Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Hindustan Motors Limited & Anr vs State Of West Bengal & Ors on 22 May, 2025
Author: Debangsu Basak
Bench: Debangsu Basak
1
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Debangsu Basak
And
The Hon'ble Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi
W.P.L.R.T 54 of 2024
Hindustan Motors Limited & Anr.
Vs.
State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Mainak Bose, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Tridib Bose, Adv.
Mr. Debojyoti Saha, Adv.
For the State : Mr. T.M.Siddiqui, AGP, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Supratim Dhar, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S. Adak, Adv.
Ms. Debdooti Dutta, Adv.
Hearing Concluded on : May 16, 2025
Judgement on : May 22, 2025
DEBANGSU BASAK, J.:-
1.
Writ petitioners have assailed the order dated March
13, 2024 corrected on March 20, 2024 passed by the West
Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in OA No. 3775 of
2022. By the impugned order learned Tribunal has dismissed
OA No. 3775 of 2002 filed by the writ petitioners.
2. Learned senior advocate appearing for the writ
petitioners has contended that, in 1946, government of West
subha
karmakar
Digitally signed by
subha karmakar
Date: 2025.05.22
12:20:41 +05’30’
2
Bengal acquired 531 acres of land under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. Possession of such land had been made over to the
writ petitioners in 1947. By an indenture dated October 1,
1948, State had conveyed 530 acres of land to the predecessor
in interest of the writ petitioner No. 1. Subsequently, State
had acquired for the land of 190 acres under the Act of 1894
and possession made over to the predecessor in interest of the
writ petitioner No. 1. A similar agreement under Section 41 of
the Act of 1894 had been executed.
3. Learned senior advocate appearing for the writ
petitioners has contended that, the subject land having been
acquired by the State under the Act of 1894, and the same
having vested in the State prior to the commencement of the
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, a land which is
already vested with the State cannot be revested in the State
under the Act of 1953.
4. Learned senior advocate appearing for the writ
petitioners has referred to Section 3 of the Act of 1953 and
more particularly to the 2nd proviso thereof and contended
that, the same expressly excludes from the purview of the Act
of 1953, land acquired by the State including land in respect
of which acquisition proceeding had commenced. He has
3
relied upon 1987 Volume 3 Supreme Court Cases
465(Union of India vs. Nihar Kanta Sen and Others.) 2002
Volume 9 Supreme Court Cases 682 (Niladri Narayan
Chandradhurja vs. State of West Bengal) in support of the
contention that, land vested with the State cannot be revested
under the provisions of the Act of 1953.
5. Learned senior advocate appearing for the writ
petitioners has contended that, the purported resumption
proceedings are contrary to the ratio of 2009 volume 4
Supreme Court Cases 454 (State of West Bengal and
others versus Ratnagiri Engineering Private Ltd and
Others). He has contended that, proviso to Section 6 (3) of the
Act of 1953 has been interpreted to mean that, the same can
be invoked only if, some fraud or misrepresentation was made
to the State for obtaining the order under Section 6 (3) of the
Act of 1953 or there was a genuine and important mistake
made by the State in passing the order under section 6 (3) of
the Act of 1953. He has contended that, the power under the
proviso to Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1953 cannot be exercised
on the ground that after the order of the State government
passed under Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1953, some
subsequent developments have taken place. He has contended
4
that, the impugned order of resumption has proceeded on the
basis of subsequent events and therefore, contrary to the ratio
of Ratnagiri Engineering (supra).
6. Learned senior advocate appearing for the writ
petitioners has contended that, Explanation II introduced to
the proviso to Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1953 is bad in law. He
has pointed out that, vires such provisions were challenged
before the learned Tribunal. He has contended that,
legislature cannot introduce a legislation to render ineffective
a judgement of a court of law through an addition of an
explanation. He has also contended that, explanation
introduced to the statute, cannot amend the provisions
therein. According to him, Explanation II introduced has
encroached on the judicial power of the court. He has relied
upon 1985 volume 1 Supreme Court cases 591 (S.
