Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
G.R.S.E. Ltd. Workmen’S Union vs Garden Reach Shipbuilders And on 17 June, 2025
17.06.2025
Item No.01
Piya
Court No. 30
WPA 11764 of 2025
G.R.S.E. Ltd. Workmen's Union
-vs-
Garden Reach Shipbuilders and
Engineers Limited & Ors.
Mr. Soumya Mazumder, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Nilay Sengpta
Mr. Sujit Banerjee
... for the Petitioner
Mr. Ranjay De, Sr. Adv.
Mr. B. Banerjee
Mr. A. A. Bose
... for the Respondents No. 1
1. The Writ petition has been preferred praying for
direction upon the respondent authorities to
withdraw the orders of the Certifying Officer
and the Appellate Authority under the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,
1946 and to set aside the G.R.S.E Ltd. notice
dated 12th April, 2025 with regard to Premature
Retirement Scheme for unionized employees.
2. The Petitioner/union’s case is that on the basis
of purported approval of the Board of Directors,
the Company had applied on 18th August, 2017
for modification of its Certified Standing Orders
towards implementation of Premature
Retirement Scheme in respect of workmen in
accordance with F.R. 56(1) of CCS (Pension)
Rules, 1972.
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3. The Company had made the application for
modification/ amendment of the Certified
Standing Orders with reference to the decision
of Government of India for Central Government
employees who are beneficiaries of CCS
(Pension) Rules, 1972 and are subject to
fundamental Rules.
4. The Petitioner/Union had filed its objection to
the proposed amendment.
5. The Certifying Officer passed an order on 28th
June, 2018, inter-alia, allowing the
amendment/ modification for Premature
Retirement Scheme in respect of
workmen/employees of G.R.S.E Ltd.
6. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the
Appellate Authority.
7. It is stated that the petitioner allegedly found
the Hearing Officer/the Appellate Authority to
be in close proximity and in
hospitality/association of G.R.S.E Officers at
Tolly Club.
8. After hearing, the Appellate Authority had
reserved the appeal for orders on 8th November,
2019.
9. The petitioner union had complained against
the officer to the Ministry of Labour &
Employment.
10. On 12th April, 2025, a notice was published by
G.R.S.E Ltd. disclosing a Premature Retirement
Scheme for unionized employees.
11. The petitioner through its office bearers
thereafter contacted the HR Department of the
company and they were handed over a copy of
an order dated 14th July, 2022 passed by Dr.
T.K. Panda.
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12. The petitioner made a representation dated 16th
April, 2025 against such Premature Retirement
Scheme.
13. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner
submits that the order passed by the appellate
authority has been passed in a non-transparent
and based manner and the same manifests
total abdication of duty by the Appellate
Authority under the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 in deciding an
appeal.
14. The question of invoking the provision in lying
with Fundamental Rules or CCS (Pension)
Rules cannot arise since the service of the
workmen of G.R.S.E Ltd. are governed by
statutorily laid down condition of service and
industrial settlements, which form parts of
contract of employment.
15. That the workmen of a public sector
undertaking do not hold their offices under the
pleasure of the President and hence the concept
of compulsory retirement cannot apply to their
case.
16. That the Certifying Officer and the Appellate
Authority under the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 have both exceeded
their jurisdiction.
17. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent
Company has relied upon the Relevant
Provisions of the Industrial dispute Act being
Section 2(K) of the Act which lays down:-
“Section 2(k)“industrial dispute” means
any dispute or difference between
employers and employers, or between
employers and workmen, or between
workmen and workmen, which is
connected with the employment or non-
employment or the terms of employment
4or with the conditions of labour, of
any person;”
18. And the second schedule to the Act which is
as follows :-
“MATTERS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF LABOUR COURTS
1. The propriety or legality of an order
passed by an employer under the standing
orders;
2. The application and interpretation
of standing orders;
3. Discharge or dismissal of workmen
including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to,
workmen wrongfully dismissed;
4. Withdrawal of any customary
concession or privilege;
5. Illegality or otherwise of a strike or
lock-out; and
6. All matters other than those specified
in the Third Schedule.”
