Raju Adhikari And Ors vs State Of West Bengal & Anr on 20 June, 2025

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Raju Adhikari And Ors vs State Of West Bengal & Anr on 20 June, 2025

                        IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                       CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
                                APPELLATE SIDE

PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR

                                CRR 3040 of 2022

                               Raju Adhikari and Ors.
                                         -VS-
                              State of West Bengal & Anr.


For the Petitioner s          : Mr. Rajdeep Majumdar, Ld. Sr. Adv.,
                               Mr. Pritam Roy
                                Ms. Arushi Rathore

For the Opposite Party No.2   : Mr. Debasis Kar
                                Mr Arka Tilak Bhadra

For the State                 : Ms. Zareen N. Khan,
                                Mr. Ashok Das

Hearing concluded on          : 23.05.2025

Judgment on                   : 20.06.2025

UDAY KUMAR, J.: -

1.

This revisional application, invoking the inherent powers of this Court

under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.),

seeks the quashing of criminal proceedings initiated pursuant to

Barrackpore Women’s Police Station Case No. 39 of 2022, dated July 16,

2022. The First Information Report (FIR) in question incorporates grave

allegations under Sections 498A, 406, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (IPC), in conjunction with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961, against the husband and his relatives. These

charges pertain to alleged dowry harassment and marital cruelty. The
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resultant G.R. Case No. 6784 of 2022 is presently pending adjudication

before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barrackpore.

2. In essence, the petitioners, comprising the husband’s mother, his

sisters, and a nephew, contend that they have been falsely implicated

and that the continuation of these proceedings constitutes a clear abuse

of the process of law. Their primary contentions rest upon the omnibus

nature of the allegations, the demonstrable geographical remoteness of

certain family members from the matrimonial abode, and a significant,

unexplained delay in the lodging of the FIR. These grounds, they argue,

collectively point towards a malicious prosecution rather than a genuine

complaint.

3. The brief facts, as presented by the prosecutrix, opposite party no. 2,

Smt. Sanjukta Adhikary Ganguly, indicate that her marriage with

petitioner no. 1, Raju Adhikary, was solemnized on January 30, 2020.

This marital journey, however, quickly descended into distress,

culminating in the FIR lodged on July 16, 2022. The complaint details a

distressing series of alleged incidents of cruelty and harassment that

purportedly commenced almost immediately post-marriage.

4. According to the prosecutrix, during the wedding and reception

ceremonies, her sisters-in-law (petitioner nos. 3 and 5) brazenly

demanded dowry and made disparaging remarks about gifts from her

family. This, she states, was merely the beginning of severe financial

exploitation. In March 2020, she was allegedly compelled to procure

Rs.20,000/- from her father. Soon after, her ATM card was reportedly

snatched, leading to a Rs.33,000/- withdrawal by petitioner no. 1,

supposedly at the instigation of his mother (petitioner no. 2) and sisters
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(petitioner nos. 3 and 5). Before their child was born, another

Rs.30,000/- was allegedly taken from her father by petitioner no. 1.

5. Moving beyond financial exploitation, the story escalates to claims of

torture during her pregnancies. Her in-laws, she states, expressed

unhappiness, shirked responsibility for the child, and forced her back to

her parental home without adequate medical care. After an abortion in

April 2020, petitioner no. 2 initially barred her re-entry into the

matrimonial home. Upon her eventual return, she allegedly faced a

harsh reality of forced household chores, relentless torture, verbal

abuse, and even deprivation of basic necessities for her newborn

daughter. Following her baby girl’s birth on April 28, 2021, petitioner

nos. 3 and 4 (sister-in-law and nephew) allegedly prevented her from

living with her husband, and communication with the in-laws ceased

entirely. When she returned to the matrimonial home in September

2021, her presence was reportedly met with displeasure by petitioner

nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, leading to continued torment and the denial of food

for her infant.

