Jharkhand High Court
Jharkhand State Forest Development … vs Md. Yusuf on 12 June, 2025
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.138 of 2024
-----
1. Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation
Limited, having its office at Road No.5, Ashok Nagar,
P.O.-Argora, P.S. Argora, District Ranchi, through its
Managing Director-cum-Additional Principal Chief
Conservator of Forest N.K. Singh, aged about 60 years,
son of late Ram Dayal Singh, resident of Forest Officers
Colony, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
2. The General Manager, Minor Forest Produce Circle,
Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation
Limited, having its office at P.O. & P.S. Hazaribag,
District Hazaribag.
3. The Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Forest Produce Project Division, Forest
Development Corporation Limited, having its office at
P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, District Garhwa.
4. The Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Forest Development Corporation Limited,
having its office at P.O. & P.S. Daltonganj, District
Palamu at Daltonganj.
5. The Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Forest Development Corporation Limited,
having its office at P.O. & P.S. Hazaribag, District
Hazaribag . ... ... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Md. Yusuf, son of Abdul Sattar, resident of Village Ichak,
P.O. Kura, P.S. Latehar, District Latehar (Jharkhand).
2. Mishri Thakur, son of Shri Nageshwar Thakur, resident
of Village Bathe, P.O. Bathe, P.S. Madhepur, District
Madhubani, Bihar, at present residing at Arya Nagar,
P.O. & P.S. Sadar, District Hazaribag.
3. Tikhuri Mahto, son of Sri Rail Mahto, resident of Village
Bajkum, P.O. & P.S. Latehar, District Latehar.
... ... Respondents/Petitioners
4. The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary/Principal
Secretary, Department of Forest, Environment and
Climate Change, having its office at Nepal House,
Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi .
... ... Performa Respondents/Respondent
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With
L.P.A. No.141 of 2024
-----
1. Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation
Limited, having its office at Road No.5, Ashok Nagar,
P.O.-Argora, P.S. Argora, District Ranchi, through its
Managing Director-cum-Upper Principal Chief
Conservator of Forest Shri N.K. Singh, aged about 60
years, son of late Ram Dayal Singh, resident of Forest
Officers Colony, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
2. The General Manager, Minor Forest Produce Circle,
Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation
Limited, having its office at P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh,
District Hazaribagh.
3. The Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Forest Produce Project Division, Forest
Development Corporation Limited, having its office at
P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, District Garhwa.
4. Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Forest Development Corporation Limited,
having its office at P.O. & P.S. Daltonganj, District
Palamu at Daltonganj.
5. Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Forest Development Corporation Limited,
having its office at P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District
Hazaribag . ... ... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Ashok Kumar Tiwari, son of
Si Muni Tiwari, resident of Village-Kutmu, P.O. & P.S. -
Untari Road, District Palamau.
2. Fotephar Bakhla, son of late Munmasi Bakhla resident of
Village-Ramar, P.O. & P.S. Bhandaria, Garhwa.
3. Rahul Kumar Sinha, son of late Rajesh Kumar Sinha,
resident of Dehri - on - sone, P.O.-Dalmianagar, P.S.
Dehri-on-Sone, District-Rohtas, Bihar.
... ... Respondents/Petitioners
4. The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary/Principal
Secretary, Department of Forest, Environment and
Climate Change, having its office at Nepal House,
Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi .
... ... Performa Respondents/Respondent
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With
L.P.A. No.176 of 2024
-----
1. Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation
Limited, having its office at Road No.5, Ashok Nagar,
P.O.-Doranda, P.S. Argora, District Ranchi, through its
Managing Director-cum-Additional Principal Chief
Conservator of Forest N.K. Singh, aged about 60 years,
son of late Ram Dayal Singh, resident of Forest Officers
Colony, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
2. The General Manager, Minor Forest Produce Circle,
Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation
limited, having its office at P.O. & P.S. Hazaribag,
District Hazaribagh.
3. The Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Forest Produce Project Division, Forest
Development Corporation Limited, having its office at
Garhwa, P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, District Garhwa.
4. Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Forest Development Corporation Limited,
having its office at P.O. & P.S. Daltonganj, District
Palamu at Daltonganj.
5. Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Forest Development Corporation Limited,
having its office at P.O. & P.S. Hazaribag, District
Hazaribag . ... ... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Kameshwar Choubey, son of Shri Surendra Nath
Choubey, resident of Village + P.O. Majhiaon, P.S.
Bhawnathpur, District Garhwa.
... ... Respondent/Petitioner
2. The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary/Principal
Secretary, Department of Forest, Environment and
Climate Change, having its office at Nepal House,
Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi .
... ... Performa Respondent/Respondent
With
L.P.A. No.180 of 2024
-----
1. Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation
Limited, having its office at Road No.5, Ashok Nagar,
P.O.-Doranda, P.S. Argora, District Ranchi, through its
Managing Director-cum-Principal Chief Conservator of
Forest N.K. Singh, aged about 60 years, son of late Ram
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Dayal Singh, resident of Forest Officers Colony, P.O. &
P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
2. The General Manager, Minor Forest Produce Circle,
Hazaribagh, Jharkhand State Forest Development
Corporation Limited, having its office at P.O. & P.S.
Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh.
3. The Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Garhwa, Jharkhand State Forest Development
Corporation Limited, having its office at P.O. & P.S.
Garhwa, District Garhwa.
4. Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Daltonganj, Jharkhand State Forest
Development Corporation Limited, having its office at
P.O. & P.S. Daltonganj, District Palamu at Daltonganj.
5. Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Hazaribag, Jharkhand State Forest
Development Corporation Limited, having its office at
P.O. & P.S. Hazaribag, District Hazaribagh.
... ... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Vinod Kumar Pandey, son of Late Bishnudeo Pandey,
resident of Village Dhela, P.O. Lesliganj, P.S. Lesliganj,
District Palamau.
2. Laxman Prakash. son of Shri Baldeo Prakash, resident of
Mohalla - Bus Stand, P.O. & P.S. Latehar, District
Latehar.
3. Anil Kumar Sinha, son of Shri Madan Mohan Prasad
Sinha, resident of Mohalla - Pandit Jee Road, Hazaribag,
P.O. & P.S. Sadar, District Hazaribag.
4. Surendra Prasad Prajapati, son of Late Bhukhan Mahto,
resident of Village - Kuppa, P.O. Argi, P.S. Bhawnathpur,
District Garhwa.
5. Girindra Nath Pandey, son of Shri Ramanand Pandey,
resident of Village & P.S. Rajwadih, P.S. Medninagar,
District Palamau.
6. Suresh Ram, son of Late Karam Manjhi, resident of
Village Sonbarsa, P.O. & P.S. Lesliganj, District Palamau.
7. Ajay Kumar Pandey, son of Late Kishun Pandey, resident
of Village Bhitihara, P.O. Singsigo, P.S. Rehal, District
Garhwa.
8. Nand Kishore Pal, son of Sri Suneshwar Pal, resident of
Village & P.O. Andhoura, P.S. Nagaruntari, District
Garhwa.
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9. Laxman Kumar Pandey, son of Shri Jagdish Pandey,
resident of Village Bankikhurd, P.O. Kobai, P.S. Panki,
District Garhwa.
10. Baijnath Singh, son of Shri Kanhaiya Singh, resident of
Village & P.S. Phulang, P.S. Lesliganj, District Palamau.
11. Upendra Pandey, son of Shri Baidyanath Pandey,
resident Village & P.O. Lagma, P.S. Garhwa, District
Garhwa.
12. Suresh Kumar Pandey, son of Shri Banktesh Narayan
Pandey, resident of Village & P.O. Mahugawan, P.S.
Chainpur, District Palamau.
13. Rishikesh Dubey @ Hirshikesh Dubey, son of Late
Fouzdar Dubey, resident of Village Patrahi, P.O. & P.S.
Lesliganj, District Palamau.
14. Yogendra Nath Pandey, son of Late Dasisha Pandey,
resident of Village & P.O. Rajwadih, P.S. Medninagar,
District Palamau.
15. Shyam Bihari Dubey, son of Shri Chandrika Dubey,
resident of Village Kolhua Khurd, P.O. Purbadiha, P.S.
Chainpur, District Palamu.
16. Baikuntha Tiwary, son of Late Jalwa Tiwary, resident of
Village Redma, P.O. Daltonganj, P.S. Medninagar,
District Palamau.
