Orissa High Court
Sri Prafulla Kumar Behera vs State Of Odisha on 19 June, 2025
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK
WA No.119 of 2025
In the matter of an Appeal under Article 4 of
the Odisha High Court Order, 1948
read with
Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting
the High Court of Judicature at Patna
and
Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII
of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 1948
***
Sri Prafulla Kumar Behera
Aged about 54 years
Son of Late Sansari Behera
At: Pandara, P.O.: G.G.P. Colony
Bhubaneswar, District: Khordha,
Working as Contractual Driver
Office of the Regional Transport Officer
Puri, District: Puri. ... Appellant
-VERSUS-
1. State of Odisha
Represented through
The Principal Secretary to Government
Commerce and Transport
(Transport) Department
Odisha, Bhubaneswar.
2. Principal Secretary to Government
Finance Department, Odisha
Bhubaneswar
District: Khordha.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 1 of 79
3. Transport Commissioner-cum-Chairman
State Transport Authority, Odisha
Cuttack.
4. Regional Transport Officer
Puri, At/P.O./District: Puri. ... Respondents.
Counsel appeared for the parties:
For the Appellant : M/s. Prasanta Kumar Mishra,
Kamal Lochan Kar and
Sidhant Mishra, Advocates
For the Respondent Mr. Saswat Das,
Nos.1 & 2 : Additional Government Advocate
For the Respondent Mr. Pravakar Behera,
Nos.3 & 4 : Standing Counsel
for Transport Department
P R E S E N T:
HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE
MR. HARISH TANDON
AND
HONOURABLE JUSTICE
MR. MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
Date of Hearing : 12.05.2025 :: Date of Judgment :19.06.2025
J UDGMENT
MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.--
This intra-Court appeal is directed against the
Judgement dated 17.12.2024 rendered by a learned
Single Bench in an application, bearing W.P.(C) No.2160
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 2 of 79
of 2020, under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India with the following prayer(s):
"It is prayed, therefore that this Hon‟ble Court may
graciously be pleased to:
(i) Admit and allow the Writ Appeal,
(ii) Issue notice to Respondents and after hearing be
pleased to set aside the Judgment dated 17.12.2024
under Annexure-1 passed by the Hon‟ble Single
Judge in W.P.(C) No.2160 of 2020 and:
(iii) Further be pleased to allow the W.P.(C) No.2160 of
2020 by granting the relief(s) prayed therein 1 in
favour of the Appellant-Petitioner with direction upon
Respondents to regularize his service as Driver
under regular establishment with all consequential
service and financial benefits with effect from the
date of completion of six years of service i.e.
1 The relief(s) sought for in the writ petition reads as follows:
"It is prayed therefore that this Hon‟ble Court may graciously be pleased to:
(i) Issue RULE NISI calling upon the opposite parties to show cause as to
why the impugned orders vide No.658/TC dated 14.01.2020 at Annexure-
1, vide No.13642 dated 24.11.2018 at Annexure-2 and vide No.204 dated
16.01.2020 at Annexure-14 shall not be quashed and the service of the
Petitioner shall not be regularized as Driver under regular establishment
with effect from the date of completion of six years of service as
contractual Driver with all consequential service and financial benefits;
(ii) And if the Opposite Parties fail to show cause or show insufficient cause,
the rule may be made absolute against Opposite Parties and a writ of
mandamus may be issued to the Opposite Parties and be pleased to
quash the impugned orders vide No.658/TC dated 14.01.2020 at
Annexure-1, vide No.13642 dated 24.11.2018 at Annexure-2 and vide
No.204 dated 16.01.2020 at Annexure-14 with a direction to Opp. Parties
to regularize the service of Petitioner as Driver under regular
establishment with effect from the date of completion of six years of
service as contractual Driver with all consequential service and financial
benefits within a time to be stipulated by this Hon‟ble Court;
(iii) Pass such other order (s), direction(s) as deem fit and proper to the facts
and circumstances of the case to give complete relief to the petitioner;
And for this act of kindness, the petitioner as in duty bound shall ever pray."
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 3 of 79
01.10.2015 as Contractual Driver within a
stipulated period of time and;
(iv) Further be pleased to direct the Respondent Nos.3
and 4 to release the un-paid remuneration from
January, 2020 in favour of the Appellant within a
stipulated period of time.
(v) And further be pleased to pass such other order (s),
direction(s) as deem fit and proper to the facts and
circumstances of the case to give complete relief to
the Appellant;
And for this act of kindness, the Appellant as in duty
bound shall ever pray."
Facts:
2. Shorn off unnecessary detailed narration of facts as
adumbrated by the appellant leading to filing of this writ
appeal, suffice here to describe herein below the
following:
2.1. Office vehicles in Chandikhole, Bhubaneswar, Ganjam,
Rourkela, Sambalpur, Bargarh, Principal, Driving
Training School, Bhubaneswar and Deputy
Commissioner, Transport (North Zone), Sambalpur, said
to have kept idle due to shortage of staff, for smooth
enforcement and administration of motor vehicles, the
concerned Regional Transport Offices, Deputy
Commissioner, Transport (North Zone), Sambalpur and
Principal, Driving Training School, Bhubaneswar, were
authorised to engage "contractual driver with condition
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 4 of 79
to renew every year" vide Office Order in Letter No.IX-
112/08-7551/TC, dated 11.06.2009.
2.2. Being so authorised, the appellant besides other
similarly placed persons was engaged by Regional
Transport Officer, Bhubaneswar, as Contractual Driver
against a vacant post to drive a Jeep bearing
Registration No.OR-02-AF-3003 vide Order No.6172,
dated 01.10.2009, pursuant to which he joined in
service and continued to work as such till date in the
Office(s) of the Regional Transport Officer.
2.3. Having joined on 01.10.2009, the appellant should have
been regularised with effect from 01.10.2015 as he
completed six years of service. He is deemed to have
been regularised in terms of Clause 2 of the Government
of Odisha in General Administration Department,
Odisha vide Resolution No.26108-GAD-SC-RULES-
0009-2013/Gen, dated 17.09.2013 (for convenience
referred to as "GAD Resolution, 2013").
2.4. Ignoring the case of the appellant for regularisation in
the service, four Contractual Drivers out of 14
Contractual Drivers were appointed on regular basis.
The appellant approached the learned Odisha
Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneswar by way of
Original Application, registered as O.A. No.1234 of 2018,
under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act,
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 5 of 79
1985, for a direction to the authorities concerned to
regularize his service as Driver. Pending this original
application, the Respondent No.3 vide Letter No.12133,
dated 06.08.2016 forwarded the details of remaining ten
numbers of Contractual Drivers (including appellant)
recommending regularisation of their service as Drivers.
Accordingly, the learned Tribunal vide Order dated
12.01.2018 allowed said Original Application with a
positive direction.
2.5. The High Power Committee (for short, "HPC") in its
Meeting held on 10.10.2018 flouted such direction of the
learned Tribunal and rejected the claim of the appellant
vide Office Order in Letter No.13642/TC, dated
24.11.2018 issued by order of the Transport
Commissioner in the Office of the Transport
Commissioner-cum-Chairman, State Transport
Authority, Odisha, Cuttack (for short, "STA").
2.6. While the authorities concerned were contemplating
action to disengage the appellant, writ petition, being
W.P.(C) No.2160 of 2020, was filed and in consideration
of the plight of the appellant, the learned Single Judge
while issuing notice to the opposite parties vide Order
dated 22.01.2020 issued following interim direction:
"As an interim measure, this Court directs that status quo
as on today shall be maintained by the parties till the
next date.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 6 of 79
It is further directed that the pendency of the writ petition
shall not stand as a bar for considering the case of the
petitioner for regularisation for being appointed as regular
driver."
2.7. The appellant stated to have served copies of writ
petition on counsel for the opposite parties on
24.01.2020 and communicated the interim order passed
by the learned Single Judge enclosed with a
representation on 29.01.2020 to the Regional Transport
Officer (Respondent No.4). However, on 06.02.2020
without following the principles of natural justice,
referring to the impugned Order dated 14.01.2020 of the
Additional Commissioner, Transport (Administration),
STA, Odisha, said Regional Transport Officer issued
Order No. 204/RTA, purported to have been passed on
16.01.2020 whereby the appellant is shown to have been
disengaged from service. Said Order 16.01.2020 was
served on the appellant on 06.02.2020 through peon
book.
2.8. Questioning tenability of such order purported to have
been passed on 16.01.2020, being served on the
appellant on 06.02.2020, i.e., after the learned Single
Judge passed the interim Order dated 22.01.2020 in the
writ petition, the appellant sought for amendment of writ
petition incorporating necessary details, which led to
filing of consolidated writ petition being interlocutory
application stood allowed.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 7 of 79
2.9. Other nine Contractual Drivers also approached this
Court by way of filing W.P.(C) Nos.2157, 2159, 2162,
2234, 2237, 2241, 2245, 2246 and 26231 of 2020,
which were disposed of along with writ petition of the
appellant being W.P.(C) No.2160 of 2020 vide common
Judgment dated 17.12.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.2157
of 2020 & batch. The Order dated 17.12.2024 passed in
the case of present appellant in W.P.(C) No.2160 of 2020
reads as under:
"1. This matter is taken up through hybrid arrangement.
2. In view of the common judgment passed today in
W.P.(C) No.2157 of 2020 2 , this writ petition is
disposed of.
3. Interim order, if any, passed earlier, stands
vacated."
2.10. Being not satisfied, the writ appeal has been filed by the
appellant craving to set aside the Judgment dated
17.12.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.2160 of 2020 with
prayers to issue of direction(s) to absorb him and in
2 The learned Single Judge has arrived at the following "conclusion" vide
Judgment dated 17.12.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.2157 of 2020 and batch:
"***
15. Upon analyzing the facts, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the
decision of the High Power Committee in rejecting the regularization of the
service of the petitioner.
16. In light of the foregoing, this Court finds no merit in the petitioner‟s plea to
interfere with the denial of regularization or the decision to disengage from
service.
17. Consequently, all the above mentioned Writ Petitions are hereby
dismissed.
18. Interim order, if any, passed earlier, in any of the Writ Petitions, stands
vacated."
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 8 of 79
consequence thereof grant all consequential service and
financial benefits.
Hearing:
3. The matter was on board under heading "Fresh
Admission".
3.1. Since short point, whether the learned Single Judge
could have intermeddled with the irrational reasoning
ascribed to by the HPC in order to disengage the
appellant from service instead of considering the case of
the appellant, Contractual Driver, for regularisation in
service, though he worked as such for substantial
number of years before interim protection was granted
by this Court, is involved, on the consent of the counsel
for the parties, this matter is disposed of at the stage of
"Fresh Admission".
3.2. Upon hearing Sri Prasanta Kumar Mishra, learned
Advocate for the appellant, Sri Saswat Das, learned
Additional Government Advocate for Respondent Nos.1 &
2 and Sri Pravakar Behera, learned Standing Counsel for
Transport Department-Respondent Nos.3 &4, this Court
proceeded to finally adjudicate the matter on merit.
3.3. On conclusion of arguments advanced by the respective
counsel for the appellant as well as the respondents on
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 9 of 79
12.05.2025, the matter stood reserved for preparation
and pronouncement of Judgment/Order.
Rival contentions and submissions:
4. Sri Prasanta Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the
appellant with the above factual backdrop submitted
that the learned Single Bench has proceeded to decide
the matter pondering heavily the terms of GAD
Resolution dated 16.01.2014, and dismissed the writ
petition acceding to the reasons ascribed by the HPC
while rejecting the claim of the appellant for
regularisation in service.
