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Uttarakhand High Court
Vijay Vardhan Dandriyal vs The State Of Uttarakhand & Others on 20 May, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
2025:UHC:4183-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT
NAINITAL
Writ Petition (M/B) No.257 of 2025
Vijay Vardhan Dandriyal ...Petitioner
Vs.
The State of Uttarakhand & others ... Respondents
Presence:
Mr. Jitendra Chaudhary, learned counsel for petitioner.
Mr. J.S. Bisht, learned Standing Counsel for State of
Uttarakhand/respondents.
Coram: Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.
Hon'ble Ashish Naithani, J.
JUDGMENT:
(per Hon’ble Justice Sri Manoj Kumar Tiwari)
Petitioner is an existing transport operator who was
granted Stage Carriage Permit for Jhajra-Suddowala-
Premnagar via Ballupur-Ghantaghar-Paradground-
Survey Chowk- Ladpur-Raipur route. He is aggrieved by
the resolution passed by Regional Transport Authority,
Dehradun in which it was decided that in place of old
polluting vikram/tempo vehicles, new vehicles with
seating capacity between 8-13 persons, which meet the
BS-6 norms, shall be permitted to ply on city routes
within Dehradun. By the said decision, Secretary,
Regional Transport Authority was authorized to issue
such permits.
2. Petitioner contends that Regional Transport
Authority Dehradun could have issued the permits, but
it cannot delegate this power to its Secretary. According
to petitioner, the power to grant permit is quasi judicial
in nature, therefore, such power cannot be delegated by
Regional Transport Authority to anyone, including its
Secretary.
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3. By means of this writ petition, petitioner has
sought the following reliefs:-
“A. To issue a writ, order or direction in the
nature Certiorari, calling for the original record
and pleased to quash the impugned agenda no.04
(a), (b) & (d) dated 16.10.2024 {Anneuxre No.2}
issued by the respondent no.2 i.e. the RTA
{Regional Transport Authority} Dehradun
including its subsequent action in toto.
B. To issue a writ, order or direction in the
nature of mandamus and pleased to make a
declaration to the effect that the Rule 58 of
Uttarakhand Motor Vehicle Rules 2011 framed by
the State Government is ultra vires to the statue
i.e. the Motor Vehicle Act 1988 and also against
the competence of the State Government to make
provision for delegation of a quashi judicial
function of the RTA or STA as the case may be, to
its Secretaries as provided under sub rule (i), (ii),
(iv) (v), (vi), (viii), (ix), (x) & (xi) of rule 58 of UK
Motor Vehicle Rules 2011 and also against the
mandate of the Constitution of India.”
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a
judgment rendered by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in
the case of Karnataka State Road Transport
Corporation vs. Pooja Travels, 2004 SCC Online Kar
503 for contending that power to issue contract carriage
permit or stage carriage permit cannot be delegated to
Secretary of Regional Transport Authority or State
Transport Authority. Para 29 of the said judgment is
reproduced below:-
“29. It is needless to observe that the concerned
authorities have to initiate action against the
erring contract carriage permit holders in
accordance with law, if they violate the conditions
mentioned therein. The observations and the
dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the
Judgment cited supra have to be strictly followed
with all seriousness by all the “Contract Carriage
Permit’ holders. The concerned officials of the
State machinery should strictly deal with such
operators, if any violation in observing the2
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aforesaid dictum laid down by the Apex Court as
well as the conditions laid down in the “contract
carriage Permits” is found. The contract carriage
permits cannot be treated as stage carriage
permits.
However, as no specific instance is brought to the
notice of this Court in these matters with regard
to violation of the conditions of the “contract
carriage permits” by the permit holders, no
specific direction or order can be issued against
any of such permit holders in these, matters.
For the foregoing reasons, and the
discussion made above, the following order is
made,
(i) Rules-55 and 56 of the Karnataka Motor
Vehicles Rules-1989 are declared as nullity in law
and Ultra Vires of the Motor Vehicles Act and
consequently, they are struck down.
(ii) The State Transport Authority has jurisdiction
to consider and dispose of the applications for
grant of “Contract Carriage Permits” and “Stage
Carriage Permits”
(iii) Secretary of STA/ RTA cannot be delegated
with power of issuing contract carriage/stage
carriage permits and to perform the duties of
RTA/ STA under Rules 55 and 56 of Karnataka
Motor Vehicles Rules,
And consequently
The Resolution passed by the Karnataka State
Transport Authority, Bangalore in its meeting
held on 20-12-1995/21-12-1995 vide Sl. No.19 of
Sub.No.25/95-96 delegating the power to its
Secretary to consider the applications for grant
“Contract Carriage Permits” is declared as without
authority of law and consequently, the same is
quashed.
