Himachal Pradesh High Court
Raj Kumar vs State Of H.P on 23 June, 2025
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 60 of 2021
Reserved on: 16.05.2025
Date of Decision: 23.06.2025.
Raj Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Petitioner : Mr. Ashok Sharma, Senior
Advocate, with Mr. Sahil Malhotra,
Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
AdvocatNeutral Citation No.
( 2025:HHC:19373 ) e General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner (accused before the learned Trial
Court) has filed the present petition for quashing of the criminal
proceedings pending before the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Lahaul and Spiti at Kullu. (Learned Trial Court)
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they
were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the police filed a challan against the accused for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 and
120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that a
secret information was received that R.L. Saini and P.K. Saxena,
both DET Project (Mandi), in conspiracy with Sunder Lal,
Rohitashiv Bhardwaj, Jai Krishan Sharma, Ramesh Thakur, Tek
Singh Raghav, Anil Gupta, Jiwan Lal Sharma, Netar Singh,
Narinder Bali, P.K. Mahindru, Bhim Chand, Bahadur Singh and
others awarded a contract to various contractors for laying
optical fibre cable on the Manali, Naggar, Patlikuhal, Kullu route
(42 km) in the year 1995-96 at exorbitant rates. R.L. Saini, P.K.
Saxena and Sunder Lal falsely and dishonestly certified the
works executed by the contractor as correct, and in this manner,
they released excess payment in lacs to contractors without
verification. They caused wrongful gain to the contractor and
wrongful loss to the Government. A technical team of HPPWD
and Telecom Department comprising D.R. Shashi (A.E.) PWD,
Katrain, Prem Lal, J.E., PWD, Katrain, L.R. Traka, SDO, T.P.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
Mandi and Harish Kumar, JTO, TP, Mandi, were constituted to
conduct the spot inspection/digging. The technical team
conducted digging at 23 places on 25.6.1997 and 26.6.1997 to
ascertain the actual depth of the cable. As per the specification,
optical cable was to be laid at a depth of 165 cm in all types of
soil; however, the optical fibre cable was found laid at a lesser
depth at 19 places with a deviation ranging from 4 cm to 91 cm.
Some differences can occur due to regular vehicular traffic and
natural changes, but the differences should not be
disproportionate. The depth was much less at most of the
places, but the Telecom Officers certified the depth as much
more in the measurement book (MB) without making any spot
verification. Wrongful payments were made to the contractor
with an ulterior motive for causing wrongful gain to them. The
work was awarded at an exorbitant rate ranging from 190 per m 3
to ₹ 228/- per m3. DGMTP, Shimla, stated that trenching rates
were determined as per the report and recommendation of the
Committee comprising senior officers of the Department of
Telecommunication and Civil Engineers of HP PWD. The rates
were determined as per the formula recommended by the High-
Level Committee. However, there exists no specific rule/formula
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
issued by the Department of Telecommunications for the
determination of trenching rates. The work was awarded in
other areas (Kangra-Dehra and Hamirpur-Nadaun) at rates
ranging from ₹75/- to ₹114/- per m3. The contractor did not
have sufficient experience to carry out the work. FIR was
registered by the police. The police conducted the investigation
and seized the record. It was found that there was a total loss of
₹28,23,238/- to the Government, and there were various
discrepancies in the award of the contract. The payment of the
final bills was made despite the pending recoveries. Hence, the
challan was prepared and filed before the Court.
3. Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge sheet, the
petitioner has filed the present petition, asserting that the
petitioner joined the Telecom Department in May 1994 as a
Junior Telecom Officer. He was working as a Junior Telecom
Officer at Aut, District Mandi in 1997 when an FIR No. 14/1997
dated 19.07.1997 was registered against him in Police Station
Enforcement, North Zone, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P
for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420,
120B, and 218 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The petitioner was
not named as an accused in the FIR; however, a charge sheet was
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
filed against him and 15 other persons for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 420, 120B and 218 of the IPC.
The allegations against the petitioner were that the optical fibre
cables were laid on the Manali Nagar, Patlikul Kullu Route at
exorbitant rates. The work was awarded to an inexperienced
contractor who executed substandard work. The petitioner
wrongly entered the depth of the trench in the measurement
books and failed to carry out the 100% checking of the depth.
