Karnataka High Court
S Suresh Occupier vs The State Of Karnataka on 12 June, 2025
Author: R.Devdas
Bench: R.Devdas
-1- NC: 2025:KHC-D:7590 CRL.P No.100272 of 2022 HC-KAR IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF JUNE, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.DEVDAS CRIMINAL PETITION NO.100272 OF 2022 (482(CR.PC)/528(BNSS)) BETWEEN: 1. S. SURESH, OCCUPIER, M/S. E.I.D PARRY (INDIA) LIMITED, HULLATTI VILLAGE, HALIYAL-581 329, UTTAR KANNADA DISTRICT. 2. J. VENKATARAO, (WRONGLY MENTIONED AS J. VENTATESHWARARAO IN THE COMPLAINT), FACTORY MANAGER, M/S. E.I.D PARRY (INDIA) LIMITED, HULLATTI VILLAGE, HALIYAL-581 329, UTTAR KANNADA DISTRICT. ...PETITIONERS (BY SRI. HARSH DESAI, ADVOCATE) AND: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AT THE INSTANCE OF BHARATI MAGADUM SENIOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF FACTORIES, MOHANKUMAR HUBLI DIVISION-1, HUBBALLI 580 020, B SHELAR REP. BY THE SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, Digitally signed by MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR Location: High Court of HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD, Karnataka, Dharwad Bench Date: 2025.06.18 10:05:13 +0530 DHARWAD-580 011. ...RESPONDENT (BY SRI. RAMESH B. CHIGARI, AGA) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO, QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING THE ORDER DATED 23.11.2021, IN CC NO.1888/2021 ON THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT HALIYAL, UTTAR KANNADA DISTRICT FOR OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 7A (1) & (2) OF THE FACTORIES ACT, 1948 AND RULES 84 & 85 OF THE KARNATAKA FACTORIES RULES, 1969 R/W. SECTION 92 OF THE FACTORIES ACT, 1948, AND SET ASIDE THE COMPLAINT IN CC NO.1888 OF 2021 (PC NO.12 OF 2021) IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE. -2- NC: 2025:KHC-D:7590 CRL.P No.100272 of 2022 HC-KAR THIS CRIMINAL PETITION, COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: ORAL ORDER
(PER: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE R.DEVDAS)
1. This criminal petition is filed by the petitioners, who
are Occupier and Manager of M/s.E.I.D. Parry (India)
Limited, manufacturing unit, aggrieved by the
impugned order dated 23.11.2021, passed by the
learned Civil Judge and JMFC at Haliyal, Uttara
Kannada District, in C.C.No.1888/2021, for the
offence punishable under Section 7A(1) and (2) of
the Factories Act, 1948 and Rules 84 and 85 of the
Karnataka Factories Rules, 1969 read with Section 92
of the Factories Act, 1948 and the complaint in
C.C.No.1888/2021, which forms the basis for the
criminal case.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners has basically
contended that;
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2.1. The proceedings could not have been initiated
against the petitioners by invoking the
provisions of the Factories Act and/or the Rules
therein, since admittedly, the deceased person
was not a workman either engaged directly by
the petitioner factory or borrowed from any
other agency for its normal manufacturing
process.
2.2. The petitioners are carrying on the production
activity of manufacturing crystal sugar, co-
generation of power, and manufacture of
distillery products in the factory premises.
However, on account of the normal wear and
tear, the work of replacement of sugar-bin
feeding belt conveyor was entrusted to
M/s.Shree Balaji Enterprises of Uttar Pradesh
on contract basis. The work commenced on
31.08.2021, and during the process of such
work entrusted to the agency, the agency had
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deputed six contract workers to carry out the
structure work of replacing the sugar-bin
feeding belt conveyor.
2.3. During the process of such work being carried
out by the entrusted agency, a mishap
happened, and one of the workmen named
Kuldeep Lallan, who was carrying out the works
under the supervision of the contractor,
accidentally fell to the ground from the height
of 21 meters and later succumbed to the
injuries.
2.4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would
therefore contend that the alleged
contravention as noticed in the complaint filed
under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. for
contravention of relevant provisions of the
Karnataka Factories Rules, 1969 and Section
7A(1) and (2) of the Factories Act, 1948 could
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not have been invoked in the facts and
circumstances narrated hereinabove.
2.5. For that purpose, attention of this Court is also
drawn to the definition of the term
“manufacturing process” as found at Clause (k)
of Section 2 of the Factories Act, which reads as
follows:
2. Interpretation.– n this Act, unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context,–
(a) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(k) “manufacturing process” means any process
for–
(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting,
finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning,
breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or
adapting any article or substance with a view to its
use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal; or
(ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other
substance; or
(iii) generating, transforming or transmitting
power; or
(iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter
press, lithography, photogravure or other similar
process or book binding; or
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(v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting,
finishing or breaking up ships or vessels; or
(vi) preserving or storing any article in cold
storage.
2.6. Learned counsel would submit that, it is clear
from the definition of the word “manufacturing
process” that, it covers all the normal processes
of manufacture, but when admittedly the works
were entrusted to the outside agency, not being
the normal manufacturing process and, on the
other hand, the civil work entrusted to the
outside agency, invocation of the provisions
under the Factories Act or the Rules was not
justified.