4.1. He would urge that when the learned Odisha
Administrative Tribunal while disposing of Original
Application, being O.A. No.1234 of 2016, vide Order
dated 12.01.2018 allowed the prayer(s) for regularisation
in service. After addressing the stand taken by the
respondents, having regard to the plight of the appellant,
directed the authorities "to regularise the services of the
applicant as recommended vide Letter dated
06.08.2016" "as has been done in the case of similarly
situated drivers", (copy of order was available at
Annexure-12 of the writ petition). Therefore, it is
forcefully argued that the HPC showing scanty regard to
the finding of fact and clear-cut direction, it rejected the
claim for regularisation in service by adhering to General
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 10 of 79
Administrative Department advisory in terms of GAD
Circular No.16645/Gen., dated 30.07.2016 3 . Such
decision of the HPC in brushing aside the
recommendation of the appointing authority, who was
duly authorised to appoint/engage Contractual drivers,
rejection of claim of the appellant is not only
unsustainable in law, but also the order of
disengagement of the appellant tends to violation of rule
of law, being not in consonance with the directions of the
learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal. He would
submit that the impugned Judgement of the learned
Single Judge is, thus, flawed and cannot be
countenanced. He, therefore, prayed to allow the writ
petition.
4.2. It is painstakingly submitted by Sri Prasanta Kumar
Mishra, learned Advocate that having joined on
01.10.2009 by virtue of Office Order dated 01.10.2009 of
the Regional Transport Officer, the appellant completed
six years of continuous service as a Contractual Driver
on 30.09.2015. Therefore, in terms of GAD Resolution,
2013 the regularisation in service of the appellant
should have been considered by the HPC, but reliance
could not have been placed on the Circular dated
3 See, copy of "Proceeding of High Power Committee Meeting for regularization of
Contractual Data Entry Operators and Drivers" held on 10.10.2018 as enclosed
as Annexure-B/3 to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the STA in
connection with the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.2157 of 2020 (Sri Krodapati
Saraf Vrs. State of Odisha) disposed of vide impugned common Judgment.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 11 of 79
30.07.2016. It is submitted that the Circular could not
have the overriding effect over the Resolution, 2013.
4.3. The alternative argument of the counsel is that even if it
is assumed that there was non-fulfilment of conditions
stipulated in General Administration Department
Resolution No.1066-GAD-SC-RULES-0009/2013/Gen.,
dated 16.01.2014 ("GAD Resolution, 2014", for short),
the terms of such Resolution could not be applied to the
present fact-situation to disqualify the claim for
regularisation in service as the same has prospective in
operation. Expanding his argument, learned counsel
urged that the appellant had been engaged against a
sanctioned post under Scheduled Caste category prior to
GAD Resolution, 2013 read with GAD Resolution, 2014.
4.4. It is matter of record which was conspicuously ignored
by the learned Single Judge that prior to passing of
interim order in the year 2020 in the writ petition, the
appellant had already completed 10 years of service as
Contractual Driver. It is vehemently contended that out
of fourteen Contractual Drivers, four Contractual Drivers
have been regularized whereas ten contractual drivers
are discriminated. This arbitrariness in action of the
respondents clearly transgressed the provisions
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India and
such action has been deprecated by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in very many cases.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 12 of 79
4.5. Therefore, the judgment dated 17.12.2024 passed by the
learned Single Bench in W.P.(C) No.2160 of 2020 is
liable to be set aside and the prayer made in the writ
petition is insisted to be allowed.
4.6. Learned counsel for the Appellant further advanced
submission that the authority concerned without giving
reasonable opportunity to the appellant sought to
disengage him and rejected the claim for regularization
in service. He, relying on Letter dated 31.10.2016
(Annexure-11 to the writ petition), submitted that the
Office of the Transport Commissioner-cum-Chairman,
State Transport Authority, Odisha, Cuttack
recommended the cases of the Contractual Drivers
including the appellant for regularisation in service to
the Under Secretary to Government, Commerce &
Transport (Transport) Department, Odisha,
Bhubaneswar. It is, therefore, contended with
vehemence that the learned Single Judge having ignored
to take into consideration facts stated therein, simply
relied heavily on the reasons of the HPC. As the reasons
are contrary to the material fact as reflected in the Letter
of recommendation, the writ appeal deserves to be
allowed.
5. Sri Saswat Das, learned Additional Government
Advocate, opposing the contentions of the learned
counsel for the appellant, made valiant attempt to
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 13 of 79
present before this Court that pursuant to direction
contained in Order dated 12.01.2018 passed in O.A.
No.1234 of 2016 (Prafulla Kumar Behera Vrs. State of
Odisha), the HPC has committed no mistake in
analysing the fact-situation of the case while taking apt
decision to reject the claim of the appellant for
regularisation in service. Considering the nature of
engagement of the appellant, said Committee applied the
conditions as spelt out in the GAD Resolution, 2014.
Having found non-fulfilment of such conditions, the HPC
denied regularisation in service.
5.1. The learned Additional Government Advocate referring to
"Conclusion" arrived at by the learned Single Judge
would submit that each conditions stipulated in the
GAD Resolution, 2014 has been kept in view by the
learned Single Bench. Since the sanction of post is the
prerogative of the Government, the High Court in
exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India cannot issue writ of mandamus to create or
sanction posts. The appellant having not been
appointed/engaged against sanctioned post, the HPC
was legally justified in rejecting the claim for regular
appointment.
5.2. Having failed to substantiate the claim vis-à-vis the
conditions envisaged in the GAD Resolution, 2014, the
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 14 of 79
appellant, Contractual Driver, is not entitled to be
regularised in service.
5.3. Thus, the learned Additional Government Advocate as
also the Standing Counsel for Transport Department
argued that parity claimed attune with the cases of four
Contractual Drivers who were regularised stemming on
provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India
cannot be sustained inasmuch as the HPC in its Meeting
dated 10.10.2018 (Annexure-B/3 of the Counter
Affidavit) clearly stated that "since none of the provisions
of GA Department (Resolution) are fulfilled the
regularisation order No.11547/TC, dated 31.08.2015
made in respect of four numbers of Drivers by STA is to
be revoked". Hence, it is insisted by the counsels for the
respondents that stance of the appellant, sans merit, is
liable to be rejected.
Analysis and discussions:
6. At the outset this Court takes up the issue whether
there is any scope left in view of Order dated 12.01.2018
of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal passed in O.A.
No.1234 of 2016 (Prafulla Kumar Behera Vrs. State of
Odisha) to delve into the factual merit of the claim of the
appellant by the HPC.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 15 of 79
6.1. Pertinent observations contained in the said Order
passed by the Odisha Administrative Tribunal runs as
follows:
"The applicant who was working as a driver on
contractual basis, has sought for a direction for
regularisation of his service, as has been done in the case
of similarly situated persons vide Order dated
31.08.2015.
***
Learned Standing Counsel, basing on the counter
submitted that the applicant has not been selected
following the regular recruitment process and
following the GA Department Resolution No.1066,
dated 16.01.2014. It is submitted that as the
applicant does not fulfil the mandatory eligibility
criteria, he is not eligible for regularisation.
From the documents produced by the applicant, it
appears that the applicant was initially engaged on
contingent paid daily wage basis for 15 (fifteen) days in a
month with effect from 30.04.2007 vide Order dated
02.05.2007 (Annexure-1). Thereafter, the applicant was
engaged as contractual driver vide Order dated
01.10.2009 and was also directed to perform the duty of
a driver vide Order dated 31.07.2011. It appears from
the letter of the Government in Commerce and
Transport Department dated 25.04.2008 that
Government in Finance Department have concurred
the proposal for engagement of 14 drivers.
Accordingly vide Letter dated 31.10.2016, Transport
Commissioner requested the Government for
regularisation of 14 drivers stating that those drivers
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 16 of 79
have been engaged, following the recruitment
procedure as well as the principle of reservation.
The name of the applicant appears at Sl.No.9 of the list.
Thereafter, vide Order dated 31.08.2015, four drivers
have been appointed on regular basis on successful
completion of six years of uninterrupted contractual
service. The stand of the State-respondent in the
counter is that the applicant has not been
appointed following due procedure which
contradicts the letter of the Transport
Commissioner vide Annexure-B/2. Out of the said list,
four drivers have already been appointed and the
Transport Commissioner vide letter at Annexure-B/1 have
submitted the list of rest of the drivers for regularisation of
their services. However, no action has yet been taken.
Since similarly situated drivers out of the list
submitted vide Annexure-B/2 have already been
regularised vide Letter at Annexure-7, the
applicant's claim for regularisation cannot be
denied.
Accordingly, the O.A. is allowed and the respondent
authorities are directed to regularize the services of
the applicant as recommended vide Letter dated
06.08.2016 as at Annexure-B/1, as has been done in
the case of similarly situated drivers vide letter at
Annexure-B/2. Such action be taken as expeditiously as
possible but within a period of three months from the date
of receipt of a copy of this order. With these orders the
O.A. is disposed of."
6.2. Vide Letter No.IX-29/2016-- 16925/TC, dated
31.10.2016, the Under Secretary in the Office of
Transport Commissioner-cum-Chairman, State
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 17 of 79
Transport Authority, Odisha, Cuttack, the case of the
appellant along with others has been recommended for
regularisation in service. The text of said letter is
reproduced hereunder:
"***
Sub.: Regularization of services of Drivers on contractual
basis.
Ref.: Commerce and Transport (Transport) Department
letter No.7331/T dated 19.10.2016, this office letter
No.2648/TC dated 20.02.2016 and 12133/TC
dated 06.08.2016.
Sir,
In inviting reference to the letter on the subject cited
above, I am directed to say that details of
contractual drivers engaged in STA and its sub-
ordinate offices is given below:
1. 14 numbers of drivers have been engaged in STA
and its sub-ordinate offices as per concurrence of
Finance Department which was intimated to this
office vide Commerce and Transport (Transport)
Department Letter No.3554/T dated 25.04.2008 on
contractual basis.
2. The Odisha Gazette dated 16.01.2014 says that
contractual appointment/engagements must have
been made against contractual posts created with
the concurrence of Finance Department on abolition
of the corresponding regular posts. Although the
regular posts have not been abolished, the
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 18 of 79
contractual engagement has been allowed within the
sanctioned strength of the posts of driver. In other
words no engagement has been made beyond the
sanctioned strength.
3. Recruitment procedure prescribed has been followed
while giving contractual engagement to the drivers.
4. Principle of reservation of posts has been observed
properly.
In this connection, statement showing details of
contractual drivers is enclosed herewith.
It is therefore requested that necessary steps may kindly
be taken for placement of the case before the high power
committee as stipulated in G.A. Department Resolution
No.1066, dated 16.01.2014."
6.3. Meticulous reading of said Order dated 12.01.2018
transpires that the reasons put forth by the HPC in its
Meeting dated 10.10.2018 (Annexure-B/3 of the counter
affidavit) was before the learned Odisha Administrative
Tribunal. After considering all these aspects, the same
were duly considered and the learned Tribunal has
rendered positive direction "to regularise the services of
the applicant as recommended vide Letter dated
06.08.2016".
6.4. No substance is placed on record that such finding of
fact including the conclusion and direction of the
learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal has been
upturned in the higher Court(s).
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 19 of 79
6.5. Therefore, the HPC fell in grave error in reconsidering
the factual merit of entitlement of the appellant for
regularisation in service. The HPC in order to say that
the claim of the appellant does not fulfil conditions laid
down in the GAD Resolution, 2014, it has reconsidered
the merits which had already been addressed to by the
learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal. Nothing is
placed by the respondents to demonstrate that said
order of the learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal
containing positive direction was questioned before
higher Court(s).
6.6. It is trite that the decision of the Tribunal is binding on
the State-functionaries and authorities, until and unless
the same is quashed/reversed/modified by this Court or
the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is propounded in Ujjam
Bai Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621 =
(1963) 1 SCR 778 that:
"It is necessary first to clarify the concept of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction means authority to decide. Whenever a
judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered or
required to enquire into a question of law or fact for
the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings
thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an
application for certiorari but are binding until
reversed on appeal. Where a quasi-judicial
authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it
does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong
conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact. The
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 20 of 79
question, whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not
on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to
enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these
facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable at the
commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry."