6. The essence of the complaint revolves around a significant incident on

February 15, 2022, when the prosecutrix and her father were allegedly

brutally assaulted by Petitioner No. 1. What’s more, petitioner nos. 2

(mother-in-law) and 4 (nephew) are also specifically accused of

physically assaulting her and pulling her hair. The situation escalated,

with petitioner no. 1 allegedly attempting to throttle her before forcibly

expelling her from the matrimonial home. It was this harrowing event,

she asserts, that ultimately compelled her to lodge the FIR on July 16,

2022, seeking justice for the alleged years of torment.
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7. The petitioners, conversely, vehemently deny all these accusations,

asserting that despite their demonstrable efforts to foster peace and

affection, opposite party no. 2 exhibited hostile behaviour, neglected her

matrimonial obligations, engaged in improper conduct, and continuously

harassed them.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Rajdeep Majumdar, Learned

Senior Advocate, advanced several compelling reasons for quashing of

the criminal proceedings by exercising inherent powers. A primary point

of emphasis was the geographical disassociation of certain family

members from the matrimonial home. He highlighted that petitioner nos.

3 and 5 (sisters-in-law) and petitioner no. 4 (nephew) were residing in

entirely separate households, specifically in Prafullanagar, Habra, and

Dalal Para, Basirhat, situated at a considerable distance from the

matrimonial home in Ashokenagar. It was further asserted that some

petitioners were even residing abroad (Mumbai, Hong Kong, Jamaica)

during various periods of the alleged torture.

9. Mr. Majumdar contended that it is “inexplicable” how they could have

consistently inflicted daily torture while maintaining such geographical

separation, leading to the inference of false implication arising from the

complainant’s alleged animosity towards her husband. He submitted

that there was no common business or daily interaction that would

facilitate such continuous acts of cruelty.

10. Furthermore, he underscored the “omnibus” and vague nature of many

allegations contained within the FIR. He argued that the complaint

indiscriminately “ropes in” all family members without specifically

attributing distinct, overt acts of cruelty to each individual, particularly
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the distant relatives. He submitted that such “bald allegations and

fanciful averments,” unsupported by concrete particulars, cannot

sustain a charge under Section 498A IPC. In this regard, he invoked

established judicial precedents that caution against the common

tendency to “rope in all relations” of the husband in matrimonial

disputes, often without attributing specific roles or providing tangible

material.

11. Another critical procedural flaw highlighted by Mr. Majumdar the

inordinate delay between the last alleged incident (February 15, 2022)

and the lodging of the FIR (July 16, 2022). He also questioned the

prosecutrix’s silence for over one and a half years if the alleged violence

was indeed continuous since the marriage in January 2020. Such

“laches” in reporting, without a satisfactory explanation, he argued,

undermines the credibility of the allegations and suggests they might be

an afterthought or motivated by ulterior designs.

12. Building on the issue of delay, Mr. Majumdar Learned Counsel for the

petitioners raised a significant legal ground concerning the police’s

alleged non-compliance with the guidelines enunciated by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari vs. Government of UP and Ors. [(2014) 2

SCC 1]. He asserted that the FIR was registered and investigation

initiated directly, without conducting a preliminary inquiry, which is

specifically mandated for “matrimonial disputes/family disputes” and

“cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal

prosecution” (e.g., over 3 months delay in reporting without satisfactory

explanation). He contended that such an inquiry is vital for screening
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frivolous and malicious complaints and protecting individual liberty, and

its absence renders the FIR liable to be quashed.

13. Moreover, Mr. Majumdar argued that to attract Section 498A IPC, it is

essential to establish that torture was inflicted with the intention to

coerce for dowry or to drive the victim to suicide. He claimed the

allegations, even if true, do not meet these “basic ingredients.” Similarly,

he submitted that allegations concerning money withdrawal might not

strictly fall under “criminal breach of trust” (Section 406 IPC) unless

specific entrustment and dishonest misappropriation are proven. He

also contended that mere verbal expressions, without intent to cause

harm, do not constitute criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC.

14. Finally, Mr. Majumdar argued that the entire proceeding is “vexatious

and harassing in nature” and has been “instituted at the behest of a

malicious complainant,” serving no useful purpose and merely

constituting a “gross abuse of the process of court” if the allegations, in

their entirety, fail to disclose any cognizable offense against them. He

supported his contention by citing the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s

observation in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693], which

highlighted the need to discourage matrimonial litigation that needlessly

involves entire families.

