Telangana High Court
Dharavath Laxmi vs The State Of Telangana on 20 June, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA, HYDERABAD
***
W.P.NO.2133 of 2025
Between:
Dharavath Laxmi.
Petitioner
VERSUS
The State of Telangana and Others
Respondents
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 20.06.2025
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO
W.P.NO.2133 of 2025
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether Her Ladyship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : No
_________________________________
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
* THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO
+ W.P.NO.2133 of 2025
ORDER:
% Dated 20.06.2025
# Between:
Dharavath Laxmi. Petitioner
VERSUS
The State of Telangana and Others Respondents
! Counsel for petitioner : Mr.Laxmaiah Kanchani.
^ Counsel for respondent No.1 : Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, the learned Special
Government Pleader representing the learned
Advocate General for the respondents.
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE :
? Cases referred :
12023 14 SCC 641
22024 SCC OnLine SC 367
3 (2020) 14 SCC 161
4 1974 SCC OnLine SC 26
5 (1975) 3 SCC 198
61950 SCC 449
71950 SCC 436
81965 SCC OnLine SC 9
91970 1 SCC 98
101969 (1) SCC 10
11(1973) 1 SCC 393
12(1973) 4 SCC 43
13(2023) 14 SCC 641
14 (2023) 9 SCC 587
152024 SCC OnLine SC 3718
162025 SCC OnLine SC 502
17(2025) 4 SCC 476
18AIR 1966 SCC 740
19W.P.No.21653 of 2024
20W.P.No.12085 of 2024
21W.P.No.12064 of 2024
22W.P.No.33604 of 2024
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025THE HON’BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAOW.P.NO.2133 of 2025
Mr.Laxmaiah Kanchani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner.
Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, the learned Special Government Pleader
representing the learned Advocate General for the respondents.
ORDER: (per Hon’ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)
1. The present writ petition has been filed by the wife of the
detenu against an order of detention dated 25.11.2024 passed by
the respondent No.2/District Collector & District Magistrate,
Warangal. The petitioner also challenges an order dated
23.12.2024passed by the respondent No.1/State of Telangana,
represented by its Chief Secretary, General Administration (Law &
Order) Department, confirming the detention of the petitioner’s
husband.
2. The petitioner seeks issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
directing the respondents to produce the detenu, who is presently
lodged at the Central Prison, Cherlapally, Medchal-Malkajgiri
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District, before this Court to set aside the impugned detention
order as well as the confirmation order, and release of the detenu.
3. The impugned order dated 25.11.2024 passed by the
respondent No.2/District Collector & District Magistrate,
Warangal, contains the grounds of detention. The detenu has been
charged with engaging in the business of possession and sale of
Illicitly Distilled Liquor (‘IDL’) in contravention of the provisions of
The Telangana Prohibition Act, 1995 (‘the 1995 Act’) as well as The
Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers,
Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders
Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders,
Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document
Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders,
Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances
Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and ‘White
Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (‘the 1986 Act’).
4. The impugned detention order also contains the particulars
of cases registered against the detenu under the provisions of the
1986 Actand subsequent cases registered under the provisions of
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
the 1995 Act. The confirmation order dated 23.12.2024 reiterates
the findings of the District Collector & District Magistrate,
Warangal, and directing detention of the detenu for a period of 12
months from the date of detention (25.11.2024).
The Facts leading to the Impugned Order:
5. A case vide Crime Occurrence Report (COR)No.99 of 2024
was registered against the detenu on 01.04.2024 under section 7A
read with section 8(e) of the 1995 Act, consequent upon 20 litres of
liquor being seized from the detenu. The seized liquor was analyzed
by the Chemical Examiner of the Regional Prohibition and Excise
Laboratory, Warangal on 05.07.2024. The Chemical Examiner
opined that the seized substance was “IDL” which is unfit for
human consumption and injurious to health. On 19.10.2024, a
second case was registered under the provisions of the 1995 Act
and 10 litres of liquor was seized from the detenu. On 28.10.2024,
the Chemical Examiner analyzed the sample and opined that the
seized IDL was unfit for human consumption and injurious to
health. On 26.10.2024, a third COR was registered against the
detenu upon seizure of 5 litres of IDL. On 28.10.2024, the
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Chemical Examiner opined that the seized IDL was unfit for
human consumption and injurious to health. On 28.10.2024, a
fourth COR was registered against the detenu upon seizure of 10
litres of IDL. On 29.10.2024, the Chemical Examiner opined that
the seized IDL was unfit for human consumption and injurious to
health.