6.7. In Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. Vrs. Commissioner
of Sales Tax, Bihar, (1961) 2 SCR 106, it has been held
as follows:
"The principal point that Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel
for the appellants, argued before us related to the duty of
the tax authorities to obey the orders of the Board of
Revenue and give effect to them, and he submitted that
the High Court erred in denying his clients the relief of
mandamus on the ground that that order was erroneous.
In support of this argument learned counsel sought
reliance on a recent decision of this Court in Bhopal Sugar
Industries Vrs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Civil Appeal
407 of 1956; since reported at (1960) 40 ITR 618 in which
it was held that when an order was made by a
superior tribunal (in that case the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal) directing the Income-tax Officer
to compute the income of an assessee on a
particular basis and that order had become final,
the subordinate officer had no right to disregard
the direction, because it was wrong and that the
High Court when approached by the assessee for the
issue of a writ of mandamus, was bound to enforce
the final order of the superior tribunal and could
not refuse to do so because it considered the order
of the tribunal to be wrong. This Court pointed out
that when the order which the tribunal had
jurisdiction to pass became final, it bound all
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 21 of 79
parties to it and its correctness could not be
challenged collaterally in proceedings for enforcing
that order. The attempt of learned counsel for the
appellants was to bring this case within the scope of the
above ruling.
The ratio of this decision is to be found in this passage:
„By that order the respondent virtually refused to carry
out the directions which a superior tribunal had given to
him in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an
order of assessment made by him. Such refusal is in
effect a denial of justice, and is furthermore destructive of
one of the basic principles in the administration of justice
based as it is in this country on a hirearchy of courts. If a
subordinate tribunal refuses to carry out directions
given to it by a superior tribunal in the exercise of
its appellate powers, the result will be chaos in the
administration of justice and we have indeed found it
very difficult to appreciate the process of reasoning by
which the learned Judicial Commissioner while roundly
condemning the respondent for refusing to carry out the
directions of the superior tribunal, yet held that no
manifest injustice resulted from such refusal.‟
To attract the principle thus enunciated, it is necessary
that there should be an order of a superior tribunal
clear, certain and definite in its terms, and without
any ambiguity, to which the subordinate authority
or officer to whom it is addressed, could give
effect."
6.8. In Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vrs. The Excise and Taxation
Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, (2023) 3 SCR 871 it has
been laid down that:
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 22 of 79
"In our view, the Revisional Authority might have been
justified in exercising suo motu power to revise the order
of the Assessing Authority had the decision of the
Tribunal been set aside or its operation stayed by a
competent Court. So long it is not disputed that the
Tribunal's decision, having regard to the framework
of classification of products/tax liability then
existing, continues to remain operative and such
framework too continues to remain operative when
the impugned revisional orders were made, the
Revisional Authority was left with no other choice
but to follow the decision of the Tribunal without
any reservation. Unless the discipline of adhering to
decisions made by the higher authorities is maintained,
there would be utter chaos in administration of tax laws
apart from undue harassment to assessees. We share the
view expressed in Union of India and Ors. Vs. Kamlakshi
Finance Corporation Ltd. 1992 SUPP (1) SCC 443 = AIR
1992 SC 711."
6.9. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Orissa
Forest Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Assistant Collector, 1982 SCC
OnLine Ori 209 held as follows:
"We do not think this should be the attitude of the Union
Government. The demand is under the Statute and the
statutory appellate authority, on the set of facts which are
common both to the period when relief was granted and
the period for which the impugned demand has been
made, has already determined that no levy is exigible. As
long as the appellate order stands, it must be duly
respected and only when the revisional authority vacates
the order and holds that the decision of the appellate
authority is wrong and the demand was justified, no
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 23 of 79
demand should be raised. It has been indicated on
more than one occasions by the Supreme Court with
reference to directions of the Appellate Tribunal
under the Income Tax Act that such directions are
binding and decisions rendered by appellate
authorities should be respected by the subordinate
revenue authorities and no attempt should be made
to wriggle out of the binding decisions of higher
authorities as long as they remain in force. The
same principle should be applied to the present set
of facts and we are, therefore, inclined to take the view
that the demand under Annexure-4 should be set aside
but we would make it clear that in the event of the
appellate orders being vacated, under the Statute the
liability would revive and notwithstanding our quashing
Annexure-4 the statutory authority would be entitled to
raise a demand in terms of the decision which may be
ultimately sustained under the Statute."
6.10. At this stage it is reminded of that, every holder of a
public office is a trustee whose highest duty is to the
people of the country and, therefore, every act of the
holder of a public office, irrespective of the label
classifying that act, is in discharge of public duty meant
ultimately for public good. [See, Shrilekha Vidyarthi
(Kumari) Vrs. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212].
6.11. Any order passed by the Odisha Administrative Tribunal,
constituted under the provisions of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 4 , ought to be respected and fully
4 Long title of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, runs thus:
"An Act to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of
disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 24 of 79
complied with, inasmuch as the hierarchy in the
judiciary needs to be respected by one and all. In that
hierarchy, the orders passed by the learned Odisha
Administrative Tribunal would bind the parties before it.
[Regard being had to observations made in Order dated
15.05.2024 of the Supreme Court of India passed in the
case of Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Sanjay
Gopinath, C.A. Nos. 2764-2771 of 2022.]
6.12. In the aforesaid premise, it is not for the HPC to
reconsider the merit of the matter to adjudicate afresh
the entitlement of the appellant contrary to what had
already been observed and held in the Order dated
12.01.2018 passed in O.A. No.1234 of 2016 by the
learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal. The tenor of
direction of the learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal
was loud and clear whereby it has unambiguously
directed to regularize the service of the appellant without
granting any scope to the HPC to sit over the findings
which was adjudicated by the learned Tribunal in its
decision. Approving the decision of HPC would clearly
tantamount to violation of rule of law.
6.13. The learned Single Judge in his Judgment dated
17.12.2024 manifestly committed error of law in ignoring
persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of
the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of
India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or
society owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance of Article 323A of the
Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 25 of 79
to take cognizance of aforesaid factor despite the
appellant agitated in the writ petition.
7. A close scrutiny of the impugned Judgment would reveal
that in order to uphold the denial of regularisation in
service by the High Power Committee, the learned Single
Judge has assigned the reason that the appellant has
not met mandatory eligibility criteria outlined in GAD
Resolution, 2014.
7.1. The essentials criteria can be culled out from the
General Administration and Public Grievance
Department Resolutions, which were considered by the
Odisha Administrative Tribunal in the earlier round of
litigation:
"GAD-SC-RULES-0009-2013--26108/Gen
Government of Odisha
General Administration Department
***
RESOLUTION
Bhubaneswar dated the 17th September, 2013.
SUB: Regular appointment of existing contractual Group C
and Group D employees who are not holding any
post in contravention of any statutory Recruitment
Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution of India or any executive instruction in
absence of such rules.
The policy regarding regular appointment of following
categories of contractual Group „C‟ and Group „D‟
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 26 of 79
employees appointed under the State Government was
under active consideration of Government for some time
past. Contractual appointments/engagements made
against contractual posts created with the concurrence of
Finance Department on abolition of the corresponding
regular posts or contractual appointments/engagements
made against contractual posts created with the
concurrence of Finance Department without abolition of
any corresponding regular post in case of new offices or
for strengthening of the existing offices/services, following
the recruitment procedure prescribed for the
corresponding regular posts and the principle of
reservation of Posts and services for different categories
of persons decided by the state Government from time to
time.
Government after careful consideration and in
supersession of the Resolutions/Orders/Instructions
issued by different Departments of Government to that
effect; except as respects things done or omitted to be
done before such supersession, have been pleased to
decide as follows:
1. Regular Appointment.--
(1) A gradation list of such contractual employees shall
be prepared by the Appointing Authority on the basis
of their date of appointment. In case, the dates of
appointment of two or more employees are the same
their inter-se position may be decided on the basis of
their date of birth, taking the elder as senior.
(2) Regular appointment of the above categories of
contractual employees shall be made on the date of
completion of six years of service or from the date of
publication of this Resolution, whichever is later, in
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 27 of 79
the order in which their names appear in the
gradation list prepared under para 1. The period of
six years shall be counted from the date of
contractual appointment prior to publication of this
Resolution.
(3) Consequent upon regular appointment under the
contractual post, if any, shall get re-converted to
regular sanctioned post.
(4) In case the person concerned has crossed the upper
age limit for entry into Government service on the
date of contractual appointment for the
corresponding regular post, the appointing authority
shall allow relaxation of upper age limit.
2. Conditions of Service on Regular Appointment.--
(1) Regular Appointments:
On the date of satisfactory completion of six years of
contractual service or from the date of publication of
this Resolution, whichever is later, they shall be
deemed to have been regularly appointed. A formal
order of regular appointment shall be issued by the
appointing authority.
(2) Pay and other benefits:
On regular appointment they shall be entitled to
draw the time scale of pay plus Grade Pay with DA
and other allowances as admissible in the
corresponding pay band.
(3) Other conditions of service:
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 28 of 79
(a) The other conditions of service shall be such as
has been provided in the relevant recruitment
rules.
(b) The conditions of service in regard to matters
not covered by this Resolution shall be the
same as are or as may from time to time be
prescribed by the State Government.
3. Interpretation.--
If any question arises relating to the interpretation of
this Resolution, it shall be referred to the State
Government whose decision thereon shall be final.
4. This has been concurred in by Finance Department
and Law Department vide their UOR No.2909-ACSF,
Dated 09.07.2013 and UOR No.1687/L., Dated
19.07.2013 respectively.
ORDER:
Ordered that the Resolution be published in the
extraordinary issue of the Odisha Gazette.
Ordered also that copies of the Resolution be
forwarded to all Departments of Government /
all Heads of Departments/all Collectors /
Registrar, Odisha High Court / Registrar,
Odisha Administrative Tribunal Special
Secretary, Odisha Public Service Commission /
Secretary, Odisha Staff Selection Commission/
Secretary, Odisha Sub-ordinate Staff Selection
Commission, Bhubaneswar.
By Order of the Governor
NITEN CHANDRA
Special Secretary to Government”
*** *** ***
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 29 of 79
[No. 1066-GAD-SC-RULES-0009/2013/Gen.]
General Administration Department
RESOLUTIONThe 16th January, 2014
Sub: Regular Appointment of existing Contractual
Group C and Group-D employees who are not
holding any post in contravention of any statutory
Recruitment Rules made under the proviso to Article
309 of the Constitution of India or any executive
instruction in absence of such rules.
1. As per General Administration Department
Resolution No. 26108/Gen., Dated the 17th
September, 2013, the following are the mandatory
eligibility conditionalities for regularlzation of
contractual appointees/engagements.
(i) Contractual appointments/engagements must
have been made against contractual posts
created with the concurrence of Finance
Department on abolition of the corresponding
regular posts or contractual posts created with
the concurrence of Finance Department without
abolition of any corresponding regular post in
case of new offices or for strengthening of the
existing offices/services,
(ii) Such Contractual appointments/
engagements must have been made
following the recruitment procedure
prescribed for the corresponding regular
posts, andWA No.119 of 2025 Page 30 of 79
(iii) Principle of reservation of Posts must have
been followed in case of such Contractual
appointments/engagements.
In other words, no contractual appointee shall
be eligible for regular appointment as per the
aforesaid Resolution unless the mandatory
eligibility conditionalities described above are
fulfilled.