(iv) The impugned orders passed by the
Secretaries of Regional Transport Authority/
Karnataka State Transport Authority, granting/
renewing the “Stage Carriage Permits”/ “Contract
Carriage Permits” in favour of the respondents-
private operators in all these writ petitions are
quashed.
(v) The private operators can operate their
contract carriages after obtaining permits in
accordance with law, as the existing schemes
framed by the State Government do not prohibit
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them to do so.
vi) The Contract Carriage Operators cannot ply
their buses as stage carriages. The concerned
authorities of the State Government are directed
to initiate action against erring contract carriage
permit holders in accordance with law, in the
light of the observations made above.
(vii) However, keeping in mind, the inconvenience
that would be caused to public at large and as the
Respondents-private operators are operating their
“Contract Carriages” since long time pursuant to
the impugned orders/permits, they are permitted
to operate their services for a period of three
months from today subject to payment of taxes,
despite the aforesaid order. The private operators-
respondents are at liberty to approach the
concerned Regional Transport Authority/State
Transport Authority as the case may be for getting
the permits afresh, in accordance with law, within
four weeks from today.
(vii) In case if the applications are filed by the
Respondents-private operators for grant of fresh
permits, the Regional Transport Authorities or
State Transport Authority as the case may be
directed to dispose of those applications on merits
after hearing KSRTC, within three months from
today.
These Writ Petitions are disposed of accordingly.”
(Emphasis Supplied.)
5. Per contra, learned State Counsel submits that
State Government is entitled to frame Rules under
Section 96 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Rules in
question are framed by the State under the said
statutory power. He further submits that Section 68,
under which State Transport Authority and Regional
Transport Authority are constituted and their powers are
delineated, in Sub Section 5 provides that
State/Regional Transport Authority may delegate its
powers to an authority or person, if authorized by the
Rules made under Section 96. Thus he submits that
delegation of Power of RTA to Secretary is permissible, if
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the Rules so permit.
6. Sub Section 5 of Section 68 of Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 is extracted below for ready reference:-
(5) The State Transport Authority and any
Regional Transport Authority, if authorised in this
behalf by rules made under section 96, may
delegate such of its powers and functions to such
authority or person subject to such restrictions,
limitations and conditions as may be prescribed
by the said rules.
7. With reference to Sub Section 5 of Section 68,
learned State Counsel submits that one of the important
function of State and Regional Transport Authority is to
grant permits; since Section 68(5) of the Act itself
permits delegation of powers of State/Regional Transport
Authority to an authority, therefore, challenge thrown by
petitioner to the Rules is without any substance. He
submits that if the Principal Act had not permitted
delegation of powers of Regional/State Transport
Authority to its Secretary, then it could have been
argued that delegation of powers to Secretary is
impermissible, thus ultra vires the provisions of Motor
Vehicles Act. He submits that it is not the case here as
parent act itself permits such delegation of powers, by
Rules made under Section 96. He submits that the
Rules, which petitioner has challenged, were framed
under Section 96, therefore, there is no infirmity in Rule
58, thus any interference in the matter would be
unwarranted.
8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R.S.
Travels By Its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar vs.
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation
Workers and others reported as (2025) 3 SCC 491,
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upheld validity of similar provision contained in
Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other
Law (Amendment) Act, 2003, which enabled Secretary of
State Transport Authority to issue permits for contract
carriages, special vehicles, tourist vehicles etc. Para 42
to 56 of the said judgment are extracted below:-
“42. The next issue before us is whether STA has
the power to delegate its functions, specifically,
the issuance of contract carriage, special, tourist,
and temporary permits, to its Secretary. In this
regard, the statutory framework provides clear
guidance.
43. Section 68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 states:
“68. (5) The State Transport Authority
and any Regional Transport Authority, if
authorized in this behalf by rules made under
Section 96, may delegate such of its powers and
functions to such authority or person subject to
such restrictions, limitations and conditions as
may be prescribed by the said rules.”
This provision unambiguously confers upon STA
and RTA the power to delegate its functions
provided that rules are framed under Section 96
of the Act. In the present context, the delegation
in question concerns the grant of permits that are
not stage carriage permits.