... ... Respondents/Petitioners
17. The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary/Principal
Secretary, Department of Forest, Environment and
Climate Change, having its office at Nepal House,
Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi .
... ... Performa Respondents/Respondent
With
L.P.A. No.220 of 2024
-----
1. Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation,
presently having its office at Road No.5, Ashok Nagar,
P.O.-Doranda, P.S. Argora, District Ranchi, through its
Managing Director-cum-Additional Principal Chief
Conservator of Forest - N.K. Singh, aged about 60 years,
son of late Ram Dayal Singh, resident of Forest Officers
Colony, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
2. The Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Ranchi, Jharkhand State Forest Development
Corporation Limited, having its office at P.O. & P.S.
Doanda, District Ranchi.
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3. Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division,Dalbhum, P.O. & P.S. Dalbhum, District East
Singhbhum.
... ... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Sanjay Kumar Singh, son of Ram Chanda Singh,
resident of Deotopma Sudiabigaha, P.O. & P.S. Deo,
District Aurangabad, Bihar.
2. Anjani Kumar Singh, son of Uchat Nath Singh, resident
of Village Manjura, P.O. Lagma, P.S. Sangrampur,
District Munger, Bihar.
3. Laxmi Oraon, son of late Patri Oraon, resident of Village
Hasanpur, P.O. Cheotanha, P.S. Semra, District West
Champaran, Bihar.
4. Babulal Oraon, son of Mahaveer Oraon, resident of
Village Hakajung, P.O. Lapu, P.S. Vishunpur, District
Gumla.
5(a) Kunti Devi, wife of Late Shri Krishna Pandey, resident
of Kachaniya, P.O. & P.S. Achar, District Baksar
(Buxar), Bihar.
5(b) Arjun Pandey, son of Late Shri Krishna Pandey,
resident of Kachaniya, P.O. Achar, P.S. - Koransarai
District Baksar (Buxar), Bihar.
... ... Respondents/Petitioners
With
L.P.A. No.437 of 2024
-----
1. Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation
Limited, having its office at Road No.5, Ashok Nagar,
P.O.and P.S.-Argora, District Ranchi, through its
Managing Director-cum-Additional Principal Chief
Conservator of Forest - N.K. Singh, aged about 60 years,
son of late Ram Dayal Singh, residing at Forest Officers
Colony, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
2. The General Manager, Minor Forest Produce Division,
Jharkhand, State Forest Development Corporation
Limited, having its office at Ashok Nagar, P.O. & P.S. -
Argora, Doranda District Ranchi.
3. The Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Ranchi, Jharkhand State Forest Development
Corporation Ltd., having its office at Ashok Nagar, P.O. &
P.S. - Argora, Doranda District Ranchi.
... ... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
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1. Arvind Kumar Sinha, son of late Nageshwar Prasad,
resident of Namkum Road, Doranda, near Vijay
Electricals P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
2. Sapan Kumar Roy, son fo late Rammay Roy, R/o C/o Sri
J.C. Manjhi, New Shadeo Nagar, Near OTC Ground, P.O.
Hehal, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, District Ranchi.
... ... Respondents/Petitioners
3. The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary/Principal
Secretary, Department of Forest, Environment and
Climate Change, having its office at Nepal House,
Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi .
... ... Performa Respondents/Respondent
With
L.P.A. No.438 of 2024
-----
1. Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation
Limited, having its office at Road No.5, Ashok Nagar,
P.O.-Doranda, P.S. Argora, District Ranchi, through its
Managing Director-cum-Additional Principal Chief
Conservator of Forest N.K. Singh, aged about 60 years,
son of late Ram Dayal Singh, residing at Forest Officers
Colony, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
2. The General Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Circle, Hazaribagh, Jharkhand Forest Development
Corporation, having its office at P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh,
District Hazaribagh.
3. The Divisional Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project
Division, Daltonganj, Jharkhand Forest Development
Corporation, having its office at P.O. & P.S. Daltonganj,
District Palamu at Daltonganj.
... ... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Virendra Kumar Pandey, son of late Bachu Pandey,
resident of Village + P.O. Bhandar, P.S. Bisrampur,
District Palamau.
... ... Respondent/Petitioner
2. The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary/Principal
Secretary, Department of Forest, Environment and
Climate Change, having its office at Nepal House,
Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi .
... ... Performa Respondent/Respondents
-------
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
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-------
For the Appellants : Mr. Rupesh Singh, Advocate
: Mr. Jagdeesh, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Manoj Tandon, Advocate
: Mr. Amandeep Kumar Pandey, Advocate
[in LPA No.180/2024]
: Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
: Mr. Shivam Utkarsh Sahay, Advocate
[in LPA No.437/2024]
: Mrs. Smita Kumari, Advocate
[in LPA No.141/2024]
: Mr. Pankaj Kr. Srivastava, Advocate
[in LPA No.220/2024]
For the State : Mr. Zeeshan Ahmad Khan, AC to SC-VII
: Mrs. Sunita Kumari, AC to SC-II
: Mr. Siddharth Jain,
: Mr. Ranjan Kumar, AC to Sr. SC-II
: Mr. Rakesh Kumar Shahi, AC to AG
[in LPA No.176/2024]
: Mr. Yogesh Modi, AC to AAG-1A
[in LPA No.438/2024]
------
C.A.V. on 06.05.2025 Pronounced on 12/06/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. All these appeals are under Clause 10 of the Letters
Patent directed against the common order/judgment dated
15.12.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No.4561 of 2016, W.P.(S)
No.6127 of 2011, W.P.(S) No.1374 of 2017, W.P.(S) No.1939
of 2017, W.P.(S) No.2257 of 2017, W.P.(S) No.6387 of 2017
and W.P.(S) No.6496 of 2017 whereby and whereunder
while allowing the writ petitions, the learned Single Judge
has directed the respondents to consider the case of each
individual petitioners and thereafter pass order for
regularization of their services from the date they have been
stopped from working, with all consequential benefits.
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Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case which are required to be
enumerated read hereunder as :-
The facts of all these writ petitions are same and
similar, save and except the formal dates of joining of
petitioners and numbers of writ petitions which were filed
in the light of order dated 27.01.2014 passed by Hon’ble
Apex Court in W.P.(C) No. 700 of 2013. As such, the facts of
only one case are being dealt with.
3. The facts pleaded in writ petition being W.P.(S) No.
4561 of 2016 are that these petitioners were working as
Daily Wagers and they were engaged in between 1982-86.
The Government of Bihar, Department of Forest and
Environment, issued a notification with respect to trading
of Kendu leaves and the same was notified on 14.03.1987.
With a view to achieve such object, the General Manager,
Minor Forest Produce Project, Hazaribagh issued
instructions to Divisional Managers to appoint daily
wagers, like the petitioners for working under the said
project on the post of Forest Produce Overseer. In the light
of such direction, the date of written test, physical test and
interview were notified. The petitioners were directed to
appear before the Selection Committee by order dated
03.05.1987. The petitioners faced selection process and
9
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subsequently declared successful on 10.05.1987 and the
document to this effect has been brought on record as
Annexure-4, wherein, the names of these petitioners find
place. This led to issuance of appointment letters on
14.05.1987 and 27.04.1988. The petitioners thereafter
joined in between 08.06.1987 to 01.05.1988. The
petitioners continued to work as such and in the meantime,
the State of Bihar was bifurcated on 15.11.2000.
Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation Limited
(JSFDC) came into existence on 23.03.2002 and the
services of petitioners fell within the jurisdiction of JSFDC.
However, by order dated 22.03.2003, the Managing
Director, Bihar State Forest Development Corporation
Limited directed to terminate the service of petitioners
along with others on the ground that these appointments
were made for three months only and hence, the petitioners
could not be retained in service. The petitioners challenged
the said decision in W.P.(S) No. 6625 of 2006, which was
dismissed on 06.11.2012 on the ground that similar matter
preferred by one Prabhu Nath Dubey was dismissed. The
Letters Patent Appeal, being L.P.A. No. 481 of 2012
preferred thereagainst was also dismissed on 05.12.2012.
The Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 13772 of 2013 was also
dismissed on 10.05.2013.
