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Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Banarsi Das Mittal vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors on 10 June, 2025
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2025:RJ-JD:17623-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2170/2018
Banarsi Das Mittal S/o Shri Dhanpat Rai, Resident Of 269- Geeta
Colony, Asand District Karnal Hariyana Through His Power Of
Attorney Shri Parveen Mittal S/o Shri Banarsi Das Mittal, Aged
About ...., Resident Of E-6, S-1, Rohini, Delhi- 110085.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan Through The Principal Secretary,
Department Of Mines, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. The Director, Mines And Geology Department, Udaipur.
3. The Additional Director Mines, Jodhpur Zone, Department
Of Mines And Geology, Jodhpur.
4. The Mining Engineer, Bikaner.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. G.R. Punia Sr. Adv. Assisted by Mr.
Rajesh Punia
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Harshvardhan Singh, assistant to
Mr. Mahaveer Bishnoi, AAG
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA PRAKASH SHRIMALI
Judgment
Reportable
Reserved on 19/03/2025
Pronounced on 10/06/2025
Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J:
1. The instant writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of
India has been preferred, claiming the following reliefs:
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“It is, therefore most humbly and respectfully prayed
that this writ petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be
allowed and:-
(a) By an appropriate writ, Order or direction, the 3 rd
proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Mining Mineral Concession
Rules, 2017 may Kindly be struck down.
(b) By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the Order
dated 20.09.2017 (Annexure-5) imposing penalty of Rs.
15,11,824/- may kindly be declared illegal and be quashed
and set aside and the respondents be directed to permit
the petitioner to carry out the mining operation without
insisting upon the payment of penalty.
(c) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this
Hon’ble Court considers just and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, may kindly be passed
be passed in favour of the petitioner.
(d) costs of the writ petition may kindly be awarded to
petitioner.”
2. Before delving into the adjudicatory pursuit, pertaining to the
reliefs claimed herein, it is pertinent to note that the statutory
framework under the Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as, “Act of 1957”)
classifies minerals into major and minor categories. As per Section
3(e) of the Act of 1957, minor minerals are those which the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
declare as such; all other minerals are categorized as major
minerals. Such classification determines the regulatory authority;
major minerals are governed by the Central Government under
the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, while minor minerals fall
under the purview of State Governments, which frame their own
Rules under Section 15 of the Act of 1957; in the present case,
such rules are known as ‘Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession
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Rules, 2017′ (hereinafter referred to as, “Rules of 2017”) framed
by the State of Rajasthan.
2.1 Furthermore, it is also important to note that on 10.02.2015,
the Central Government issued Notification No. GSR 423(E),
reclassifying 31 minerals, including Ball Clay and Silica Sand, from
major to minor minerals. Such reclassification transferred the
regulatory control over these minerals to the State Governments,
thereby subjecting them to State-specific rules and procedures.
The reclassification altered the regulatory landscape, particularly
concerning compliance requirements, lease procedures and the
imposition of penalties.
2.2. The instant controversy arose when the petitioner herein
applied for grant of a mining lease in respect of minerals Ball Clay
and Silica Sand on 18.10.2013 for an area situated in Village
Guda, Tehsil Kolayat, District Bikaner, registered as M.L. No.
48/2013. At the time of the application, Ball Clay and Silica Sand
were classified as major minerals and were governed by the
provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and the Act of
1957. On 10.02.2015, the Central Government issued a
notification reclassifying Ball Clay and Silica Sand as minor
minerals. However, in view of the subsequent developments, the
matter came to be governed by the Rules of 2017.
2.2.1. Pursuant to the application for grant of Mining lease, a
Letter of Intent (LoI) was issued to the petitioner on 05.05.2015
under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and the Act of 1957, as
amended upto 2015. After the change in governing law as stated
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above, the petitioner’s LoI was saved under Rule 5 of Rules of
2017. The terms of the LoI required the petitioner to submit a
mining plan, progressive mining closure plan, and obtain an
Environmental Clearance Certificate within six months of the
issuance of the said LoI.
