05.2023, a letter

was received from the office of the Home, Jail and Disaster Management

Department regarding filing of LPA against the impugned judgment.

3. Opinion of the Advocate was thereafter sought and he gave his

opinion for filing a Letters Patent Appeal against the impugned judgment.

On 14.06.2023, the Section Officer forwarded the file to the Deputy

Election Officer; the latter forwarded it to the District Election Officer

with a noting that LPA may be filed through the concerned Law Officer;

on 01.08.2023, the Section Officer forwarded the file to the Deputy

Election Officer with a note indicating that the previous Deputy Election

Officer, who was assigned to file the LPA had retired on 30.06.2023

resulting in failure to file the LPA; and it was requested that a Deputy

Election Officer be appointed to file the Letters Patent Appeal.

4. Subsequently, on 17.10.2023, the Section Officer forwarded the file

to the Deputy Election Officer along with a note suggesting that a request

may be made to the Advocate General for nomination of a Government

Advocate to file the LPA; file was then forwarded to the office of the

Senior Standing Counsel-I, Jharkhand High Court, for preparing Letters

Patent Appeal; the appeal was then drafted and returned to the

Department; and the appeal then came to be filed on 06.12.2023.

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2025:JHHC:14483-DB

5. The limitation for filing a Letters Patent Appeal against the

judgment of a learned Single Judge in a writ petition is admittedly only 30

days from the date of the said judgment. It was therefore incumbent on the

part of the applicants to act with diligence and ensure that LPA is filed

within a period of limitation or with the shortest possible delay. The

applicants have adopted a very casual approach and the file was simply

moved from table to table as if there is no limitation for taking steps to file

a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge

and they can file the LPA whenever they choose.

6. The Supreme Court has deprecated the practice of Government

Departments in moving the file from table to table and inordinately

delaying filing appeals against the impugned judgments.

7. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India

Limited and another1, the Supreme Court held:

“25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better
affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting
Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the
Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment
of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster
v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the
deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said
judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the
Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not
applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009
or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified
copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four
months.

26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by
placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-
incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy
within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit

1
(2012) 3 SCC 563
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which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at
every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the
decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had
occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was
due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact
remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons
concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this
Court by taking appropriate steps.

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or
conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of
limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation
of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and
circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in
view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of
limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.”

(Emphasis supplied)

8. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in

several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai v. M/s Volex

Delhi-1 v. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India v. Central

Tibetan Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India & Others

2
(2022) 3 SCC 159
3
(2022) 2 SCC 327
4
(2021) 11 SCC 557
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v. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and State of

Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Sabha Narain & others6.

9. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through

his legal heir7, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to look

into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient

cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay;

that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or

Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12

years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into

consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or

not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they

want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings

for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a

party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of

his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in

such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice

deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was

reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not

start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first

ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking

condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of

generosity.

10. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Ramkumar Choudhary8.

5
(2022) 9 SCC 263
6
(2022) 9 SCC 266
7
2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489
8
Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt.29.11.2024
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11. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the

above decisions of the Supreme Court, we are satisfied that sufficient

cause has not been shown by the applicants for condonation of delay of

306 days in filing the instant Letters Patent Appeal.

12. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay (I.A.

No.5088 of 2025) is dismissed. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is

also dismissed.

13. All pending applications shall stand closed.

(M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)

(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
Manoj/-

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