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4. Thereafter, a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India was preferred before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, which was registered as W.P.(C) No. 700 of
2013. This writ petition was disposed of by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court on 27.01.2014 with observations that the
petitioners should raise all the factual and legal issues
available to them before the High Court. However, in the
meantime, on 05.01.2012, a Committee was constituted
and letter dated 13.05.2013 was issued whereby it was
stated that since the petitioners have worked for more than
25 years, their cases shall be considered. Finally, when the
case of the petitioners were not considered in the light of
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in W.P.(C)
No.700 of 2013, the petitioners preferred a writ petition,
being W.P.(S) No.1449 of 2014, which was disposed of on
16.10.2015, whereby this Court directed the respondent-
Corporation to consider the case of petitioners for
regularization.
As per direction of this Hon’ble Court in W.P.(S)
No.1449 of 2014, the respondents have considered the case
of the petitioners, but the same was rejected on
09.05.2016. This decision dated 09.05.2016 was
communicated vide letter dated 26.05.2016, which is
impugned in these writ petitions.
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5. Respondents 2 to 6 (Jharkhand State Forest
Development Corporation Limited) filed counter affidavit
stating inter alia therein that the writ petition was devoid of
any merit. It was contended that the petitioners moved this
Court and ultimately lost up to the Hon’ble Apex Court.
However, liberty was given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India to approach the High Court. This Court directed the
respondents to consider the case of petitioners, but the
same was rejected, which is valid and legal. The petitioners
were engaged purely on temporary basis as stopgap
arrangement or on ad hoc basis. Their services came to an
end after expiry of three months. Though the petitioners
continued for many years but that would not give or confer
any legal right upon the petitioners to continue on the post.
The petitioners were not a confirmed employee of Bihar
State Forest Development Corporation Limited. After
bifurcation, the petitioners continued until 23.03.2003 by
virtue of the provisions enshrined in Section 65 of the Bihar
Reorganization Act, 2000. Salary up to 23.3.2002 has also
been paid. It is reiterated that the petitioners were
appointed by letter nos. 264 and 265 dated 03.06.1982 and
letter no. 51 dated 07.07.1987 for three months only for
seasonal work. The claim of regularization of the petitioners
has rightly been refused.
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6. It is evident from the factual aspect that save and
except the respondents of L.P.A. No.138 of 2024, after being
separated from service since they were restrained from
discharging their duties, had approached this Court by
filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.5695 of 2004.
7. The said writ petition was dismissed. The
petitioners, respondents herein, had filed intra-court
appeals being L.P.A. No. 483 of 2012, but the same was
also dismissed against which Special Leave Petition being
S.L.P.(Civil) D. No.7627 of 2013 had been filed but the said
Special Leave Petition has also been dismissed.
8. Subsequent thereto, the writ petitioners/
respondents in L.P.A. No. 180 of 2024, moved an
application before the Hon’ble Apex Court under Article 32
of the Constitution of India being Writ Petition (Civil)
No.700 of 2013, seeking therein direction for regularization.
The said writ petition has been allowed to be withdrawn
with liberty to the writ petitioners to approach the High
Court vide order dated 27.01.2014.
9. The writ petitioners/respondents preferred writ
petition before this Court in terms of the said order being
W.P.(S) No.2172 of 2014 and analogous cases (i.e., W.P.(S)
No.1449 of 2014, W.P.(S) No.2316 of 2014 and W.P.(S)
No.2425 of 2014).
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10. The learned Single Judge of this Court has passed
an order directing that due consideration should be
accorded to such a claim in accordance with law and the
Rules of 2015 by the respondent corporation within a
reasonable time, preferably within a period of six months.
11. The case of the writ petitioners had been considered
but rejected vide order dated 09.05.2016 on the ground
that no such sanctioned post was available during the
relevant time.
12. The case of the respondents/writ petitioners in
L.P.A. No.437 of 2024 being represented by Mr. Amit
Kumar Das, learned counsel, is that they have been
restrained from discharging their duties and even though
they have been appointed against the sanctioned post but
their regularization has been refused by the common order
passed by the respondent authority.
13. The case of the respondents/writ petitioners in
L.P.A. No.220 of 2024 who are being represented by Mr.
Pankaj Srivastava, learned counsel, is that the writ
petitioners/respondents had been separated from service
amounting to termination which had been challenged by
filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.6127 of 2011 and
during the pendency of the said writ petition, the prayer for
regularization has been rejected.
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14. The respondents/writ petitioners, against the
rejection of the regularization in service, preferred writ
petitions being W.P.(S) No. 4561 of 2016 and analogous
cases.
15. The learned Single Judge, on consideration of the
fact of long length of service said to be continued by one or
the other writ petitioners as also the appointment has been
considered to be made against the sanctioned post on the
basis of the fact that all the respondents/writ petitioners
had been given the benefit of regular pay scale, revision in
pay scale, preparation of seniority list as also opening of the
service books, directed vide order dated 15.12.2023 to
consider the case of one or the other writ petitioners with a
further direction to regularize them with all consequential
benefits.
16. The said order has been challenged in these appeals
which have been directed to be heard together and, as
such, listed together for analogous hearing.
Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant-Jharkhand State Forest Development
Corporation Limited:
17. Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant-Jharkhand State Forest Development
Corporation Limited, has taken the following grounds in
assailing the impugned order :-
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(i) One or the other writ petitioners, admittedly the day
when the order was passed by the learned Single
Judge were out of service being terminated employees.
(ii) The order of separation from service has attained its
finality by dismissal of the writ petition which has
been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court
against which S.L.P. has also been dismissed.
(iii) The aforesaid fact, although, has been brought to the
notice of the learned writ court but deviating from the
same, the direction has been passed for regularization
which cannot be said to be a proper direction since
the regularization of an employee can only be
considered if such employee is in the roll of service.
But, herein the writ petitioners have been separated
from service amounting to termination hence the
terminated employees are having no right for
consideration of their regularization.
(iv) The claim of one or the other writ petitioners has been
rejected on the ground that they had not been
appointed against the sanctioned post which is the
sine qua non for consideration of the issue of
regularization on the ground of the law laid down by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of
Karnataka & Others v. Uma Devi (3) and Others,
(2006) 4 SCC 1.
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(v) The respondent authority, in terms of the direction
passed by the writ court dated 16.10.2015 passed in
W.P.(S) No.2172 of 2014 and analogous cases, has
considered the case of one or the other writ petitioners
but on consideration of the fact that they had not
been appointed on sanctioned post, hence their claim
has been rejected but the learned Single Judge has
not considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter
which is the primary requirement for regularization of
one or the other employee working under the
establishment, rather, on presumption the order has
been passed presuming that appointment of one or
the other writ petitioners was made against the
sanctioned post on the ground of preparation of
seniority list, benefit of revision in pay scale having
been extended as also the petitioners have been
granted the pay scale.
(vi) It has been submitted that merely because the pay
scale has been granted to one or the other employees
or the seniority list has been prepared, it does not
mean that they have been appointed on the
sanctioned post.
(vii) Moreover, once the service of one or the other writ
petitioners has been terminated/separated, then it is
the primary requirement to question the issue of
17
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termination/separation for the purpose of
consequential direction for regularization.
(viii) The status of the writ petitioners since is of the
separated/terminated employees, as such, there
cannot be any regularization but this aspect of the
matter has not been taken into consideration.
(ix) It has been contended that the writ court, while
directing to regularize, has committed error since
there cannot be any direction by way of command in
exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India to regularize the services of the daily rated
employees.
18. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground,
has submitted that the order/judgment passed by the
learned Single Judge, therefore, suffers from an error and,
as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Submission made by learned counsel appearing for the
writ petitioners/respondents in L.P.A. No.180 of 2024
19. Per contra, Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel
appearing for the writ petitioners/respondents in L.P.A.
No.180 of 2024, has taken the following grounds in
defending the impugned judgment: –
(i) It has been contended in response to the contention
advanced on behalf of the appellant Corporation that
once the writ petitioners have been
18
2025:JHHC:15286-DBterminated/separated, there cannot be consideration
for regularization in service but the same is having no
force on the ground that the said stage has already
crossed the moment the learned Single Judge has
issued a command for consideration of the case of the
writ petitioners vide order dated 16.10.2015 in W.P.(S)
No.2172 of 2014 and batch cases.
(ii) It has been contended that the said order has never
been challenged by the Corporation and, as such, the
same has attained its finality, rather the Corporation
has also considered the issue of regularization which
has been rejected on the ground of appointment being
made not against the sanctioned post which has been
considered by the learned Single Judge on its merit
independently and having found it suffering from
error, the order impugned has been quashed and set
aside, as such, it is incorrect on the part of the
appellant Corporation to take the ground that once
the writ petitioners have been terminated/separated
from service, there cannot be any regularization.
