Chattisgarh High Court
Surendra Kumar Choubey vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 16 June, 2025
1
Digitally
signed by 2025:CGHC:24285
RAMESH
KUMAR VATTI NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 5054 of 2018
• Surendra Kumar Choubey S/o Late Shri Kapil Deo Choubey, Aged
About 54 Years, Posted As Director, State Resources Centre, Women
And Child Development Department, Raipur, District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Secretary, Women And Child Welfare
Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur, District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2. Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission, Through- Secretary,
Chhattisgarh State Public Service Commission, Raipur, Shankar Nagar,
Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3. Nandlal Choudhary, Secretary, Rajya Baal Adhikar Sanrakshan Ayog,
Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4. Rajesh Singhi, Special Assistant To Shri Rajesh Munat, Minister, PWD
And Transport Department, Government Of Chhattisgarh, Raipur,
District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Saket Pandey, Advocate holding the
brief of Mr. Anoop Majumdar, Advocate
For Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Shubham Bajpai, Panel Lawyer
For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Siddhant Das, Advocate holding the
brief of Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
16/06/2025
1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):-
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10.1 That the records of the promotion to the post of Joint
Director in the year 2015 may be called for kind perusal of this
Honourable Court.
10.2 That the impugned promotion order dated 05.01.2016
granted to respondent number 3 and 4 to the post of Joint Direc
tor, Women and Child Welfare Department may be quashed and
respondents be directed to convene review DPC with reference
to vacant posts as existed on 01.01.2013 as per Promotion Rules
of 2003.
10.3 That any of the relief which Hon’ble Court may deem fit
and just in facts and circumstances of the case.
2. The petitioner was appointed to the post of District Women and Child
Development Officer on 03.09.1995. He was promoted to the post of
Deputy Director on 25.04.1998. For promotion to the next post i.e. Joint
Director, the requirement was experience of 05 years. The petitioner
had completed 05 years of service in the year 2003. In the gradation
list issued on 01.04.2004, the petitioner was placed at serial no. 03 and
junior to the petitioner, namely Prateek Khare was promoted to the post
of Joint Director in the year 2005. The petitioner challenged the
promotion order by filing WP(S) No. 5603/2017. Another DPC was
convened for promotion to the post of Joint Director on 29.12.2015 and
the name of the petitioner was within the zone of consideration. The
ACRs from the years 2010 to 2014 were taken into consideration, but
the name of the petitioner was not found suitable as his grade in ACR
of the year 2012 was lower. The juniors to the petitioner, namely
Rajesh Kumar Singhi and Nand Lal Choudhary were considered for
promotion. The criteria for promotion to the post of Joint Director were
merit-cum-seniority. It is also pleaded that the ACR of the year 2012
was never communicated to the petitioner.
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3. Mr. Saket Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would
argue that the petitioner was in the post of Deputy Director since 1998,
but his name was not considered for promotion and his juniors were
promoted. He would further submit that the adverse entries made in
the ACR of the year 2012 were taken into consideration while denying
promotion to the petitioner and the particular ACR was never
communicated. It is also contended that the respondent authorities
ought to have conducted DPC each and every year. It is also
contended that the impugned promotion order dated 05.01.2016,
whereby respondents No. 3 and 4 were promoted to the post of Joint
Director may be quashed and the respondent authorities may be
directed to consider the name of the petitioner for promotion.
4. On the other hand, Mr. Shubham Bajpai, learned Panel Lawyer
appearing for respondent No. 1 and Mr. Siddhant Das, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No. 2 would oppose. They would submit that
respondents No. 3 and 4 were promoted to the post of Joint Director
vide order dated 05.01.2016. They would further submit that the ACRs
of the last 05 years were considered and the ACR of 2012 of the
petitioner was not up to the mark, therefore, he was not found suitable.
They would also submit that the petitioner kept mum for a considerable
period and on 31.07.2018 filed this petition without explaining the delay
part. They would state that the petition deserves to be dismissed.
5. Admittedly, the age of the petitioner in the year 2018 was 54 years. The
impugned promotion order was issued on 05.01.2016, whereby
respondents No. 3 and 4 were promoted to the post of Joint Director.
The note-sheet filed along with the writ petition would reveal that
initially, adverse entries of the year 2012 made against the petitioner
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were not communicated, but later on, the petitioner was served with
the document and a representation was made by the petitioner, which
was rejected by the then Secretary of the department, but the petitioner
failed to challenge the said order.
6. The impugned order of promotion was issued on 05.01.2016 and the
petitioner should have approached this Court within a period of 06
months or one year, but the petitioner filed this petition on 31.07.2018.
In para- 7 of the writ petition, it is stated that the representation made
by the petitioner was accepted, but the Minister-in-Charge again sent
the matter for unnecessary deliberations. The petitioner has not
explained the reasons for not filing the petition in the year 2016 or
2017. Respondents No. 3 and 4 were promoted way back on
05.01.2016 and after more than 09 years, it would not be appropriate
to disturb their position.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of delay and
laches, particularly in service matters held as under:-
In Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal
Corporation reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 64 held as under:-
“9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter
statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of
repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary
opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. state
of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have
expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the
foundations of greater public interest for three reasons,
namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty
than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost
the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that
persons with good causes of action (who are able to
enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable
diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3
SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn.,
Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68
(2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or
character, creation of third party rights over a period of
5time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in
dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why
period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation
does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested
with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as
delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure
the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury,
quicken diligence, and prevent oppression.(see Popat and
Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association
(2005) 7 SCC 510).Therefore, some decisions and
judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with
favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons
suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts
for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the
rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have
observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and
are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan
during which a person must approach the court for their
remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty
as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N.
Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998)7 SCC 123.
Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court,
way back in Moons Mils Ltd Vs. M.R. Mehar, President,
Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred
to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The
Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper Armstrong
Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in
the following words:
” Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the
party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by this
conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving
that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse
of time and delay are most material. But in every case,if an
argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is
founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity
of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such
cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking
the one course or the other, so far as relates to the
remedy.”
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8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bichitrananda Behera
Vs. State of Orissa and others reported in 2023 Livelaw (SC) 883,
under relevant para 21 held as under:-
“21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passagesfrom
certain decisions of this Court:
(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim
will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where
remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation
(where remedy is sought by an application to the
Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said
rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a
service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief
can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking
remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing
wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a
continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the
exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or
administrative decision which related to or affected several
others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect
the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or
refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite
of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if
the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,
etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale
and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as
the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past
period is concerned, the principles relating to
recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence,
the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating
to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the
date of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied)
(B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:
“Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many
occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and
distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to
which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly,
laches might be called a genus to a species by name
acquiescence. However, there may be a case where
acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles
are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify
that these principles find place in various statutes which
restrict the period of limitation and create non consideration
7of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to
be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the
court than of a strict application of law. The underlying
principle governing these concepts would be one of
estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important
issue to be taken note of by the court.
Laches
21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language
meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves
unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim
involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the
other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act
which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore,
must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the
delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As
stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of
the party approaching the court apart from the change in
position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be
unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a
party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a
waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other
party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be
unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court.
Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not
expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.
23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is
no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a
clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a
remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The
said principle may not have any application when the
existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side.
To determine the difference between the concept of laches
and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches,
the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences
that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can
succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff,
while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to
acquiescence.
Acquiescence
24. We have already discussed the relationship between
acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on
the other.
25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive
acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In
other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent.
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Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes
knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge
comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any
action against any alleged refusal to perform the original
contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and
instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it
and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take
place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied
agreement between the parties. Once such a situation
arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to
insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence,
what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only
dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence.
When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become
laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept
of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis.”
(emphasis supplied)
(C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2
SCC 301:
“36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a
straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days,
etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. A right not exercised for a long time is
nonexistent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as
acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who
approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without
any justifiable explanation for bringing action after
unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the
order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after
four years and five months, which is certainly highly
belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory
explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the
appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently,
the challenge was primarily on the ground that the
respondent was not allowed to be represented by a
representative of his choice. The respondent knew that
even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has
happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not
be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a
legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also
noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to
show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed
challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question
of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the
present case.
Xxx
38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union
of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar
[State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court
9observed that if the statutory authority has not performed
its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same
by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived
of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for
relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and
thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within
reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to
take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such
cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some
cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh
[Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008)
2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action.The
State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine
claims and not deny them for want of action on their part.
However, this general principle would not apply when, on
consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the
respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either
express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies
intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6
of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.
[Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.,
(1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this
principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and
laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v.Jaswant Singh [U.P.
Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1
SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has
accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury’s Laws of
England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant
Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] ,
SCC pp. 470-71, paras 1213)“12. The statement of law has also been summarised in
Halsbury’s Laws of England, Para 911,p. 395 as follows:
‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to
amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part;and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the
defendant’s part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by
while the violation of a right is in progress,but assent after
the violation has been completed and the claimant has
become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a
remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or
where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and
10
delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests
the doctrine of laches.’
13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above,
the respondents are guilty since the respondents have
acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not
challenge the same in time. If they would have been
vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as
others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears
that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not
rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then
in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the
relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken
into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver
on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are
going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present
case, if the respondents would have challenged their
retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act,
perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to
raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting
their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and
after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ
petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will
definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to
have serious financial repercussions on the financial
management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to
the rescue of such persons when they themselves are
guilty of waiver and acquiescence?”
39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify
distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and laches”.
Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which
applies when a party having a right stands by and sees
another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right,
while the act is in progress and after violation is completed,
which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot
afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt.,
(2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see
Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925
SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal sense,
the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent,
concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust
v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584]
which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a
party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote
conduct from which another party will be justified in
inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari,
1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34] Acquiescence
can be either direct with full knowledge and express
approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to
set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in
a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the
infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See
11
“Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures — Law of
Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.]
However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of
no importance or consequence.
40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both
limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right.
Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable
considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports
even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence
implies active assent and is based upon the rule of
estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party
afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right.
Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent,
which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction
which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is
quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys
the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT,
1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] Given the
aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part
of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal,
and not for the period post filing of the appeal.
Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of
estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the
right of fair representation.”
9. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is
to be ignored without any justification. Remaining innocuously oblivious
to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it
brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have
impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others
into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been
treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons, such delay does not deserve any
indulgence and on the said ground alone this Court deems it
appropriate to dismiss this petition at the very threshold. The doctrine
of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation are
considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace. There must
be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their
12
remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the
rights and obligations of the parties.
10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in light of
the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of
Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra) and Bichitrananda Behera
(supra), it is quite vivid that the petitioner has approached this Court
with an inordinate delay and in para 7 of the writ petition, he has stated
that there is no delay in filing the instant petition. The petitioner utterly
failed to explain the delay caused in filing the instant petition.
Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, this petition is liable
to be and is hereby dismissed on account of delay and laches. No
costs.
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
vatti