Chattisgarh High Court
Rajendra Kumar Mishra vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 June, 2025
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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 4288 of 2025
1 - Rajendra Kumar Mishra S/o Late Kailash Chandra Mishra Aged About
62 Years Presently Working As Executive Engineer At Maniyari, Water
Resource Division, Mungeli, Distt- Mungeli (C.G.) Attach After Suspension
Office Of The Engineer In Chief, Water Resources Division, Raipur (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Water Resource Department,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Engineer In Chief Mahanadi Project, Water Resources Department,
Raipur, Distt- Raipur (C.G.)
3 - Chief Engineer Hasdeo Basin, Water Resources Department, Bilaspur,
Distt- Bilaspur (C.G.)
4 - S.K. Badhoriya Sub-Divisional Officer, Water Resources Sub Division
No. 5, Kanki, Distt. Baloda Bazar Bhatapara (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate and Mr.
Vivek Verma, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Suyashdhar Badgaiya, Deputy G.A.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
VEDPRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Order on Board
Digitally signed
by VEDPRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Date: 2025.06.17
18:23:08 +0530
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13/06/2025
1. The petitioner is questioning his suspension order dated 20.05.2025
(Annexure P/1) issued by the respondent No. 1 and claiming
revocation of the same and also to consider his representation dated
30.05.2025 and filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India claiming the following reliefs:-
“Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the
petitioners most humbly pray for the following
relief: –
i. To call for the entire records available in the
office of the Respondents pertaining to the
case of petitioners.
ii. That the Hon’ble High Court may kindly be
pleased to direct the respondent authority to
consider the case of the petitioner and decide
the representation dated 30.05.2025 pending
before the Respondent Authority for
revocation of suspension order.
iii. That the Hon’ble High Court may kindly be
pleased to direct the Respondent Authority to
revoke the suspension order 20.05.2025 and
give the permission to petitioner for join his
service.
iv. That the Hon’ble High Court may kindly be
pleased to direct the respondents to the entire
3period of suspension shall be treated as a
period spent on duty.
v. Any other relief or relief(s) which this
Hon’ble Court may think proper in view of the
facts and circumstances of the case may also
kindly be granted.”
2. The brief facts of the case as emerges from the pleadings and
documents annexed with the petition are that the petitioner is initially
appointed in the year 1994 on the post of Sub-Engineer and was
posted at Water Resources Department at Mungeli. During the entire
service tenure, he was promoted and posted at different places and
ultimately was promoted from the post of Assistant Engineer to the
post of Executive Engineer and was posted at Maniyari, Water
Resources Division, Mungeli vide order dated 23.08.2024. The place
of posting of the petitioner was at Maniyari Barrage, Project division,
Mungeli. The Maniyari Barrage was sanctioned by the State
Government on 13.07.2007 and an amount of Rs. 1921.87 lakhs
were sanctioned for the project. The sanction of amount was revised
on 15.04.2011 by the State Government, and the revised sanction
was Rs. 4375.31 lakhs. It was again revised to Rs. 12452.78 lakhs
including the acquisition of land of village Kuksada, Raunakapa,
Sanwatal and deposited the amount of Rs. 6700.00 lakhs before the
Collector, Mungeli. On 04.11.2024, the Executive Engineer wrote a
letter to the State Government for completing the remaining work of
the Maniyari Barrage along with the cost of remaining work
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amounting to Rs. 822.67 lakhs and on 16.12.2024, a letter written by
the Engineer-in-Chief to the State Government for revision of the
sanction and its approval, but the same is still pending for its
administrative sanction.
3. It is also the case of the petitioner that, the Pathariya Barrage project
was sanctioned by the State Government on 12.03.2012 and an
amount of Rs. 3586.20 lakhs were sanctioned. The sanction amount
was sent for its revision and the revised proposal for Rs. 8380.52
lakhs were sent for its approval and sanctioned on 23.09.2016 to the
State Government, which is still pending.
4. The officers on special duty wrote a letter on 17.09.2024 to the
Engineer-in-Chief for administrative sanction and direction regarding
verification of the project of Pathariya Barrage. The Superintending
Engineer submits its report with respect to Pathariya Barrage and
also submitted a revised administrative proposal for Maniyari
Barrage. It is also the case of the petitioner that in a meeting held on
19.05.2025 by the Hon’ble Chief Minister of the State, in which it
came into knowledge about discontinuation of the Maniyari Barrage
as well as Pathariya Barrage project since 2017 due to
administrative approval, decided to suspend the petitioner and
ultimately vide order dated 20.05.2025, the petitioner is suspended
under Rule 9(1)(a) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short ‘CCA Rules’) on the
ground that the petitioner is negligent in discharging his duty to get
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his efforts to complete the pending project of Pathariya Barrage and
Maniyari Barrage, which amounts to misconduct under the CCA
Rules and his headquarter is fixed at the office of Engineer-in-Chief,
Water Resources Department, Atar Nagar, Nawa Raipur, which is
under challenge in the present writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner
was promoted on the post of Executive Engineer vide order dated
28.06.2023 and has joined at Water Resources Department, Mungeli
as Executive Engineer on 21.08.2023, which has been intimated on
23.08.2023 to the Superintending Engineer, Water Resources
Division, Bilaspur. Both these projects are lying ideal since 2017 and
no liability is fastened upon the officers, who are there prior to the
petitioner. After joining, he made his efforts and wrote letters to the
higher authorities for revised administrative approval, but the same
are still pending before the authorities and there is no misconduct on
the part of the petitioner. The charge leveled against the petitioner till
his suspension order is so vague that he has not made his sincere
efforts to get the project continued and to complete the same at the
earliest. There is no disciplinary proceeding pending against the
petitioner, nor any complaint against him. The petitioner is going to
retire on 31.07.2025 and at the fag end of his service tenure, he has
been suspended without any sufficient reason. There is no willful and
deliberate omission on the part of the petitioner and the suspension
order is arbitrary and mala fide. In support of his submission, he
would rely the order passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter
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of “Union of India and another v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal” 2013
(16) SCC 147 and “Public Service Tribunal Bar Association v.