Sundaram Pillai and Others vs. V. R. Pattabiraman and
Others), All India Reporter 1961 Supreme Court 315
(Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India
Ltd. and Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. The Commercial
Tax Officer and Others), and 2023 SCC online SC 1137
(NHPC Ltd versus State of Himachal Pradesh) in support of
his contentions.
5
7. Learned senior advocate appearing for the writ
petitioners has contended that, holders of land under Section
6 (3) of the Act of 1953 are statutory lessees under the State
Government. He has referred to Section 4B (2) of the West
Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 in this regard.
8. Learned senior advocate appearing for the writ
petitioners has referred to orders passed by the Delhi High
Court and the affidavits used by the state government in the
writ proceedings therein being WP (C) 823 of 2016 to contend
that, state government has accepted that, the writ petitioner
No. 1 was a statutory lessee under the State government by
virtue of Section 4B (2) of the Act of 1955. Consequently, he
has contended that, the order of resumption purported to be
passed under Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1953 after the
introduction of Section 4B (2) of the Act of 1955 is bad and
contrary to law.
9. Learned senior advocate appearing for the State has
contended that, land was initially acquired for Hindustan
Motors Corporation Ltd. Acquired land had been made over to
the Hindustan Motors Corporation Ltd by a registered
instrument. Therefore, title to the land stood transferred to
6
and vested with Hindustan Motors Corporation Ltd prior to
the Act of 1953 coming into effect.
10. Learned senior advocate appearing for the State has
relied upon 2020 Volume 9 Supreme Court Cases 548
(West Uttar Pradesh Sugar Mills Association and Others
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others), All India Reporter
1957 Supreme Court 297 (A. S. Krishna And Others vs.
State of Madras) and 1979 Volume 3 Supreme Court
Cases 431 ( M. Karunanidhi vs. Union of India and
Another.) in support of his contention that, there is no
repugnancy between the Act of 1894 and the Act of 1953.
11. Referring to the 2nd proviso to section 3 of the Act of
1953, learned senior advocate appearing for the State has
contended that, such proviso governs land in respect of which
possession was taken before the date mentioned in the
notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1953 but the process
of acquisition was not completed. He has contended that, the
land in question does not fall within the purview of the 2nd
proviso to Section 3 of the Act of 1953.
12. Learned senior advocate appearing for the State has
contended that, the ratio of Ratnagiri Engineering Private
Limited (supra) is not attracted to the facts and
7
circumstances of the present case as, the land in question
stood in the name of Hindustan Motors Corporation Ltd on
the date of coming into effect of the Act of 1953.
13. The issues that have fallen for consideration are as
follows:
i) Are the provisions of the Act of 1953 attracted in respect of
the subject land despite the same being acquired under the
Act of 1894?
ii) Is Explanation (II) to Section 6(3) of the West Bengal
Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 ultra vires the Constitution of
India?
iii) Is Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953 not applicable in view of
the writ petitioner No. 1 being a statutory lessee in terms of
Section 4B(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955?
iv) To what relief or reliefs are the parties entitled to?