(iii) The issue of termination/separation although has
been upheld up to the level of Hon’ble Apex Court
after dismissal of Special Leave Petition but fresh
consideration has been given on the ground of
regularization holding that the appointment of one or
19
2025:JHHC:15286-DBthe other writ petitioners was made against the
sanctioned post and, as such, the case of the writ
petitioners was found to be within the purview of Rule,
2015 formulated in pursuance to the judgment passed
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narendra
Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand reported in
(2018) 8 SCC 238.
(iv) It has also been contended that the learned Single
Judge has come to the conclusive finding considering
the appointment of one or the other writ petitioners
made against the sanctioned post since it is the State
Government who has extended the benefit of revision
in the pay scale as also prepared the seniority list and
not only that their services have also been confirmed,
hence, if on that basis the service of one or the other
writ petitioners has been considered to be sanctioned
one, it cannot be said that the appointment of one or
the other writ petitioners was not against the
sanctioned post.
20. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds,
has submitted that the impugned judgment, therefore,
needs no interference.
20
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
Submission made by learned counsel appearing for the
respondents in L.P.A. No. 437/2024:
21. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for
the respondents in L.P.A. No. 437/2024, has submitted
that the fact of the writ petitioners/respondents in the
instant appeal is quite different since one or the other writ
petitioners although have been separated/terminated but
the order passed has not travelled up to Hon’ble Apex Court
like that of the case of writ petitioners/respondents who are
being represented by Mr. Tandon, learned counsel.
22. It has been contended that their appointments were
made against the sanctioned post after following all due
procedure i.e., made by the Selection Committee followed
by the interview. Hence, the appointment of the writ
petitioners is not illegal, rather, it is regular appointment
and in view of the parameter fixed in Para-53 of the
judgment rendered in State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi
(3) reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1, the services of the writ
petitioners are fit to be regularized.
Submission made by learned counsel appearing for the
writ petitioners/respondents in L.P.A. No.220 of 2024:
23. Mr. Pankaj Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel
appearing for the writ petitioners/respondents in L.P.A.
No.220 of 2024, has submitted that the factual aspect of
the writ petitioners/respondents in the present appeal is
almost same to that of the writ petitioners/respondents
21
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
who are being represented by Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned
counsel, save and except the difference that the prayer for
regularization of the respondents/writ petitioners has been
rejected during the pendency of the order of
separation/termination which was lying pending for its
consideration before this Court under writ jurisdiction.
24. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents/writ
petitioners, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the impugned order suffers from no error.
Analysis
25. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, gone
through the factual aspect as also the finding recorded by
the learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated
15.12.2023.
26. This Court, before considering the legality and
propriety of the impugned judgment, needs to refer herein
one important fact i.e., the admitted case of the
respondents/writ petitioners is that they have been
separated/terminated by virtue of restraining them by the
State authority in discharge of their duty for which they
have come to the High Court by challenging the said action
of stopping them from discharge of the duty.
27. The said action of the State had been challenged by
filing writ petitions being W.P.(S) No.5679 of 2004 and
W.P.(S) No.5695 of 2004. The writ petitions have been
22
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
dismissed vide order dated 30.10.2012. The operative part
of the said order is being referred herein :-
“In the totality of circumstances, discussed
herein-above, the impugned orders, by which the
services of the petitioners have been terminated, do
not suffer from any such infirmity so as to warrant
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. More so, in view of the fact that similar matter
arising out of the common impugned order dated
22.03.2003 has been decided and upheld up to the
Supreme Court i.e. connected case being W.P.(S) No.
2021 of 2003. These petitioners have continued in
service till date on account of interim order passed in
these writ petitions, which was passed in the light of
the interim order passed in WP(S) No.2021 of 2003.
The interim orders, therefore, stand vacated and
these writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.”
28. The writ petitioners/respondents had preferred
Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No. 473 of 2012 and
L.P.A. No.483 of 2012 but the said Letters Patent Appeals
have also been dismissed.
29. The writ petitioners/respondents had preferred
Special Leave Petition being S.L.P.(Civil) D. No.7627 of 2013
but the same has also been dismissed.
30. The aforesaid fact, therefore, clarifies the position
that the issue of separation/termination of the writ
petitioners/respondents of L.P.A. No.138 of 2024 has been
approved up to the level of Hon’ble Apex Court by way of
order passed in the Special Leave Petition.
23
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
31. So far as the case of writ petitioners/respondents of
other Letters Patent Appeals is concerned, the admitted fact
is that they have also been separated/terminated but they
had not moved up to the Hon’ble Apex Court by preferring
Special Leave Petition but the fact about
separation/termination is not in dispute.
32. The aforesaid admitted fact, thus, clarifies the
position that one or the other writ petitioners/respondents
have been separated/terminated and their status is of the
separated/terminated employees.
33. It is also admitted fact as would be evident from
Annexure-A to the counter affidavit of the writ
petitioners/respondents filed in L.P.A. No.437 of 2024 that
they were engaged in service as seasonal workers for three
months during the period when the Kendu leaves was to be
collected from the different forest areas of the State of
Jharkhand.
34. It is also evident from the notification dated
13/14.03.1987 as appended as Annexure-A to the counter
affidavit filed in L.P.A. No.437 of 2024 that the
remuneration which has been decided to be paid in favour
of one or the other engages is on the basis of that
notification notified by the State of Jharkhand.
35. The writ petitioners/respondents in L.P.A. No.180 of
2024, after dismissal of the S.L.P., had preferred a fresh
24
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
litigation before the Hon’ble Apex Court by invoking its
jurisdiction conferred under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India. The said writ petition, however, has been
withdrawn with liberty to approach the High Court and
while granting such liberty, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
passed the following order :-
“As the matter remained pending before this Court for
quite some time and the petitioners’ claim that they
are struggling for their continuation in the
department of the respondent-authority for the last
25 years, if such a petition is filed before the High
Court, we request the High Court to decide the
petition as early as possible preferably within a
period of six months. Both parties are at liberty to
raise all factual and legal issues available to them
before the High Court.”
36. In terms of the said observation made by the
Hon’ble Apex Court, writ petitions being W.P.(S) No.4561 of
2016, W.P.(S) No.6127 of 2011, W.P.(S) No.1374 of 2017,
W.P.(S) No.1939 of 2017, W.P.(S) No.2257 of 2017, W.P.(S)
No.6387 of 2017 and W.P.(S) No.6496 of 2017 were filed
seeking therein direction for regularization.
37. The learned Single Judge of this Court, vide order
dated 15.12.2023 has passed the following directions :-
“36. In view of the aforesaid rules, regulations,
guidelines and judicial pronouncements, this Court is
of the considered view that the impugned order dated
9.5.2016 is not tenable in the eyes of law and as
such, it is quashed and set aside. The respondents
are directed to consider the case of each individual
petitioners and thereafter pass order for25
2025:JHHC:15286-DBregularization of their services from the date they
have been stopped from working, with all
consequential benefits. Let it be made clear that as
the matter remains pending for several years before
the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as before this Court, if
any of the employees has retired or died, he is also
entitled for the benefits which are likely to be
extended to other similarly situated persons with
fixation of pensionery benefits and extending the
retiral benefits, if they come within the purview and
regularisation.
37. Resultantly, all the writ petitions stand allowed.
Pending interlocutory applications stand closed.”
38. However, in the said order it has also been taken
note about earlier proceeding pertaining to the order of
separation/termination.
39. The respondent authority has taken decision
against the writ petitioners/respondents by rejecting their
claims for regularization on the ground that they are not
coming under the fold of Rule, 2015 being not appointed
against the sanctioned post.
40. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid admitted
fact, is now to consider these issues:-
(i) Whether the order of regularization can be passed in
favour of an employee who is not in service and in the
litigations preferred against it, the writ petitioners lost
up to the level of Hon’ble Apex Court?
(ii) Whether the direction can be given by the learned
Single Judge in exercise of power conferred under
26
2025:JHHC:15286-DBArticle 226 of the Constitution of India for
regularization by way of command or it should have
been by way of a direction to consider in accordance
with law by scrutinizing the factual aspect for the
purpose of appropriate consideration of the claim?