2. A part from the contractual employees fulfilling the
conditionalities elucidated in Para. 1 above, there
are other categories of contractual employees
engaged with or without creation of posts with the
concurrence of Finance Department, without
following the relevant recruitment and reservation
Rules. There are also contractual employees
engaged on out sourcing basis through service
providing agencies. These contractual employees are
not eligible for regularization as per the aforesaid
Resolution.
3. In order to prevent misuse of the aforesaid
Resolution, it is felt necessary to put appropriate
mechanism in place to ensure that the necessary
conditionalities as mentioned in Para. 1 are met.
4. Government, therefore, after careful consideration
have been pleased to decide in the following
manner.
(a) Proposal for regularization of contractual
appointees/engagements as per the aforesaid
Resolution shall be considered and approved
by a HPC to be constituted under the
Chairmanship of the Secretary of the relevantWA No.119 of 2025 Page 31 of 79
Department in which the concerned Head of
Department and FA/AFA of the Department
shall be Members.
(b) In case the matter pertains to Administrative
Department, then the High Power Committee
shall be constituted under the Chairmanship of
the Secretary of the Department with Special
Secretary/Additional Secretary in-charge of the
office establishment and FA/AFA of the
Department as Members.
(c) While considering the cases of regularization,
High Power Committee shall at the outset
ensure that the concerned appointments fulfil
the mandatory eligibility conditionalities as
elucidated in Para. 1 above and thereafter
consider the case on the basis of the
stipulations contained under the heading
„Regular Appointments‟ of the General
Administration Department Resolution
No.26108/Gen, Dated the 17th September,
2013.
5. This Resolution has been issued with the advice of
Finance Department communicated to General
Administration Department vide their DOR No.5660-
ACSF, dated the 19th December, 2013.
Order: Ordered that the Resolution be published In the
Extraordinary Issue of the Odisha Gazette.
Ordered also that copies of the Resolution be
forwarded to all departments of Government/
all Heads of Departments/all Collectors/
Registrar, Odisha High Court/Registrar,
Odisha Administrative Tribunal/Special
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 32 of 79
Secretary, Odisha Public Service
Commission/Secretary. Odisha Staff Selection
Commission/Secretary, Odisha Sub-ordinate
Staff Selection Commission. Bhubaneswar.
By Order of the Governor
NITEN CHANDRA
Special Secretary to Government”
7.2. Going through said Resolutions, particularly GAD
Resolution, 2014, it is made to understand that
Contractual Appointment must have been made against
contractual posts created with concurrence of Finance
Department on abolition of the corresponding regular
posts or contractual posts created with the concurrence
of Finance Department without abolition of any
corresponding regular post in case of new offices or for
strengthening of the existing offices/services. At this
juncture if the Office Order dated 11.06.2009 (Annexure-
5) is glanced, it is depicted that due to shortage of
regular Drivers, the office vehicles being kept idle in
certain offices, concerned Regional Transport Officers,
Deputy Commission of Transport (North Zone),
Sambalpur and Principal, Driving Training School,
Bhubaneswar were authorised “to engage Contractual
Driver with condition to renew every year by the Finance
Department Order No.Bt-V-47/04-55764-F., dated
31.12.2004 communicated vide Commerce and
Transport (Transport) Department Letter No.1913-T.,
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 33 of 79
dated 10.02.2005″. In the said letter it has been
stipulated that the appointment shall be made with
strict adherence with the terms and conditions imposed
by Finance Department. Therefore, the HPC having held
otherwise without assigning cogent reason, the
engagement/appointment of Contractual Drivers could
not be said to be de hors record and material available
on record. So far as concurrence of the Finance
Department is concerned, this aspect has been
considered by the Odisha Administrative Tribunal in its
Order dated 12.01.2018 passed in O.A. No.1234 of 2016
in connection with the appellant’s case, wherein it has
been mentioned that “Thereafter, he was engaged as a
Contractual Driver vide Order at Annexure-4 and 4/1.
While the matter stood thus, Government in Finance
Department vide their letter at Annexure-5 approved
the proposal for appointment of 14 Contractual
Drivers”. This Court is, thus, convinced that the
appointment of the appellant was made against
sanctioned post with necessary concurrence as is made
necessary in the said Resolution.
7.3. The next condition as revealed from the GAD Resolution,
2014 is that contractual appointment/engagement must
have been made following the recruitment procedure
prescribed for corresponding regular posts. This aspect
has been dealt with by the Odisha Administrative
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 34 of 79
Tribunal in its Order dated 12.01.2018 passed in O.A.
No.1234 of 2016 in connection with the appellant’s case.
From the said Order which has been extracted supra it is
recorded that “the stand of the State-respondent in the
counter is that the applicant has not been appointed
following due procedure which contradicts the letter of the
Transport Commissioner vide Annexure-B/2”. Therefore,
in the present case, the counter affidavit filed in the writ
petition taking contradictory stand by the Transport
Department, which aspect has already been decided by
the Odisha Administrative Tribunal and remained
unchallenged by the respondents in further proceedings.
7.4. In Kalinga Mining Corpn. Vrs. Union of India, (2013) 5
SCC 252 the principle of res judicata vis-à-vis scope to
reopen already decided issue in another litigation inter
se parties has been discussed as follows:
“42. Considering the principle of res judicata, this Court
in Mohanlal Goenka Vrs. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee,
(1952) 2 SCC 648 = AIR 1953 SC 65 = 1953 SCR
377 held as under:
„23. There is ample authority for the proposition
that even an erroneous decision on a question
of law operates as „res judicata‟ between the
parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a
judicial decision has no bearing upon the
question whether or not it operates as „res
judicata‟.‟WA No.119 of 2025 Page 35 of 79
This Court also held that:
„14. *** A wrong decision by a court having
jurisdiction is as much binding between the
parties as a right one and may be superseded
only by appeals to higher tribunals or other
procedure like review which the law provides.‟
[See State of W.B. Vrs. Hemant Kumar
Bhattacharjee, AIR 1966 SC 1061]
43. In view of the aforesaid clear enunciation of the law
by this Court, it would appear that even if the
judgment dated 02.07.2001 [Kalinga Mining Corpn.
Vrs. Union of India, AIR 2002 Ori 83] rendered by
the High Court in OJC No. 11537 of 1999 and the
dismissal [Kalinga Mining Corpn. Vrs. Union of
India, SLP (C) No. 13556 of 2001, Order dated
24.08.2001, wherein it was directed: „The special
leave petition is dismissed.‟] in limine of SLP (C) No.
13556 of 2001 arising from the aforesaid judgment
is considered to be erroneous in view of the
judgment in Saligram Khirwal Vrs. Union of India,
(2003) 7 SCC 689, the matter regarding the locus
standi of the LRs of Respondent 10 to proceed with a
mining lease application cannot be permitted to be
reopened at this stage since it has become final inter
partes.”
7.5. Stemming on such principle, there is no doubt in mind
that in the present case the HPC could not have
reopened the aspects which were discussed and decided
by the Odisha Administrative Tribunal qua the appellant
and the respondents. Therefore, this Court hastens to
observe that the reason for denial of claim of the
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 36 of 79
appellant by the HPC is liable to be rejected inasmuch as
there is nothing on record to suggest that the said Order
of the learned Tribunal has been questioned before any
higher Court(s). Thus, the argument of the Additional
Government Advocate as well as the Standing Counsel
for the Transport Department is fallacious and at this
stage such aspect cannot be insisted to have a relook.
7.6. This Court now ventures to examine another reason
assigned by the HPC to reject the claim for regularisation
in service, viz., reservation policy was not followed at the
time of engagement/appointment. It is further stipulated
in the GAD Resolution, 2014 that principle of reservation
of posts must have been followed in case of such
contractual appointment/engagement. The question of
applicability of reservation policy at the stage of
consideration of regularisation in service arose in many
cases before this Court.
7.7. In State of Odisha Vrs. Biswamitra Parida, W.A. No.822
of 2020, vide Order dated 10.02.2021 5 it has been
observed by this Court as follows:
“In view of the Resolution dated 17.09.2013, since the
respondents have already completed the required years of
continuous service/engagement and posts were created5 The view of Division Bench has been referred to and followed in Brajendra
Kumar Jena Vrs. State of Odisha, 2024 ILR-CUT-ONLINE-785 (Single Bench).
Visiting the webportal reveals that no writ appeal against said judgment has
been preferred by the State of Odisha.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 37 of 79
pursuant to the direction of the learned Court, the
appellants-opposite parties should not have
engaged the respondents on contractual basis.
Therefore, the appellants opposite parties should
regularize the service of the respondents in accordance
with the Resolution dated 17.09.2013 of the General
Administration Department.
Considering the above facts, it is not disputed that similar
questions on principles of ORV Act which were not
followed earlier, series of writ petitions were disposed of
which were confirmed by the Apex Court in SLP No.18642
of 2018 dated 06.08.2018 in the case of State of Odisha
& Anr. Versus Jatin Kumar Das which arises out of
Original Application No.2172(C) of 2015 and batch of
cases. In the said Original Application, the learned
Tribunal has already dealt with the said issue
having not followed the Rules of the ORV Act at
paragraph-8 of the judgment dated 17.05.2017 and
Original Applications were disposed of by the Tribunal
wherein the following specific finding was given:
„the ORV Posts and Services Act, 1975 has no
application to the posts to be filled up through
contract in terms of Section-3(d) of the said Act. The
respondents failed to produce any paper indicating
the amendment of Section 3(d) of ORV Act, 1975 so
also they could not able to produce the documents
that there was any other statutory and mandatory
provision overriding section 3(d) referred to above
for application of the reservation principle while
issuing contractual engagement/appointment in
favour of the applicants during the year 2005.‟However, pursuant to the direction of this Court to take
instruction, learned Additional Government Advocate
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 38 of 79
submitted that the Resolution dated 17.09.2013 passed
by the General Administration Department for
regularization of the DLR, daily wages employees shall be
applicable in the case of present respondents.
In view of the above facts, all the writ petitions were
disposed of confirming the order of Tribunal and the said
orders of the writ petitions were confirmed by the apex
Court in Special Leave Petition on the same issue. Rightly
the learned Single Judge has directed the appellants-
State authorities to regularize services of the
Respondents petitioner in terms of the above facts and
circumstances narrated in the above paragraphs.
Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the
impugned order dated 03.09.2020 passed by the learned
Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.22112 of 2020. Accordingly,
the Writ Appeal is dismissed.”
Said matter was carried to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
S.L.P.(C) No.6851 of 2021 [State of Odisha Vrs.
Biswamitra Parida] wherein the following Order was
passed on 30.06.2021:
” We are not inclined to entertain the Special Leave
Petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution.
2 The Special Leave Petitions are accordingly
dismissed.
3 Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.”
In this regard it may be worthy to say that so far as
engagement of employees holding contractual posts are
concerned the provisions of the Odisha Reservation of
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 39 of 79
Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1975 (“ORV Act“, for brevity)
have got no application, as held by a Division Bench of
this Court vide Order dated 10.05.2018 passed in the
matter of State of Odisha Vrs. Jatin Kumar Das, W.P.(C)
No.6661 of 2018 6 , which pertains to regularisation in
service of Data Entry Operators engaged on contractual
basis in the Commercial Tax Organization. Following
observation made by the Division Bench of this Court in
Order dated 10.05.2018 in State of Odisha Vrs. Jatin
Kumar Das, W.P.(C) No.6661 of 2018 is noteworthy:
“2. This writ petition has been filed by the functionaries
of the State assailing the correctness and legality of
the common order dated 17.05.2017 passed by
Odisha Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench,
Cuttack in O.A.No.2172(C) of 2015 along with
similar batch of Original Applications, wherein the
respondent-State Government was directed to issue
formal order of regular appointment in favour of the
applicants therein, who were initially engaged in
2005 as Data Entry Operators and Junior
Programmers engaged in IT Organization on
outsourcing basis and thereafter with effect from
17.09.2013, on annual contract basis directly by the6 In State of Odisha Vrs. Jatin Kumar Das, S.L.P.(C) No. 18642 of 2018 [Arising out
of impugned final judgment and order dated 10.05.2018 in W.P.(C) No.6661 of
2018 passed by the High Court Of Orissa at Cuttack] the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India has been pleased to pass the following Order on 06.08.2018:
“No ground for interference is made out in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution of India.