15. Conversely, the learned advocate for opposite party no.2, Mr. Debasis

Kar and Learned Advocate for the State, Ms. Zareen N. Khan,

vehemently opposed the prayer for quashing of the proceedings. They

initially emphasized the fundamental principle that registration of an

FIR is mandatory if the information discloses a cognizable offense, citing

Hon’ble Supreme Court guidelines in cases like Lalita Kumari itself
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(regarding mandatory registration upon disclosure of cognizable offense)

and Amit Kumar vs. Union of India [(2015) INSC 384]. He submitted that

the complaint, on its face, prima facie disclosed cognizable offenses, thus

justifying immediate FIR registration.

16. They further argued that the High Court, when exercising its inherent

powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., should not conduct a ‘mini-trial’ or

delve into disputed questions of fact. They asserted that evaluating the

truthfulness or falsity of the allegations is a matter reserved for a full

trial, where evidence can be properly adduced, examined, and tested.

The State contended that sufficient material exists to proceed against

multiple accused, implying a “common intention” or concerted action in

inflicting an “aggravated form of torture.” This directly challenged the

petitioners’ claims of separate residences and false implication,

suggesting a collective responsibility.

17. They also submitted that “sufficient materials are available” to proceed

with the case, mentioning that formal charges have not yet been framed

due to “non-cooperation of parties.” This implies that the investigation

has indeed gathered enough evidence to warrant a trial, and the process

should not be prematurely truncated.

18. Finally, the learned counsel referred to a (2017) Calcutta High Court

ruling (the specific citation of which was not fully clarified), stating that

“the disputed question of fact victim defence was oriented… quashing

would not be allowed without disputed question of fact is involved.” The

essence of this submission was that if disputed facts exist, particularly

concerning the victim’s assertions, quashing is generally impermissible.
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19. To determine whether the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

should be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings, either in whole

or in part, I find several core questions that require judicial scrutiny.

These questions are:

a. Whether the allegations contained in the FIR, even when

accepted at their face value, prima facie disclose the commission

of cognizable offenses under Sections 498A, 406, and 506 IPC

read with Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961,

particularly as against Petitioner Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5?

b. Whether the alleged inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, coupled

with the absence of a preliminary inquiry, warrants the

quashing of the entire proceedings or specific aspects thereof.

c. Whether the implication of petitioner Nos. 3, 4, and 5, who

assert their residence in separate households, constitutes a

case of false implication or an abuse of the process of law,

thereby justifying the quashing of proceedings specifically

against them.

d. Whether the allegations are genuinely “omnibus” and vague,

lacking specific details or overt acts attributable to each

petitioner, particularly the extended family members, which

would consequently fail to establish a case of individual

culpability.

20. Indubitably, the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are vast,

yet not limitless. They serve as a vital safety valve, to be employed

sparingly, cautiously, and only in truly exceptional circumstances to
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prevent a clear abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. It is a

sacrosanct principle, reiterated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR

1992 SC 604, that such powers are generally not invoked to quash a

First Information Report (FIR) or a criminal complaint if the allegations

therein, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, disclose

the commission of a cognizable offence. Conversely, quashing may be

justified where the allegations don’t disclose a cognizable offence, or

where they are “so absurd and inherently improbable” that no prudent

person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground

for proceeding against the accused.

21. Applying these established principles of judicial restraint to the instant

matter, I first turn to the prima facie assessment of the alleged offences

as they pertain to petitioner no. 1 (the husband). The complaint details

several specific incidents involving petitioner no. 1. The prosecutrix

alleges that he forcibly withdrew Rs.33,000/- from her ATM card, and

later took another ₹30,000 from her father. More critically, on February

15, 2022, he is accused of brutally assaulting both the prosecutrix and

her father, attempting to throttle her, and forcibly expelling her from

the matrimonial home. These allegations, if substantiated, clearly

satisfy the core ingredients of Section 498A IPC (cruelty, physical and

mental), Section 406 IPC (criminal breach of trust related to dowry

articles/money, though specific entrustment would need to be proven

at trial), and Section 506 IPC (criminal intimidation). The Dowry

Prohibition Act sections would also prima facie be attracted by the

alleged demands and financial exploitations. Given the specificity and

gravity of these allegations directly against the husband, they do not fall
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into the category of “absurd and inherently improbable” assertions.

Therefore, for petitioner no. 1, there is no demonstrable abuse of

process concerning his prosecution, and the allegations warrant a full

trial.