14. Facts which can be governed from the records that
have been produced before us are as follows: –
(i) Hindustan Motors Corporation Ltd had entered into an
agreement on November 23, 1946 with the Governor of
the Province of Bengal in respect of acquisition of land for
the purpose of setting up of workshop and factory;
8
(ii) The Governor of the then Province of Bengal had
proceeded to acquire 530.333 acres of land in the district
of Hooghly by invoking the provisions of the Act of 1894;
(iii) A declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 had
been made on November 28, 1946 for the purpose of
acquiring the land;
(iv) Between the period January 19, 1947 and August 3,
1947, the Governor for the then Province of Bengal had
made over possession of the acquired land to Hindustan
Motors Corporation Ltd. on payment in terms of section 41
of the Act of 1894;
(v) By a Registered Instrument dated October 1, 1948 the
Governor of West Bengal had transferred and conveyed
530.333 acres of land acquired under the Act of 1894 to
Hindustan Motors Corporation Ltd;
(vi) By a registered instrument dated April 10, 1950
Hindustan Motors Corporation Ltd, with the consent of the
Governor of West Bengal had leased 313.44 acres out of
the aggregate land of 530.333 acres, for valuable
consideration in favour of the writ petitioner No. 1 for a
period of 999 years for the purpose of construction of
workshop and factories for the assembly and manufacture
9
of motor vehicles and establishment of allied industries
and storage of goods;
(vii) By a registered deed of conveyance dated June 5, 1967
Hindustan Motors Corporation Ltd as the owner of
530.333 acres of the acquired land including the 313.44
acres of the leased land had transferred right, title and
interest therein in favour of the writ petitioner No. 1 for
valuable consideration; writ petitioner No. 1 had applied
before the State of West Bengal for further acquisition of
land in July 1956.
(viii) On August 19, 1957, Hindustan Motor Corporation
Limited had entered into an agreement with the Governor
agreeing to pay all compensation in respect of further
acquisition.
(ix) Between August 4, 1959 and November 14, 1973
Governor had made over a possession of 190.801 acres of
land to the writ petitioner no. 1. Writ petitioner no. 1 had
duly deposited necessary amounts with the State
Government.
(x) By an indenture dated June 1, 1983 Government had
transferred and conveyed to the writ petitioner no. 1
190.801 acres of land.
10
(xi) By virtue of a scheme of arrangement sanctioned by
the High Court at Calcutta, writ petitioner No. 1 had
transferred 54.84 acres of land to Hyderabad Industries
Limited on April 15, 1992.
(xii) By an order dated September 13, 2006, Department of
Land and Land Reforms, Government of West Bengal, had
allowed writ petitioner no. 1 to transfer and develop a
portion of the factory land comprising of 314 acres by
virtue of setting up of an Integrated Information
Technology Township and added ancillary park.
(xiii) On March 23, 2007 writ petitioner No. 1 had entered
into a development agreement with Bengal Shriram Hi
Tech City Private Limited, a special purpose vehicle
company set up by the writ petitioner No. 1 with Shriram
Transport Ltd. for the purpose of developing and setting up
of an integrated IT township and auto ancillary park. Writ
petitioner No. 1 had also executed a shareholders
agreement with Shrirams Properties Limited and Bengal
Shriram.
(xiv) Writ petitioner No. 1 had informed the State by letters
dated August 8, 2011, September 6, 2011 and December
6, 2011 that, the consideration money of Rs. 279.47 crores
11
received by the writ petitioner No. 1 was utilized towards
repayment of lenders, meeting overdue outstanding wages,
salaries, working capital requirements as also a statutory
dues leaving a small amount to be invested for the
rejuvenation of the automotive plant.
(xv) On September 18, 2014, writ petitioner No. 1 Bengal
Shriram and the State had executed a deed of assignment
whereby, it was agreed to assign the entire 4 per cent of
the non-compete fee receivable by the writ petitioner No. 1
from Bharat Shriram in favour of the State.
(xvi) By a memorandum dated September 29, 2014, State
had described the manner in which the 4 per cent non-
compete fee was to be realized.
(xvii) Between December 6, 2019 and March 16, 2020 State
had requested the writ petition No. 1 to disclose the
proposal for utilizing the remaining 395 acres of land.
(xviii) By letters dated November 10, 2020 and June 25,
2020 State directed the writ petitioner No. 1 to attend a
meeting in connection with the two notices issued.
(xix) By a letter dated April 11, 2022 writ petitioner no. 1
had filed a proposal with the Principal Secretary, Land and
Land Reforms Department, State of West Bengal
12
requesting for an approval to transfer 120 acres of the land
out of 395 acres to one joint venture company.