(iii) Whether the order of regularization can be passed as
has been directed by the learned Single Judge in the
impugned judgment without exactly scrutinizing the
fact that the engagement was made against the
sanctioned post or on the presumption of appointment
said to be made against the sanctioned post as the
fact of the present case herein is, as would be evident
from the consideration given by the learned Single
Judge in the impugned judgment.
41. The Issue No.(i) is being dealt with separately
herein.
42. The law is well settled that the regularization of one
or the other engagees is only required to be made who is in
roll of an establishment.
Regularization means that whatever irregularity has
been committed in the matter of appointment, the same if
regularized, such engagee will come under the regular
establishment.
While the termination implies separation from
service, meaning thereby, the moment one appointee will be
27
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
terminated, there will be no relationship of employer and
employee. The moment the relationship of the employer
employee will end, there cannot be question of
regularization, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Raj Balam Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2018) 12 SCC 50
wherein it has been observed as under:
16. This is what the Division Bench held for allowing the
appeal and dismissing the appellants’ writ petition:
(Vinay Kishore case [State of Bihar v. Vinay Kishore
Pandey, 2016 SCC OnLine Pat 1465] , SCC OnLine Pat
para 12)
“12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties
and find that the order passed by the learned Single
Judge is not sustainable in law. The order passed
in Sant Prakash Srivastava v. State of Bihar [Sant
Prakash Srivastava v. State of Bihar, LPA No. 434 of
2001, order dated 28-7-2008 (Pat)] dated 28-7-2008
was not brought to the notice of the learned Single
Judge. It is further contended that even if the order
dated 10-10-2006 was not set aside, the fact remains
that such order of regularisation could not have been
passed since the services of the Muharrir have come to
an end in 1991 itself. The permanent status could be
conferred to those who were in service and not to those
whose services had come to an end many years ago.
Such an order could not be made the basis of
permanent status through the writ court. Such order
dated 10-10-2006 is not enforceable in law. The
representation having been declined in the light of the
Circular dated 16-4-2008, we do not find that the writ
petitioners were entitled to any direction to treat them
as regular employees.”
17. We agree with the reasoning of the Division Bench
quoted supra.
28
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
20. In other words, the grant of extension to work for
some more period to the writ petitioners could never
result in conferring on them the status of a permanent
employee or/and nor could enable them to seek
regularisation in the services unless some Rule had
recognised any such right in their favour.
43. In the case of Ramchander v. A.D.M., (1998) 1
SCC 183 while referring the rule has observed that in view
of the fact that the services of the appellants had been
terminated, they will not be eligible for regularization, for
ready reference same is being quoted as under:
“5. We are not examining the correctness or otherwise of
this interpretation because, in the present case, the
appellants did not fulfil the basic requirement of Rule 4(i)
namely that they should be continuing in service as ad
hoc employees in order to be eligible for regularisation.
The services of at least some of the appellants were
terminated in February 1984. The services of others were
terminated in June 1984. In view of the fact that the
services of the appellants had been terminated, they will
not be eligible for regularisation under the amended
Rules of 1984. Those who are not in service cannot be
regularised. In the writ petition which was filed, the
appellants who were the petitioners, prayed for
regularisation. Although they made averments relating to
their termination of service, they did not pray for setting
aside the orders of termination passed in their cases. So
long as the orders of termination stand, they cannot get
the benefit of regularisation under the amended Rules of
1984”
44. Herein, the admitted case of the respondents/writ
petitioners is that they have been separated/terminated
from service and the said order of separation/termination
has also been upheld, in some of the cases, up to the
29
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
Hon’ble Apex Court and in some of the cases up to this
Court.
45. The question, therefore, would be that when the
writ petitioners/respondents were not in service then how
can they be regularized in service by inducting them in the
regular establishment, rather, the first requirement was to
get a declaration holding the separation/termination to be
illegal with consequential direction for reinstatement and
thereafter the question of regularization which is lacking
herein and straightaway the order of regularization has
been passed without going into the issue of
separation/termination.
46. The issue of separation/termination, in the facts of
the present cases, should not have been considered by the
learned Single Judge in view of the fact that the issue of
separation/termination has already attained finality.
47. The further question would be that when the issue
of separation/termination has already attained its finality
then the employee who is not in service after being
separated/terminated, cannot be regularized in service.
48. Further, the moment one or the other writ
petitioners/respondents have been separated/terminated,
no occasion is available to them to raise the issue of being
appointed against the sanctioned post.
30
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
49. Termination means all past service rendered said to
be forfeited and the order of termination attained finality,
then it is not available for one or the other writ petitioners
to take the ground that they were appointed against the
sanctioned post.
50. The Issue No.(i) is answered as above.
51. So far as Issue No.(ii) and (iii) are concerned, since
both the issues are interlinked and, as such, are being
dealt with together.
52. The argument has been advanced on behalf of the
writ petitioners that even accepting that the writ petitioners
have been separated/terminated but after passing of the
order by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.2172 of
2014 and analogous cases dated 16.10.2015, the cases
have been considered and thereafter fresh decision has
been taken by the authority holding appointment of one or
the other writ petitioners made not against the sanctioned
post.
53. The fact about passing of the order by the learned
Single Judge dated 16.10.2015 in W.P.(S) No.2172 of 2014
admittedly had not been questioned by the Corporation and
even by the authorities. The authorities, rather, had acted
upon on the basis of the said direction by taking decision
afresh by rejecting the claim of regularization being not
appointed against the sanctioned post.
31
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
54. But the question which requires consideration
herein is that even accepting that the learned Single Judge
in its order dated 16.10.2015 passed in W.P.(S) No.2172 of
2014 has passed an order then also on the admitted fact of
status of one or the other writ petitioners of
separated/terminated employees, there cannot be
regularization.
55. Although the Corporation has considered the issue
of regularization on the direction passed by this Court, but
the same has also been rejected, therefore, this Court is
now proceeding to consider the order passed by the learned
Single Judge by way of command for consideration of the
issue on the basis of applicability of Rule, 2015.
56. Such consideration is required keeping the fact into
consideration that the order passed by the learned Single
Judge dated 16.10.2015 in W.P.(S) No.2172 of 2014 has
not been challenged by the appellant Corporation, rather,
they have acted by taking decision afresh, therefore, this
Court is required to consider the legality and propriety of
the impugned decision passed by the authority concerned
dated 09.05.2016 circulated vide Memo dated 16.05.2016
keeping the fact into consideration that the order passed by
the learned Single Judge based upon which the
consideration on merit has been given by passing the
impugned order by the authority concerned, having not
32
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
been challenged before the higher forum and this Court
cannot go into the legality and propriety of the said order
since the said order is not the subject matter of these
appeals.
57. Therefore, this Court has thought it proper to
consider the legality and propriety of the impugned decision
taken by the authority which has been reversed by the
learned Single Judge.
58. This Court, before considering the same, needs to
refer herein the backdrop on which the judgment has been
passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Karnataka v. Uma Devi (3) (Supra), as would be evident
from paragraph 7 to 10 which is being referred herein.
7. These two sets of appeals reflect the cleavage of opinion in
the High Court of Karnataka based on the difference in
approach in two sets of decisions of this Court leading to a
reference of these appeals to the Constitution Bench for
decision. The conflict relates to the right, if any, of employees
appointed by the State or by its instrumentalities on a
temporary basis or on daily wages or casually, to approach the
High Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing that
they be made permanent in appropriate posts, the work of
which they were otherwise doing. The claim is essentially
based on the fact that they having continued in employment or
engaged in the work for a significant length of time, they are
entitled to be absorbed in the posts in which they had worked
in the department concerned or the authority concerned.
There are also more ambitious claims that even if they were
not working against a sanctioned post, even if they do not
possess the requisite qualification, even if they were not
appointed in terms of the procedure prescribed for
appointment, and had only recently been engaged, they are
entitled to continue and should be directed to be absorbed.
33
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
8. In Civil Appeals Nos. 3595-612 of 1999 the respondents
therein who were temporarily engaged on daily wages in the
Commercial Taxes Department in some of the districts of the
State of Karnataka claim that they worked in the Department
based on such engagement for more than 10 years and hence
they are entitled to be made permanent employees of the
Department, entitled to all the benefits of regular employees.