2.2.2. On 05.10.2015, a ban was imposed on the grant of mining
leases for the relevant minerals until new rules were framed.
Subsequently, the Rules of 2017 came into force, with Rule 16(2)
prescribing the grant of mining leases subject to payment of
premium installments, submission of performance security,
approved mining plan, and other consents and approvals.
2.2.3. The third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of 2017
specifically provided for extension of the period of the LoI issued
before the commencement of the Rules subject to payment of late
fees at the rate of 10% of the annual dead rent for every month
or part thereof for such extended period from the date of issuance
of LoI. On 20.09.2017, the competent authority issued an order
extending the period of the LoI till 13.02.2017, imposing a late
fees of Rs. 15,11,824/- for the delay. The petitioner was granted
the mining lease, however the same was made subject to
payment of the said penalty and performance security.
2.2.4. The petitioner preferred the present writ petition
challenging the legality of the third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the
Rules of 2017 and the order imposing penalty, seeking reliefs in
the form of quashment of the penalty and issuance of directions to
allow mining operations without payment thereof.
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3. Mr. G.R. Punia, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr.Rajesh
Punia, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the
third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of 2017, under which the
penalty in question has been imposed, is manifestly arbitrary and
unreasonable. It imposes a mandatory penalty of 10% of the
annual dead rent for every month or part thereof for delay in
extending the LoI, without any discretion vested in the competent
authority to consider the reasons for such delay. The third proviso
to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of 2017 is reproduced as hereunder:-
“Provided also that period of letter of intent, issued
before the commencement of these rules, may be
extended by the competent authority, subject to payment
of late fees at the rate of ten percent of annual dead rent
for delay of every month or part thereof for such extended
period from the date of issuance of letter of intent.”
3.1. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the said
proviso fails to take into account the circumstances beyond the
control of the petitioner, including the prolonged and complex
procedure involved in obtaining mandatory approvals such as the
Environmental Clearance Certificate. The petitioner had acted
diligently and without any default by applying for the
Environmental Clearance immediately after the grant of the LoI.
3.2. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that there was no
delay or inaction on the petitioner’s part in complying with the
conditions of the LoI, particularly with regard to obtaining the
Environmental Clearance Certificate. It was further submitted that
the petitioner applied for Environmental Clearance Certificate in
the year 2014, immediately after issuance of the LoI on
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05.05.2014, however, despite the timely submission of
application, the Environmental Clearance Certificate was granted
only on 30.01.2017, which was more than two years later.
3.2.1. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the
process of obtaining the Environmental Clearance Certificate is
known to be lengthy and time-consuming, involving several layers
of scrutiny and approvals from various authorities. The delay in
grant of Environmental Clearance Certificate, it was submitted,
was purely administrative in nature and entirely beyond the
control of the petitioner. In this regard, reliance was placed on a
clarificatory order dated 04.01.2017 issued by the Government of
India, which provides that where the Environmental Clearance
Certificate could not be obtained by 11.01.2017, but all other
conditions specified in the LoI were fulfilled, the mining lease
application would still be required to be considered as valid. The
said notification emphasizes that mining operations may not
commence without Environmental Clearance Certificate, but does
not bar the grant of the lease itself in the absence of
Environmental Clearance Certificate, provided the remaining
formalities have been complied with.
3.3. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the delay in
compliance with the preconditions stated in the LoI — occurred
due to circumstances wholly beyond the petitioner’s control. It
was also submitted that during the operative period of the LoI, a
ban was imposed by the competent authority of the government
on grant or execution of mining leases, and the said ban resulted
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into an effective standstill of all procedural steps necessary for
progressing from the stage of LOI to lease execution. It was
further submitted that the petitioner acted with due diligence and
took all reasonable steps to obtain the required clearances and
permissions. However, the procedural bottleneck caused by the
ban made it practically impossible for the petitioner to meet the
timelines prescribed under Rule 16(2) of the Rules of 2017.