22. However, a nuanced approach is required when examining the

involvement of the other petitioners–Petitioner Nos. 2 (mother-in-law),

3 (sister-in-law), 4 (nephew), and 5 (sister-in-law). While the complaint

does contain specific allegations of physical assault against petitioner

nos. 2 and 4 on a particular date (February 15, 2022, accusing them of

physically assaulting her and pulling her hair), and some involvement

in financial matters by Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 (instigation for money

withdrawal), the overall pattern of accusation against petitioner nos. 3

and 5, particularly when viewed against their geographical separation,

leans towards generalized implication rather than precise criminal acts

of continuous cruelty. The petitioners’ contention that petitioner nos. 3,

4, and 5 reside in “entirely separate households” (e.g., Prafullanagar,

Habra, Basirhat) and even in different cities or countries (Mumbai,

Hong Kong, Jamaica) during various periods of the alleged torture, is a

significant factual assertion. While this geographical remoteness does

not create an absolute immunity from all charges, it logically renders

continuous, daily “torture” by them, within the matrimonial home,

improbable. The prosecutrix’s allegations, such as “in-laws expressed

unhappiness,” “forced household chores,” “constant torture,” and

“denial of food for her infant” attributed generally to “in-laws” or

multiple petitioners without precise attribution, squarely fall within the

“omnibus” description cautioned against by the Supreme Court. In
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Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207], the Hon’ble Supreme

Court expressed concern over the tendency to “rope in all relations” of

the husband, stating that “some over-implication is natural… but the

Court has to guard against false implication.” Similarly, in Preeti Gupta

v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC 667], the Court specifically

highlighted the common practice of making “bald allegations and

fanciful averments” against family members without concrete

particulars, especially against distant relatives, noting that such

allegations cannot sustain charges like 498A IPC. The allegations of

“instigation” or “unhappiness” against Petitioner Nos. 3 and 5, without

more specific overt acts of sustained cruelty, are highly general and

appear to be precisely the kind of “omnibus” accusations that these

precedents warn against. While the specific incident of physical assault

on Feb 15, 2022, involving P2 and P4 is concrete, the broader context of

their alleged “continuous torture” over years, given their alleged remote

residences, necessitates careful scrutiny.

23. Beyond the nature of the allegations and geographical considerations, a

critical procedural aspect emerges: the inordinate delay in lodging the

FIR. The complaint was filed on July 16, 2022, whereas the last alleged

incident is stated to be on February 15, 2022, indicating a gap of

approximately five months. More significantly, the alleged continuous

torture is claimed to have commenced immediately after the marriage in

January 2020. This substantial period of silence (over two and a half

years from the initial alleged cruelty, and five months from the final

incident) clearly falls within the category of “abnormal delay” (over 3

months) as contemplated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita
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Kumari vs. Government of UP and Ors. [(2014) 2 SCC 1]. While delay, per

se, does not automatically vitiate a criminal proceeding, its unexplained

presence in matrimonial disputes is a significant factor in assessing the

credibility of the prosecution’s case. In such emotionally charged cases,

unexplained delay often raises questions about exaggeration,

afterthought, or the possibility of the complaint being a pressure tactic

rather than a genuine cry for justice for immediate grievances. More

importantly, Lalita Kumari explicitly mandates that in cases involving

“matrimonial disputes/family disputes” and where there is “abnormal

delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution,” a preliminary inquiry

may be conducted to ascertain whether a cognizable offense has truly

been committed. The purpose of this preliminary inquiry is precisely for

“screening frivolous and malicious complaints” and “protecting

individual liberty” from unwarranted criminal prosecution, thereby

“preventing abuse of the criminal process.” The police’s absence of any

preliminary inquiry in the instant case, despite this demonstrable delay

and the clear matrimonial nature of the dispute, constitutes a pertinent

procedural lapse that runs contrary to the authoritative guidelines of

Lalita Kumari. The petitioners’ reliance on this procedural lacuna is

well-founded and cannot be brushed aside.