The inspection team conducted test checks at 23 places and
found a lesser depth at 19 places. The petitioner failed to
perform his duties and helped the contractor by abusing his
position. The charge sheet was filed in the year 2007, and no
reason was assigned for the delay in the submission of the
charge sheet. The charge was not framed against the petitioner
by the learned Trial Court. Rakesh Seth preferred a Criminal
Revision No. 51/2014 challenging the order dated 04.01.2014
passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing his application
under Section 239 of Cr. P.C. The service benefit of the petitioner
has been put on hold since 2016. No sanction was accorded by
the competent authority, and the Government declined the
prosecution sanction sought under Section 197 of the Cr. P.C.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
The prosecution sanction was also not granted under Section 19
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the criminal
proceedings cannot continue in the absence of the sanction. The
right to a speedy trial is being infringed. No prima facie case is
made out against the petitioner. There is no credible material to
support the averments made in the FIR; hence, the present
petition.
4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply making a
preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability.
The contents of the FIR were reproduced. It was asserted that
the delay in finalisation of the charge sheet occurred because
BSNL authorities kept the file pending from 1998 till 2007. The
prosecution sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act was denied in the year 2007; hence, the charge
sheet was filed for the commission of offences punishable under
various provisions of the IPC. The offence punishable under the
Prevention of Corruption Act was not mentioned in the charge
sheet because no sanction was granted to prosecute the
petitioner for the commission of the aforesaid offences. The
report submitted by the Technical Committee is credible. Lesser
depth was found at 19 places, with deviations ranging from 4 cm
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
to 91 cm. There is sufficient material to connect the petitioner
with the commission of the crime; hence, it was prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
5. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and
affirming those of the petition was filed.
6. A sur-rejoinder was also filed by the State to the
rejoinder filed by the petitioner. A supplementary affidavit was
also filed by the petitioner.
7. I have heard Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned Senior
Counsel, assisted by Mr. Sahil Malhotra, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
8. Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the prosecution sanction under
Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was not accorded
by the Telecom Authorities. The petitioner cannot be prosecuted
in the absence of the prosecution sanction. The petitioner is a
Government Servant who cannot be removed except with the
sanction of the Government. The act was done by the petitioner
in discharge of his official duties, and he cannot be prosecuted
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
without the sanction; therefore, he prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the
learned Trial Court be quashed. He relied upon the judgments of
State of Orissa vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew, 2004 (8) SCC 40, K.
Kalimuthu vs. State, 2005 (4) SCC 512, A. Sreenivasa Reddy vs.
Rakesh Sharma and anr, 2023 (8) SCC 711 and Gauri Shankar
Prasad vs. State of Bihar and anr, 2000 (5) SCC 15 in support of his
submission.
9. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the benefit of
Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. is only available to a public servant
who is not removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the Government. In the present case, there is
nothing to show that the petitioner cannot be removed save or
except by the sanction of the Government; therefore, the
provisions of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. do not apply to the present
case; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
11. Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under:-
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
"197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.
(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate
or a public servant not removable from his office save by
or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any
offence alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence
except with the previous sanction (a) in the case of a
person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the
time of the commission of the alleged offence employed,
in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central
Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed
or, as the case may be, was at the time of the commission
of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the
affairs of a State, of the State Government."
12. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section
that before a public servant can claim protection u/s 197 of the
Cr.P.C., he should not be removable from his office save by or
with the sanction of the Government. It was laid down by the
Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Raj Kumar Anandilal Versus State
of Maharashtra 2005 Crim. L.J. 4665 that the Section is attracted
only to those cases where the public servant is not removable
from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government.
Even if the accused is a public servant, but can be removed
without the sanction of the State Government, the protection of
Section 197 of Cr.P.C. will not be available to him. It was
observed:
"8. With this preliminary discussion relating to the
nature of the act committed by the accused, we now come
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
to the legal objection based upon Section 197 (2) of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It is an admitted fact that
no sanction was taken under Section 197 (2) of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. There was also no dispute
raised before us, and it was the admitted position that the
Railway Protection Force would be an armed force of the
Union of India within the meaning of Section 197 (2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was contended that a
sanction under Section 197 (1) was required to be taken
from the Government only in respect of "a public servant
not removable from his office save by or with the sanction
of the Government". There was no such requirement in
Section 197 (2). Section 197 (2) applied to any member of
the Armed Forces of the Union. The limitation contained
in Section 197 (1) was not restated in Section 197 (2) of the
said Act and could not be read into the said sub-section.
