In light of the Delhi High Court’s recent orders in Sadhguru Jaggi Vasudev and Ankur Warikoo cases, SpicyIP intern Anureet Kaur highlights how, instead of building a principled framework for assessing personality rights, the courts are granting injunctions without a firm doctrinal grounding. Anureet is a second year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab. She has a keen interest in Intellectual Property Law and enjoys exploring the intersection of legal principles with innovation and creativity through research and writing.
Delhi HC’s Orders in Sadhguru & Ankur Warikoo Cases: What Indian Courts Are Getting Wrong About Personality Rights?
By Anureet Kaur
In an age where our identities are no longer limited to the physical world but extend into pixels, posts, and algorithms, two recent Delhi High Court orders have tried to grapple with the fast-mutating nature of identity misuse. The orders in Sadhguru Jaggi Vasudev v. Rogue Websites & Ors. and Ankur Warikoo v. John Doe & Ors. aimed to address the unauthorised use of public personas. While the Court acted swiftly to curb harm, a closer examination reveals a troubling pattern: Courts in India are leaning on vague doctrine, overbroad relief, and an underdeveloped understanding to decide what amounts to personality rights violations. In the absence of doctrinal clarity or understanding, the scope of personality rights is quietly but significantly expanding. This blog post, shaped by reflections from a recent academic session and doctrinal insights, critically engages with these two judicial orders. It asks whether Indian courts are building a principled framework for personality rights or simply stretching the boundaries without a clear map.
Judicial Shortcuts: Identifiability Is Not Infringement
The Delhi HC’s orders in Sadhguru and Ankur Warikoo cases share a common flaw: they both presume that recognisability of a person automatically gives rise to infringement. In the Ankur Warikoo case, AI-generated videos mimicked the influencer’s voice and likeness to promote fraudulent investment schemes. Similarly, in Sadhguru’s case, rogue websites used his name, speech style, and appearance.
However, in both cases, the Court granted relief without carefully examining whether there was actual consumer confusion, intent to deceive, or proven reputational harm. This short-circuits the foundational confusion test that underpins trademark law and publicity rights globally. This pattern is not limited to these two cases and has become a recurring approach in Indian courts when dealing with personality rights. A prime example is Titan Industries v. Ramkumar Jewellers (also discussed here and here), where the Court protected goodwill without requiring proof of actual consumer confusion. These judicial actions are often described by scholars as “performative protection”. They look like they’re defending a right but actually skip over the legal reasoning needed to support it.
Injunctions Without Doctrinal Grounding
The Delhi HC’s dynamic+ injunction in Sadhguru’s case aimed to pre-emptively tackle future misuse. The Court allowed the plaintiff to notify new infringing content and compelled platforms to act within 36 hours. While commendable in its swiftness, the order’s breadth lacked nuance. Most strikingly, the Court failed to engage with the use of NFTs (Non-Fungible Tokens), despite the complaint clearly stating that Sadhguru’s likeness was being tokenised and monetised across digital platforms. This was a real opportunity for the Court to address how newer forms of technology are shaping identity misuse, but unfortunately it was entirely overlooked.
This gap reflects a broader pattern: courts are still approaching deepfakes and synthetic media through pre-digital legal frameworks, without engaging with how these technologies actually operate or spread. As digital impersonation becomes more sophisticated, the legal response must evolve accordingly. By missing this opportunity to comment on NFTs, tokenisation, or decentralised platforms, the Court reinforced the sense that our jurisprudence is lagging behind the realities. Furthermore, without distinguishing between commercial, expressive, and parodic uses, the law risks becoming a tool of over-policing rather than a means of nuanced protection, as seen in Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India (discussed in depth here).
In the Ankur Warikoo case, the impersonation directly affected the public as people were misled into fraudulent schemes. Warikoo’s brand identity is deeply tied to financial literacy, and misuse could easily trigger monetary loss for unsuspecting viewers. The case, therefore, had a clear consumer protection dimension. However, the order still framed the issue as a private harm and failed to draw a line between protecting public interest and merely asserting celebrity control. This is where judicial language becomes critical. As the Delhi HC highlighted in Dr. Devi Prasad Shetty v. Medicine Me & Ors., when identity misuse endangers public health or public safety, relief should be granted in the name of public harm, not merely individual dignity. (The importance of incorporating a public interest test is discussed in detail by Rebecca Cardoso in this blog.)