They were engaged for the first time in the years 1985-86 and
in the teeth of orders not to make such appointments issued
on 3-7-1984. Though the Director of Commercial Taxes
recommended that they be absorbed, the Government did not
accede to that recommendation. These respondents thereupon
approached the Administrative Tribunal in the year 1997 with
their claim. The Administrative Tribunal rejected their claim
finding that they had not made out a right either to get wages
equal to that of others regularly employed or for regularisation.
Thus, the applications filed were dismissed. The respondents
approached the High Court of Karnataka challenging the
decision of the Administrative Tribunal. It is seen that the High
Court without really coming to grips with the question falling
for decision in the light of the findings of the Administrative
Tribunal and the decisions of this Court, proceeded to order
that they are entitled to wages equal to the salary and
allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of
their cadre in government service with effect from the dates
from which they were respectively appointed. It may be noted
that this gave retrospective effect to the judgment of the High
Court by more than 12 years. The High Court also issued a
command to the State to consider their cases for regularisation
within a period of four months from the date of receipt of that
order. The High Court seems to have proceeded on the basis
that, whether they were appointed before 1-7-1984, a situation
covered by the decision of this Court in Dharwad District PWD
Literate Daily Wage Employees Assn. v. State of
Karnataka [(1990) 2 SCC 396 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 274 : (1990)
12 ATC 902 : (1990) 1 SCR 544] and the scheme framed
pursuant to the direction thereunder, or subsequently, since
they have worked for a period of 10 years, they were entitled to
equal pay for equal work from the very inception of their
engagement on daily wages and were also entitled to be
considered for regularisation in their posts.
34
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
9. Civil Appeals Nos. 1861-2063 of 2001 reflect the other side
of the coin. The appellant association with indefinite number
of members approached the High Court with a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of
the Government directing cancellation of appointments of all
casual workers/daily-rated workers made after 1-7-1984 and
further seeking a direction for the regularisation of all the
daily-wagers engaged by the Government of Karnataka and its
local bodies. A learned Single Judge of the High Court
disposed of the writ petition by granting permission to the
petitioners before him, to approach their employers for
absorption and regularisation of their services and also for
payment of their salaries on a par with the regular workers, by
making appropriate representations within the time fixed
therein and directing the employers to consider the cases of
the claimants for absorption and regularisation in accordance
with the observations made by the Supreme Court in similar
cases. The State of Karnataka filed appeals against the
decision of the learned Single Judge. A Division Bench of the
High Court allowed the appeals. It held that the daily-wage
employees, employed or engaged either in government
departments or other statutory bodies after 1-7-1984, were not
entitled to the benefit of the scheme framed by this Court
in Dharwad District PWD case [(1990) 2 SCC 396 : 1990 SCC
(L&S) 274 : (1990) 12 ATC 902 : (1990) 1 SCR 544] referred to
earlier. The High Court considered various orders and
directions issued by the Government interdicting such
engagements or employment and the manner of entry of the
various employees. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of their
claim, the members of the associations have filed these
10. When these matters came up before a Bench of two
Judges, the learned Judges referred the cases to a Bench of
three Judges. The order of reference is reported in Secy., State
of Karnataka v. Umadevi (1) [(2004) 7 SCC 132 : 2004 SCC
(L&S) 935 : (2003) 9 Scale 187] . This Court noticed that in the
matter of regularisation of ad hoc employees, there were
conflicting decisions by three-Judge Benches of this Court and
by two-Judge Benches and hence the question required to be
considered by a larger Bench. When the matters came up
before a three-Judge Bench, the Bench in turn felt that the
matter required consideration by a Constitution Bench in view
35
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
of the conflict and in the light of the arguments raised by the
Additional Solicitor General. —
33. It is not necessary to notice all the decisions of this Court
on this aspect. By and large what emerges is that regular
recruitment should be insisted upon, only in a contingency
can an ad hoc appointment be made in a permanent vacancy,
but the same should soon be followed by a regular recruitment
and that appointments to non-available posts should not be
taken note of for regularisation. The cases directing
regularisation have mainly proceeded on the basis that having
permitted the employee to work for some period, he should be
absorbed, without really laying down any law to that effect,
after discussing the constitutional scheme for public
employment.
34. In A. Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies [(2004) 7 SCC
112 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 918] a three-Judge Bench made a
survey of the authorities and held that when appointments
were made in contravention of mandatory provisions of the Act
and statutory rules framed thereunder and by ignoring
essential qualifications, the appointments would be illegal and
cannot be regularised by the State. The State could not invoke
its power under Article 162 of the Constitution to regularise
such appointments. This Court also held that regularisation is
not and cannot be a mode of recruitment by any State within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution or any body or
authority governed by a statutory Act or the rules framed
thereunder. Regularisation furthermore cannot give
permanence to an employee whose services are ad hoc in
nature. It was also held that the fact that some persons had
been working for a long time would not mean that they had
acquired a right for regularisation.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual,
be regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by
the fact that the person concerned has worked for some time
and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as
if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or
casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment.
He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that
he is not in a position to bargain–not at arm’s length–since
he might have been searching for some employment so as to
eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on
that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the
36
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view
that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed
should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so,
it will be creating another mode of public appointment which
is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual
employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were
not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable
the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo
on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given
the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only
mean that some people who at least get employment
temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting
even that employment when securing of such employment
brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable
citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and
one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary
employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an
employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on
the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the
nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other
words, even while accepting the employment, the person
concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an
appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim
acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily
employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to
be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the
procedure established, for making regular appointments to
available posts in the services of the State. The argument that
since one has been working for some time in the post, it will
not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of
the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not
one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure
established by law for public employment and would have to
fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and
equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution.
59. It is evident from the aforesaid paragraph that the
reason for rendering such judgment by the Hon’ble Apex
Court is to put restriction upon the backdoor entry.
However, after giving the consideration about illegal entry
37
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
and bifurcating the recruitment/appointment in two
categories i.e., irregular and illegal, parameter has been
fixed at para-53, i.e., if the appointment is irregular, the
same can be regularized depending upon the condition of
more than ten years continuous service without any aid of
the order of the court and the appointment being made
against the sanctioned post. Such employees to be
regularized by the State by taking one time exercise to be
completed within six months from the date of judgment
passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case, for
ready reference Para-53 is being referred hereunder as :-
53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases
where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments)
as explained in S.V. Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 :
AIR 1967 SC 1071] , R.N. Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC
409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799] and B.N. Nagarajan [(1979) 4
SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937] and
referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in
duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and
the employees have continued to work for ten years or
more but without the intervention of orders of the courts
or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the
services of such employees may have to be considered on
merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court
in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this
judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State
Governments and their instrumentalities should take
steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of
such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten
years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under
cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should
further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken38
2025:JHHC:15286-DBto fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be
filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily
wagers are being now employed. The process must be set
in motion within six months from this date. We also
clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not
sub judice, need not be reopened based on this
judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of
the constitutional requirement and regularising or
making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the
constitutional scheme.
60. The irregular and illegal appointment has been
taken note by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid
paragraph as also in the case of State of
Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari [(2010) 9 SCC 247].
61. The irregular appointment has been held to be an
appointment where the irregularity is curable while the
appointment where the illegality is not curable, has been
held to be illegal appointment. The irregular appointment is
the subject matter of paragraph -53.
62. Subsequent to he said judgment, after creation of
the State of Jharkhand on 15.11.2000, the issue crept up
that how the ten years will be said to be completed by way
of continuous service by one or the other employees
working in the territorial jurisdiction of the State of
Jharkhand since the judgment rendered in State of
Karnataka v. Uma Devi (3) (Supra) by the Hon’ble Apex
Court speaks with respect to the consideration of the issue
of regularization of one or the other engagees who have
39
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
completed ten years of continuous service on the date of
the judgment i.e.,10.04.2006.
63. The said issue has been considered by Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari Vs. State of
Jharkhand and others (supra) wherein a direction was
issued to the State of Jharkhand to formulate a rule and in
pursuance thereto, a rule was formulated as Rule, 2015
carving out the conditions for the purpose of regularization
of one or the other employees, the relevant paragraph of the
said judgment is being quoted hereunder as :-
“8. If a strict and literal interpretation, forgetting the
spirit of the decision of the Constitution Bench
in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006)
4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753], is to be taken into
consideration then no irregularly appointed employee of
the State of Jharkhand could ever be regularised since
that State came into existence only on 15-11-2000 and
the cut-off date was fixed as 10-4-2006. In other words,
in this manner the pernicious practice of indefinitely
continuing irregularly appointed employees would be
perpetuated contrary to the intent of the Constitution
Bench.
