Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Jakir Hussain vs State on 13 June, 2025
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 859/2013
Jakir Hussain s/o Shri Abdul Karee @ Babu Khan, r/o
Shramikpura, Masuriya, Jodhpur
(Lodged in Central Jail, Jodhpur)
----Appellant
Versus
The State of Rajasthan.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Harshvardhan Thanvi (Amicus
Curiae).
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Deepak Choudhary, GA cum AAG
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH
Judgment
Reserved on 25/04/2025
Pronounced on 13/06/2025
Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J:
1. The instant criminal appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. has
been preferred by the accused-appellant against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 03.09.2013 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Women Atrocities Cases,
Jodhpur Metropolitan in Sessions Case No.22/2013 (State of
Rajasthan Vs. Jakir Hussain), whereby the accused-appellant has
been convicted and sentenced as under:
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (2 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
Conviction u/s. Sentence & Fine In Default of
payment of fine
further undergo
498-A of I.P.C. One Year's R.I., One month's
alongwith Fine of additional
Rs.1000/- imprisonment
302 of I.P.C. Life Imprisonment One Year's additional
alongwith Fine of imprisonment
Rs.10,000/-
2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the
year 2012 and the present appeal has been pending since the year
2013.
3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court are that
one Liyakat (complainant) alongwith his younger brother Maqbool
Ali submitted a written report (Ex.P-5) on 08.02.2012, at around
12:30 p.m., before the Police Station, Pratap Nagar, Jodhpur,
stating therein that his sister, Aasfa had been married for 22 years
and was living in her matrimonial home situated at Shramikpura,
Masuriya, Jodhpur, with her husband, namely, Jakir Hussain
(present accused-appellant) and in-laws, who used to subject her
to grave acts of cruelty including beatings.
3.1. It was further stated in the report that in continuation of
such cruel acts, on 07.02.2012, at around 11:00 p.m., the
husband and in-laws of Aasfa, set her on fire, information
whereof, was received by the complainant (family member of
Aasfa) at around 12:15 a.m. As alleged in the report, Aasfa
received burns to the extent of 90%. As per the report, in the said
act, present accused-appellant Jakir (husband), Bibi w/o Babu
Khan (mother-in-law) and Yasmin d/o Babu Khan (sister-in-law),
were involved.
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (3 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
3.2. On the basis of the aforesaid information, an FIR bearing
No.67/2012 was registered at Police Station, Pratap Nagar,
Jodhpur for the offence under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC, and
the police started investigation in the matter. However, before
conclusion of the investigation, Aasfa succumbed to the burn
injuries during the treatment on 18.02.2012. After completion of
the investigation, a charge-sheet under section 498A and 302 IPC
against accused-appellant was submitted before the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.2, Jodhpur.
3.3. Owing to the nature of crime involved, the matter was
committed to the Court of Sessions, wherefrom the same was
transferred to the learned Trial Court, for the necessary trial.
3.4. During the course of trial, the statements of 24 witnesses
(P.W. 1 to P.W. 24) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P.1 to 22)
got exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; in defence, document
(Ex.D.1) got exhibited, for examination; whereafter, the accused-
appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which he
pleaded innocence and false implication in the criminal case in
question.
3.5. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court,
convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant, as above, vide
the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
03.09.2013; against which, the present appeal has been preferred
by the accused-appellant.
4. Mr. Harshvardhan Thanvi, learned Amicus Curiae for the
accused-appellant contended that the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 03.09.2013 is not sustainable in law, as
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (4 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
the learned Trial Court failed to properly consider and appreciate
the material facts and evidence placed on record.
4.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the dying declaration
of the deceased (Ex.D.1), forming the sole foundation of the
conviction, was not recorded as per law. It was highlighted that
Santosh Agarwal (P.W.24), the magistrate who recorded the said
dying declaration, did not record the same in a question-answer
format which raises substantial doubts about potential leading
queries influencing the responses.
4.1.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the doctor Ramveer
Singh who granted the certificate of fitness for the statement was
not the competent doctor to grant the said certificate, he was just
a duty doctor, who was asked to grant the said certificate by P.W.
24. Moreover, it was highlighted that the said doctor was not even
examined as a witness.
4.1.2. Learned counsel also submitted that Dr. D.D. Meena
(P.W.20) who conducted postmortem of the deceased stated in his
testimony that both the thumbs of the deceased were completely
burnt, thus it was contended that it would impossible to have the
left thumb impression as apparent on the dying declaration with
the clear ridges and curves.