The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending application, if any,
stands disposed of.”
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 40 of 79
Commercial Taxes Department, with all
consequential service and financial benefits.
3. Narrating the admitted factual scenario, i.e.,
engagement of IT personnel on outsourcing basis
thereafter on direct contractual basis by the
Commercial Taxes Organization Mr. Sahu, learned
Additional Government Advocate assails the
impugned order on the ground that the direction for
regular appointment of those IT personnel violates
the Government of Odisha in G.A. Department
Resolution dated 17.09.2013 fixing certain
mandatory norms for regularization of contractual
appointees. Secondly, 2 persons whose initial
appointment was on outsourcing basis, cannot come
under the regular establishment because no open
and transparent recruitment procedure has
been adopted. Thirdly, provisions of ORV Act
has not been followed while appointing them
on outsourcing and direct contractual basis.
4. Learned Tribunal, taking into consideration the facts
and circumstances of the case as well as
submissions of learned counsel for the parties, has
arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, which is clear,
cogent and well-reasoned, which hardly requires
any interference under writ jurisdiction. Therefore,
we are in agreement with the reasons assigned
and findings arrived at by learned Tribunal in
directing for regular appointment of the
contractual employees in question, including
the opposite party No.1 herein.
However, while parting with the order, we may note
that whatever may be the mode of engagement/
appointment, there is concurrence of the Finance
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 41 of 79
Department and the employees in question were
engaged in different Departments of the Government
and rendered their services uninterruptedly. Besides
that, mode of engagement adopted and selection
process followed was consciously adopted and law
prevalent at the relevant time for engagement of
contractual employees was scrupulously followed
under the aegis of Government functionaries. But,
surprisingly, after utilizing their services for
more than a decade, when question of bringing
them under regular establishment arises, they
(employees) are pushed to a corner. Government
functionaries in a welfare State should refrain
from adopting hire and fire policy. The action
taken amounts to gambling with the career of
the employees, some of whom might have been
overaged to compete for employment.”
7.8. At this juncture this Court feels it apposite to examine
the provisions of the ORV Act and applicability thereof to
the fact-situation of the present case. Even if it is
assumed that the appellant was not appointed by
following the provisions of the ORV Act during the
course of selection procedure, the provisions of the Act
being not applicable to the engagees on contract basis
prior to introduction of sub-section (2) to Section 3 for
the purpose of regularisation in service. The letter of
appointment of the Appointing Authority clearly spells
out that the appellant has been engaged as Contractual
Driver. For that the State Government has introduced
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 42 of 79
amendment to Section 37 thereof by virtue of the Odisha
Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Amendment
Ordinance, 2023 [published in Odisha Gazette,
Extraordinary No.1996, dated 19.08.2023], which has
been given effect to “at once”. Later said Ordinance has
been promulgated as the Odisha Reservation of
Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes) Amendment Act, 2023 [published
in Odisha Gazette, Extraordinary No.2543, dated
7 Section 3 of the Odisha Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1975, after insertion of sub-
section (2) would read thus:
“3. Applicability.–
(1) This Act shall apply to all appointments to the Posts and Services under
the State except–
(a) Class-I posts which are above the lowest rung thereof and meant
for conducting or guiding or directing Scientific and Technical
research;
(b) Class-I Posts which are above the lowest rung thereof and
classified as scientific posts;
(c) tenure posts;
(d) those filled up on the basis of any contract;
(e) ex-cadre posts;
(f) those which are filled up by transfer within the cadre or on
deputation;
(g) the appointment of such staff the duration of whose appointment
does not extend, beyond the term of office of the person making the
appointment and the work charged staff which are required for
emergencies like flood relief work, accident restoration and relief
etc.;
(h) temporary appointments of less than forty-five days duration;
(h-I) those which are required to be filled up by appointment of persons
under the rehabilitation assistance given to the members of the
family of the deceased or permanent disabled employees who
suffer from the disability while in service;
(i) those in respect of which recruitment is made in accordance with
any provision contained in the Constitution.
(j) Schematic posts.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), reservation shall
apply to appointment made or to be made to all tenure posts or
contractual posts or schematic posts which are to be regularized
against the sanctioned posts.”
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 43 of 79
07.11.2023], which came into force with effect from
19.08.20238. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 as inserted by
virtue of said amendment does not admit of any
ambiguity. Said amendment specifies the effective date
for its enforcement as 19.08.2023 (prospective
amendment). This is clearly indicative that prior to said
date the provisions introduced by way of amendment to
the ORV Act, 1975, had no application to contractual
engagements for consideration of regularisation against
the sanctioned posts.
8 The Odisha Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Amendment Act, 2023 (Odisha Act 10 of 2023)
stands as follows:
[Be it encacted by the Legislature of the State of Odisha in the Seventy- fourth
Year of the Republic of India, as follows:
1. Short title and commencement.–
(1) This Act may be called the Odisha Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and
Services (for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Amendment Act,
2023.
(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 19th day of August,
2023.
2. Amendment of Section 3.–
In the Odisha Reservation of Vacancies In Posts and Services (for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1975 [Odisha Act No. 38 of
1975], Section 3 shall be re-numbered as sub-section (1) thereof and in
sub-section (1) as so re-numbered, —
(i) after clause (i), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:
“(j) Schematic Posts.”
(ii) after sub-section (1) so re-numbered, the following sub-section shall be
inserted, namely:
“(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), reservation
shall apply to appointment made or to be made to all tenure posts
or contractual posts or Schematic posts which are to be regularised
against the sanctioned posts.”
3. Repeal and Savings.–
(1) The Odisha Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled
Castes and Schedule Tribes) Amendment Ordinance, 2023 [Odisha
Ordinance No.3 of 2023] is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal under sub-section (1), anything done or any
action taken under the said Ordinance so repealed shall be deemed to
have been done or taken under this Act.]
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 44 of 79
It may be stated that recourse to a subsequent
legislation is permissible if there exists any ambiguity in
the earlier legislation for the purpose of ascertaining as
to whether by a subsequent legislation proper
interpretation has been fixed which is to be put upon the
earlier Act. [Mahim Patram Private Ltd. Vrs. Union of
India, 2007 (3) SCC 668]. Glaringly, in the present
context, the case of the appellant emanated prior to the
Odisha Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services
(for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes)
Amendment Act, 2023 came into force. Before said
amendment Act, 2023 came into effect, the appellant
had already been eligible for consideration of
regularization in service and the Odisha Administrative
Tribunal disposed of the Original Application of the
appellant prior to the amendment Act, 2023 came to
operate.
In such conspectus of the matter, the ground for
rejection of claim of the appellant by the HPC as upheld
in the impugned Judgment dated 17.12.2024 that the
provisions of the ORV Act was not followed seems to be
based on incorrect appreciation of legal impact on the
fact-situation obtained on record.
7.9. Under such delineated precinct, this Court is of the
considered view that the learned Single Judge has not
dealt with the issue by considering the legal perspective.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 45 of 79
Legal perspective of necessity for consideration of
regularisation in service with regard to engagees having
worked for substantial number of years and cases of
irregular engagement:
8. Legal position with respect to regularisation in service on
having worked for substantial number of years has been
spelt out in very many cases.
8.1. Reference can be had to Union of India Vrs. Subhankari
Das, 2023 (III) ILR-CUT 979, wherein it has been stated
that,
“5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
after going through the records, it is admitted that
the opposite parties are discharging their duties and
responsibilities from the date of their initial
appointment in the year 1995 and 2002. In the year
2017, their designations were changed without any
change of remuneration. Without regularising their
services, the authorities issued a circular on
15.02.2018, which is absolutely a camouflaged way
of approach to the difficulties of the opposite parties
to deprive them of the benefit of their regularisation
after utilising their services from 1995 and 2002,
i.e., for more than 23 years and 16 years by then.
6. The reliance was placed by the present petitioners
before the Tribunal on the cases of State of
Karnataka Vrs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1;
Government of Tamil Nadu Vrs. Tamil Nadu Makkal
Nala Paniyalargal, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 393 and
Vibhuti Shankar Pandey Vrs. State of Madhya
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 46 of 79
Pradesh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 91 and submission was
made that there was no sanctioned post available
for engagement of the opposite parties and that the
process of engagement of the opposite parties was
not in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. Therefore, the opposite parties have no right
for regularisation.
7. The above stand of the petitioners cannot have any
application to the case of the present opposite
parties, as because, in a case of similarly situated
persons, i.e. Basanta Kumar Sahoo Vrs. Union of
India, W.P.(C) No.24759 of 2012, disposed of on
31.07.2017, relying on the decisions rendered in
Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 and State of Karnataka
Vrs. M.L. Keshari, 2010 (II) OLR (SC) 932 = (2010) 9
SCC 247, direction was issued for regularisation of
such employees. Similarly, in the case of Manoj
Kumar Jena Vrs. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 24758
of 2012, disposed of 31.07.2017, this Court also
took the similar view as was taken in the case of
Basanta Kumar Sahoo (supra). The order passed in
the case of Manoj Kumar Jena (supra) was assailed
by the authorities before the Apex Court in S.L.P.
No.35963 of 2017, which was dismissed vide order
dated 05.01.2018. Thereby, the order passed by
this Court in Manoj Kumar Jena (supra) got affirmed
in the apex Court. Here, it is worth mentioning that
in both the cases indicted above, i.e. in the case of
Basanta Kumar Sahoo and Manoj Kumar Jena
(supra), the orders have been passed by one of us
(Dr. B.R. Sarangi, ACJ). The said order having been
affirmed by the apex Court, as a consequence
thereof, the same has been implemented. The
decision of Basanta Kumar Sahoo (supra) was
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 47 of 79
referred to by the High Court of Delhi in the case of
Amrish Kumar Vrs. Indian Institute of Mass
Communication, W.P.(C) No.5906 of 2018 & CM Appl
No.23016 of 2018, disposed of on 14.02.2020 [2020
SCC OnLine Del 1915].
8. In Amrish Kumar (supra), the High Court of Delhi
observed as follows:
„In the present case too, the workmen admittedly
have been working for 23 years. It clearly
tantamount to unfair labour practice by denying
them the benefits of regular services for 23 years.
The objective of the Act is to prevent unfair labour
practice which is defined in detail in 5th Schedule of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with reference to
Section 2A. The specific definition applicable to the
present case is clause 10 which reads as under:
„10. To employ workmen as “badlis”, casuals or
temporaries and to continue them as such for
years, with the object of depriving them of the
status and privileges of permanent workmen.‟The facts of the instant case as discussed
hereinabove clearly shows that keeping the
workmen in uninterrupted service for 23 years as
casual workmen and denying them the status and
privilege of permanent workmen, constitutes unfair
labour practice which is illegal and needs to be
quashed. Furthermore, similarly situated workmen
of the respondent who worked in its other
administrative unit in Orissa (Dhenkanal), for
roughly half a century on ad hoc basis, have been
directed by the Orissa High Court in Basanta Kumar
Sahoo Vrs. Union of India, W.P.(C) No.24759 ofWA No.119 of 2025 Page 48 of 79
2012, decided on 31.07.2017 to be regularized. The
said judgment has referred to and relied upon
Umadevi (supra) and State of Karnataka Vrs. M.L.