9. The High Court as well as the State of Jharkhand
ought to have considered the entire issue in a
contextual perspective and not only from the point of
view of the interest of the State, financial or otherwise —
the interest of the employees is also required to be kept in
mind. What has eventually been achieved by the State of
Jharkhand is to short circuit the process of regular
appointments and instead make appointments on an
irregular basis. This is hardly good governance.
40
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
10. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the
Regularisation Rules must be given a pragmatic
interpretation and the appellants, if they have completed
10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the
Regularisation Rules, ought to be given the benefit of the
service rendered by them. If they have completed 10
years of service they should be regularised unless there is
some valid objection to their regularisation like
misconduct, etc.”
64. The case of the one or the other writ petitioners has
been considered by the authority in the light of the order
passed by the learned Single Judge but their appointment
has been found to be not against the sanctioned post and
hence the claim for regularization has been rejected.
65. Sanctioned post means the post which has been
created by the State Government under the process of
discharge of business as provided under the Rules of
Executive Business. The State Government is required to
concur for sanction of the post with the concurrence of the
Finance Department by taking into consideration the issue
of salary etc.
66. Sanctioning the post is always the domain of the
State and not vested in one or the other departments since
requirement of concurrence by the Finance Department is
there, meaning thereby, the post is to be created only by
the State Government then only it will be said to be
sanctioned post.
41
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
67. Further, a post if not sanctioned, then there cannot
be any presumption merely on the ground of benefit of pay
scale being given to the concerned employee or the revision
of pay scale being extended or the seniority list has been
prepared since these parameters cannot be taken into
consideration to come to the conclusion that the post has
been created. If these parameters will be followed for the
purpose of coming to the conclusion of creation of post,
then the same will be said to be based upon he
presumption and surmises in absence of any decision
taken by the State, being the competent body to create the
post.
68. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
tried to demonstrate by referring Annexure-D to the
counter affidavit made part of the paper book wherein
reference of different posts has been given including the
post of the present writ petitioners.
69. We have gone through the said document and found
therefrom that the posts upon which the writ petitioners
are claiming to be engaged, has been shown as 172 posts of
Forest Produce Overseers, but the question herein is as to
whether the appointment of one or the other writ
petitioners has been made against the sanctioned post or
not.
42
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
70. There is no averment to that effect by the appellant
based upon the relevant document save and except reliance
is being placed upon Annexure-D appended to the counter
affidavit filed before the learned writ court.
71. As we have already referred hereinabove that the
post cannot be presumed to be sanctioned one, rather,
there must be valid document to that effect to suggest that
the posts had been sanctioned against which one or the
other engagees were engaged for the purpose of
consideration in the light of the observation made at Para-
53 of judgment rendered in the case of State of
Karnataka v. Uma Devi (3) (Supra).
72. This Court has not found any material available on
record, rather, only material available is document dated
16.01.1987 showing the reference of 172 posts of Forest
Produce Overseers which has been taken note by the
learned Single Judge.
73. This Court has failed to understand on what basis
the document dated 16.11.1987 showing the availability of
172 posts has been considered by the learned Single Judge
for the purpose of interfering with the impugned order in
absence of any specific document put forth on behalf of the
writ petitioners showing their appointment made against
the sanctioned post.
43
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
74. The learned Single Judge has further considered the
fact about the appointment being made on the sanctioned
post on consideration of the fact of the pay scale being
given to one or the other writ petitioner, services being
confirmed, preparation of seniority list and the benefit of
pay revision having been given in their favour. But the said
parameter cannot be said to be adequate to come to the
conclusion that the posts will be said to be sanctioned
merely on the ground of pay scale, confirmation of services,
preparation of seniority list and the benefit of pay revision,
rather, there must be a valid order to that effect by the
State Government.
75. The learned Single Judge has not considered the
fact that once the writ petitioners have been
separated/terminated then how can they be regularized in
service.
76. The consideration has also not been given in right
perspective by passing the order of regularization without
appreciating its effect that if one or the other writ
petitioners will be regularized then they will be regularized
from the date of their engagement and what will happen to
the order of separation amounting to termination which
has already attained its finality by way of Judicial order.
77. Consideration further has not been given that the
order of separation/termination having attained its finality
44
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
even then the order of regularization has been passed that
too by not directing the State to consider, rather, in one line
the word direction to consider is there but in the
subsequent line the direction has been passed to grant all
consequential benefits by regularizing the writ petitioners,
for ready reference, the relevant part of the paragraph of
the said order is being referred herein :-
“… … … The respondents are directed to
consider the case of each individual petitioners and
thereafter pass order for regularization of their
services from the date they have been stopped from
working, with all consequential benefits. … …”
78. The Hon’ble Apex Court time and again has laid
down that there cannot be any direction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India by way of command to
regularize, rather, it is the domain of the State authorities
to consider the issue of regularization depending upon the
facts about the nature of appointment if made against the
sanctioned posts or not.
79. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case School
Education Deptt., Chennai v. R. Govindaswamy, (2014)
4 SCC 769 while referring the ratio rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Rajasthan v. Daya Lal [State of Rajasthan v. Daya Lal,
(2011) 2 SCC 429 has categorically held that the High
Courts, in exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution will not issue directions for regularisation,
45
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
absorption or permanent continuance, unless the
employees claiming regularisation had been appointed in
pursuance of a regular recruitment in accordance with
relevant rules, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is
being quoted as under:
8.This Court in State of Rajasthan v. Daya Lal [State of
Rajasthan v. Daya Lal, (2011) 2 SCC 429 : (2011) 1 SCC
(L&S) 340 : AIR 2011 SC 1193] has considered the scope
of regularisation of irregular or part-time appointments in
all possible eventualities and laid down well-settled
principles relating to regularisation and parity in pay
relevant in the context of the issues involved therein. The
same are as under : (SCC p. 435, para 12)
“(i) The High Courts, in exercising power under Article
226 of the Constitution will not issue directions for
regularisation, absorption or permanent continuance,
unless the employees claiming regularisation had been
appointed in pursuance of a regular recruitment in
accordance with relevant rules in an open competitive
process, against sanctioned vacant posts. The equality
clause contained in Articles 14 and 16 should be
scrupulously followed and Courts should not issue a
direction for regularisation of services of an employee
which would be violative of the constitutional scheme.
While something that is irregular for want of compliance
with one of the elements in the process of selection which
does not go to the root of the process, can be regularised,
back door entries, appointments contrary to the
constitutional scheme and/or appointment of ineligible
candidates cannot be regularised.
80. This Court, on consideration as per the discussion
made hereinabove, is of the view that both the issues are to
be answered against the writ petitioners/respondents.
46
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
81. Learned counsel appearing for the writ
petitioners/respondents has referred Annexure-A appended
to the counter affidavit filed in L.P.A. No.437 of 2024 upon
which learned counsel for the appellants has also relied.