We have heard both sides exhaustively on this aspect of
the matter. We find that the matter is not res integra and
is covered by three judgments of the Apex Court. In the
case of K. Ch. Prasad v. Smt. J. Vanalatha Devi reported in
AIR 1987 SC 722, the question before the Apex Court was
whether the sanction was required for prosecuting an
employee of a nationalised bank who held a post which
did not require the sanction of the Government for
removal. In paragraph 5 of the said judgment, the Apex
Court reproduced the text of the entire Section 197 of the
Criminal Procedure Code (inclusive of sub-section 2) and
thereafter, observed in paragraph 6 as under:
" It is very clear from this provision that this
Section is attracted only in cases where the public
servant is such who is not removable from his
office save by or with the sanction of the
Government. It is not disputed that the appellant is
not holding a post where he could not be removed
from service except by or with the sanction of the
Government. In this view of the matter, even if it is
held that the appellant is a public servant, still the
provisions of Section 197 are not attracted at all."
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
A subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dr
Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela v. Naresh Kumar
Chandrashankar Jha reported in AIR 1990 SC 1976, the
question before the Apex Court was as to whether an
employee of the Municipal Corporation of Ahmadabad
holding the post of Public Analyst under the Food
Adulteration Act, can be prosecuted without sanction
under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
The Apex Court came to a finding that the appellant
before the Apex Court was an employee of the Municipal
Corporation of Ahmadabad, and the fact that he was
appointed as a Public Analyst did not confer on him the
status of an Officer of the Government or Public Servant.
In paragraph 5 of the said judgment, the Apex Court
observed as under: -
"Section 197, Cr. P.C. intends to draw a line between
public servants and to provide that only in the case
of the higher ranks should the sanction of the
Government to their prosecution be necessary."
In the case of Director of Inspection and Audit and others v.
C.L. Subramaniam reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 615: (AIR
1995 SC 866), the accused were customs officers and the
question was whether they could be prosecuted without
sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure
Code. In paragraph 6 of the said judgment, the Apex Court
analysed Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code and
the object of the said section and observed as under:-
"6. If the provisions of Section 197 Cri. P.C. are
examined, it is manifest that two conditions must
be fulfilled before they become applicable; one is
that the offence mentioned therein must be
committed by a public servant and the other is that
the public servant employed in connection with the
affairs of the Union or a State is not removable from
his office save by or with the sanction of the Central
Government or the State Government, as the case
may be. The object of the section is to provide a
guard against vexatious proceedings against
judges, magistrates and public servants and to
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
secure the opinion of superior authority whether
there should be a prosecution."
13. In the present case, the Court noticed on 20.03.2025
that there was no material on record to show that the petitioner
cannot be removed except with the sanction of the Government;
hence, a direction was issued to place the material if desired.
The petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit asserting that he
was holding the post of Junior Telecom Officer in the Central
Government. He underwent induction training vide office order
dated 01.08.1993. He was allotted to the office of G.M Task Force,
Mandi for further posting. He filed Annexure P1 issued on behalf
of the President of India, showing that he was an employee of
the Department of Telecommunications and was ordered to be
permanently absorbed in BSNL. Article 309 of the Constitution
of India empowers the President to make Rules regarding the
Recruitment and conditions of service. The Rules were framed
under the authority of the President of India, known as Junior
Telecom Officers Recruitment Rules, 1990. Since the petitioner's
appointment was governed by the Rules framed on behalf of the
President of India, therefore, his case is covered under Section
197 of Cr. P.C.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
14. These averments and the documents do not satisfy
the conditions laid down under Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. The
Presidential order (Annexure P1) is regarding the permanent
absorption of the petitioner in BSNL as per the terms and
conditions specified. It does not show that the petitioner was not
removable except with the sanction of the Government of India.
The Junior Telecom Officer Recruitment Rules, 1990 do not
provide that the appointment or the removal of the petitioner
can be made with the sanction of the Government. Merely
because the Rules have been framed in the name of the President
does not mean that the appointment/removal was with the
sanction of the Government. Accepting this interpretation will
mean that every person appointed in the Government service
would be covered under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. because every
appointment under the Government is made under the Rules
framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. This
would be violative of the plain language of Section 197 of Cr.P.C.
and cannot be accepted. Therefore, the first condition that the
petitioner is not removable except with the sanction of the
Government is not satisfied.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
15. The record shows that the charge sheet was filed for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420,
120B and 218 of the IPC. It was laid down in Manohar Nath Kaul v.