Kesari (2010) 9 SCC 247. The SLP against the said
judgment of the Orissa High Court was dismissed by
the Supreme Court on 05.01.2018; therefore, it has
attained finality. The case of the present petitioners
is identical. That being the position i.e. they had
worked for almost 23 years; the employer was
same; they had been working against the
sanctioned posts; they were not considered as
regular employees, therefore, the treatment meted
out to them constitutes unfair labour practice. In the
circumstances, their services too shall be regularized
from initial date of joining, with all consequential
benefits.
9. It is pertinent to mention here that the decision
rendered by the High Court of Delhi in Amrish
Kumar (supra) was challenged before the apex Court
in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 710 of 2021,
which was dismissed vide order dated 10.12.2021
and, as a consequence thereof, the same has also
been implemented. Therefore, the Central
Administrative Tribunal, relying on the said
judgment, having passed the order impugned, this
Court is not inclined to interfere with the same. As
such, the order passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal dated 13.07.2023 in O.A. No. 260/00/163
of 2018 is hereby confirmed and the petitioners
are directed to regularise the service of the
opposite parties from initial date of their
joining with all consequential benefits within a
period of sixty days from the date of receipt of
the order.”
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 49 of 79
8.2. In view of State of Jammu and Kashmir Vrs. District Bar
Association, Bandipora, MANU/SC/1566/2016 = (2017)
3 SCC 410; and Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra Vrs. State
of Odisha, (2014) 4 SCC 583 = AIR 2014 SC 1716
wherein it has been clearly laid down that in order to
ascertain whether an appointment is irregular or illegal,
the Court would have to enquire as to whether the
appointment process adopted was tainted by vice of non-
adherence to an essential prerequisite or is liable to be
faulted on account of the lack of a fair process of
recruitment. It has already been noticed in Umadevi‟s
case, (2006) 4 SCC 1, which was further explained in
State of Karnataka Vrs. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247,
that the “regularisation” in service can be permissible if
the following conditions are fulfilled:
i. The employee concerned should have worked for 10
years or more in duly sanctioned post without the
benefit or protection of the interim order of any
Court or Tribunal.
ii. In other words, the State Government or its
instrumentality should have employed the employee
and continued him in service voluntarily and
continuously for more than ten years.
8.3. The view of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India expressed in
the case of Jaggo Vrs. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLineWA No.119 of 2025 Page 50 of 79
SC 3826 = 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1032, is as follows
(extracted from SCC):
“20. It is well established that the decision in Uma
Devi (supra) does not intend to penalize
employees who have rendered long years of
service fulfilling ongoing and necessary
functions of the State or its instrumentalities.
The said judgment sought to prevent backdoor
entries and illegal appointments that circumvent
constitutional requirements. However, where
appointments were not illegal but possibly
“irregular,” and where employees had served
continuously against the backdrop of sanctioned
functions for a considerable period, the need for a
fair and humane resolution becomes paramount.
Prolonged, continuous, and unblemished service
performing tasks inherently required on a regular
basis can, over the time, transform what was
initially ad-hoc or temporary into a scenario
demanding fair regularization. In a recent
judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar Vrs. Union
of India, (2024) 1 SCR 1230, it was held that held
that procedural formalities cannot be used to
deny regularization of service to an employee
whose appointment was termed “temporary”
but has performed the same duties as
performed by the regular employee over a
considerable period in the capacity of the
regular employee. The relevant paras of this
judgment have been reproduced below:
„6. The application of the judgment in Uma Devi
(supra) by the High Court does not fit
squarely with the facts at hand, given the
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 51 of 79
specific circumstances under which the
appellants were employed and have
continued their service. The reliance on
procedural formalities at the outset
cannot be used to perpetually deny
substantive rights that have accrued
over a considerable period through
continuous service. Their promotion was
based on a specific notification for vacancies
and a subsequent circular, followed by a
selection process involving written tests and
interviews, which distinguishes their case
from the appointments through back door
entry as discussed in the case of Uma Devi
(supra).
7. The judgment in the case Uma Devi (supra)
also distinguished between “irregular” and
“illegal” appointments underscoring the
importance of considering certain
appointments even if were not made strictly
in accordance with the prescribed Rules and
Procedure, cannot be said to have been
made illegally if they had followed the
procedures of regular appointments such as
conduct of written examinations or
interviews as in the present case. ***‟
21. The High Court placed undue emphasis on the
initial label of the appellants‟ engagements and the
outsourcing decision taken after their dismissal.
Courts must look beyond the surface labels and
consider the realities of employment: continuous,
long-term service, indispensable duties, and
absence of any mala fide or illegalities in their
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 52 of 79
appointments. In that light, refusing
regularization simply because their original
terms did not explicitly state so, or because
an outsourcing policy was belatedly
introduced, would be contrary to principles of
fairness and equity.
22. The pervasive misuse of temporary
employment contracts, as exemplified in this
case, reflects a broader systemic issue that
adversely affects workers’ rights and job
security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig
economy has led to an increase in precarious
employment arrangements, often characterized by
lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment.
Such practices have been criticized for exploiting
workers and undermining labour standards.
Government institutions, entrusted with upholding
the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even
greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative
employment practices. When public sector entities
engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not
only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the
gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent
that can erode public trust in governmental
operations.
23. The International Labour Organization (ILO), of
which India is a founding member, has
consistently advocated for employment stability
and the fair treatment of workers. The ILO‟s
Multinational Enterprises Declaration [International
Labour Organization– Tripartite Declaration of
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy] encourages companies to provide
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 53 of 79
stable employment and to observe obligations
concerning employment stability and social
security. It emphasizes that enterprises should
assume a leading role in promoting
employment security, particularly in contexts
where job discontinuation could exacerbate
long-term unemployment.
24. The landmark judgment of the United State in the
case of Vizcaino Vrs. Microsoft Corporation, 97
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996) serves as a pertinent
example from the private sector, illustrating the
consequences of misclassifying employees to
circumvent providing benefits. In this case,
Microsoft classified certain workers as independent
contractors, thereby denying them employee
benefits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit determined that these workers were, in fact,
common-law employees and were entitled to the
same benefits as regular employees. The Court
noted that large Corporations have increasingly
adopted the practice of hiring temporary employees
or independent contractors as a means of avoiding
payment of employee benefits, thereby increasing
their profits. This judgment underscores the
principle that the nature of the work performed,
rather than the label assigned to the worker,
should determine employment status and the
corresponding rights and benefits. It highlights
the judiciary’s role in rectifying such
misclassifications and ensuring that workers
receive fair treatment.
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary
employees, particularly in government institutions,
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 54 of 79
often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While
the foundational purpose of temporary contracts
may have been to address short-term or seasonal
needs, they have increasingly become a
mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed to
employees. These practices manifest in several
ways:
Misuse of “Temporary” Labels:
Employees engaged for work that is essential,
recurring, and integral to the functioning of an
institution are often labeled as “temporary” or
“contractual,” even when their roles mirror those of
regular employees. Such misclassification deprives
workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that
regular employees are entitled to, despite
performing identical tasks.
Arbitrary Termination:
Temporary employees are frequently dismissed
without cause or notice, as seen in the present
case. This practice undermines the principles of
natural justice and subjects workers to a state of
constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or
duration of their service.
Lack of Career Progression:
Temporary employees often find themselves
excluded from opportunities for skill development,
promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain
stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic
disparity between them and their regular
counterparts, despite their contributions being
equally significant.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 55 of 79
Using Outsourcing as a Shield:
Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles
performed by temporary employees, effectively
replacing one set of exploited workers with
another. This practice not only perpetuates
exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate
effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular
employment.
Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits:
Temporary employees are often denied
fundamental benefits such as pension, provident
fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when
their tenure spans decades. This lack of social
security subjects them and their families to undue
hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement,
or unforeseen circumstances.
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra)
sought to curtail the practice of backdoor
entries and ensure appointments adhered to
constitutional principles, it is regrettable that
its principles are often misinterpreted or
misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-
serving employees. This judgment aimed to
distinguish between “illegal” and “irregular”
appointments. It categorically held that employees
in irregular appointments, who were engaged in
duly sanctioned posts and had served
continuously for more than ten years, should be
considered for regularization as a one-time
measure. However, the laudable intent of the
judgment is being subverted when institutions rely
on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of
employees, even in cases where their
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 56 of 79
appointments are not illegal, but merely lack
adherence to procedural formalities. Government
departments often cite the judgment in Uma
Devi (supra) to argue that no vested right to
regularization exists for temporary
employees, overlooking the judgment’s
explicit acknowledgment of cases where
regularization is appropriate. This selective
application distorts the judgment’s spirit and
purpose, effectively weaponizing it against
employees who have rendered indispensable
services over decades.
27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is
imperative for Government departments to lead by
example in providing fair and stable employment.
Engaging workers on a temporary basis for
extended periods, especially when their roles are
integral to the organization’s functioning, not only
contravenes international labour standards but
also exposes the organization to legal challenges
and undermines employee morale. By ensuring
fair employment practices, Government
institutions can reduce the burden of
unnecessary litigation, promote job security,
and uphold the principles of justice and
fairness that they are meant to embody. This
approach aligns with international standards and
sets a positive precedent for the private sector to
follow, thereby contributing to the overall
betterment of labour practices in the country.”
8.4. In the case of Shripal Vrs. Nagar Nigam, 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 221 = 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 referring to
observations rendered in Jaggo (supra), the Hon’ble
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 57 of 79
Supreme Court of India has been pleased to clarify that
(extracted from SCC):
“16. The High Court did acknowledge the Employer‟s
inability to justify these abrupt terminations.
Consequently, it ordered re-engagement on daily
wages with some measure of parity in minimum
pay. Regrettably, this only perpetuated
precariousness: the Appellant Workmen were
left in a marginally improved yet still
uncertain status. While the High Court
recognized the importance of their work and hinted
at eventual regularization, it failed to afford them
continuity of service or meaningful back wages
commensurate with the degree of statutory
violation evident on record.
17. In light of these considerations, the Employer‟s
discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen stands
in violation of the most basic labour law principles.
Once it is established that their services were
terminated without adhering to Sections 6E and 6N
of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that
they were engaged in essential, perennial duties,
these workers cannot be relegated to perpetual
uncertainty. While concerns of municipal budget
and compliance with recruitment rules merit
consideration, such concerns do not absolve the
Employer of statutory obligations or negate
equitable entitlements. Indeed, bureaucratic
limitations cannot trump the legitimate
rights of workmen who have served
continuously in de facto regular roles for an
extended period.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 58 of 79
18. The impugned order of the High Court, to the extent
they confine the Appellant Workmen to future
daily-wage engagement without continuity or
meaningful back wages, is hereby set aside with
the following directions:
I. The discontinuation of the Appellant
Workmen‟s services, effected without
compliance with Section 6E and Section 6N
of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
declared illegal. All orders or
communications terminating their services
are quashed. In consequence, the Appellant
Workmen shall be treated as continuing in
service from the date of their termination, for
all purposes, including seniority and
continuity in service.
II. The Respondent Employer shall reinstate the
Appellant Workmen in their respective posts
(or posts akin to the duties they previously
performed) within four weeks from the date
of this judgment. Their entire period of
absence (from the date of termination until
actual reinstatement) shall be counted for
continuity of service and all consequential
benefits, such as seniority and eligibility for
promotions, if any.
III. Considering the length of service, the
Appellant Workmen shall be entitled to 50%
of the back wages from the date of their
discontinuation until their actual
reinstatement. The Respondent Employer
shall clear the aforesaid dues within three
months from the date of their reinstatement.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 59 of 79
IV. The Respondent Employer is directed to
initiate a fair and transparent process for
regularizing the Appellant Workmen within
six months from the date of reinstatement,
duly considering the fact that they have
performed perennial municipal duties akin to
permanent posts. In assessing
regularization, the Employer shall not impose
educational or procedural criteria
retroactively if such requirements were never
applied to the Appellant Workmen or to
similarly situated regular employees in the
past. To the extent that sanctioned vacancies
for such duties exist or are required, the
Respondent Employer shall expedite all
necessary administrative processes to
ensure these long time employees are not
indefinitely retained on daily wages contrary
to statutory and equitable norms.”