4.1.3. Learned counsel further submitted that Dr. Kamal Kant
(P.W.9) stated in his testimony that an analgeic injection was
given to the deceased so that the deceased could be relieved of
the pain, but the said injection as per the doctors testimony, does
have effect on functioning of the brain. Furthermore, it was
contended that the deceased was burnt more than 90% as per the
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (5 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
Ex.P.10, and in such a situation a person cannot be in a fit state of
mind to give dying declaration. Learned Counsel relied upon the
jugement passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Sampat Babso Kale vs. State of Maharatra (2019) 4 SCC
739 wherein the it was held as hereunder:
"13. In our view, though the dying declaration stand proved,
the issue is whether we can convict the accused only on the
basis of these dying declarations. In a case of the present
nature where the victim had 98% burns and the doctor has
stated from the record that a painkiller was injected at 3:30
a.m. and the dying declaration had been recorded
thereafter, there is a serious doubt wether the victim was in
a fit state of mind to make the statement. She must have
been in great agony and once a sedative had been injected,
the possibility of her being in the state of delusion cannot
be completely ruled out..."
4.1.4. Learned Counsel submitted that these cumulative infirmities
vitiate the evidentiary sanctity of the dying declaration, rendering
it insufficient and unreliable to be admitted under Section 32(1) of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
4.2. Learned counsel further contended that the Parcha Bayan
(Ex.P.21) cannot be relied upon as the Ram Nayaran (P.W. 23)
admitted in his testimony that he did not record the Parcha Bayan
himself, rather it was a Sipahi who recorded the same. It was
further contended that P.W.23 has also refused to remember the
name of the person who recorded the Parcha Bayan, and neither
was the said person examined as a witness. Moreover, it was
contended that the Parcha Bayan was recorded without certificate
of fitness by a doctor. The Parcha Bayan also contains infirmities
such as the date and time of recording not being mentioned on it,
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (6 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
and it was also not mentioned that the same was read over to the
deceased. These omissions, it was submitted, create significant
gaps in the prosecution's case. Additionally, counsel argued that
the alleged recovery of the kerosene tin has not been duly
established. In view of the absence of such crucial evidence and
the non-examination of vital witnesses, it was asserted that the
conviction of the accused-appellant is not sustainable in law.
4.2.1. Learned counsel additionally submitted that Dr.
Kamalkant(P.W.9), unequivocally deposed that the injuries
sustained by the deceased were consistent with flame burns
rather than burns caused by kerosene. This testimony, it was
contended, undermines the prosecution's version that the
accused-appellant poured kerosene on the deceased and set her
ablaze.
4.3. Learned counsel further contended that the medical
evidence, specifically the postmortem report (Ex.P.19) of the
deceased, does not record any finding regarding the presence of
kerosene on the body of the deceased.
4.4. Learned Counsel also submitted that the prosecution's case
is not corroborated by its own witnesses, namely Wasim Ahmed
(P.W.1), Khurshid Ahmed (P.W.5), Jubeda(P.W.11), Liyakat
Ali(P.W.12), Abdul Gani(P.W.13), Chand Biwi(P.W.14),
Sabra(P.W.15), Rukiya Baano(P.W.17), Abdul Javed @ Guddu (P.W.
18) Shamin(P.W.19), all were declared hostile during the course of
the trial.
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (7 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
4.5. Learned counsel further submitted that the allegations of
dowry demand do not find a strong footing in the present case, as
the same has not been supported by the prosecution witnesses.
4.6. Learned counsel further argued that the prosecution has not
established any motive on the part of the accused-appellant for
committing the alleged offence. It was also submitted that the
deceased and the accused-appellant had been married for 22
years, and none of the prosecution witnesses have alleged that
the deceased was subjected to cruelty or ill-treatment by the
accused-appellant at any point in time.
4.7. Learned counsel in support of his case relied on the following
Judgments:
(i) The State of Punjab vs. Gian Kaur and ors (Criminal
Appeal No. 122/1991 decided on 05.03.1998 by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court).
(ii) Govind Narain and Another vs. The State of
Rajasthan (Criminal Appeal Nos. 852 of1985 with 197 of
1987 and 279 of 1988 decided on 31.03.1993 by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court).
(iii) Panchanand Mandal @Pachan Mandal and Anr. Vs
State of Jharkhand (Criminal Appeal No.2173 of 2009
decided on 04.10.2013 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court).