(xx) By a writing dated July 6, 2022 State of West Bengal
had expressed its intention to resume the 395 acres of
land. Writ petitioner No. 1 had filed a representation dated
July 22, 2022 as against that.
(xxi) By a letter dated August 25, 2022, State had called
upon the writ petitioner No. 1 to furnish project plan for
the proposed EV project detailing requirement of the land
and justification with regard thereto.
(xxii) Writ petitioner No. 1 had replied thereto by a letter
dated September 2, 2022.
(xxiii) By an order dated November 9, 2022, State had
resumed 395 acres of land. Writ petitioners had challenged
the same by way of OA 3775 of 2022 which has resulted in
the impugned order.
15. State had acquired land in two tranches for Hindustan
Motors Corporation Limited. In the first tranche, 530.333
acres of land had been acquired. Such 530.333 acres of land
had been conveyed in favour of Hindustan Motors Corporation
Limited on October 1, 1948.
13
16. In the second tranche of acquisition proceedings,
190.801 acres of land had been acquired. State Government
had transferred and conveyed such 190.801 acres of land to
the writ petitioner No. 1 by a registered deed dated June 1,
1983.
17. The Act of 1953 has come into effect from February 12,
1954. On such date, Hindustan Motors Corporation Limited
was the owner of 530.333 acres of land. Subsequent to the
coming into effect of the Act of 1953, 190.801 acres of land
was acquired by the State under the Act of 1894 and title
thereof had been transferred to the writ petitioner on June 1,
1983. Land owned by individuals or legal entitles are not
immune from the provisions of the Act of 1953.
18. The land in question therefore, is governed by the Act
of 1953 and has been accepted to be so by the writ petitioners
themselves by their actions taken. In fact, writ petitioner No. 1
has taken the benefit of Section 14Z of the Act of 1955 as well
as Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953 as will appear from the
memo No. 2675-GE(M)-5M-03-06 dated September 13, 2006.
By such memo, the writ petitioner No. 1 has allowed the State
to resume 314 acres of land out of 709 acres, in exercise of
powers under Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953 unopposed. By
14
such order, State has resettled the 314 acres of land in favour
of the writ petitioner No. 1 under the Second proviso to sub-
Section (1) of Section 14Z of the West Bengal Land Reforms
Act, 1955 on realisation of a consideration money amounting
to Rs. 10.50 crores.
19. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited (supra) was
decided on February 24, 2009 while Explanation II to the
proviso to Section 6(3) of the Act of 1993 has been inserted
with effect from November 9, 2010.
20. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited & Ors.
(supra) has consider the proviso to Section 6(3) of the Act of
1953 and held that, the power under the proviso to Section
6(3) of the Act of 1953 cannot be exercised by the State
Government by taking into consideration subsequent events
to the order passed.
21. Section 6(3) with the proviso, explanation and the
exception is as follows:
“6(3) In the case of land comprised in a tea garden,
mill, factory or workshop the intermediary, or where the
land is held under a lease, the lessee, shall be entitled to
retain only so much of such land as, in the opinion of the
State Government, is required for the tea garden, mill,
factory or workshop, as the case may be, and a person
15holding under a lease shall, for the purpose of assessment
of compensation, be deemed to be an intermediary:
Provided that the State Government may, if it thinks
fit so to do after reviewing the circumstances of a case and
after giving the intermediary or the lessee, as the case may
be, an opportunity of being heard, revise any order made
by it under this sub-section specifying the land which the
intermediary or the lessee shall be entitled to retain as
being required by him for the tea garden, mill, factory or
workshop, as the case may be.
[Explanation I].- The expression “land held under a
lease” includes any land held directly under the State
under a lease.
[Explanation II. – For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby declared that the expression “revise any order”
mentioned in the proviso to this sub-section, shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time
being in force or in any agreement or in any decree,
judgment, decision, award of any court, tribunal or other
authority, include revision of an order of retention made
under this sub-section, at any time after such order of
retention so made, if the intermediary or the lessee, as the
case may be, fails to use or ceases to use the whole or any
part of the land for the purpose for which it has been
retained i.e. for tea-garden, mill, factory or workshop, as
the case may be, by him, so as to resume such land as
being surplus to his requirement, by the State Government
in the manner laid down in this proviso.]