State of J & K, (1983) 3 SCC 429: 1983 SCC (Cri) 647: 1983 SCC
OnLine SC 1, that cheating by drawing T.A. does not require any
sanction for prosecuting the person for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. It was observed at
page 436:
9. In B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar [(1979) 4 SCC 177: 1979 SCC (Cri)
939: (1980) 1 SCR 111: 1979 Cri LJ 1367], a three-Judge
Bench dealt with the same submission advanced on
behalf of certain officers of the Customs Department
convicted for offences punishable under Sections 120-B,
166 and 409 of the Penal Code. Sarkaria, J. speaking for
the court observed: [SCC para 18, p. 185: SCC (Cri) p. 946]
"In sum, the sine qua non for the applicability of this
section is that the offence charged, be it one of
commission or omission, must be one which has been
committed by the public servant either in his official
capacity or under colour of the office held by him."
The rule in Amrik Singh case [AIR 1955 SC 309: (1955) 1 SCR
1302:1955 Cri LJ 865] was quoted with approval. It was
observed: [SCC para 17, pp. 184-85: SCC (Cri) pp. 945-46]
"The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed
by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty' employed in Section
197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a
wide interpretation. If these words are construed too
narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether
sterile, for 'it is no part of an official duty to commit
an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
words will take under their umbrella every act
constituting an offence, committed in the course of
the same transaction in which the official duty is
performed or purports to be performed. The right
approach to the import of these words lies between
these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not
every offence committed by a public servant while
engaged in the performance of his official duty, which
is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act
constituting an offence, directly and
reasonably connected with his official duty will require
sanction for prosecution under the said provision."
(emphasis supplied)
We are of the definite view that the rule quoted above
from the Amrik Singh case [AIR 1955 SC 309: (1955) 1 SCR
1302:1955 Cri LJ 865] correctly lays down the legal
proposition as to invocability of the protection under
Section 197(1) of the Code. The observations of Imam, J.
in Satwant Singh case [AIR 1960 SC 266: 1960 Cri LJ 410 :
(1960) 2 SCR 89] that there could be no hesitation in
saying that where a public servant commits the offence of
cheating or abets another so to cheat, the offence
committed by him is not one while he is acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, as
such offence has no necessary connection between it and
the performance of the duties of a public servant, the
official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity
for the commission of the offences, is also the correct
exposition of the law. It has not been contended before us
that the official duty of the appellant was to draw
travelling allowance bills, though his status as a public
servant authorised him to draw such bills. Drawing of T.A.
bills cannot be said to have been directly and reasonably
connected with the appellant’s duty as Regional Officer of
the Directorate, and the official status furnished the
opportunity for doing the acts which constitute
ingredients of the offence. He was, therefore, not entitled
to claim the protection of Section 197(1) of the Code. The
16
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )prosecution is not vitiated for want of sanction. The
appeal has, therefore, to be dismissed.
16. This position was reiterated in Inspector of Police v.
Battenapatla Venkata Ratnam, (2015) 13 SCC 87: (2016) 1 SCC (Cri)
164: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 339 wherein it was observed at page 91:
“11. The alleged indulgence of the officers in cheating,
fabrication of records or misappropriation cannot be said
to be in discharge of their official duty. Their official duty
is not to fabricate records or permit evasion of payment
of duty, and cause loss to the Revenue. Unfortunately, the
High Court missed these crucial aspects. The learned
Magistrate has correctly taken the view that if at all, the
said view of sanction is to be considered, it could be done
at the stage of trial only.”
17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Bholu Ram v. State of Punjab, (2008) 9 SCC 140: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
710: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1317, that the offence punishable under
Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 cannot be said to have been
committed in the discharge of official duties and hence no
sanction is required. It was observed at page 159:
“60. We express our inability to agree with the learned
counsel. It is settled law that offences punishable under
Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, etc. can by no stretch of
imagination by their very nature be regarded as having
been committed by a public servant while “acting or
purporting to act in discharge of official duty”
(vide Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab [(2007) 1 SCC
1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] ).”