44. This is further clarified in Rule 56(1)(d) of
the KMV Rules, which reads as follows:
“56. Delegation of powers by State
transport authority.- (1) The State Transport
Authority may, by a general or special resolution
recorded in its proceedings, delegates-
(d) its power to grant a permit other than a
stage carriage permit on an application made to
the Chairman or Secretary or any officer of the
Motor Vehicles Department not below the rank of
a Regional Transport Officer with reference to the
notification issued under sub-section (2) of
Section 69.”
45. The language of Rule 56(1)(d) explicitly
differentiates between the grant of stage carriage
permits, which involve complex and inherently
quasi-judicial considerations, and other types of
permits that are essentially administrative in
nature. The fact that only the grant of stage
carriage permits is excluded from delegation
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underscores the legislature’s intention: routine
and time-sensitive permits such as contract
carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits
can be efficiently processed through delegation to
a competent officer like the Secretary, thereby
ensuring that administrative functions are not
unduly delayed by the need for a full board’s
involvement.
46. The respondents argue that permit-granting is
a quasi-judicial function that must be exercised
solely by the composite body of STA or RTA, as
such functions require deliberation by multiple
high-ranking officials, ensuring that decisions are
made with due consideration and dissenting
opinions. They contend that delegating this power
to a single officer would undermine the judicial
character of the decision-making process.
However, this argument does not withstand if we
have a closer analysis of the statutory provisions.
47. Firstly, even if one accepts that the grant of
permits has a quasi-judicial element, it is an
established principle of administrative law that
quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the
enabling statute expressly provides for such
delegation. Here, Section 68(5) of the MV Act,
coupled with the specific language of Rule 56(1)(d)
of the KMV Rules makes it clear that the
legislature intended for STA to delegate certain
routine permit functions. The exclusion of stage
carriage permits from this delegation does not
imply that all permit functions are inherently
non-delegable; rather, it reflects a calibrated
approach that distinguishes between complex
adjudicatory functions and routine administrative
tasks.
48. Secondly, from a practical standpoint, STA is
entrusted with a wide range of responsibilities
under the Motor Vehicles Act, and its workload
necessitates delegation to ensure timely service
delivery. The Secretary, being a high-ranking
officer with substantial expertise in transport
administration, is well equipped to handle routine
permit applications. The delegation mechanism is
not a blank check for arbitrary decision-making;
it operates within the boundaries and conditions
prescribed by the enabling rules framed under
Section 96 of the MV Act. This ensures that, while
administrative efficiency is achieved, there
remains adequate oversight and accountability
through the broader STA framework.
49. Moreover, the High Court’s reasoning in this
regard appears to have conflated the inherent
quasi-judicial nature of certain decisions with the
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broader statutory power of delegation. The High
Court held that because permit-granting is quasi-
judicial, it cannot be delegated to a single officer.
However, this view fails to recognise that
delegation does not remove judicial oversight from
the process. Instead, it merely streamlines routine
functions that do not require the full deliberative
process of STA.
50. In Newtech Promoters & Developers (P) Ltd. v.
State of U.P., this Court has affirmed that even
quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the
statute provides for it and if appropriate
safeguards are in place. The relevant paras of this
judgment are reproduced hereunder: (SCC p. 45,
paras 114-16)
“114. It is a well-established principle
of interpretation of law that the court should
read the section in literal sense and cannot
rewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does
any canon of construction permit the court
to read the section in such a manner as to
render it to some extent otiose. Section 81 of
the Act positively empowers the Authority to
delegate such of its powers and functions to
any member by a general or a special order
with an exception to make regulations under
Section 85 of the Act. As a consequence,
except the power to make regulations under
Section 85 of the Act, other powers and
functions of the Authority, by a general or
special order, if delegated to a Single
Member of the Authority is indeed within
the fold of Section 81 of the Act.
115. The further submission made by the
learned counsel for the promoters that
Section 81 of the Act empowers even
delegation to any officer of the Authority or
any other person, it is true that the
Authority, by general or special order, can
delegate any of its powers and functions to
be exercised by any member or officer of the
Authority or any other person but we are
not examining the delegation of power to
any third party. To be more specific, this
Court is examining the limited question as
to whether the power under Section 81 of
the Act can be delegated by the Authority to
any of its member to decide the complaint
under Section 31 of the Act. What has been
urged by the learned counsel for the
promoters is hypothetical which does not
arise in the facts of the case. If the
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delegation is made at any point of time
which is in contravention to the scheme of
the Act or is not going to serve the purpose
and object with which power to delegate has
been mandated under Section 81 of the Act,
it is always open for judicial review.