Exception. – In the case of land allowed to be
retained by an intermediary or lessee in respect of a tea
garden, such land may include any land comprised in a
16
forest if, in the opinion of the State Government, the land
comprised in a forest is required for the tea garden.”
22. Proviso to Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953 has allowed
the State Government to revise any order impugned by it
under Section 6(3). Explanation II has explained that, for the
removal of doubts, the expression “revise any order”
mentioned in the proviso shall notwithstanding anything
contained in any law for the time being in force or in any
agreement or in any decree, judgment, decision, award of any
Court, Tribunal or other authority, including revision of any
order of retention at any time after such order of retention so
made, if the intermediary of the lessee as the case may be,
fails to use or ceases to hold any part of the land for the
purpose of which it has been retained, can be resumed as
surplus land. In other words, Explanation II allows the State
Government to revise its order under Section 6(3) on the basis
of subsequent events.
23. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited & Ors.
(supra) has been rendered in a situation where, Explanation
(II) was not introduced to the proviso to Section 6(3) of the Act
of 1953. Explanation II introduced to the proviso to Section
6(3) of the Act of 1953 otherwise falls within the competence
17
of the State legislature to legislate should it muster the test of
“colourable legislation”. Writ petitioners have contended that,
in view of Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited &
Ors.(supra) , Explanation (II) is ultra vires the Constitution as
it is a piece of colourable legislation.
24. The preamble to the Act of 1953 has specified that, the
same is to provide for the State acquisition of estates, of rights
of intermediaries therein and certain rights of raiyats and
under-raiyats and of the rights of certain other persons in
lands comprised in estates. The word estate has been defined
in Section 2 (f) of the Act of 1953 to include part of an estate
or part of a tenure. Agricultural land as well as
nonagricultural land have been defined in Section 2 (b) and (j)
respectively in the Act of 1953.
25. Section 3 of the Act of 1953 has provided that, the Act
of 1953 shall override other laws. The 2nd proviso to such
Section has provided that, if possession of land is taken by the
State in terms of any acquisition proceedings, then, the Act of
1953 shall not affect such land and that, the proceedings for
acquisition of such land may be continued or commenced as if
the Act of 1953 had not been passed.
18
26. Section 4 of the Act of 1953 has provided for vesting of
estates and rights of intermediaries on publication of requisite
notification to such effect. It has been admitted at the bar
that, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
land in question falls in an area in which, the Act of 1953
operates. Independent of such admission, there is a
notification in the Calcutta Gazette dated November 11, 1954
which contains a notification under Section 4 of the Act of
1953 in respect of the district concerned.
27. Title of 530.333 acres of land acquired by the State
under the Act of 1894 had been transferred to Hindustan
Motors Corporation Ltd prior to the notification under Section
4 of the Act of 1953. Such land was therefore not under an
acquisition process in terms of the 2nd proviso of Section 3 of
the Act of 1953. Similarly, titled to 190.801 acres of land
acquired under the Act of 1894 was transferred to the writ
petitioner No. 1 on June 1, 1983 and therefore, such portion
of land also cannot be considered to be falling within the 2nd
proviso to Section 3 of the Act of 1953.
28. Section 41 of the Act of 1894 permits transfer of right,
title and interest in respect of land acquired thereunder to the
person at whose behalf acquisition proceedings had been
19
undertaken, on certain conditions. At best, such transfer of
right, title and interest of the land to the entity at whose
behest, the acquisition proceedings were undertaken under
the Act of 1894, can be said to be a conditional transfer.