19. It is thus stated that as the order of the
appellate authority dated 14.02.2022 has
already culminated in the premature retirement
scheme for unionized Employees under Ref:
HR/Estt./85/25 dated 12th April, 2025, the
petitioner’s claim lies before the Labour
Court/Industrial tribunal as per Second
Schedule point no. 2 and not the writ Court as
the said scheme is now part of the terms of
employment and thus covered under Section
2(K) of the industrial dispute Act.
20. The following judgments of the Supreme Court
have been relied upon by the
Respondent/Company in support of their
contention.
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a) The premier Automobiles Ltd. vs
Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of
Bombay & Ors., (1976) 1 SCC 496.
“23. To sum up, the principles applicable
to the jurisdiction of the civil court in
relation to an industrial dispute may be
stated thus:
(1) If the dispute is not an industrial
dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement
of any other right under the Act the
remedy lies only in the civil court.
(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute
arising out of a right or liability under the
general or common law and not under the
Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is
alternative, leaving it to the election of the
suitor concerned to choose his remedy for
the relief which is competent to be granted
in a particular remedy.
(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the
enforcement of a right or an obligation
created under the Act, then the only
remedy available to the suitor is to get an
adjudication under the Act.
(4) If the right which is sought to be
enforced is a right created under the Act
such as Chapter V-A then the remedy for
its enforcement is either Section 33-C or
the raising of an industrial dispute, as the
case may be.”
b) Rajasthan State Road Transport
Corporation & Anr. vs Krishna Kant
& Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 75.
“35. We may now summarise the
principles flowing from the above
discussion:
(1) Where the dispute arises from general
law of contract, i.e., where reliefs are
claimed on the basis of the general law
of contract, a suit filed in civil court
cannot be said to be not maintainable,
even though such a dispute may also
constitute an “industrial dispute” within
the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2-
A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
(2) Where, however, the dispute involves
recognition, observance or enforcement of
6any of the rights or obligations created
by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only
remedy is to approach the forums
created by the said Act.
(3) Similarly, where the dispute involves
the recognition, observance or
enforcement of rights and obligations
created by enactments like Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
— which can be called “sister
enactments” to Industrial Disputes Act —
and which do not provide a forum for
resolution of such disputes, the only
remedy shall be to approach the forums
created by the Industrial Disputes Act
provided they constitute industrial
disputes within the meaning of Section
2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial
Disputes Act or where such enactment
says that such dispute shall be either
treated as an industrial dispute or says
that it shall be adjudicated by any of the
forums created by the Industrial
Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to civil
court is open.
(4) It is not correct to say that the
remedies provided by the Industrial
Disputes Act are not equally effective for
the reason that access to the forum
depends upon a reference being made by
the appropriate Government. The power
to make a reference conferred upon the
Government is to be exercised to
effectuate the object of the enactment
and hence not unguided. The rule is to
make a reference unless, of course, the
dispute raised is a totally frivolous one
ex facie. The power conferred is the
power to refer and not the power to
decide, though it may be that the
Government is entitled to examine
whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous,
not meriting an adjudication.
(5) Consistent with the policy of law
aforesaid, we commend to Parliament
and the State Legislatures to make a
provision enabling a workman to
approach the Labour Court/Industrial
Tribunal directly — i.e., without the
requirement of a reference by the
Government — in case of industrial
disputes covered by Section 2-A of the
Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a
long way in removing the misgivings
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with respect to the effectiveness of the
remedies provided by the Industrial
Disputes Act.
(6) The certified Standing Orders framed
under and in accordance with the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed
conditions of service and are binding
both upon the employers and employees,
though they do not amount to “statutory
provisions”. Any violation of these
Standing Orders entitles an employee to
appropriate relief either before the
forums created by the Industrial
Disputes Act or the civil court where
recourse to civil court is open according
to the principles indicated herein.