24. This procedural lapse, highlighted by the petitioners, is further

underscored by recent High Court decisions, such as those cited by the

petitioners (e.g., CRR 2635 of 2021, Rahul Kumar Shaw and others

versus State of West Bengal and Another and CRR 1383 of 2021 Varun

Goenka versus The State of West Bengal), which have indeed

underscored the necessity of such preliminary inquiries in similar
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matrimonial disputes with unexplained delays. These rulings reinforce

that while the State’s contention regarding mandatory FIR registration

upon disclosure of a cognizable offense is generally true, it does not

negate the specific preliminary inquiry mandate in Lalita Kumari for the

defined categories of cases, particularly when there are grave concerns

about generalized implications or mala fide intentions.

25. Against this backdrop of specific allegations, procedural lapses, and

guiding judicial principles, the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be

exercised sparingly and with caution, primarily to prevent abuse of the

Court’s process or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, as held in

State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699]. When

allegations in the FIR are vague and omnibus, lacking specific instances

or overt acts attributable to each accused, especially in cases involving

multiple family members, it can warrant the quashing of proceedings.

While the allegations against petitioner no. 1 (husband) are specific and

do not fall into the omnibus category, the nature of the allegations

against some of the other petitioners, particularly petitioner nos. 3 and

5, appears to be generalized, coupled with their claim of separate

residences. While there are specific allegations against petitioner nos. 2

and 4 regarding physical assault on a particular date, the broader

narrative of “constant torture by in-laws” could be considered omnibus

unless distinct, continuous actions by each individual are clearly

detailed. The lack of specific, sustained, and direct overt acts of cruelty

by petitioner nos. 3 and 5, beyond general taunts or instigation, within

the context of their separate residences, strongly suggests that their
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implication may be generalized rather than precise and may well

constitute an abuse of process.

26. Consequently, in view of the exhaustive discussion and analysis of the

submissions and the factual matrix, it is clear that the allegations

against petitioner no. 1 (the husband) are sufficiently specific and

severe to warrant a trial. There is no demonstrable abuse of process

concerning his prosecution that would justify quashing the proceedings

against him at this juncture.

27. However, for the other petitioners–petitioner nos. 2 (mother-in-law), 3

(sister-in-law), 4 (nephew), and 5 (sister-in-law)–the situation demands

a nuanced approach. While the complaint does contain specific

allegations of physical assault against petitioner nos. 2 and 4 on

February 15, 2022, and some involvement in financial matters by

petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 (instigation for money withdrawal), the overall

pattern of accusation against petitioner nos. 3 and 5, particularly when

viewed against their geographical separation, leans towards generalized

implication rather than precise criminal acts. The specific allegations

against petitioner nos. 2 and 4, while concrete, are still nested within a

broader complaint characterized by significant delay and general

accusations against the “in-laws.”

28. Significantly, this nuanced assessment is strongly reinforced by a

crucial procedural omission: the non-conduct of a preliminary inquiry,

despite the discernible and inordinate delay in filing the FIR and the

clear matrimonial nature of the dispute. This procedural lapse, coupled

with the valid concerns regarding potential over-implication of extended

family members due to omnibus allegations and geographical distances,
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strongly indicates that judicial intervention is necessary to prevent an

abuse of the legal process. To permit the proceedings to continue

against these non-husband petitioners without the benefit of such a

preliminary assessment, especially when many allegations against them

appear omnibus and potentially indicative of over-implication, would

undoubtedly amount to an abuse of the due process of law.

29. While I firmly uphold the prosecutrix’s right to seek justice against

genuine perpetrators, must equally ensure that the formidable

machinery of criminal law is not utilized as a tool for vengeance or to

harass individuals who may have been falsely implicated. A preliminary

inquiry will serve as a crucial filter, ensuring that only those against

whom credible and specific material exists are subjected to the full

rigors of a criminal trial, thereby securing the ends of justice for all

parties involved in a fair and transparent manner.

30. In matrimonial disputes marked by an inordinate and unexplained

delay in filing the First Information Report (FIR), a preliminary inquiry

is mandatory as per the guidelines enunciated in Lalita Kumari v.

Government of UP (2014) 2 SCC 1 before proceeding with criminal

charges, especially when allegations against extended family members

appear vague or omnibus and their active and continuous involvement

is rendered improbable by factors such as geographical remoteness.

The purpose of this preliminary inquiry is to prevent the abuse of the

legal process and ensure that only credible cases with specific and

substantiated allegations are pursued to trial against all implicated

parties, while simultaneously protecting individuals from generalized or

malicious implication.