State of U.P. and another” 2003 (4) SCC 104 and submits that
suspension of the employee should be made only in case, where
strong prima facie case against employee and the allegations
involved moral turpitude, grave misconduct or indiscipline or refusal
to carry out the orders of the superior authority, if proved, would
ordinarily result in reduction in rank, removal or dismissal from
service, but it is not the situation in the present case. There is no
prima facie evidence on record against the petitioner with the alleged
misconduct, therefore, his suspension order is liable to be quashed.
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State vehemently
opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner
and would submit that the petitioner is having an alternative remedy
of appeal provided under Rule 23 of the CCA Rules and the writ
petition is not maintainable challenging the suspension order. The
allegation against the petitioner includes various factual aspects,
which cannot be determined in the present writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India and this Court cannot examine the
correctness of the allegations against the petitioner in the writ
petition. He would further submit that the judicial review against a
suspension order is very limited, as the suspension does not cast
any stigma upon the employee. After considering the entire material,
the authorities concerned have considered for suspension of the
petitioner and there is sufficient material available before the
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authorities to consider the same, and therefore, there is no merit in
the present writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material annexed with the petition.
8. The scope of judicial review against a suspension order has been
considered by Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matter of “U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv
Rajan” reported in 1993 Suppl. 3 SCC 483, and in para 5 of its
judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:-
“5. The ground given by the High Court to stay the
operation of the suspension order, is patently wrong.
There is no restriction on the authority to pass a
suspension order second time. The first order might
be withdrawn by the authority on the ground that at
that stage, the evidence appearing against the
delinquent employee is not sufficient or for some
reason, which is not connected with the merits of the
case. As happened in the present case, the earlier
order of suspension dated 22nd March, 1991 was
quashed by the High Court on the ground that some
other suspended officer had been allowed to join
duties. That order had nothing to do with the merits of
the case. Ordinarily, when there is an accusation of
defalcation of the monies, the delinquent employees
have to be kept away from the establishment till the
charges are finally disposed of. Whether the charges
8are baseless, malicious or vindictive and are framed
only to keep the individual concerned out of the
employment is a different matter. But even in such a
case, no conclusion can be arrived at without
examining the entire record in question-and hence it
is always advisable to allow the disciplinary
proceedings to continue unhindered. It is possible
that in some cases, the authorities do not proceed
with the matter as expeditiously as they ought to,
which results in prolongation of the sufferings of the
delinquent employee. But the remedy in such cases is
either to call for an explanation from the authorities in
the matter, and if it is found unsatisfactory, lo direct
them to complete the inquiry within a stipulated
period and to increase the suspension allowance
adequately. It is true that in the present case, the
charge-sheet was filed alter almost a year of the order
of suspension. However, the facts pleaded by the
appellants show that the-defalcations were over a
long period from 1986 to 1991 and they involved
some lakhs, of rupees. It also appears that the
authorities have approached the police and in the
police investigation, the amount of defalcation is
found to be still more. Since the matter is of taking
accounts which are spread over from 1986 to 1991
and of correlating the entries with the relevant
documents, and several individuals are involved, the
framing of charges was bound to take some time. The
Court has to examine each case on its own facts and
decide whether the delay in serving the charge-sheet
9and completing the inquiry is justified or not.
However, in the present case the High Court has not
quashed the order of suspension on the ground of
delay in framing of the charges. As stated earlier, it
has set aside the order of suspension on the ground
that the authority had no power to pass the second
order of suspension in the same case. We are afraid
that the High Court has misconstrued the nature and
purpose of the power of suspension vested in the
management. It is not disputed that at present all
officers concerned are served with the charge-sheets
and have been suspended. There is no discrimination
between the officers on that account. The charges are
also grave and the authorities have come to the
conclusion that during the disciplinary proceedings,
the officers should not continue in employment to
enable them to conduct the proceedings unhindered.
Hence, we are satisfied that the order in appeal was
not justified.”