6. The impugned detention order was passed by the District
Collector & District Magistrate, Warangal, on 25.11.2024 and was
confirmed by the State Government on 23.12.2024.
Arguments made on behalf of the Parties:
7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that
the alleged crimes, which form the basis for the
impugneddetention order, do not constitute disturbance of public
order as defined under section 2(a) of the 1986 Act. Counsel
argues that possession or distribution of liquor would fall within
the definition of ‘law and order’ as opposed to ‘maintenance of
public order’ under the 1986 Act. Counsel further submits that
the detenu can be produced before and punished by a competent
Court of law since the criminal justice system has already been set
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in motion. Counsel submits that Investigation Officers failed to
take any steps under section 41A(4) of The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, despite the detenu allegedly being involved in
similar offences. Counsel further submits that relevant material
was not placed before the Advisory Board and that the impugned
order was passed solely on the earlier cases registered against the
detenu. Counsel also argues that the detention order was based
on mere apprehension and lacked concrete evidence in support of
the conclusion that the detenu is a habitual offender. Counsel
relies on decisions to urge that the Supreme Court as well as a
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court have set aside similar detention
orders on the difference between ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’.
8. The learned Special Government Pleader (‘SGP’) appearing
for the respondentNos.1-3 i.e., the State of Telangana, the District
Magistrate, Warangal, and the Superintendent, Central Prison,
Cherlapally, submits that the impugned order was passed under
section 2(a) and 2(b) of the 1986 Act. The SGP argues that four
cases were registered against the detenu for the offence under
section 7A read with section 8(e) of the 1995 Act and that the
Chemical Examiner, upon analysis, confirmed that the seized
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
substance to be IDL which is unfit for human consumption and
injurious to public health.
9. The SGP relies on the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
including the case of Pesala Nookaraju Vs. Government of Andhra
Pradesh 1 to contend that the seized samples which were found to
be unfit for human consumption, constitute activity prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order, thereby justifying the detention of
the manufacturer/seller of the liquor. It is argued that the
Detaining Authority duly considered the material on record and
arrived at a subjective satisfaction of the necessity for detaining
the petitioner and that there is no scope of interference with the
impugned order.
Habeas Corpus and Preventive Detention:
10. “Habeas Corpus” literally means “have the body” and is
directed to the person detaining the other and requires the first
person to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time
and place together with the cause of the detention to the Court.
The Court can issue the Writ to have the body of the detained
12023 14 SCC 641
9
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
person to be brought before the Court in order to determine
whether the detention is legal or illegal: Corpus Juris Secundum.
The purpose of the Writ is to obtain the production of the
individual before the Court or a Judge for securing the liberty of
the subject and by affording an effective release from unlawful or
unjustifiable detention whether in prison or private custody. The
Writ of Habeas Corpus is a powerful Writ given by the Constitution
to every man who is unlawfully detained and is therefore an
extraordinary remedy: Nenavath Bujji Vs. State of Telangana 2.
11. The Writ of Habeas Corpus is an extraordinary remedy which
has been included as one of the Constitutional guarantees
upholding individual liberty under Articles 226 and 32 of the
Constitution of India. The Writ is to safeguard the freedom of an
individual against illegal detention and ensures procedural justice
to a person who has been unlawfully detained. The Writ is a
judicial command directed to a jailer to produce the named
prisoner together with the legal cause of detention. It is well settled
that a Writ of Habeas Corpus will not lie where the detention or
imprisonment is in accordance with law: Home Secretary (Prison)
2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 367
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
Vs. H. Nilofer Nisha 3. The Writ of Habeas Corpus is a prerogative
Writ in England, issued by the King against his officers to compel
them to exercise their functions properly and where ordinary legal
remedies are insufficient: Halsbury’s Laws of England. The legality
of any form of detention may be challenged under common law by
an application for the Writ of Habeas Corpus. The question which
the Court must answer is whether any right of the detenu has been
violated which would warrant an order directing his/her release
from prison. Habeas Corpus is essentially a procedural Writ and
deals with the machinery of justice and not the substantive law:
12. Preventive Detention, as the name entails, prevents a person
from doing an act which is apprehended on the part of the
concerned authority by way of a subjective assessment of the
misconduct of the detenu and the likelihood of the detenu
committing or repeating the act which would adversely affect the
maintenance of public order.