3.4. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the amount of
penalty imposed i.e. Rs.15,11,824/-, calculated at 10% of the
Annual Dead Rent per month, is exorbitant, disproportionate, and
unreasonable, especially in light of the facts and circumstances of
the present case, wherein delay in fulfillment of the conditions
stipulated in the LoI, including submission of the Environment
Clearance Certificate, was not attributable to the petitioner, but
rather to the lengthy and time-consuming statutory process
involved in securing environmental clearance certificate and the
ban imposed by the government.
3.5. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the retrospective
application of the penalty provision to LoI issued prior to the
commencement of the Rules of 2017 violates the principles of
fairness and is contrary to the settled legal principles against
retrospective penal legislation. At the time when the LoI was
issued and even at the time of grant of Environmental Clearance
Certificate, no such penalty clause existed under the earlier
Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 or the Act of 1957.
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3.6. In the above backdrop, the prayer made on behalf of the
petitioner is that the third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of
2017 deserves to be declared ultra vires the Constitution of India
and consequently, the order dated 20.09.2017 imposing the
penalty in question deserves to be quashed and set aside, thereby
permitting the petitioner to carry out mining operations without
the payment of the said penalty.
4. Per contra, Mr. Harshavardhan Singh, Assistant to
Mr.Mahaveer Bishnoi, learned Additional Advocate General, on
behalf of the respondents, while opposing the aforesaid
submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that in
pursuance of the order, passed in favor of the petitioner, the same
was duly acted upon, i.e., the petitioner deposited the amount of
penalty along with rent royalty etc., and consequently, a lease
deed was executed between the petitioner and the Mining
Engineer, Bikaner, on 28.03.2018, and the said lease was
registered on the very same day.
4.1. It was further submitted that in light of the above
developments, the subject matter of the writ petition no longer
survives, as the ultimate relief i.e. grant of the mining lease has
already been extended to the petitioner, followed by formal
execution and registration of the lease deed. Therefore, it was
submitted that nothing remains to be adjudicated in the present
petition, and the same is liable to be dismissed as infructuous.
4.2. It was further submitted that the instant writ petition is not
maintainable also on count of failure of the petitioner in serving
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mandatory notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code,
1908. It was contended that Section 80 CPC mandates prior
service of notice upon the Government or public officer before the
institution of any legal proceedings against them, with the
objective of giving the authority concerned an opportunity to
reconsider the legal position pertaining to the matter, resolve the
same, or settle the claim without the necessity of litigation. In the
present case, the petitioner has failed to serve such notice before
filing the instant writ petition, thereby rendering the writ petition
unworthy of acceptance.
4.3. It was further submitted that even if the petitioner was
genuinely aggrieved by the imposition of penalty or the demand
raised under the third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of 2017,
he ought to have availed the remedy of statutory appeal provided
under Rule 63 of the said Rules, rather than invoking the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. It was also submitted that Rule
63 of the Rules of 2017, provides for a comprehensive appellate
mechanism against any order passed by the Superintending
Mining Engineer, Mining Engineer, Assistant Mining Engineer, or
their vigilance counterparts. In addition, the respondents
submitted that the Rules also provide for the remedy of revision
under Rule 64, empowering the Government to revise any order
passed under the Rules. Thus, the statutory framework provides
an adequate and efficacious remedy for redressal of grievances as
raised herein.
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4.4. It was further submitted that the petitioner has challenged
the validity of the third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of 2017.
However, the Union of India, through the Secretary, Ministry of
Mines, Government of India, has not been impleaded as a party
respondent in the writ petition. It is a settled proposition of law
that the Rules of 2017 have been framed pursuant to the powers
delegated under the Act of 1957, a Central Legislation. The
authority to frame such Subordinate Legislation has been
conferred upon the State Government by virtue of delegation
under the Central Statute. In the absence of impleadment of the
Union of India as a party to this litigation, the constitutional
validity or otherwise of the said provision cannot be adjudicated in
the instant writ petition, more particularly, when the Union of
India is a necessary and proper party for the purpose of deciding
the vires of any delegated legislation framed under a Central
Statute.