(iv) Shrawan Ram and ors. vs. The State of Rajasthan
(D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 394/2012 decided on
21.10.2019 by this Hon'ble Court).
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (8 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
(v) Rupa Ram and Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan (D.B.
Criminal Appeal No. 540/2017 decided on 04.03.2021 by
this Hon'ble Court).
(vi) Pravin vs. The State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal
No. 482 of 2016 decided on 07.01.2020 by the Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay).
5. Per Contra, Mr. Deepak Choudhary, learned Government
Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General, appearing for the
State, opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the
accused-appellant. He submitted that the dying declaration of the
deceased was recorded in strict compliance with the prescribed
legal procedures, and was made in the presence of PW.24 Santosh
Agarwal, Judicial Magistrate after acquiring the required certificate
of mental fitness. Accordingly, he contended that the credibility
and evidentiary value of the said dying declaration remain
unimpeachable.
5.1. Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that
the fitness certificate of the deceased was duly issued by Dr.
Ramveer Singh, who was also responsible for treating the
deceased during her hospitalization. Therefore, it is incorrect to
allege that the dying declaration was recorded without a fitness
certificate from the attending doctor.
5.2. Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that
both the dying declaration (Ex.P.5) and the Parchabayan (Ex.P.21)
were recorded within a few hours to each other. Accordingly,
there is no valid basis to question the authenticity or reliability of
these documents as there is sufficient consistency between them.
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (9 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
5.3. Learned Additional Advocate General also submitted that the
recovery of a tin of kerosene was made from the accused-
appellant, which further fortifies the case of prosecution.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the
record of the case.
7. This Court observes that on the night of 07.02.2012, the
deceased sustained severe burn injuries at her matrimonial home
and was admitted to the hospital with approximately 90% burns,
as reflected in the medical records (Ex.P.10), and consequently on
08.02.2012, a written report (Ex.P.5) was submitted by the
complainant Liyakat Ali (brother of the deceased) at Police Station
Pratap Nagar, Jodhpur, alleging that the deceased had been
subjected to cruelty by her husband and in-laws, and was set on
fire. Thus, an FIR No. 67/2012 was registered for offences under
Sections 498-A and 307 IPC, which was later converted to Section
302 IPC upon the death of the deceased on 18.02.2012. This
Court further observes that during the course of investigation, the
police recorded a Parcha Bayan (Ex.P.21) and a dying declaration
(Ex.D.1) of the deceased, and upon completion of investigation, a
charge sheet was filed against the present accused-appellant
under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC. At the conclusion of the trial,
the learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 03.09.2013, convicted
the accused-appellant, against which the present appeal has been
preferred.
8. This Court observes that as per the evidence on record, the
Parcha Bayan (Ex.P.21) is fraught with infirmities, including
absence of certificate of fitness by any medical professional
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (10 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
and lack of mention of whether the statement was read over to
the deceased. It was admitted by Ram Narayan (P.W.23) that he
did not record the Parcha Bayan himself, and the person who did
record it was neither named nor examined before the learned Trail
Court. This Court is conscious of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Manjunath & Ors vs. State of Karnataka
(Criminal Appeal No. 866 of 2011 decided on 6.11.2023,
wherein it was held as hereunder:
"11.10 Examination of the person who reduced into
writing, the dying declaration, is essential. Particularly, in
the absence of any explanation forthcoming for the
production of evidence is what stands observed in Govind
Narain v. State of Rajasthan.
11.10.1 In fact, in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab it was held:
-
11. …To make such statement as substantive evidence, the
person or the agency relying upon it is under a legal
obligation to prove the making of such statement as a fact.
If it is in writing, the scribe must be produced in the Court
and if it is verbal, it should be proved by examining the
person who heard the deceased making the statement.
and;”
In view of the aforementioned precedent law and the infirmities
mentioned herein above in light thereof, the probative value of the
Parcha Bayan is substantially weaken.
9. This Court further observes that the dying declaration
(Ex.D.1), which forms the principal basis of conviction, was
recorded by Santosh Agarwal (P.W.24), Judicial Magistrate.
However, the same was not recorded in a question-and-answer
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (11 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]format, and this Court is conscious of the Judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of State Delhi (Administration) vs
Laxman Kumar & Ors (1998) 4 SCC 517, wherein it was held
as hereunder:
“…Again, unless the dying declaration is in question and
answer form it is very difficult to know to what extent the
answers have been suggested by question put. What is
neceassy is that the exact statement made by the
deceased should be available to the Court…”
9.1. Moreover, this Court observes that a certificate of fitness was
issued by Dr. Ramveer Singh, who was not examined during the
trial, and his qualification or competence to issue such a certificate
remains unsubstantiated on record, and this Court is mindful of
the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Surjit
Singh vs. State of Punjab (Criminal Appeal No. 565/2012
decided on 07.12.2023), wherein it was held as hereunder:
” There is nothing brought on record to show that Dr.