3 (2020) 14 SCC 161
4 1974 SCC OnLine SC 26
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13. A distinction should also be made between preventive
detention and punitive detention. While preventive detention is to
prevent commission of an act or a crime on the basis of a
reasonable apprehension, punitive detention is to punish a person
for something he/she has already done. An order of preventive
detention may be made with or without prosecution and in
anticipation or after discharge or even after acquittal. Pendency of
prosecution is not a bar to an order of preventive detention; the
reverse is also true: Haradhan Saha Vs. The State of West Bengal 5.
14. The concept of preventive detention takes colour from the
1986 Act and particularly section 2(a) of the said Act read with
Explanation thereto.
‘2(a). “acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order” means when a boot-legger,
a dacoit, a drug-offender, a goonda, an immoral traffic
offender, Land-Grabber, a Spurious Seed Offender, an
Insecticide Offender, a Fertiliser Offender, a Food
Adulteration Offender, a Fake Document Offender, a
Scheduled Commodities Offender, a Forest Offender, a
Gaming Offender, a Sexual Offender, an Explosive
Substances Offender, an Arms Offender, a Cyber Crime
Offender and a White Collar or Financial Offender is
engaged or is making preparations for engaging, in any
5 (1975) 3 SCC 198
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of his activities as such, which affect adversely, or are
likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public
order:
Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause public order
shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or
shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter
alia, if any of the activities of any of the persons
referred to in this clause directly, or indirectly, is
causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or
alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public
or any section thereof or a grave wide-spread danger to
life or public health;’
15. The detention of a person belonging to any of the categories
of offenders named in the Act would be justified if the detaining
authority is able to establish that the detention is necessary not
only by reason of the past acts/offences committed by the person
but also an anticipation of the repetition of the said acts in future
or even a feeling of insecurity among the general public or a sense
of alarm on its part by reason of the recurrence of the act.
The degree of seriousness, the breach of offence as well as the risk
to public health are all brought within the ambit of the justification
for preventive detention.
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The Telangana Prohibition Act, 1995 and
The Telangana Prevention Of Dangerous Activities Of Boot-Leggers,
Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders
Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders,
Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document
Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders,
Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances
Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders And White
Collar Or Financial Offenders Act, 1986.
16. The Telangana Prohibition Act, 1995 and The Telangana
Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986 form part of the
impugned order of detention and we hence propose to deal with the
relevance of these statutes in the context of the present dispute.
The avowed object of The Telangana Prohibition Act, 1995 is
the prohibition of consumption of intoxicating drugs which is
injurious to health except for medicinal purposes. The enactment
of the statute was considered necessary in the wake of an alarming
increase in consumption of alcoholic drinks, especially Arrack,
despite the Government banning its sale on 01.10.1993. Arrack is
defined as an Asian alcoholic beverage like Rum which is distilled
from a fermented mash of malted rice with toddy or molasses:
Merriam-Webster dictionary. Several State Governments had
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025banned Arrack in an effort to prevent poor people who are the
largest consumers of local liquor. Section 7A of the 1995 Act
prohibits production, manufacture, storage, possession, collection,
purchase, sale and transport of Arrack. Section 8(e) imposes
punishment with imprisonment and fine in the event of
contravention of section 7A.
17. The Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986
(as amended in 2017) provides for preventive detention of persons
in the categories mentioned in the Act for the overall prevention of
dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act specifically notes
dangerous activities of certain anti-social elements who cause
harm, danger and alarm and a feeling of insecurity among the
general public and adversely affects public order by causing grave
danger to life and public health. The Explanation to section 2(a)
adds that public order shall be deemed to have been adversely
affected or likely to be adversely affected if any of the activities of
the persons referred to in section 2(a) directly or indirectly causes
or is likely to cause danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or
widespread danger to life or public health.
18. The Explanation to section 2(a) of the 1986 Act needs to be
broken up into meaningful parts for understanding the import of
the expression ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’.
Public order can be adversely affected if the activities have a direct
or indirect bearing or is calculated to cause any harm, danger or
alarm to the general public or any section thereof or widespread
danger to life or public health. The adverse effect can also be
expanded to a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any
section thereof. The adverse effect of public order stretches further
to a serious danger to a large number of person or a danger to the
lives of the larger community.
19. The Explanation further clarifies that public order can also
be adversely affected when there is a grave or widespread danger to
public health. An expansive reading of the Explanation would
make it clear that the seriousness and reach of the act with the
potential to cause harm, danger or alarm to the general public
transitions to an actual risk to life and public health with the
potential of destabilizing public order. The Explanation to section
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2(a) becomes relevant in the context of the grounds of detention
contained in the impugned order i.e., detention of the detenu for
the repeated acts of manufacture and sale of IDL.