29. Two title deeds had been executed by the State-one in
favour of Hindustan Motors Corporation Ltd and the other in
favour of the writ petitioner No. 1-in respect of the land
concerned claimed to be governed by Section 41 of the Act of
1894. Nothing has been placed on record to establish that,
any of the transfer these have violated any of the provisions of
the conditional sale or that, State has sought to repudiate the
title deeds.
30. Nihar Kanta Sen and others (supra) has held that,
the 2nd proviso to Section 3 of the Act of 1953 is intended to
protect the rights of those tenure holders whose land may
have been the subject matter of acquisition proceedings under
any law with a view to protect their rights to get
compensation. In the facts of that case, it has held that, since
the property in dispute was not under acquisition and the
possession of the same had been taken by the State in
acquisition proceedings, the 2nd proviso has no application. In
the facts and circumstances of the present case, the entirety
20
of the land had belonged to legal entities other than the State.
At the time when the Act of 1953 has come into operation,
such land was not the subject matter of any acquisition
proceedings.
31. Niladri Narayan Chandradhurja (supra) has held in
the facts and circumstances of that case, that, the land in
question stood vested under the Act of 1953 and therefore, the
question of the same vesting under the Act of 1894 does not
arise. Again, in the facts and circumstances of the present
case, on the date when the Act of 1953 came into effect, the
land in question stood in the name of an entity other than the
State.
32. In view of the discussions above, the first issue is
answered in the affirmative and against the writ petitioners,
by holding that the provisions of the Act of 1953 stands
attracted in respect of the subject land.
33. S Sundaram Pillai and others (supra) has dealt with
the issue of an Explanation added to a statutory provision. It
has held that, an Explanation added to a statutory provision
is not a substantive provision in any sense of the term but as
the plain meaning of the word itself shows it is merely meant
21
to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept
in the statutory provision.
34. NHPC Ltd (supra) has considered the issue of
legislative enactment to remove the basis of judgement. It has
considered the doctrine of abrogation. It has held as follows: –
“39. The Constitution of India precludes any
interference by the legislature with the administration of
justice and judicial determination of the validity of a
legislation. The power of abrogation is to be exercised in
the light of the said constitutional mandate. The legislative
device of abrogation must be in accordance with the
following principles which are not exhaustive:
39.1. There is no legal impediment to enacting a law to
validate a legislation which has been held by a court to be
invalid, provided, such a law removes the basis of the
judgment of the court, by curing the defects of the
legislation as it stood before the amendment.
39.2. The validating legislation may be retrospective.
It must have the effect that the judgment pointing out the
defect would not have been passed, if the altered position
as sought to be brought in by the validating statute
existed before the court at the time of rendering its
judgment.
39.3. Retrospective amendment should be reasonable
and not arbitrary and must not be violative of any
constitutional limitations.
39.4. Setting at naught a decision of a court without
removing the defect pointed out in the said decision is
opposed to the rule of law and the scheme of separation of
powers under the Constitution of India.
22
39.5. Abrogation is not a device to circumvent an
unfavourable judicial decision. If enacted solely with the
intention to defy a judicial pronouncement, an Amendment
and Validation Act, 1997 may be declared as ultra vires.”
35. A S Krishna (supra) has upheld the constitutional
validity of Sections 4 (2), 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of the Madras
Prohibition Act, 1937.
36. M Karunanidhi (supra) has held that, the
presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of a
statute and the onus lies on the person claiming the Act to be
ultra vires to prove that it is unconstitutional. It has
considered the issue of the repugnancy of statutes. It has held
that, provisions of Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal
Misconduct) Act, 1973 was not repugnant to the Indian Penal
Code, Prevention of Corruption Act, and Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 1952.
37. Doctrine of separation of powers although not
expressly engrafted in the Constitution is apparent from its
working. It has been judicially recognised that, the doctrine of
separation of powers is an entrenched principle in the
Constitution of India being an essential constituent of the rule
of law. Independence of Courts from the executive and the
legislature is fundamental to the rule of law and one of the
basic tenets of the Constitution of India. Doctrine of
23
separation of power ipso facto does not prevent the legislature
from passing a law which it is otherwise competent to do so.