82. This Court has gone through the said document
which is the basis of engagement of one or the other writ
petitioners in job. It is evident therefrom that the State has
decided to engage the persons as seasonal workers for the
purpose of collection of Kendu leaves on the basis of
minimum wages as notified by the Government, for ready
reference the relevant part of the said notification is being
referred herein :-
la[;k&yks0 mi0&5@87 [kaM 592 o0
fcgkj ljdkj
ou ,oa i;kZoj.k foHkkx
izs”kd]
Jh ,l0 ,u0 ih0 ,u0 flUgk]
ljdkj ds lfpoA
lsok esa]
izcU/k funs’kd]
fcgkj jkT; ou fodkl fuxe fy0]
13] ikVyhiq= dksyuh] iVukA
iVuk&800015] fnukad 13@14 ekpZ] 1987
fo”k;%&iwjs jkT; esa o”kZ 1987 ekSle ls dsUnq iÙkh ds O;kikj ¼laxzg.k ,oa foi.ku½ dk
dk;Z ou fuxe dks lkSaius ds lEcU/k esaA
egk’k;]funsZ’kkuqlkj mi;qZDr fo”k; esa ljdkj }kjk yksd fgr esa fuEukafdr
fu.kZ; fy;s x;s gSa %&
¼1½ o”kZ 1987&88 ls iwjs jkT; esa dsUnq iÙkk ds O;kikj ¼laxzg.k ,oa foi.ku½ djus gsrq
fcgkj jkT; ou fodkl fuxe fy0 dks ljdkj ¼ou ,oa i;kZoj.k foHkkx½ viuk
vfHkdÙkkZ fu;qDr djrh gSA
¼2½ o”kZ 1987 ekSle ls iwjs jkT; esa dsUnq iÙkh O;kikj ¼laxzg.k ,oa foi.ku½ fcgkj jkT;
ou fodkl fuxe fy0 }kjk lEikfnr fd;k tk;sxkA
¼3½ dsUnq iÙkh O;kikj ¼laxzg.k ,oa foi.ku½ ou fodkl fuxe }kjk okf.kT; ds vk/kkj ij
¼dkWef’kZ;y ykbZu½ fd;k tk;sxk rFkk laxzg.k ,oa foi.ku lEcU/kh O;; fuxe ds }kjk
ogu fd;s tk;saxsA fuxe blds fy, ‘kh?kz bUQzkLVªDpj rS;kj djus dh O;oLFkk djsxkA47
2025:JHHC:15286-DB¼4½ bl dk;Z esa yxs etnwjksa dks fu;ekuqdwy U;wure ,oa leqfpr ¼Qs;j½ etnwjh ds
Hkqxrku dh O;oLFkk dh tk;sxhA
¼5½ ou fuxe }kjk bl dk;Z ds lapkyu gsrq ou ,oa i;kZoj.k foHkkx esa dk;Zjr
inkf/kdkfj;ksa ,oa deZpkfj;ksa dks leqfpr ekuns; fn;k tk;sxk tks muds }kjk fu/kkZfjr
dk;Z ij fuHkZj djsxkA
¼6½ iz/kku eq[; ou laj{kd] fcgkj mi;qZDr dk;ksZa ds lEiknu gsrq vuqHkoh inkf/kdkfj;ksa
,oa deZpkfj;ksa dh lsok ou fuxe dks lkSiasxsA
¼7½ iz/kku eq[; ou laj{kd] fcgkj bl vuqns’k ds lfØ; vuqikyu gsrq lHkh eq[; ou
laj{kd] lHkh vij eq[; ou laj{kd] lHkh ou laj{kd ,oa lHkh ou izeaMy inkf/kdkfj;ksa
dks bl dk;Z esa lHkh izdkj dh lfØ; lgk;rk iznku djus dk vkns’k vius Lrj ls
fuxZr djsaxsA
¼8½ ou fodkl fuxe dks bl dk;Z ds lQy lapkyu gsrq ou Hkouksa dk iz;ksx vLFkk;h
rkSj ij djus dh vuqefr nh tkrh gSA
¼9½ ou fodkl fuxe bl dk;Z ds lqn`<+ :i ls dk;kZUo;u gsrq fdlh Hkh jk”Vªh;d`r
cSad ls vko’;drkuqlkj dS’k ØsfMV@cSad _.k dh O;oLFkk djsxkA fuxe }kjk fy;s
tkus okys _.k dh xkjaVh dh O;oLFkk jkT; ljdkj ¼ou ,oa i;kZoj.k foHkkx½ }kjk dh
tk;sxhA
¼10½ dsUnq iÙkh O;kikj ¼laxzg.k ,oa foi.ku½ ds en esa ljdkj dks ns; jktLo ds
fu/kkZj.k dk izLrko iz/kku eq[; ou laj{kd fcgkj ,oa izcUO/k funs’kd] ou fodkl fuxe
}kjk la;qDr :i ls ljdkj dks lefiZr fd;k tk;sxkA mlds vkyksd esa vkns’k i`Fkd
:i ls fuxZr fd;k tk;sxkA
¼11½ ,slh bdkbzZ;ksa ds fo”k; esa ftudks o”kZ 1987 ds fy, ;k muds fdlh va’k ds fy,
ljdkj }kjk iwoZ esa yht nh xbZ gks vyx ls leqfpr vkns’k fuxZr fd;k tk;sxkA
mi;qZDr lHkh fcUnqvksa ds vkyksd esa vuqjks/k gS fd izkFkfedrk ds vk/kkj
ij dkjZokbZ dh tk;Afo’oklHkktu
,l 0 ,u0 ih0 ,u0 flUgk
ljdkj ds lfpo
83. The said notification being the basis of engagement
upon which the writ petitioners are also relying upon and
the said decision since referred about making of payment of
minimum wage and the status of one or the other writ
petitioners has been decided to be of seasonal worker for a
period of three months then how can they be regularized in
service in such a situation where their services have been
48
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
terminated being not required and further they were
engaged on the basis of minimum wages.
84. This Court although has referred hereinabove
regarding the issue of the post having not been sanctioned
but even in a case where post is not sanctioned, the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaggo v. Union of India
and Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 has
directed for regularization of the services of the concerned
employee in the regular establishment by taking into
consideration the long continued service by considering the
nature of work to be perennial, the relevant paragraph of
the aforesaid judgment is being referred here in :-
“27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it
is imperative for government departments to lead by
example in providing fair and stable employment.
Engaging workers on a temporary basis for extended
periods, especially when their roles are integral to the
organization’s functioning, not only contravenes
international labour standards but also exposes the
organization to legal challenges and undermines
employee morale. By ensuring fair employment
practices, government institutions can reduce the
burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security,
and uphold the principles of justice and fairness that
they are meant to embody. This approach aligns with
international standards and sets a positive precedent
for the private sector to follow, thereby contributing to
the overall betterment of labour practices in the
country.”
85. But, this Court even cannot apply the ratio of the
aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
49
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
the facts of the present case where it is the admitted case of
the respondents/writ petitioners that they had already
been separated from service amounting to termination for
which some of the writ petitioners had gone up to the
Hon’ble Apex Court and some of the writ petitioners up to
this Court wherein the order of separation has attained
finality.
86. Therefore, the principle which has been propounded
in the judgment rendered in the case of Jaggo v. Union of
India and Others (Supra) is not of any aid to the writ
petitioners in the facts of the aforesaid case reason being
that the respondents/writ petitioners have been separated
from service amounting to termination and the said
decision of the State has attained its finality by the court of
law.
87. Even accepting the argument advanced on behalf of
the respondents/writ petitioners that the order passed by
the learned Single Judge dated 16.10.2015 in W.P.(S)
No.2172 of 2014 has attained its finality but if the intent of
the order will be seen, the only direction was to consider
the case of the writ petitioners.
88. Consideration always means active application of
mind and consideration does not mean that any positive
decision if taken then only it will be said to be
consideration in the eyes of law.
50
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
89. The word “consideration” has also been defined by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life
Insurance Corporation of India and Others v. A.
Masilamani reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 wherein at
paragraph 19 it has been observed which is being quoted
hereunder as:-
“19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The
dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard
as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to
the effect that there must be active application of mind. In
other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of
all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion
by the statutory authority should reflect intense application
of mind with reference to the material available on record.
The order of the authority itself should reveal such
application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply
adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority
and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar [(2006) 11 SCC 147] and Bhikhubhai
Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [(2008) 4 SCC 144] .)
90. The impugned order very much reflects that the
consideration is there by active application of mind by the
authorities wherein the reason for rejecting the claim of the
writ petitioners has been shown to be the post having not
been sanctioned and primarily the writ petitioners were not
in service at the time when the consideration for
regularization was being done by the authority in
pursuance to the aforesaid order.
91. This Court, after having answered the issues as
above and based upon the reasons, is of the view that the
learned Single Judge has not considered these aspects of
51
2025:JHHC:15286-DB
the matter and has interfered with the impugned order with
a direction to consider the case of each individual
petitioners and thereafter pass order for regularization of
their services from the date they have been stopped from
working, with all consequential benefits, which according to
our considered view, cannot be held to be correct.
92. Accordingly, the impugned order needs interference.
93. The instant appeals are allowed. The impugned
order dated 15.12.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No.4561 of 2016,
W.P.(S) No.6127 of 2011, W.P.(S) No.1374 of 2017, W.P.(S)
No.1939 of 2017, W.P.(S) No.2257 of 2017, W.P.(S) No.6387
of 2017 and W.P.(S) No.6496 of 2017 is quashed and set
aside.
94. In consequence thereof, the writ petitions are
dismissed.
95. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also
stands disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Birendra/A.F.R.
52