20. The impugned Preventive Detention Order dated 25.11.2024
categorises the detenu as a ‘Boot-Legger’ under the 1986 Act as
justification for the impugned order.
21. ‘Boot-Legger’ has been defined under section 2(b) of the 1986
Act as a person, who distils, manufactures, stores, transports,
imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug
or other intoxicant in contravention of any of the provisions of The
Telangana Excise Act, 1968 or in contravention of any other law for
the time being in force.
The Undisputed Facts in The Present Case
22. The Grounds of Detention which form the part of the
impugned order dated 25.11.2024 records the following facts:
(i) The detenu was found to be habitually indulging
in the clandestine business of possession and
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025sale of IDL in contravention of the provisions of
the 1995 Act.
(ii) The detenu acted in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance to public order.
(iii) The IDL was found to be unfit for human
consumption and injurious to health due to the
presence of fusel oil and allied impurities.
(iv) The detenu created a situation which caused
fear and insecurity among the public and
widespread danger to public health.
(v) The detenu is disturbing public order. (vi) The detenu has indulged in the trade of IDL at
the cost of public health for financial gains.
(vii) The detenu’s illegal activities constitute offences
under The Telangana Prohibition Act, 1995 and
The Telangana Prevention of Dangerous
Activities Act, 1986 (as amended by the
Telangana Ordinance No.3 of 2017).
23. The Grounds of Detention consist of six old cases registered
against the detenu from 27.06.2022 – 28.10.2024 and four cases
against the petitioner (the wife of the detenu) from 30.01.2024 –
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14.09.2024. Of the six cases registered against the detenu, four
cases were singled out in the grounds as being within the area
limits of the Prohibition and Excise Station: Parkal. The detenu
was charged under the 1995 Act in these four cases for possession
of various amounts of IDL i.e., 5 Litres to 25 Litres. The saidfour
cases are pending investigation. The Grounds of Detention
proceed to individually deal with each of the four cases in detail
including the finding of the Chemical Examiner that the seized IDL
in each of the cases was found to be “unfit for human consumption
and injurious to health”.
‘PUBLIC ORDER’ Vs. ‘LAW AND ORDER‘
24. The debate over whether a detention order is justified or can
be challenged within the rights safeguarded by the Constitution of
India primarily hinges on whether the act complained of disturbs
the law and order of a particular locality or has broader
repercussions on the larger sphere of public order. This
distinction assumes crucial significance within the framework of
the 1986 Act, particularly section 2(a) thereof, which specifically
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refers to any act that is prejudicial to the ‘maintenance of public
order’.
25. Before turning our gaze to the Explanation of the term
‘public order’ in the 1986 Act, it would be useful to examine the
decisions of the Supreme Court, right from Brij Bhushan Vs. State
of Delhi 6 to the recent judgment delivered on 21.03.2024 in
Nenavath Bujji (supra). The Supreme Court considered the fine line
demarcating ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ in several cases
spanning 75 years and arrived at illuminating opinions on the
issue.
26. On an overview of the decisions, the consensus appears to
be that ‘public order’ can be equated with ‘public tranquility’ as an
overall environment of peace prevailing amongst members of a
political society, akin to public safety: Brij Bhushan (supra) and
Romesh Thappar Vs. State of Madras 7. Public order has also been
described as any kind of disturbance which would lead to public
disorder and generally involves disruptions of greater gravity than
those affecting law and order: Ram Manohar Lohia Vs. State of
6 1950 SCC 449
71950 SCC 436
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Bihar 8. Apart from its gravity, ‘public order’ also entails a broader
segment of the community, as opposed to ‘law and order’ where the
even tempo of life of the community or the country as a whole or
even a specific locality is disrupted by the commission of the act:
Arun Ghosh Vs. State of West Bengal 9 . The Supreme Court in
Pushkar Mukherjee Vs. State of West Bengal 10 dwelt on the
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ crimes, emphasizing the
injury to public interest in the former as opposed to the injury to
specific persons in the latter.