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31. This principle underscores the High Court’s role in balancing the rights

of the complainant to justice against the potential for abuse of the

criminal process. While FIR registration is mandatory for cognizable

offenses, the Lalita Kumari judgment provides a specific carve-out for

matrimonial disputes and cases with significant delay, mandating a

preliminary inquiry. This inquiry acts as a crucial filtering mechanism,

particularly to scrutinize vague or omnibus allegations against distant

relatives, who are often “roped in” without specific overt acts. The delay

in lodging the complaint further heightens the need for such an inquiry

to assess veracity and avoid proceedings being driven by ulterior

motives. By ordering a preliminary inquiry, the Court ensures that only

those against whom credible material exists after due preliminary

assessment are subjected to the rigors of a full criminal trial, thereby

upholding the integrity of the justice delivery system and preventing

harassment based on generalized accusations.

32. In culmination of this detailed analysis, I conclude that while the

allegations against petitioner no. 1 (the husband) are sufficiently

specific and direct to warrant continuation of proceedings, the case

against the other petitioners (mother-in-law, sisters-in-law, and

nephew) warrants further, mandatory scrutiny. The procedural lapse of

not conducting a preliminary inquiry, coupled with valid concerns

regarding potential over-implication arising from omnibus allegations

and geographical distances, is a significant flaw that demands

rectification to prevent an abuse of the legal process.

33. Therefore, the application for quashing of proceedings arising out of

Barrackpore Women’s Police Station Case No. 39 of 2022 dated
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16.07.2022, under Section 498A/406/506 of IPC read with Section 3/4

of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, corresponding to G.R. Case No.

6784 of 2022, is partially allowed as follows:

i. The application for quashing of the aforesaid criminal

proceedings against Petitioner No. 1, Raju Adhikary (husband),

is hereby dismissed.

ii. The criminal proceedings against petitioner no. 1 (Raju

Adhikary) shall continue in accordance with the provisions of

law. The Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barrackpore, is

directed to proceed with his trial expeditiously and in

accordance with law.

iii. In view of the inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the

FIR, coupled with the fact that it is a matrimonial dispute falling

within the guidelines of Lalita Kumari v. Government of UP

(2014) 2 SCC 1, it is essential that a preliminary enquiry be

conducted.

iv. The Investigating Agency / Investigating Officer concerned is

hereby directed to conduct a preliminary enquiry specifically

regarding the active and direct involvement of petitioner no. 2

(mother-in-law), Petitioner No. 3 (sister-in-law), petitioner no. 4

(nephew), and Petitioner No. 5 (sister-in-law) in the alleged

commission of offenses under Sections 498A/406/506 of IPC

and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

v. This preliminary enquiry shall be conducted by giving notice to

all concerned parties, including petitioner nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5,

and the opposite party no. 2 (complainant), providing them a
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fair opportunity to present their respective positions and

relevant materials.

vi. The Investigating Officer/ Agency shall take endeavour to

complete this preliminary enquiry and submit a comprehensive

report to the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barrackpore,

within a period of six weeks from the date of this order.

vii. The criminal proceedings against petitioner nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5

in Barrackpore Women’s Police Station Case No. 39 of 2022

dated 16.07.2022 shall remain stayed until the submission of

the aforesaid preliminary enquiry report.

viii. Upon receipt of the preliminary enquiry report, the Learned

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barrackpore, shall proceed in

accordance with law.

ix. If the report indicates insufficient material or no credible

evidence to proceed against any or all of petitioner nos. 2, 3, 4,

and 5, the Learned Magistrate shall pass appropriate orders,

including their discharge, without requiring further recourse to

this Court. Conversely, if the report substantiates clear and

specific involvement, the proceedings against such implicated

petitioners shall resume.

x. All parties are directed to cooperate fully with the preliminary

enquiry.

34. The CRR 3040 of 2022 along with connected applications, if any, are

accordingly disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

35. There shall be no order as to costs. xiii. Interim order/ orders, if any,

stand vacated.

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36. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the Learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Barrackpore, 24 Parganas (North), and the Barrackpore

Women’s Police Station for necessary compliance.

37. Urgent photostat copy of this judgment may be provided to the parties,

if applied for, upon compliance with requisite formalities.

(Uday Kumar, J.)