A rare counter-example within Indian jurisprudence is the Jackie Shroff case (discussed here and here). There, the Delhi HC refused to grant blanket injunctions against disputed content using the actor’s image. Rather, it made a conscious effort to protect memes, parody, and non-derogatory commentary under Article 19(1)(a). This case highlights that courts should engage with the broader context- Was the use transformative? Was it social commentary? Was it fan-created content with no intent to deceive? Without this balancing, personality rights become dangerously close to private censorship, especially when granted through ex parte injunctions.
Personality Rights vs. Right of Publicity: A Conceptual Crisis
It needs to be noted that the Indian jurisprudence has consistently failed to differentiate between “personality rights” and the “right of publicity,” despite their distinct legal foundations. The former is rooted in privacy and dignity, as established in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (discussed here and here), while the latter centres on the economic value of one’s identity, as developed in the U.S. decision Haelan Labs v. Topps Chewing Gum (as discussed here and here).
This lack of distinction was evident in both Sadhguru and Ankur Warikoo orders, where the courts did not clarify whether they were protecting moral dignity or commercial exploitation. The result is more than just academic uncertainty as this doctrinal vagueness leads to inconsistent orders, unpredictable remedies, and an unclear legal standard.
The Problem of One-Sided Litigation
One of the most structurally problematic features that continues to go on in these cases is the lack of representation for defendants. These orders are typically passed ex parte, with the only voice in the courtroom being that of the aggrieved celebrity or public figure. This means that critical defences, such as, fair use, satire, public interest, lack of confusion are never put on the record. Not only this, when platforms like YouTube or Instagram are asked to take down content, they argue only on compliance grounds, not user rights. This procedural gap partly explains why personality rights remain under-litigated before the Supreme Court as the absence of rigorous adversarial proceedings at lower levels leaves little room for doctrinal evolution.
Conclusion: Personality Rights Need More Than Just Injunctions
The Delhi High Court’s swift intervention in the Sadhguru and Ankur Warikoo cases reveals a recurring tendency in Indian courts to grant sweeping, ex parte injunctions often without the necessary doctrinal clarity, without a full understanding of the underlying technology, and without hearing opposing arguments. What is most troubling is not that courts are attempting to protect individuals, but that in doing so, they risk closing off space for everyone else: meme-makers, fan communities, critics, educators, and ordinary users engaging with culture online. At the very least, courts must begin applying consistent standards- distinguishing between dignity and commercial control, separating mischief from mimicry, and focusing on demonstrable harm rather than presumed celebrity status.
Moreover, the courts must take the liberty to appoint an academic amicus before issuing blanket ex-parte injunctions to delve into the nitty-gritties, especially in cases involving complex and evolving legal issues. A good example here would be the case of UTV Software Communication Ltd. & Ors. v. 1337x[dot]to & Ors., where, considering the substantial question of law of general in the case and the ex-parte proceedings, The Delhi High Court appointed Mr. Hemant Singh, a seasoned practitioner in IP law as amicus curiae to assist the court in determining legal questions involved (please refer to para 6 of the judgement). In situations where the law is still evolving or playing catchup to technology, similar steps would ensure more justiciable and balanced judicial outcomes.
The question also arises: should India codify personality rights to ensure better legal implementation? The academic debate remains open. Codification, if done hastily, could entrench the very overreach we critique. However, a carefully crafted legal framework, with clear exceptions for satire, parody, public interest, and non-commercial use, may offer the balance we need.
Personality rights must evolve in this AI-driven, digitally saturated era. But they must do so with restraint, legal discipline, and a clear sense of purpose. What we need is not just stronger enforcement, but a better framework. A framework that protects without suppressing, empowers without overreaching, and prioritises both individual dignity and the democratic value of free expression.