27. The conclusion which may be drawn from the above cases is
that the act complained of must be assessed not only in terms of
gravity but also by its potential to cause widespread breach of
tranquility affecting persons forming a sizable part of a community
or a locality. The potential impact of the act was also considered in
Babul Mitra alias Anil Mitra Vs. State of West Bengal 11, Dipak Bose
alias Naripada Vs. State of West Bengal 12, and in Pesala Nookaraju
81965 SCC OnLine SC 9
91970 1 SCC 98
101969 (1) SCC 10
11(1973) 1 SCC 393
12 (1973) 4 SCC 43
21
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh 13 which contains a
comprehensive discussion of the law on the subject.
28. Therefore, the essential distinction between ‘public order’
and ‘law and order’ is that the act committed by the detenu must
not only be of an indisputably serious nature amounting to a grave
offence against persons under the prevailing laws, but must also
have a ripple-effect extending beyond the immediacy of the
situation to the community at large, thereby disturbing and
unsettling public peace and tranquility. In other words, the
adverse effect of the act complained of does not remain restricted
to the first/immediate sufferer, so to speak, but transcends the
private sphere of the person/s directly involved to others in the
locality or community who would also bear the consequences of
the act.
29. The widespread effect of the act is specifically clarified in the
1986 Act which provides that ‘public order’ shall also be ‘deemed’
to have been adversely affected where the activities of the persons
described in the Act, even indirectly, affect or are calculated to
13 (2023) 14 SCC 641
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MB,J & BRMR,J
W.P.No.2133 of 2025cause danger to the general public. The Explanation to section 2(a)
of the 1986 Act reinforces the significance of the indirect effect by
expanding the same to a feeling of alarm or insecurity among the
general public. This means that, a person may be subjected to
preventive detention even in the absence of any direct or proven
tangible harm to the general public provided the Detaining
Authority is satisfied, based on the material before it, that the act
has the potential to cause insecurity among members of the
community.
30. The second limb of the Explanation to section 2(a) of the
1986 Act i.e., ‘grave or widespread danger to life or public health’ is
more relevant to the present dispute and is being separately dealt
with in the next section.
‘…grave or widespread danger to life or public health’ – the
Explanation to section 2(a) of The Telangana Prevention of
Dangerous Activities Act, 1986.
31. As stated above, the concluding part of the Explanation to
section 2(a) of the 1986 Act contains a separate, if not severable,
constituent that would qualify as an act prejudicial to the
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
maintenance of public order. Since the Explanation has already
been set out in the earlier part of the judgment, the portion which
is relevant for the present discussion is extracted below:
“Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause public order
shall be deemed ……. to cause any harm, danger or alarm or
a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any
section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life or
public health.”
32. It is clear that the adverse effect of an act also encompasses
public health. The Explanation to section 2(a) provides context to
public health through the immediately preceding words used in the
Explanation i.e., ‘widespread danger to life’.
33. The grounds of detention lists six cases registered against
the detenu, of which four cases were considered while passing the
impugned Preventive Detention Order. It is undisputed that six
cases were registered against the detenu from 27.06.2022 –
28.10.2024. There is a noticeable gap of almost 18 months
between the second and the third cases, followed by three other
cases registered until 28.10.2024. The reference to the registration
of offence/Crime Occurrence Report is corroborated in the grounds
of detention which state that the detenu had taken strategic gaps
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between his operations and that different quantities of contraband
substance/IDL was recovered from the possession of the detenu
several times in 2022 and 2024. The grounds also state that the
detenu was acquitted in the two CORs of 2022 and investigation is
pending in the remaining four CORs of 2024.
34. The particulars of the four cases pending investigation also
include a clear statement that the samples seized were analysed by
the Chemical Examiner and found to be ‘Illicitly Distilled Liquor,
unfit for human consumption and injurious to health’. The findings
of the Chemical Examiner are reiterated in the Grounds of
Detention, a portion of which is reproduced below:
“The Chemical Examiner who analyzed the sample opined
through his C.E. Report No.1244/2024, dt: 05.07.2024 that
SI.No.27268 to 27280 was Illicitly Distilled Liquor which was
unfit for human consumption and injurious to health.”
35. Therefore, the impugned detention order first classifies the
detenu as a ‘Boot-Legger’ under section 2(b) of the 1986 Act, for
selling IDL in contravention of the 1995 Act and thereafter sets out
the Grounds of Detention in justification of the impugned order
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under the provisions of section 2(a) of the 1986 Act read with the
Explanation thereto.