However, in the event, it is established that, the law enacted
by the legislature, although apparently being within its
competence but in substance an attempt to interfere with the
judicial process, such law may be invalidated being in breach
of doctrine of separation of powers.
38. NHPC Limited (supra) has held that, though
legislature cannot directly set aside a judicial decision, but it
is open to the legislature to alter the law retrospectively
provided the basis of the earlier judgment is removed, thereby
resulting in fundamental change of circumstances upon which
it was founded. Such legislative exercise is valid provided it
does not transgress on any other constitutional limitation. The
power of legislature to legislate within its field both
prospectively and to a permissible extent retrospectively,
cannot be interfered with by Courts provided that they are
made in accordance with the Constitution. However, while
legislature merely seeks to validate acts carried out under
previous legislation which was struck down by subsequent
legislation without removing the defect in such legislation, the
subsequent legislation would also be ultra vires.
24
39. In the facts and circumstances of the present case,
Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953 has been interpreted by
Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited (supra) to mean
that, revision of the quantum of land allowed to be retained
cannot be done on the basis of subsequent events.
Explanation II introduced to the 2nd proviso of Section 6(3)
however, has sought to redress such defect in Section 6(3) by
providing, retrospectively, that, revision of quantum of land
allowed to be retained can be undertaken on the basis of the
subsequent events.
40. Explanation II introduced to Section 6(3) of the Act of
1953 has brought Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953 to be in tune
with the declared objective of the Act of 1953, that is, it being
the law relating to land tenure consequent on the vesting of all
estates and certain rights therein. Power of the State to take
cognizance of the subsequent events with regard to the land in
question governed under the Act of 1953 has been recognised
in various provision of the Act of 1953 itself as also in the Act
of 1953. Both Act as complementing each other. Explanation
II is one of such provision which allow subsequent events to
be taken into account.
25
41. In view of the discussions above, the Explanation II
cannot be said to be beyond the legislative competence of the
State legislature nor can it be said be limited to any individual
person. It seeks to redress a lacunae with regard to its
interpretation, as noted in Ratnagiri Engineering Private
Limited (supra).
42. In such circumstances, we hold that Explanation II to
Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953 is not ultra vires the
Constitution of India. The second issue is, therefore, answered
in the negative and as against the writ petitioners.
43. Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of
India Ltd. and Standard Vacuum Oil Co. (supra) has
considered the issue of an explanation appearing in Article
286 of the Constitution of India before amendment and when
the same can be invoked. It has explained that, the
explanation can apply only if more than one State was
involved in the same transaction.
44. West Uttar Pradesh Sugar Mills Association and
Others (supra) has dealt with the issue of repugnancy. It has
held that, question of repugnancy arises only in a case where
there is an actual irreconcilable conflict between the two
lands. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it
26
cannot be said that the explanation II introduced to Section 6
(3) of the Act of 1953 is repugnant to Section 6 (3) thereof.
45. The writ petitioners may or may not be direct lessee
under the State in terms of Section 4B (2) of the Act of 1955
but that does not preclude the applicability of Section 6(3) of
the Act of 1953 in respect of the land in question.
46. In such circumstances, the third issue is answered by
holding that, the writ petitioner No. 1 is governed by the Act of
1953 and is amenable to proceedings under Section 6 (3)
thereof.
47. In view of the discussions above we find no merit in
the present writ petition. The writ petitioners are not entitled
to any relief. Fourth issue is answered accordingly.
48. WPLRT 54 of 2024 is dismissed without any order as
to cost.
[DEBANGSU BASAK, J.]
49. I agree.
[MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.]
27
Later:-
Prayer for stay of the impugned judgment and order made
on behalf of the petitioners is considered and refused since, we
dismissed the writ petition and upheld the order of the learned
Tribunal.
[DEBANGSU BASAK, J.]
I agree.
[MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.]