Sudhir Sharma examined the deceased before giving
certificate of fitness at 4:30 p.m. What is most crucial is
that Dr. Sudhir Sharma has not been examined as a
prosecution witness. In view of the what is admitted by
Surjit Singh (PW-10) in paragraph 2 in his cross-
examination, which we have quoted above, an adverse
inference will have to be drawn against the prosecution for
not examining the said doctor. Therefore, for the aforesaid
reasons, the dying declaration allegedly recorded by Surjit
Singh (PW-10) will have to be discarded.”
9.2. Thus, this Court finds that, in light of the principles laid down
by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the failure of the prosecution to
examine Dr. Ramveer Singh, who issued the certificate of fitness,
warrants drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (12 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
because P.W. 9 has testified that he was the doctor who treated
the deceased. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view
that the evidentiary value of the dying declaration stands
substantially weakened.
9.3. This Court also takes note of the fact that Dr. D.D. Meena
(P.W.20), who conducted the postmortem, categorically stated
that both thumbs of the deceased were completely burnt, and in
such circumstances, the affixation of a legible thumb impression
with identifiable ridges and curves is highly doubtful.
10. This Court also observes that Dr. Kamal Kant (P.W.9), who
treated the deceased, admitted that the deceased was
administered analgesics to manage pain. Given that the deceased
had over 90% burns and was under sedative medication, serious
doubt is cast on her mental and physical fitness to make a cogent
and voluntary dying declaration. In such cases, the Hon’ble Apex
Court, in Sampat Babso Kale vs. State of Maharashtra
[(2019) 4 SCC 739], has laid down that conviction solely based
on a dying declaration must be cautiously scrutinized, especially
where the deceased had suffered severe burns and was under
sedative medication.
11. This Court observes that the recovery of kerosene tin, as
alleged, does not inspire confidence, keeping in view that Dr.
Kamalkant (P.W.9) has stated that the injuries sustained were due
to flame burns. Further, no chemical analysis or forensic report
substantiating presence of kerosene on the body or clothing of the
deceased was brought on record. The postmortem report (Ex.P.19)
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (13 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
also does not record any finding regarding the presence of
kerosene.
12. This Court further observes that the key prosecution
witnesses, namely Wasim Ahmed (P.W.1), Khurshid Ahmed
(P.W.5), Jubeda(P.W.11), Liyakat Ali(P.W.12), Abdul Gani(P.W.13),
Chand Biwi(P.W.14), Sabra(P.W.15), Rukiya Baano(P.W.17), Abdul
Javed @ Guddu (P.W. 18) Shamin(P.W.19) were declared hostile.
These witnesses, did not support the prosecution’s case, and failed
to corroborate the allegations of cruelty.
13. In view of the above, the allegations under Section 498-A IPC
and section 302 therefore remain unsubstantiated. Furthermore,
this Court also takes note that no specific or proximate motive has
been established against the accused-appellant. The deceased and
the accused-appellant had been married for over 22 years, and no
incident of prior cruelty or harassment has been credibly
established. In absence of a consistent chain of events or
corroborative evidence, the prosecution’s case fails to meet the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
14. In view of the cumulative infirmities in the prosecution’s
case, including the doubtful evidentiary value of the Parcha Bayan
and dying declaration, absence of medical corroboration, failure to
establish motive, hostile witnesses, and lack of proof of cruelty or
dowry demand, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
conviction of the accused-appellant cannot be sustained.
15. This Court further observes that when the judgment of
conviction is challenged before the Appellate Court, a proper
appreciation of the evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (14 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
has to be made. The power of the Appellate Court is provided
under Section 386(b) of Cr.P.C., which reads as under:-
“386. Powers of the Appellate Court.–
(b) in an appeal from a conviction–
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or
discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by
a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such
Appellate Court or committed for trial, or
(ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the
nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the
sentence, but not so as to enhance the same.”