36. The very fact that the samples of IDL seized from the
possession of the detenu were chemically-analyzed and found to be
‘unfit for human consumption’ and ‘injurious to health’, coupled
with the series of identical offences committed by the detenu and
the cases registered against him, would bring the act squarely
within the contours of the Explanation to section 2(a) of the 1986
Act. The manufacture, possession and sale of liquor may not, by
themselves, breach the outer parameters of public order unless the
substance distributed falls foul of the standards required for public
health and safety.
37. In the present case, the IDL recovered from the possession of
the detenu failed the certification for safe consumption every single
examination in all the four cases registered against the detenue.
The four cases pending investigation also prove that the detenu is
a habitual offender who has attempted to evade the process of law
despite being charged for similar offences in 2022. The grounds of
detention make a compelling case for detention, highlighting the
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
risk to gullible consumers who may be lured by inexpensive
intoxicants and, as a result, be exposed to serious and chronic
health problems including loss of memory, blurred vision and
permanent damage to the liver and nervous system.
38. We are reminded of several instances of wide reportage of
hooch tragedies which claimed a large number of lives, particularly
among the socio-economic weaker sections. These kinds of
tragedies not only affect isolated individuals but have a
far-reaching impact on the wider social order, i.e., disrupting
families, jeopardizing the future of innocent children and causing
irreversible damage to social structures. We simply cannot shut
our eyes to the real possibility that the sale of IDL which is ‘unfit
for human consumption’ could cause immeasurable and
permanent damage to society, including harm to the health and
well-being of the public and irrevocably disturbing public
tranquility in its wake. If this is not destabilizing of public order,
then nothing is.
39. The objective of preventive detention is to serve as insurance
for the future. It is meant to ensure that the person detained
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
cannot commit or repeat the act complained of, thereby
prejudicially affecting the lives of others. Though orders of
preventive detention are considered to be dracorian on the
deprivation of individual liberty, they may be necessary when the
potentiality of the act to cause widespread injury is established on
the material before the Detaining Authority. The 1986 Act aims to
intervene in this space where the ‘Dangerous Activities’ of Boot-
Leggers and other offenders named in the Act have the capacity to
disturb the maintenance of public order, including causing
widespread danger to life or public health. The sale of IDL, which is
injurious to public health, hence clearly falls within this category
and qualifies for an order of preventive detention.
Cases relied on by the Petitioner
40. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed several
decisions in support of the plea for production and release of the
detenu. These decisions however do not assist the petitioner for
the reasons discussed below.
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
41. Nenavath Bujji (supra) and Ameena Begum Vs. State of
Telangana 14 were both concerned with ‘Goonda’s as defined under
section 2(g) of the 1986 Act and hence were on a different factual
footing. The Supreme Court also came to a specific finding in
Ameena Begum that the detention order is not sustainable by
reason of the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad, transgressing
his jurisdiction and attempting to detain the detenu at any cost
without resorting to due procedure. Arjun S/o. Ratan Gaikwad Vs.
State of Maharashtra 15 was under The Maharashtra Prevention of
Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders
and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981. The case was concerned with
manufacture of handmade liquor and the Supreme Court came to
a specific finding that the alleged crime can be dealt with by the
ordinary legal machinery in respect to a law and order situation.
The Supreme Court accordingly held that the subjective
satisfaction of the Detaining Authority did not support the fact that
the activities of the appellant were prejudicial to maintenance of
public order.
14 (2023) 9 SCC 587
15 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3718
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
42. The Supreme Court in Mortuza Hussain Choudhary Vs. The
State of Nagaland 16 held that the grounds for detention were
absent and that the Detaining Authority/Special Secretary, Home
Department, Government of Nagaland, had merely acted on the
proposal for detention forwarded by the Additional Director
General of Police (Administration) Nagaland. The Supreme Court
also found that the detention order was cryptic and did not adhere
to the statutory scheme of The Prevention of Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. Joyi Kitty
Joseph Vs. Union of India 17 was delivered under The Conservation
of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act,
1974 (‘the COFEPOSA Act‘). The Supreme Court found that the
detaining authority should have examined whether the conditions
granted by the jurisdictional Court were sufficient to curb the
commission of identical activities. Ram Manohar Lohia Vs. State of
Bihar 18 dealt with the Writ of Habeas Corpus for directing the
release of the appellant who had been detained under The Defence
of India Rules, 1962.
16 2025 SCC OnLine SC 502
17 (2025) 4 SCC 476
18 AIR 1966 SCC 740
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
43. It should be stated in this context that for a case to be
relevant, the offence must be in the same category i.e., of a Boot-
Legger, as in the present, case which is under the 1986 Act. The
cases cited on behalf of the petitioner are mostly under other
statutes, though occasionally of similar import or passed much
before the 1986 Act.