4.5. It was also submitted that the Environmental Clearance
Certificate was issued to the petitioner on 30.1.2017, and that the
same was submitted to the Directorate of Mines, Udaipur on
13.2.2017. It was contended that issuance of such Certificate
cannot lead to inference that the petitioner is exempt from the
application of the Rules of 2017. The petitioner was only holding a
LoI and had not been granted a mining lease nor had any lease-
deed been executed prior to the commencement of the Rules of
2017. Thus, the Rules of 2017 are fully applicable to the
petitioner’s case.
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4.6. It was further submitted that the petitioner’s application for
grant of mining lease remained pending due to non-compliance
with condition No.3 of the LoI, which required timely submission
of requisite documents including Environmental Clearance
Certificate. In this regard, it was submitted that a D.O. letter
dated 15.9.2015 was issued by the Hon’ble State Minister for
Mines, Environment, and Forest (Independent Charge),
Department of Mines, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur, which
addressed certain administrative aspects, and on 5.10.2015,
Hon’ble Mines Minister also issued direction not to sanction any
further mining leases until coming into force of the new Rules. It
was brought to the notice of the Court that in exercise of the
powers conferred by Section 15 of the Act of 1957, the State
Government promulgated the Rules of 2017. Hence, the
application submitted by the petitioner is governed by the Rules of
2017.
4.6.1. It was also submitted that only those applications have
been saved under the Rules of 2017 where LoI was issued prior to
12.1.2015 i.e. coming into force of the Amended Act of 1957. It
was contended that the petitioner has been benefited by the said
proviso, as his application has not been rejected even after
coming into force of the Rules of 2017 in view of issuance of the
LoI.
4.7. It was further submitted that the LoI was saved under Rule
5, but its period could only be extended subject to compliance
with Rule 16, which includes deposition of penalty at the rate of
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10% of the annual dead rent per month of delay. Further, the
notification dated 04.01.2017, relied upon by the petitioner,
pertains to cases under Section 10A(2)(c) of the Act of 1957
relating to major minerals, whereas the petitioner’s case concerns
with the minor minerals, and thus the said notification is not
applicable in the case of the petitioner herein.
4.8. In support of such submissions, reliance was placed upon the
following judgments to contend that imposition of penalty in
question under the third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of
2017 is in consonance with the Statutory framework and
Constitutional norms:-
(i) ITC Ltd. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (2011) 7 SCC 493:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment held that if an
allotment of land by a public authority is found to have been made
in violation of statutory rules or public policy, the authority is not
automatically entitled to cancel the lease arbitrarily. Instead, an
equitable approach must be adopted, especially when the lessees
were not at fault and had acted bona fide. The Hon’ble Court ruled
that instead of canceling the leases, the lessees should be given
the opportunity to pay the differential premium.
(ii) Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. vs.
Sai Renewable Power Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2011) 11 SCC 34:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the power of the Electricity
Regulatory Commission to revise tariffs, even if such revision went
against earlier expectations of power producers. The Hon’ble Court
rejected the plea of promissory estoppel, holding that public
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[2025:RJ-JD:17623-DB] (13 of 20) [CW-2170/2018]interest and statutory authority override earlier non-binding
promises.
4.9. It was further submitted that it is a settled legal principle
that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of
an enactment, and the burden lies upon the party who challenges
it to demonstrate a clear transgression of constitutional principles.
It was also submitted that where the validity of a law made by a
competent legislature is challenged before a Court of law, the
Court is bound to presume in favour of the law’s validity.