16. This Court also observes that as provided under Section
386(b)(i) Cr.P.C., the Appellate Court has the power to reverse the
findings of the conviction, so as to acquit the accused. At this
juncture, it is considered appropriate to reproduce the relevant
portion of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
case of Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat,
(2013) 15 SCC 263, as hereunder:-
“9. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that though it may
be difficult to state that the judgment suffers from sans
reasons, yet it is not at all difficult to say that the reasons
ascribed are really apology for reasons. If we allow ourselves
to say so, one may ascribe certain reasons which seem to be
reasons but the litmus test is to give seemly and condign
reasons either to sustain or overturn the judgment. The
filament of reasoning must logically flow from requisite
analysis, but, unfortunately, the said exercise has not been
carried out. In this context, we may refer with profit to the
decision in Padam Singh v. State of U.P [(2000) 1 SCC 621:
2000 SCC (Cri) 285], wherein a two-Judge Bench, while
dealing with the duty of the appellate court, has expressed
thus: (SCC p. 625, para 2)“2. … It is the duty of an appellate court to look into the
evidence adduced in the case and arrive at an(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (15 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence
can be relied upon or not and even if it can be relied
upon, then whether the prosecution can be said to have
been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said
evidence. The credibility of a witness has to be adjudged
by the appellate court in drawing inference from proved
and admitted facts. It must be remembered that the
appellate court, like the trial court, has to be satisfied
affirmatively that the prosecution case is substantially
true and the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
all reasonable doubt as the presumption of innocence with
which the accused starts, continues right through until he
is held guilty by the final Court of Appeal and that
presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal nor
weakened by a conviction in the trial court.”
(emphasis
supplied)
10. In Rama v. State of Rajasthan[(2002) 4 SCC 571 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 829], the Court has stated about the duty of the appellate
court in the following terms: (SCC p. 572, para 4)
“4. … It is well settled that in a criminal appeal, a duty is
enjoined upon the appellate court to reappraise the evidence
itself and it cannot proceed to dispose of the appeal upon
appraisal of evidence by the trial court alone especially when
the appeal has been already admitted and placed for final
hearing. Upholding such a procedure would amount to
negation of valuable right of appeal of an accused, which
cannot be permitted under law.”
11. In Iqbal Abdul Samiya Malek v. State of Gujarat [(2012) 11
SCC 312: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 636], relying on the
pronouncements in Padam Singh [(2000) 1 SCC 621 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 285] and Bani Singh v. State of U.P. [(1996) 4 SCC
720: 1996 SCC (Cri) 848], this Court has reiterated the
principle pertaining to the duty of the appellate court.
12. Recently, a three-Judge Bench in Majjal v. State of Haryana
[(2013) 6 SCC 798] has ruled thus: (SCC p. 800, para 7)
“7. It was necessary for the High Court to consider
whether the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and
its opinion that the appellant must be convicted deserve to
be confirmed. This exercise is necessary because the
personal liberty of an accused is curtailed because of the
conviction.
The High Court must state its reasons why it is accepting
the evidence on record. The High Court’s concurrence with
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (16 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
the trial court’s view would be acceptable only if it is
supported by reasons. In such appeals it is a court of first
appeal. Reasons cannot be cryptic. By this, we do not
mean that the High Court is expected to write an unduly
long treatise. The judgment may be short but must reflect
proper application of mind to vital evidence and important
submissions which go to the root of the matter.”
17. This Court also observes that looking into the overall factual
matrix and the circumstances of the case as well as the evidence
and the precedent law, as placed before us, it is a fit case to
exercise the power conferred under Section 386(2), which pertains
to the reversal of a finding from conviction to acquittal.
18. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed and the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.09.2013
passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Women
Atrocities Cases, Jodhpur Metropolitan in Sessions Case
No.22/2013 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Jakir Hussain) is quashed
and set aside. The accused-appellant is acquitted of the charges
against him. The accused-appellant is in custody; he be released
forthwith, if not required in any other case.
19. However, keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A
Cr.P.C./481 B.N.S.S., the accused-appellant is hereby directed to
furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- and a surety
bond each in the like amount before the learned Trial court which
shall be effective for a period of six months to the effect that in
the event of filing of a Special Leave Petition against the present
judgment on receipt of notice thereof, the accused-appellant shall
appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as and when called
upon to do so.
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:22205-DB] (17 of 17) [CRLA-859/2013]
20. All pending applications stand disposed of. The record of the
learned Trial Court be returned forthwith.
21. This Court is thankful to Mr. Harshvardhan Thanvi, who has
rendered his assistance as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of the
accused-appellant, in the present adjudication.
(SANDEEP SHAH),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
SKant/-
(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:57:18 PM)
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)