(7) The policy of law emerging from
Industrial Disputes Act and its sister
enactments is to provide an alternative
dispute-resolution mechanism to the
workmen, a mechanism which is speedy,
inexpensive, informal and unencumbered
by the plethora of procedural laws and
appeals upon appeals and revisions
applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the
powers of the courts and tribunals under
the Industrial Disputes Act are far more
extensive in the sense that they can
grant such relief as they think
appropriate in the circumstances for
putting an end to an industrial dispute.”
21. Countering the argument of the Respondent/
Company, it is contended by the
petitioner/Union that they have challenged the
order of the Appellate Authority dated
14.07.2022 on the ground of bias thus injustice
and the Certifying Officer, appellate authority
having exceeded their jurisdiction. As such only
a writ lies against such action.
22. It appears that the petitioner at Para 15 of the
writ petition has also prayed for restraining the
respondents from giving effect or further effect
to the premature Retirement Scheme and also
the order of the certifying officer and the
Appellate authority – on the ground that though
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hearing was conducted in 2019, the order was
passed in 2022, thus was not in the knowledge
of the petitioners who first came to know of the
order when the scheme was notified on 12th
April, 2025.
23. The order of the appellate authority was passed
on 14.07.2022. The Scheme amending the
standing order has been framed on 12th April,
2025.
24. The second schedule includes the
application and interpretation of standing
orders.
25. In the present case the petitioner has neither
challenged the application nor the
interpretation of the standing orders.
26. It is the amendment of the standing orders
which has been challenged on the ground that
the authorities have acted beyond their
jurisdiction.
27. As such, when the order of an appellate
authority allowing the amendment to the
standing orders is challenged the tribunal or
the Labour Court does not have the
jurisdiction.
28. The Industrial Employment (Standing
orders) Act, 1946 lays the law in respect of
standing order Section 10:-
“Section 10. Duration and
modification of standing orders.–(1)
Standing orders finally certified under this
Act shall not, except on agreement
between the employer and the workmen
20[or a trade union or other representative
body of the workmen] be liable to
modification until the expiry of six months
from the date on which the standing
orders or the last modifications thereof
came in to operation.
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[(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section
(1), an employer or workman [ or a trade
union or other representative body of the
workmen] may apply to the Certifying
Officer to have the standing orders
modified, and such application shall be
accompanied by five copies of [***] the
modifications proposed to be made, and
where such modifications are proposed to
be made by agreement between the
employer and the workmen 19[or a trade
union or other representative body of the
workmen], a certified copy of that
agreement shall be filed along with the
application.]
(3) The foregoing provisions of this Act
shall apply in respect of an application
under sub-section (2) as they apply to the
certification of the first standing orders.
[(4) Nothing contained in sub-section (2)
shall apply to an industrial establishment
in respect of which the appropriate
Government is the Government of the State
of Gujarat or the Government of the State
of Maharashtra.]
Section 13-A. Interpretation, etc., of
standing orders.–If any question arises
as to the application or interpretation
of a standing order certified under this Act,
any employer or workman [or a trade
union or other representative body of the
workmen]31 may refer the question to any
one of the Labour Courts constituted under
the Industrial Disputes Act,. 1947, and
specified for the disposal of such
proceeding by the appropriate Government
by notification in the Official Gazette, and
the Labour Court to which the question is
so referred shall, after giving the parties
an opportunity of being heard, decide the
question and such decision shall be final
and binding on the parties.”
29. In present case the petitioner has not
challenged the application or interpretation of
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the standing orders, but amendment of the
same, which has been allowed by the appellate
authority. It is this decision which is challenged
and the same has been challenged on the
ground of Lack of Jurisdiction and bias causing
injustice.
30. Section 11 of the Industrial employment
(Standing orders) Act, 1946, confers the power
of a Civil Court upon the Certifying Officer and
the /Appellate Authority.
31. The writ petition is thus maintainable and be
fixed for hearing on merit on 02.07.2025.
Parties to file their short notes of Argument.
32. Pending hearing, the order of the appellate
authority dated 14.07.2022 and notification of
the Premature Retirement Scheme dated
12.04.2025 be stayed till the 30th of July, 2025
or until further orders whether is earlier.
( Shampa Dutt (Paul), J. )