Furthermore, while considering the validity of the law, the Court
may not confine the adjudication to the pleadings of the State and
is free to independently satisfy itself as to whether the law can be
sustained under any Constitutional provision. In this regard,
reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice
S.R. Tendolkar (Civil Appeals Nos. 455 to 457 and 656 to
658 of 1957, decided on 28.03.1958), wherein it was held as
under:
“(b) There is always a presumption in favour of the
constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is upon him
who attacks it to show that there has been a clear
transgression of the constitutional principles;
(e) In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality,
the Court may take into consideration matters of common
knowledge matters of common report, the history of the times
and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived
existing at the time of legislation; and . . . .”
4.9.1. Reliance was also placed on the judgment rendered in
the case of Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving
Co. Ltd. (2001) 4 SCC 139 to contend that a statute is to be
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construed so as to make it effective and operative. It was further
submitted that as per the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble
Apex Court there is always a presumption that the legislature does
not exceed its jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing that the
legislature has transgressed constitutional mandates, such as
those relating to fundamental rights, lies on the person who
challenges its vires. It was submitted that this principle is subject
to one exception, namely that if a citizen is able to establish that
the legislation has invaded his/her fundamental rights, then the
State must justify that the law is saved.
4.9.2. Reliance was also placed on the judgment rendered in the
case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary & Higher
Secondary Education v. Paritosh (1984) 4 SCC 27, wherein
the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the following three-fold test for
examining the Constitutional validity of a provision:
“1. Whether the provisions of such regulations fall within the
scope and ambit of the power conferred by the statute on the
delegate;
2. Whether the rules/regulations framed by the delegate are to
any extent inconsistent with the provisions of the parent
enactment; and lastly,
3. Whether they infringe any of the fundamental rights or
other restrictions or limitations imposed by the Constitution.”
4.9.3. It was submitted in view of the settled law mentioned
hereinbefore, the reliefs claimed by the petitioner in the present
writ petition do not deserve to be granted.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused
the record of the case, alongwith the judgments cited at the Bar.
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6. At the outset, it is pertinent to highlight that, it was
contended on behalf of the respondents that, amongst others,
since the petitioner has already deposited the penalty amount
as contemplated under the impugned third proviso to Rule 16(2)
of the Rules of 2017, the instant writ petition has rendered
infructuous. However, this Court is of the considered view that
mere compliance with the impugned condition — especially
when made to avoid further coercive consequences — cannot
ipso facto be construed as waiver of the right to challenge its
legality. Furthermore, in the present case, since the petitioner
has assailed the constitutionality of the third proviso to Rule
16(2) of the Rules of 2017, this Court is well within its
jurisdiction to entertain the present petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
7. This Court is also conscious of the contention regarding the
absence of notice under Section 80 of CPC. However, it is a trite
position in law that Section 80 CPC applies to institution of suits
and does not govern proceedings initiated under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. The writ jurisdiction, as invoked
herein, is of a special and extraordinary nature and is not
fettered by procedural formalities governing civil suits.
Accordingly, the non-issuance of a notice under Section 80 CPC
does not render the present writ petition non-maintainable, and
the said objection of the respondents is liable to be rejected at
the threshold.
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8. Having made the observations on preliminary objections
raised by the respondents, this Court further proceeds to
substantively analyze the merits of the case, and this Court
observes that in matters concerning statutory regulation,
including prescription of penalty, royalty and dead rent, the
State Government retains full authority under the Act of 1957,
to introduce and enforce relevant provisions under the Rules of
2017. Furthermore, the impugned third proviso to Rule 16(2) of
the Rules of 2017, is a valid statutory provision framed within
the scope of powers delegated to the State under the parent
legislation. The said provision serves a regulatory and deterrent
purpose to ensure compliance with environmental and
procedural norms within a reasonable time-frame. Thus, the
petitioner cannot seek exemption from the penalty merely on
the ground of delay caused in the issuance of Environmental
Clearance Certificate, as the statutory condition requiring
submission within six months was clear, and non-compliance in
this regard attracts the stipulated consequence. The rules being
prospective in nature, their application to a lease granted in
2017, after their enforcement, does not suffer from any legal
infirmity.