116. The further submission made by the
learned counsel for the appellants that
Section 81 of the Act permits the Authority
to delegate such powers and functions to
any member of the Authority which are
mainly administrative or clerical, and
cannot possibly encompass any of the core
functions which are to be discharged by the
Authority, the judicial functions are non-
delegable, as these are the core functions of
the Authority. The submission may not hold
good for the reason that the power to be
exercised by the Authority in deciding
complaints under Section 31 of the Act is
quasi-judicial in nature which is delegable
provided there is a provision in the statute.
As already observed, Section 81 of the Act
empowers the Authority to delegate its
power and functions to any of its members,
by general or special order.”
51. Lastly, the practical impact of not allowing
delegation would be to overload STA with routine
functions, potentially causing undue delays and
inefficiencies in the permit-issuance process.
Such delays could disrupt the balance of public
transport service delivery, which the legislature
clearly sought to improve by liberalising the
regime for non-stage carriage permits. In this
light, the delegation of routine permit-granting
powers is not only legally permissible but is also
necessary to meet the practical demands of an
evolving transport sector.
52. In view of the above analysis, we conclude
that the power of STA to delegate the issuance of
contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary
permits to its Secretary is fully supported by the
statutory provisions of Section 68(5) of the MV
Act, and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, 1989.
The delegation is a rational and necessary
administrative measure that facilitates prompt
and efficient processing of permit applications
without undermining the oversight function of
STA. Consequently, we reject the respondents’
arguments and hold that the High Court’s
reasoning on the non-delegability of permit-
granting power is flawed. The power to delegate,
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as provided by law, remains intact, and any
decision to the contrary is unsustainable in light
of both legislative intent and practical necessity.
53. In view of the discussions and analysis above,
we hold that:
53.1. Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles
Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment)
Act, 2003, which repeals the Karnataka Contract
Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, is
constitutional.
53.2. The State Transport Authority (STA)
possesses the power to delegate its functions
under Section 68(5) of the MV Act, as expressly
provided by the statute and further clarified by
Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules.
54. Consequently, we direct that the appeals of
the respondent Corporation (KSRTC) are
dismissed, while the appeals filed by the private
bus operators and Karnataka State Road
Transport Authority are allowed.
55. The impugned orders of the High Court that
denied the delegation power of STA are set aside,
and it is confirmed that the Secretary of STA is
empowered to grant non-stage carriage permits
(including contract carriage, special, tourist, and
temporary permits) in accordance with Section
68(5) of the MV Act and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV
Rules, subject to the limitations and conditions
prescribed therein.
56. The appropriate authorities are directed to
take all necessary measures to implement the
above findings and ensure that the delegation of
permit-granting power is exercised in a manner
consistent with the statutory provisions and the
objectives of efficient public transport
administration. All pending applications are
disposed of.”
9. Now coming back to the facts of the present case.
Petitioner is plying city bus in Dehradun City. He is
opposing the decision taken by Regional Transport
Authority as he apprehends that his business would be
affected if new vehicles are permitted within the City.
Regional Transport Authority has resolved to grant
temporary permits to new vehicles, which meet BS-6
Pollution norms with a view to phase out old polluting
vehicles. Such temporary permits to new vehicles are yet
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to be issued. Thus, no cause of action is available to the
petitioner as of now, as temporary permits contemplated
in the decision taken by the Regional Transport
Authority have not be issued.
10. In view of the authoritative judicial pronouncement
by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R.S. Travels
(supra), this Court do not find any reason to interfere in
the matter. The delegation of powers provided for in Rule
58 of the Uttarakhand Motor Vehicles Rules, 2011 is
referable to Section 68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, thus intra vires. In such view of the matter, the
writ petition is dismissed. No order as to cost.
(Ashish Naithani, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
20.05.2025
Arti
ARTI SINGH
Digitally signed by ARTI SINGH
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=487ed955e722ba65aab55409e686c12fb83a19325e8b66890fbee418e7b69c0d,
postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=26DC90E00D839E3E8714131F235087D2D87E133C57E7F4A7B2E734BE2521F982,
cn=ARTI SINGH
Date: 2025.06.13 18:12:15 +05’30’
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