8.5. It is apt to refer to the anxious consideration shown by
the Madras High Court in N. Karunanidhi Vrs. Union of
India, W.P. No. 12887 of 2016, vide Judgment dated
22.04.2022 rendered with respect to exploitation of
service. The following benevolent observation has been
made by said Court in favour of the employees, whose
services have been utilized by the Government for a
substantial length of time:
“18. If the Courts cannot give direction for their
regularisation of service, in the constrained legal
scenario what other remedies that are available to
these unfortunate employees, who have been
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 60 of 79
engaged in service for public purpose, without
having any definite future to hold on? These
petitioners cannot be kept on the tenterhooks
of their employment for years together, by
brushing aside and discarding their concerned
yearning for a definite future, with
unresponsive indifference.
19. A welfare State grounded on constitutional
values, cannot come up with apathetic and
callous stand that despite continued
employment of these petitioners for years
together, no semblance of right is available to
them. Such stand by the State is opposed to
constitutional values as enshrined in Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. The Courts of course have
held that equal opportunity must be provided in
public employment and entry through back door
should be discountenanced. When Article 21, being
violated by the State, action towards its servants,
the consideration of the Government must primarily
be focussed on alleviating legitimate grievances of
its employees. Even assuming that the recruitment of
these writ petitioners had not been fully in
consonance with the procedure for appointment in
Government services, the fact remained that these
persons have been consciously appointed by the
Government for implementing public projects and the
work has been extracted from them continuously for
several years. It is therefore, not open to the
Government after a period of time to turn around
and contend that these writ petitioners have no right
at all to seek any kind of guarantee for their future.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 61 of 79
20. In the opinion of this Court, continued
employment for several years, even on a
projects meant to serve the State as a whole,
certain rights would definitely accrue to them,
atleast to the extent of making a claim for
formulation of a scheme/towards their
absorption. This Court is quite conscious of the fact
that the Government has been benevolent and had
come up with several schemes in the past and
directed regularisation of services of thousands of
employees over a period of time. Such benevolence
ought to permeate to the lowest levels to take within
its sweep the desperate cry of the petitioners as
well. As in the sublime words of the father of nation,
Mahatma Gandhi, „A nation‟s greatness is measured
by how it treats its weakest members‟. Merely
because these writ petitioners have been employed
in the projects, the policy makers may not shut their
mind and close their eyes to their precarious plight
having to serve public purpose but left in the lurch
and unprotected, at the end of the day.”
8.6. In Sheo Narain Nagar Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2017)
11 SCR 138, the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognized such
employment on temporary status as on exploitative
terms. The pertinent observation made in the said case
is quoted hereunder:
“8. When we consider the prevailing scenario, it is
painful to note that the decision in Uma Devi
(Supra) has not been properly understood and
rather wrongly applied by various State
Governments. We have called for the data in the
instant case to ensure as to how many employees
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 62 of 79
were working on contract basis or ad-hoc basis or
daily-wage basis in different State departments. We
can take judicial notice that widely aforesaid
practice is being continued. Though this Court has
emphasised that incumbents should be
appointed on regular basis as per rules but
new devise of making appointment on contract
basis has been adopted, employment is offered
on daily wage basis etc. in exploitative forms.
This situation was not envisaged by Uma Devi
(supra). The prime intendment of the decision was
that the employment process should be by fair
means and not by back door entry and in the
available pay scale. That spirit of the Uma Devi
(supra) has been ignored and conveniently over
looked by various State Governments/
authorities. We regretfully make the
observation that Uma Devi (supra) has not be
implemented in its true spirit and has not been
followed in its pith and substance. It is being
used only as a tool for not regularizing the services
of incumbents. They are being continued in service
without payment of due salary for which they are
entitled on the basis of Article 14, l6 read with
Article 34(1)(d) of the Constitution of India as if they
have no constitutional protection as envisaged in
D.S. Nakara Vrs. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130
from cradle to grave. In heydays of life they are
serving on exploitative terms with no guarantee of
livelihood to be continued and in old age they are
going to be destituted, there being no provision for
pension, retiral benefits etc. There is clear
contravention of constitutional provisions and
aspiration of down trodden class. They do have
equal rights and to make them equals they
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 63 of 79
require protection and cannot be dealt with
arbitrarily. The kind of treatment meted out is not
only bad but equally unconstitutional and is denial
of rights. We have to strike a balance to really
implement the ideology of Uma Devi (supra). Thus,
the time has come to stop the situation where Uma
Devi (supra) can be permitted to be flouted, whereas,
this Court has interdicted such employment way
back in the year 2006. The employment cannot be
on exploitative terms, whereas Uma Devi
(supra) laid down that there should not be back
door entry and every post should be filled by
regular employment, but a new device has been
adopted for making appointment on payment
of paltry system on contract/adhoc basis or
otherwise. This kind of action is not permissible,
when we consider the pith and substance of true
spirit in Umadevi (supra).
9. Coming to the facts of the instant case, there was a
direction issued way back in the year 1999, to
consider the regularization of the appellants.
However, regularization was not done. The
respondents chose to give minimum of the pay scale,
which was available to the regular employees, way
back in the year 2000 and by passing an order, the
appellants were also conferred temporary status in
the year 2006, with retrospective effect on
2.10.2002. As the respondents have themselves
chosen to confer a temporary status to the
employees, as such there was requirement at
work and posts were also available at the
particular point of time when order was
passed. Thus, the submission raised by learned
counsel for the respondent that posts were not
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 64 of 79
available, is belied by their own action. Obviously,
the order was passed considering the long
period of services rendered by the appellants,
which were taken on exploitative terms.
10. The High Court dismissed the writ application
relying on the decision in Umadevi (supra). But the
appellants were employed basically in the year
1993; they had rendered service for three
years, when they were offered the service on
contract basis; it was not the case of back door
entry; and there were no Rules in place for
offering such kind of appointment. Thus, the
appointment could not be said to be illegal and in
contravention of Rules, as there were no such Rules
available at the relevant point of time, when their
temporary status was conferred with effect from
02.10.2002. The appellants were required to be
appointed on regular basis as a one-time
measure, as laid down in paragraph 53 of
Umadevi (supra). Since the appellants had
completed 10 years of service and temporary
status had been given by the respondents with
retrospective effect in the 02.10.2002, we
direct that the services of the appellants be
regularized from the said date i.e. 02.10.2002,
consequential benefits and the arrears of pay
also to be paid to the appellants within a
period of three months from today.”
8.7. It is manifest from record that by now the petitioner-
Appellant, being appointed by duly authorized
Appointing Authority, has completed more than 10 years
of service, which is requisite length of service for
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 65 of 79
consideration of regularization in service as per Umadevi
(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 [although the Government of Odisha
has accepted six years of satisfactory service for
regularization in terms of Resolution dated 17.09.2013
read with Resolution dated 16.01.2014] and the
authorities of the Regional Transport Officer employed
the petitioner-Appellant and extended his terms in
service voluntarily and continuously for more than ten
years.
8.8. It is trite that where the appointments are not made or
continued against sanctioned posts or where the persons
appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum
qualifications, the appointments will be considered to be
illegal. But in the instant case, as there is no complaint
with respect to possession of the prescribed
qualifications and the appellant has been working
against sanctioned post on being selected by undergoing
the process of selection, such appointment could neither
be said to be illegal nor irregular.
8.9. Noteworthy to refer to the Order dated 06.12.2021
passed in W.A. No.231 of 2016 [Vice Chairman, State
Council for Technical Education & Vocational Training,
Odisha Vrs. Braja K. Mohanty] and batch, wherein it has
been observed as follows:
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 66 of 79
“In each of these appeals, the respondent has worked as
contractual watchman for over ten years. It is also stated
in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition in
paragraph 13 by the present appellants that there were in
fact five vacancies in sanctioned posts of watchman. The
only distinction sought to be made is that for benefiting by
the decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka Vrs.
Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, their appointments had to be
merely „irregular‟ and not „illegal‟. The fact remains that
the respondents have been working continuously as
watchmen. It is not the case of the appellant that they are
not qualified to be employed as watchman. Given the
fact that the respondents have worked as watchmen
on contract basis for over ten years, it is obvious
that the appellant requires their services. In the
circumstances, this Court is not inclined to interfere with
the impugned order of the learned Single Judge requiring
the appellants to consider the cases of the respondents for
regularization. The appeals are dismissed.”
8.10. Noticing the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vrs.
Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, in Niranjan Nayak Vrs.
State of Odisha & Others, 2023 (I) OLR 407 the
observation of this Court runs as follows:
“12. Similarly, in the case of Amarendra Kumar
Mahapatra and Others Vrs. State of Odisha and
Others, (2014) 4 SCC 583 = AIR 2014 SC 1716, the
Supreme Court was of the opinion that the
appellants were entitled to regularization in service
having regard to the fact that they have rendered
long years of service on ad hoc basis.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 67 of 79
13. In the case at hand, it can be ascertained that the
petitioner was appointed against a substantive
vacant post and he had been discharging his
duties in the said post since 1993. The
appointment was made on an ad hoc basis and was
extended from time to time. Since the petitioner was
appointed against substantive vacancy and the post
was sanctioned by higher authorities, the petitioner
should have been extended the benefit of
regulatisation like other similarly situated persons.”
8.11. In the case at hand there is nothing placed on record
except contemplation of the HPC to revoke the order of
regularisation in service being made in respect of four
persons out of fourteen Contractual Drivers.
Nevertheless, having not challenged the Order dated
12.01.2018 passed in OA No.1234 of 2016 (Prafulla
Kumar Behera Vrs. State of Odisha) the respondents
allowed the same to attain its finality, and at this belated
stage they cannot take the same stand for adjudication
afresh which fell for consideration before the learned
Odisha Administrative Tribunal. Reading of counter
affidavit filed by the Under Secretary on behalf of STA in
W.P.(C) No.2157 of 2020 (Krodapati Saraf Vrs. State of
Odisha) the contentions and grounds justifying rejection
of claim of the appellant appears to be contrary to what
is reflected in the letter of recommendation vide No.IX-
29/2016– 16925/TC, dated 31.10.2016 of Under-
Secretary, STA, Odisha, Cuttack and observations and
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 68 of 79
directions contained in Order dated 12.01.2018 passed
in O.A. No.1234 of 2016 by the Odisha Administrative
Tribunal, and thereby, such a course adopted by the
respondents is hit by the principles of estoppel on the
anvil of proposition of law laid down in Bikash Mahalik
Vrs. State of Odisha, 2022 (I) ILR-CUT 108.
8.12. In such view of the matter, this Court cannot
countenance the reasons assigned by the learned Single
Judge to uphold the denial of the regularisation in
service of the appellant by the HPC. There was no
occasion for the HPC to consider the same grounds
which had already been addressed to and decided by
referring to counter affidavit filed by the respondents
before the learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal in
O.A. No.1234 of 2016 (supra).
Conclusion:
9. Given the above factual matrix and circumstances
coupled with legal perspective, the following norms set
forth by the Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka
Vrs. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 does require to be
adhered to:
“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be
cases where irregular appointments (not illegal
appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa,
(1967) 1 SCR 128 = AIR 1967 SC 1071, R.N.