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
18. Hence, no sanction is required for the prosecution of
cheating.
19. Section 218 of the IPC deals with framing an incorrect
record or writing with the intent to save any person from
punishment. Thus, it is akin to the falsification of the record.
Since this is not the job of the public servant to falsify the
record, therefore, the requirement of sanction will not apply to
the present case.
20. It was submitted that the Court has allowed the
Criminal Revision No. 51/2014, and the proceedings are liable to
be quashed against the petitioner as well. A perusal of the order
passed in Criminal Revision No. 51 of 2014 shows that it was
passed because of the peculiar situation of the petitioner,
Rakesh Seth, which is quite distinct from the case of the
petitioner. Therefore, the proceedings cannot be quashed
because the revision filed by the co-accused was allowed.
21. It was submitted that there is a violation of the right
to a speedy trial, and the petition is liable to be quashed on this
ground. This submission is not acceptable. It is apparent from
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
the petition itself that the record was summoned by this Court at
the instance of the co-accused. A person cannot take the benefit
of the proceedings stalled at the instance of the accused to claim
that his right to a speedy trial is being violated.
22. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress
of the trial, and a direction should be issued to expedite the trial.
It was laid down in M. Gopalakrishnan v. Pasumpon
Muthuramalingam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1968, that any order of
expediting the hearing might upset the calendar and schedule of
the subordinate Court, and might result in assigning an
unwarranted priority to that particular case over and above other
cases pending in that Court. It was observed: –
“4. Looking to the nature of the order passed by the High
Court, we are not inclined to grant leave to appeal in this
matter but feel impelled to observe that ordinarily,
before passing any such order for expeditious
proceedings in a particular case (which might appear to
be rather innocuous), it would be appropriate for the
higher Court to appreciate that any such order for one
case, without cogent and extremely compelling reasons,
might upset the calendar and schedule of the
subordinate Court; might result in assigning an
unwarranted priority to that particular case over and
above other cases pending in that Court; and progression
of such other cases might suffer for no reason and none
of the faults of the litigants involved therein.”
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
23. This position was reiterated in Shaikh Uzma Feroz
Hussain vs. State of Maharashtra Writ Petition Criminal no. 587 of
2023 decided on 10.11.2023 (SC) wherein it was observed:
“We are of the view that since every High Court and
every Court in the country has a huge pendency, the
Constitutional Court should avoid the temptation of
fixing a time-bound schedule for the disposal of any case
before any Court unless the situation is extraordinary.”
24. A similar view was taken in the Allahabad High Court
Bar Assn. v. State of U.P., (2024) 6 SCC 267: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 207
wherein it was observed:
41. Therefore, constitutional Courts should not normally
fix a time-bound schedule for the disposal of cases
pending in any Court. The pattern of pendency of various
categories of cases pending in every Court, including High
Courts, is different. The situation at the grassroots level is
better known to the judges of the concerned Courts.
Therefore, the issue of giving out-of-turn priority to
certain cases should be best left to the concerned Courts.
The orders fixing the outer limit for the disposal of cases
should be passed only in exceptional circumstances to
meet extraordinary situations.
42. There is another important reason for adopting the
said approach. Not every litigant can easily afford to file
proceedings in the Constitutional Courts. Those litigants
who can afford to approach the constitutional Courts
cannot be allowed to take undue advantage by getting an
order directing out-of-turn disposal of their cases while
all other litigants patiently wait in the queue for their
turn to come. The Courts, superior in the judicial
hierarchy, cannot interfere with the day-to-day
functioning of the other Courts by directing that only
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19373 )
certain cases should be decided out of turn within a time
frame. In a sense, no Court of law is inferior to the other.
This Court is not superior to the High Courts in the
judicial hierarchy. Therefore, the Judges of the High
Courts should be allowed to set their priorities on a
rational basis. Thus, as far as setting the outer limit is
concerned, it should be best left to the concerned Courts
unless there are very extraordinary circumstances.
25. Therefore, no direction can be issued to expedite the
hearing. However, this Court hopes and trusts that the learned
Trial Court shall deal with the matter as expeditiously as possible
in the facts and circumstances of the case.
26. No other point was urged.
27. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the
same is dismissed.
28. The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
23rd June, 2025
(saurav pathania)
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