44. Rampuri Vaishali Vs. The State of Telangana 19 involved
peddling of Cannabis/Ganja and the Division Bench found that the
use of preventive detention in the facts of that case would be an
overreach of executive power which would be amount to
circumventing the judicial process. The Court also found that the
detaining authority had treated pending cases against the detenu
as evidence of guilt and that the detention order was also in
violation of earlier bail orders. The decisions of the Co-ordinate
Benches of this Court including Konireddy Premalatha Vs. The
State of Telangana 20 and Bodapati Laxmi Vs. The State of
Telangana 21 were on factually different situations including that
19W.P.No.21653 of 2024
20W.P.No.12085 of 2024
21W.P.No.12064 of 2024
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
the offence in those cases involved the category ‘Goonda’ and
crimes of a different order including rape, criminal trespass,
extortion and criminal intimidation.
45. Counsel for the petitioner has laid particular emphasis on a
decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in Banoth Bulli Vs. The State of
Telangana 22. Although, the detention order in the said case was
passed on the offence of Boot-Legging under the 1986 Act, there
was no finding of the seized sample being ‘unfit for human
consumption and injurious to health’. The argument made on
behalf of the detaining authority was that the manufacture of IDL
was done with the help of unscientific methods and in unhygienic
conditions. As stated before, there was no independent finding of
any chemical examination of the sample failing the test of fitness
for human consumption. The Co-ordinate Bench was also of the
view that the detaining authority had failed to make a distinction
between ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ while passing the
detention order. There is no reference to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Pesala Nookaraju in the said decision.
22W.P.No.33604 of 2024
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
46. We are hence of the considered view that the decisions cited
on behalf of the petitioner do not support the case for production
of detenu or for his release. As stated above, we are inclined to
follow the view taken by the Supreme Court in Pesala Nookaraju.
The State Authorities must also discharge their Duty
47. We take note of the caution sounded by the Supreme Court
in Nenavath Bujji and Ameena Begum on the spate of orders of
preventive detention under the 1986 Act and that the State of
Telangana should ensure that orders of preventive detention are
not passed in a routine manner without application of mind.
Giving due weightage to the observations, we deem it fit to direct
the Detaining Authority to ensure that the ongoing investigation in
each of the four cases registered against the detenu are expedited
and that the Detaining Authority extends full co-operation in that
regard. We note that the first case was reported on 01.04.2024
which means that the investigation has been pending for 15
months. We are of the firm view that the detenu should not be
detained for an inordinately long period on the pretext of pending
investigation. We also deem it expedient to reiterate the view taken
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
by the Supreme Court in Nenavath Bujji that the Advisory Board
constituted under section 9 of the 1986 Act with powers of
Reference of an Order of Detention under section 10 and 11 of the
said Act, should give due importance to its role of ascertaining
whether the detention is justified under the law or not. The
Advisory Board should give its definite opinion of the legality of the
order of detention in view of the immediate infraction of a person’s
constitutional right of freedom and liberty. The Advisory Board
should apply its independent assessment to the particular facts of
each case and should come to a conclusion which is supported by
law.
The present Case aligns with the decision of the Supreme Court in
Pesala Nookaraju
48. The Appeal in that case was filed at the instance of the
detenu who had been preventively detained under section 3(2) of
the 1986 Act. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court had dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the detenu (the
appellant before the Supreme Court) and had declined to interfere
with the order of preventive detention passed by the District
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
Collector, Kakinada District, Andhra Pradesh. The particulars of
the four cases which had been registered against the detenu under
the 1986 Act formed part of the order of detention and spanned
from 06.01.2021 – 09.03.2022. The detenu was categorised as a
‘Boot-Legger’ under section 2(b) of the 1986 Act. All the four
samples of liquor recovered from the detenu were analysed and
were found to be IDL unfit for human consumption and injurious
to health. The Supreme Court exhaustively analysed the material
and the case law on the subject of Preventive Detention and the
Writ of Habeas Corpus and concluded that the liquor sold by the
detenu is dangerous to public health and is activity prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order under the provisions of the 1986
Act. The Supreme Court also found that the grounds of detention
had specifically mentioned that the appellant/detenu’s sale of the
liquor would be harmful to the health of the people of that locality
and constitutes an expression of subjective satisfaction of the
Detaining Authority. The detenu’s Appeal was accordingly
dismissed by the Supreme Court.