Nanjundappa, (1972) 1 SCC 409 = (1972) 2 SCR 799WA No.119 of 2025 Page 69 of 79
and B.N. Nagarajan, (1979) 4 SCC 507 = (1979) 3
SCR 937 and referred to in para 15 above, of duly
qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant
posts might have been made and the employees
have continued to work for ten years or more
but without the intervention of orders of the
courts or of tribunals. The question of
regularisation of the services of such employees may
have to be considered on merits in the light of the
principles settled by this Court in the cases above-
referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that
context, the Union of India, the State Governments
and their instrumentalities should take steps to
regularise as a one-time measure, the services of
such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten
years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under
cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and
should further ensure that regular recruitments are
undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that
require to be filled up, in cases where temporary
employees or daily wagers are being now employed.
The process must be set in motion within six months
from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if
any already made, but not sub judice, need not be
reopened based on this judgment, but there should
be no further bypassing of the constitutional
requirement and regularising or making permanent,
those not duly appointed as per the constitutional
scheme.”
9.1. Culling out above paragraph from Umadevi (supra), in
the case of Vinod Kumar Vrs. Union of India, (2024) 1
SCR 1230 = 2024 INSC 332 it has been indicated as
follows:
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 70 of 79
“4. The appellants have approached this Court arguing
that the High Court erred in its judgment by failing
to recognize the substantive nature of their duties,
which align with regular employment rather than the
temporary or scheme-based roles they were
originally appointed for. Furthermore, their
promotion by a regularly constituted Departmental
Promotional Committee, the selection process they
underwent, and the continuous nature of their
service for over a quarter of a century underscored
their argument for regularization and that the High
Court has incorrectly applied the principles from the
case of Uma Devi (supra) to their situation.
***
8. In light of the reasons recorded above, this Court
finds merit in the appellants‟ arguments and holds
that their service conditions, as evolved over time,
warrant a reclassification from temporary to regular
status. The failure to recognize the substantive
nature of their roles and their continuous
service akin to permanent employees runs
counter to the principles of equity, fairness,
and the intent behind employment
regulations.”
9.2. After taking note of judgments rendered in Secretary,
State of Karnataka Vrs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, State
of Karnataka Vrs. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247, &c. the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Neelima Srivastava
Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 8 SCR 167 = 2021
SCC OnLine SC 610 observed:
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 71 of 79
“32. The Division Bench of the High Court proceeded as if
it was hearing an appeal against the judgment
dated 23.01.2006 of the learned Single Judge which
had already attained finality. Appeal filed under the
Rules of the Court was filed against the judgment
dated 15.05.2014 rendered in Writ Petition No. 8597
of 2010. It is a well settled principle of law that
a Letters Patent Appeal which is in
continuation of a Writ Petition cannot be filed
collaterally to set aside the judgment of the
same High Court rendered in an earlier round
of litigation ignoring the principles of res-
judicata and doctrine of finality.
33. By a majority decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar
Vrs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 has laid
down the law in this regard as under:
„When a Judge deals with matters brought before
him for his adjudication, he first decides questions,
of fact on which the parties are at issue, and then
applies the relevant law to the said facts. Whether
the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right
or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn
by him suffers from any infirmity, can be considered
and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of
the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate
Court.
34. In Rupa Ashok Hurra Vrss. Ashok Hurra & Anr.,
(1999) 2 SCC 103, while dealing with an identical
issue this Court held that reconsideration of the
judgment of this Court which has attained finality is
not normally permissible. The decision upon a
question of law rendered by this Court was
conclusive and would bind the Court in subsequent
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 72 of 79
cases. The Court cannot sit in appeal against its
own judgment.
35. In Union of India & Ors. Vrs. Major S.P. Sharma &
Ors., (2014) 6 SCC 351, a three-judge bench of this
Court has held as under:
„A decision rendered by a competent court cannot be
challenged in collateral proceedings for the reason
that if it is permitted to do so there would be
confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings
would cease to have any meaning.‟
36. Thus, it is very well settled that it is not permissible
for the parties to re-open the concluded judgments of
the Court as the same may not only tantamount to
an abuse of the process of the Court but would have
far reaching adverse effect on the administration of
justice.”
9.3. In N. Ramachandra Reddy Vrs. State of Telangana,
(2019) 11 SCR 792 it has been restated as follows:
“43. Further, in the case of Management of Narendra &
Company Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Workmen of Narendra &
Company, (2016) 3 SCC 340, while considering the
scope of the intra-Court appeal, this Court has held
that, unless Appellate Bench concludes that findings
of the learned Single Judge are perverse, it shall not
disturb the same.”
9.4. In Management of Narendra & Company Pvt. Ltd. Vrs.
Workmen of Narendra & Company, (2016) 3 SCC 340 it
has been observed as follows:
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 73 of 79
“Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding
of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion
that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall
not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a
better view is possible, there should be no interference
with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single
Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on
relief.”
9.5. In Wander Ltd. Vrs. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp. SCC
727 following is the observation:
“14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against
the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In
such appeals, the appellate Court will not interfere
with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first
instance and substitute its own discretion except
where the discretion has been shown to have been
exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or
where the court had ignored the settled principles of
law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory
injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion
is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court
will not reassess the material and seek to reach a
conclusion different from the one reached by the
court below if the one reached by that court was
reasonably possible on the material. The appellate
court would normally not be justified in interfering
with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely
on the ground that if it had considered the matter at
the trial stage it would have come to a contrary
conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by
the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner
the fact that the appellate court would have taken a
different view may not justify interference with the
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 74 of 79
trial court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to
these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers
(Mysore) Private Ltd. Vrs. Pothan Joseph, (1960) 3
SCR 713 = AIR 1960 SC 1156: (SCR 721)„*** These principles are well established, but as has
been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles
Osenton & Co. Vrs. Jhanaton,1942 AC 130:
„*** the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of
an order made by a judge below in the exercise of
his discretion is well established, and any difficulty
that arises is due only to the application of well
settled principles in an individual case.‟ ***’***”
9.6. In Anindita Mohanty Vrs. The Senior Regional Manager,
H.P. Co. Ltd., Bhubaneswar, 2020 (II) ILR-CUT 398 this
Court had the occasion to examine the scope of intra-
Court appeal and observed as follows:
“*** Let us first examine the power of the Division Bench
while entertaining a Letters Patent appeal against the
judgment/order of the Single Judge. This writ appeal has
been nomenclature as an application under Article 4 of
the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 read with clause 10 of
the Letters Patent Act, 1992. Letters Patent of the Patna
High Court has been made applicable to this Court by
virtue of Orissa High Court Order, 1948. Letters Patent
Appeal is an intra-Court appeal where under the Letters
Patent Bench, sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its
own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as vested
in the Single Bench. (Ref: (1996) 3 SCC 52, Baddula
Lakshmaiah Vrs. Shri Anjaneya Swami Temple). The
Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal should not disturb
the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Single Judge
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 75 of 79
of the Court unless it is shown to be based on no
evidence, perverse, palpably unreasonable or inconsistent
with any particular position in law. This scope of
interference is within a narrow compass. Appellate
jurisdiction under Letters Patent is really a corrective
jurisdiction and it is used rarely only to correct errors, if
any made.
In the case of B. Venkatamuni Vrs. C.J. Ayodhya Ram
Singh reported in (2006) 13 SCC 449, it is held that in an
intra-Court appeal, the Division Bench undoubtedly may
be entitled to reappraise both questions of fact and law,
but entertainment of a letters patent appeal is
discretionary and normally the Division Bench would not,
unless there exist cogent reasons, differ from a finding of
fact arrived at by the Single Judge. Even a Court of first
appeal which is the final Court of appeal on fact may
have to exercise some amount of restraint. Similar view
was taken in the case of Umabai Vrs. Nilkanth Dhondiba
Chavan reported in (2005) 6 SCC 243. In the case of
Commissioner of Income Tax Vrs. Karnataka Planters
Coffee Curing Work Private Limited reported in (2016) 9
SCC 538, it is held that the jurisdiction of the Division
Bench in a writ appeal is primarily one of adjudication of
questions of law. Findings of fact recorded concurrently
by the authorities under the Act concerned (Income Tax
Act) and also in the first round of the writ proceedings by
the learned Single Judge are not to be lightly disturbed.
Thus a writ appeal is an appeal on principle where the
legality and validity of the judgment and/or order of the
Single Judge is tested and it can be set aside only when
there is a patent error on the face of the record or the
judgment is against established or settled principle of
law. If two views are possible and a view, which is
reasonable and logical, has been adopted by a Single
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 76 of 79
Judge, the other view, howsoever appealing may be to the
Division Bench; it is the view adopted by the Single
Judge, which would, normally be allowed to prevail. If the
discretion has been exercised by the Single Judge in good
faith and after giving due weight to relevant matters and
without being swayed away by irrelevant matters and if
two views are possible on the question, then also the
Division Bench in writ appeal should not interfere, even
though it would have exercised its discretion in a different
manner, were the case come initially before it. The
exercise of discretion by the Single Judge should
manifestly be wrong which would then give scope of
interference to the Division Bench.”
9.7. With such delineated scope laid down with respect to
consideration of writ appeal, this Court finds that there
is factual perversity as well as legal flaw apparent on the
face of Judgment dated 17.12.2024 of the learned Single
Bench. Therefore, it is felt expedient to show indulgence
in said judgment.
10. For the reasons ascribed supra and in the light of
discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs and
bearing in mind the scope for interference while sitting
in intra-Court appeal filed under Article 4 of the Orissa
High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10 of the
Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature
at Patna and Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of
Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa,
1948, this Court sets aside the Judgment dated
17.12.2024 rendered in W.P.(C) No.2160 of 2020.
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 77 of 79
11. As a consequence of such order, needless to say that the
Order of disengagement of Contractual Drivers, so far as
the appellant is concerned, vide Letter No.IX-29/2020–
658/TC, dated 14.01.2020 (Annexure-1 of writ petition)
and Office Order bearing No.13642/TC, dated
24.11.2018 issued from the Office of the Transport
Commissioner-cum-Chairman, State Transport
Authority, Odisha, Cuttack (Annexure-2 of writ petition)
declining to regularise services of the appellant on the
grounds that “High Power Committee has considered the
matter and decided not to regularise services of the
applicant as he was not engaged against contractual
post created with concurrence of Finance Department
and no post of regular Driver was abolished for the
purpose and provisions of ORV Act was not followed”
stand quashed, being contrary to facts stated in
recommendation in the Letter No.IX-29/2016–
16925/TC, dated 31.10.2016 of Under-Secretary, STA,
Odisha, Cuttack issued from the above said Office of
STA as well as the findings, observations and directions
contained in Order dated 12.01.2018 passed in O.A.
No.1234 of 2016 by the learned Odisha Administrative
Tribunal in the case of present appellant, titled Prafulla
Kumar Behera Vrs. State of Odisha.
11.1. As is ex facie manifest from the Counter-Affidavit sworn
to by Under Secretary, State Transport Authority, filedWA No.119 of 2025 Page 78 of 79
on behalf of the State Transport Authority in the writ
petition being W.P.(C) No.2157 of 2020 (which was
disposed of vide common Judgement dated 17.12.2024),
is hit by estoppel, inasmuch as the Order dated
12.01.2018 passed in O.A. No.1234 of 2016 by the
learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal attained its
finality being not challenged before higher Court(s).
11.2. Ergo, it is directed that the respondents shall take a
decision within three months from date in the light of
the observations made herein above keeping in view the
legal position discussed in this Judgment and comply
with the direction contained in Order dated 12.01.2018
passed in O.A. No.1234 of 2016 by the learned Odisha
Administrative Tribunal.
12. In the result, this writ appeal is allowed; so also the writ
petition as a consequence thereof; and all pending
Signature Not
Verified interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR
SETHY
Designation: Personal Assistant
of, but in the circumstances, there shall be no order as
(Secretary-in-Charge)
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
to costs.
Date: 19-Jun-2025 17:24:40
I agree.
(HARISH TANDON) (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
The 19th June, 2025//Aswini/MRS
WA No.119 of 2025 Page 79 of 79