9. This Court further observes that where public resources are
allotted by the State, such allotments must withstand the test of
legality, transparency and fairness, especially if they lead to
financial loss or breach of statutory obligations. However, rather
than declaring every such allotment void, the Courts may allow
the beneficiary to retain the benefit, provided he/she compensates
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the public exchequer adequately, thus striking a balance between
legal rectitude and equity. Applying the above principle, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ITC Ltd. (supra) has
upheld the validity of the allotment but directed the beneficiaries
to pay the shortfall in consideration as determined by the State.
10. This Court also observes that the petitioner has assailed the
validity and legality of the third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules
of 2017 on the ground that it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable
and ultra vires the Constitution of India. It is contended that the
said proviso mandates a penalty of 10% of the annual dead rent
for each month or part thereof of delay in seeking extension of the
LoI, without vesting any discretion in the competent authority to
consider extenuating circumstances, such as delays in obtaining
environmental clearance. However, this Court is unable to accept
the said contention for the following reasons:
(i) The power of the State Government to frame rules under
the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act,
1957, including prescription of penalties, is well-settled. The
third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of 2017 is a fiscal
and regulatory measure introduced to ensure discipline in
the timely compliance of pre-conditions to lease execution. It
cannot be said to be per se arbitrary merely because it is
couched in mandatory terms.
(ii) The imposition of a uniform penal consequence for delay
does not, by itself, amount to discrimination or arbitrariness
under the Constitution of India. The rule applies equally to all
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[2025:RJ-JD:17623-DB] (18 of 20) [CW-2170/2018]similarly situated parties and is a reasonable classification
premised on a legitimate objective — namely, the timely
initiation of mining operations in accordance with
environmental and regulatory safeguards.
(iii) Mining activity has significant environmental and
economic implications. Delays in securing mandatory
clearances — even if procedurally cumbersome — cannot
indefinitely stall the process. The rule incentivizes due
diligence and timely action. In the broader public interest,
the legislature is entitled to place the onus on the applicant
to comply expeditiously with statutory prerequisites.
(iv) As reiterated in Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra) and
Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Co.
(supra), there exists a strong presumption in favour of the
constitutionality of subordinate legislation. The burden lies
heavily upon the petitioner to demonstrate a clear
transgression of constitutional mandates, which has not been
discharged in the present case.
(v) It is also pertinent that the petitioner, with full knowledge
of the regulatory framework including Rule 16(2) of the
Rules of 2017, accepted the LoI and later executed the lease
deed after depositing the applicable penalty. By such
conduct, the petitioner has voluntarily submitted to the
conditions prescribed under law and cannot now be
permitted to assail the very provision under which relief has
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[2025:RJ-JD:17623-DB] (19 of 20) [CW-2170/2018]already been obtained. The principle of allegans contraria
non est audiendus is squarely attracted in the present case.
11. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the challenge herein
to the validity of the third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of
2017, since the said provision is neither ultra vires the parent
enactment nor violative of the Constitution of India.
12. Thus, in view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered view that as third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of
2017 is a validly framed subordinate legislation, traceable to the
enabling provisions of the parent Act, and serves a legitimate
regulatory purpose in ensuring timely compliance with statutory
obligations relating to mining leases. Hence, once the rule itself
has been upheld as constitutionally and statutorily valid, any
action taken by the competent authority in furtherance thereof —
including the imposition of penalty in extending the LoI — cannot
be faulted merely on grounds of hardship or inconvenience, as
raised by the present petitioner. The levy of penalty, being in
consonance with a valid rule, is equally sustainable in law, and
does not warrant interference by this Court.
13. Therefore, in the firm opinion of this Court, there is no legal
infirmity in the third proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules of 2017,
and consequently, the impugned order dated 20.09.2017,
imposing penalty of Rs. 15,11,825/- is also valid, thus does not
warrant any interference by this Court.
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[2025:RJ-JD:17623-DB] (20 of 20) [CW-2170/2018]
14. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. All pending
applications stand disposed of.
(CHANDRA PRAKASH SHRIMALI),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
SKant/-
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