49. The facts in the present case are substantially similar to
those in Pesala Nookaraju. In the case before us, the Grounds of
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
Detention specifically record multiple cases being registered
against the detenu and the four recovered samples being found
unfit for human consumption and injurious to health. This would
show that not only was the detenu indulging in repeated offences
of the same nature but was also selling liquor which would disrupt
public order by affecting the health and well-being of the
community. The Grounds of Detention also narrate the
components used for IDL together with the unhygienic conditions
for production of IDL. The Grounds further narrate the debilitating
irreversible injury to health on consumption of such liquor.
50. As opined in Pesala Nookaraju, we do not find any material
placed before us for dislodging the subjective satisfaction arrived at
by the District Collector and District Magistrate, Warangal or any
compelling shift in the narrative to take a different view in the
present case.
51. We also find that the Detaining Authority followed the
sequential procedure provided under the 1986 Act, i.e.,
categorising the detenu as a ‘Boot-Legger’under section 2(b) of the
1986 Act and thereafter passing the impugned order along with the
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
Grounds of Detention upon satisfaction of the requirement to pass
such an order under section 3(1) of the 1986 Act. The Government
is conferred with the power under section 3 to pass orders
detaining certain persons named in the 1986 Act. The impugned
order does not contain omnibus allegations but deals with each of
the four cases of recovery of IDL from the detenu and the chemical
analysis reports of the same.
52. We accordingly find that the case in hand fits within the
decision-parameters in Pesala Nookaraju and the law discussed by
the Supreme Court therein.
Conclusion
53. The discussion in the preceding paragraphs leads us to the
firm conclusion that the impugned order of Preventive Detention
dated 25.11.2024 along with its Confirmation Order dated
23.12.2024 are justified in the particular facts of the case. The
petitioner has not been able to counter the findings in the
impugned order and the Grounds of Detention with regard to the
multiple offences committed by the detenu qualifying him as a
habitual offender or the fact that the IDL failed to meet the
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
required safety standards of human consumption. The opinion on
the necessity of the detention is fortified by the factual particulars
and constitutes the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining
Authority. The subjective satisfaction so expressed cannot
ordinarily be discarded by the Court unless it is demonstrably
clear that the Detaining Authority has failed to consider relevant
circumstances or has taken unnecessary and irrelevant
circumstances into account for ordering a detention. The Court
does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective
satisfaction unless the decision-making process is influenced by
caprice and malice: Nenavath Bujji (supra). The present facts fully
satisfy the last and ninth conclusion outlined in the “Summary of
Findings” at paragraph 43 of Nenavath Bujji (supra).
54. The Detaining Authority has examined the material adduced
against the detenu and satisfied itself, first, that the detenu has
been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order, and second, that the detenu is likely to continue to act in a
similar manner in the near future unless prevented from doing so
by passing an order of detention.
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
55. In the instant case, we have not found any lack of
application of mind in the impugned order, nor any perverse
element that would vitiate the said order.
56. We also do not have any doubt that possession and sale of
IDL, which is unfit for human consumption and injurious to
health, would have larger and irreversible repercussions on the
community. The depth and gravity of the offence would extend
beyond the smallest circle of the community and penetrate through
successive layers, thereby affecting a much larger number of
persons. The indirect effect of the sale of spurious liquor, which is
hazardous to health, would result in permanent and irreversible
health hazards, leading to a decline in the overall quality of life and
well-being of the society. This would in turn impair the income
generating capability, employment opportunities, nutritional
standards and literacy levels of the society as a whole.
57. The impugned order therefore satisfies the manifold
requirements of section 2(a) of the 1986 Act read with the
Explanation thereto. The only caveat is that the preventive
detention should not be continued for an indefinite period under
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W.P.No.2133 of 2025
the pretext of an ongoing investigation. The authorities concerned
should ensure that the justice system is activated and sustained to
conclude the investigation as expeditiously as possible and
preferably by 31.12.2025.
58. Thus, we do not find any reason to interfere with the
impugned Preventive Detention Order dated 25.11.2024 or the
subsequent Confirmation Order dated 23.12.2024.
59. W.P.No.2133 of 2025 is accordingly dismissed, without any
order as to costs. All connected applications are disposed of.
Interim orders, if any, shall stand vacated.
_________________________________
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
______________________________
B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO, J
20thJune, 2025.
Note: Mark L.R. Copy.
(B/o. VA/BMS)