2.7. Notwithstanding the said argument, learned
counsel would also point out to the complaint
lodged by the Director of Factories, Hubballi,
who on enquiry, found that six members of the
contract workmen started shifting of the sugar
conveyor structure from sugar bin section to
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the ground floor with the help of two-way
pulley. The enquiry clearly reveals the fact that
the persons supervising the entire activity had
taken all precautions and were guiding Kuldeep
Lallan, who was sitting on the base frame of
sugar bin area with the support of x-bracing.
This would show that all precautions had been
taken.
2.8. In fact, it is clearly stated that, Mr.Kuldeep was
slowly releasing the rope tied to the structure
of the bin, and the other end of the rope was
held by him. However, Mr.Kuldeep himself
increased the speed of releasing the rope which
was tied to the structure, assuming that
everything was going on safely and the
conveyor was reaching the ground safely.
During the said process, suddenly the rope tied
to his hand pulled him with a jerk due to the
weight of the conveyor, and Mr.Kuldeep was
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pulled back along with the rope and he fell from
the height of 21 meters to the ground.
2.9. Learned counsel would also point out from the
complaint itself that, insofar as the safety
measures for the workers of the factory were
concerned, all were in place. But here is a
situation where a work, which was not the
normal manufacturing process, was being
carried on by an external agency, and whatever
safeguards and precautions had to be taken
and requested were also given on behalf of the
factory. Therefore, it is submitted that no
disregard for safety measures can be attributed
to the petitioners.
2.10. Learned counsel would also place reliance on
the judgment of this Court in the case
of Ramchandra vs. A.R.Vijendra1, where it
was held that, if bodily injury was caused to a
1
ILR 1994 KAR 2437
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workman not on account of any inherent defect
in the construction, situation, operation or
maintenance of the means of transport, but on
account of negligence of another employee,
then it cannot be said that there is
contravention of Rule 88.
2.11. Learned counsel would hasten to add that, in
the present context, it is clear that there is no
negligence on the part of any other employee
or workman of the petitioners, and it is only on
account of a small mistake committed by
Mr.Kuldeep himself, who increased the speed of
lowering the ropes.
2.12. It was also submitted before this Court that the
petitioners have paid a sum of ₹16,00,000/- to
the family of the deceased person under the
provisions of the Employees’ Compensation Act.
3. Per contra, learned AGA would draw the attention of
this Court to the definition of the term “worker” as
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provided in clause (l) of Section 2 of the Factories
Act, which reads as follows:
2. Interpretation.– n this Act, unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context,–
(a) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(l) “worker” means a person employed, directly or
by or through any agency (including a contractor)
with or without the knowledge of the principal
employer, whether for remuneration or not], in any
manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of
the machinery or premises used for a
manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work
incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing
process, or the subject of the manufacturing
process but does not include any member of the
armed forces of the Union.
4. Learned AGA would submit that the definition of the
term “worker” would also include any person
employed directly or by or through any agency,
including a contractor, and therefore, the petitioner
cannot contend that the deceased person was not a
contractor of the petitioner.
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5. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners,
learned AGA, and on perusing the petition paper, this
Court finds that there is substance in the submission
of learned counsel for the petitioners, while
contending that primarily the work entrusted to an
external agency was not in respect of the normal
manufacturing process of the petitioner Factory. It
was a civil work entrusted for replacing the sugar bin
feeding conveyor belt and therefore, invocation of
the provisions of the Factories Act and/or the Rules
thereunder, would become suspect.
6. The definition of the term “worker,” although would
include any person employed directly or by or
through any agency including the contractor,
nevertheless, it should be in the process of any
manufacturing process as could be found in the
definition of the term “worker” Even otherwise, the
complaint itself makes it clear that all standard
precautionary safety measures were in place in the
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factory unit of the petitioners. Even insofar as the
work that was carried out by the external agency, it
was a civil work that was being carried out. It
appears that all precautionary measures were taken
both by the petitioners as well as the contractor. It
was an unfortunate incident where, because of the
negligence of the deceased person himself, the
accident occurred.
7. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the impugned order passed
by the learned Civil Judge and JMFC, Haliyal, Uttara
Kannada, directing to restore the criminal case
against the petitioners for offences punishable under
Sections 7A (1) and (2) of the Factories Act, 1948
and Rules 84 and 85 of the Karnataka Factories
Rules, 1969 R/w. Section 92 of the Factories Act,
1948, cannot be sustained. Accordingly, I pass the
following:
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ORDER
i. The criminal petition is allowed.
ii. The impugned order dated 23.11.2021
passed in CC No.1888/2021, on the file of
the learned Civil Judge and JMFC, Haliyal,
Uttara Kannada District, stands quashed.
iii. All further proceedings initiated pursuant
to the complaint filed under Section 200
of Cr.P.C in CC No.1888/2021, is hereby
quashed and set aside.
Sd/-
(R.DEVDAS)
JUDGEgab
CT:VP
LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 10