9. In the matter of “State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty” 1994
(4) SCC 126, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 13 that:-
“13. It is thus settled law that normally when an
appointing authority or the disciplinary authority
seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or
contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into
grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds
or serious acts of omission and 5 1993 Supp (3) SCC
483: 1994 SCC (L&S) 67: (1993) 25 ATC commission,
10the order of suspension would be passed after taking
into consideration the gravity of the misconduct
sought to be inquired into or investigated and the
nature of the evidence placed before the appointing
authority and on application of the mind by
disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or
disciplinary authority should consider the above
aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an
employee under suspension pending aforesaid action.
It would not be as an administrative routine or an
automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be
on consideration of the gravity of the alleged
misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to
the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal
must consider each case on its own facts and no
general law could be laid down in that behalf.
Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of
forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the
duties of office or post held by him. In other words it
is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to
perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the
impression among the members of service that
dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending
employee could get away even pending inquiry
without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity
to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or
investigation or to win over the witnesses or the
delinquent having had the opportunity in office to
impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry
etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be
11considered depending on the nature of the
allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible
impact it creates on the service for the continuance of
the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or
contemplated inquiry or investigation. It would be
another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides,
arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must
be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the
investigation or inquiry. The authority also should
keep in mind public interest of the impact of the
delinquent’s continuance in office while facing
departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge.”
10. A plain reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that,
whether charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive, cannot be
gone into at the stage of examining the validity of suspension order.
At the stage of suspension, the correctness of allegations is not
required to be looked into. The public interest is also an element on
the consideration of which an employee can be placed under
suspension. This is within the province of the Disciplinary Authority
to decide, whether an employee is required to be suspended or not,
because suspension is a step towards ultimate result of an
investigation or an inquiry.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “M. Paul Anthoni v.
Bharat Gold Mines Limited” 1999 (3) SCC 679 has held in para 26
that:-
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“26. To place an employee under suspension is an
unqualified right of the employer. This right is
conceded to the employer in service jurisprudence
everywhere. It has even received statutory recognition
under service rules framed by various authorities,
including Govt. of India and the State Governments.
(See: for example, Rule 10 of Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules. Even under
the General Clauses Act, this right is conceded to the
employer by Section 16 which, inter alia, provides that
power to appoint includes power to suspend or
dismiss.”
12. Further, in the matter of “Ashok Kumar Aggarwal” (supra), in para
22 and 27, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:-
“22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that suspension order can
be passed by the competent authority considering the
gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of
omission or commission and the nature of evidence
available. It cannot be actuated by mala fide,
arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. Effect on public
interest due to the employee’s continuation in office
is also a relevant and determining factor. The facts of
each case have to be taken into consideration as no
formula of universal application can be laid down in
this regard. However, suspension order should be
passed only where there is a strong prima facie case
against the delinquent, and if the charges stand
13proved, would ordinarily warrant imposition of major
punishment i.e. removal or dismissal from service, or
reduction in rank etc.
27. Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out
of the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the
proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim
measure in aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the
delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers
or take any advantage of his position. More so, at this
stage, it is not desirable that the court may find out as
which version is true when there are claims and
counter claims on factual issues. The court cannot
act as if it an appellate forum de hors the powers of
judicial review.”
13. Rule 23 of CCA Rules, 1966 provides for a departmental appeal
against the order of suspension of the employee to the State
Government, which reads as under:-
“23. Orders against which appeal lies.- Subject to the
provisions of Rule 22, a Government servant may prefer
an appeal against all or any of the following orders,
namely-
(i) an order imposing any of the penalties specified
in Rule 10 whether made by the disciplinary
authority or by any appellate or reviewing authority;
(ii) an order enhancing any penalty, imposed under
Rule 10;
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(iii) [an order of suspension made or deemed to
have been made under Rule 9;]
Explanation. – In this rule the expression “Government
servant” includes a person who has ceased to be in
Government service.”
14. It is settled law that the order of suspension is not that of
punishment. The requirement of the law is that the reason should be
there in the order of suspension. In the present case, the reason for
the suspension of the petitioner is mentioned that, he is negligent in
discharging his duty by not taking any proper steps for completion of
the important irrigation projects of Maniyari Barrage and Pathariya
Barrage, which amounts to misconduct under the CCA Rules, 1996.
The petitioner is having specific remedy of appeal before the State
Government as provided under Rule 23 of the CCA Rules.
15. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner would
not extend any benefit to him, as the case of “Ashok Kumar
Aggarwal” (supra) and “Public Service Tribunal Bar Association”
(supra) does not support the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner, rather it holds that whether the employee
should or should not continue in their office during the period of
inquiry, is a matter to be assessed by the authorities concerned and
ordinarily the Court should not interfere with the order of
suspension.
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16. In view of the foregoing analysis and also in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, this Court does not find any
mala fide or arbitrariness in passing the suspension order and
further is of the opinion that the petitioner does not make out any
exceptional case to interfere with his suspension order dated
20.05.2025 invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The petitioner is at liberty to challenge his
suspension order before the State Government as provided under
Rule 23 of CCA Rules, if so advised.
17. In the result, the petition is liable to be and hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved