Bombay High Court
Rakesh S/O Upendra Singh vs State Of Mah. Thr. Officer In Charge Of Ps … on 23 June, 2025
2025:BHC-NAG:5757
Judgment
414 revns238 & 239.22
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.238 OF 2022
WITH
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.239 OF 2022
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.238 OF 2022
Rakesh s/o Upendra Singh,
aged about 45 years,
occupation : business,
r/o 43, Welcome Nagar,
Bokhara, Koradi Road, Nagpur,
currently lodged in Central Jail,
Nagpur. ..... Applicant.
:: V E R S U S ::
1. State of Maharashtra,
Officer-in-charge of Police
Station Jalalkheda, Nagpur,
District (Rural), Nagpur.
2. State of Maharashtra, through
Economic Offences Wing,
Nagpur (Rural), Civil Lines,
Nagpur. ..... Non-applicants.
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.239 OF 2022
Nutan w/o Rakesh Singh,
aged about 43 years,
.....2/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
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occupation : business,
r/o 43, Welcome Nagar, Bokhara,
Koradi Road, Nagpur, currently
lodged in Central Jail, Nagpur. ..... Applicant.
:: V E R S U S ::
1. State of Maharashtra, Officer-
in-charge of Police Station
Jalalkheda, Nagpur, District (Rural),
Nagpur.
2. State of Maharashtra, through
Economic Offences Wing, Nagpur
(Rural), Civil Lines,
Nagpur. ..... Non-applicants.
Shri F.T.Mirza, Senior Counsel assisted by Shri M.N.Ali,
Advocate for Applicants.
Shri Anant Ghongre, Additional Public Prosecutor for the
Non-applicants/State.
CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.
CLOSED ON : 13/06/2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 23/06/2025
COMMON JUDGMENT
1. Heard learned Senior Counsel Shri F.T.Mirza for
applicants and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri
.....3/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
3
Anant Ghongre for the State. Rule. Heard finally by
consent.
2. By these revisions, applicants have challenged
orders dated 13.6.2022 passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Nagpur rejecting their applications for
discharge in connection with Crime No.304/2018 (Special
Case No.539/2020) registered under Sections 120-B; 409;
411; 413; 420; 467; 468; and 471 of the IPC and 3 of the
MPID Act below Exhs.36 and 37. By these revisions,
applicants are challenging orders only to the extent of
discharge of offences under Section 3 of the MPID Act and
Sections 411 and 413 of the IPC.
3. Brief facts for disposal of these revisions are as
under:
The crime is registered on the basis of a report
lodged by Madhukar Vithoba Gaikwad against applicants,
.....4/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
4
who are husband and wife, alleging that they through co-
accused Nilesh Dhorpe collected documents i.e. 7/12
Extracts, Aadhar Cards, Voter IDs, and Photographs from
agriculturists on pretext of ensuring benefits under the
Government Schemes and, thereafter, fraudulently, loan
applications were prepared showing said farmers are
asking for financial assistance. Applicants Rakesh Singh,
represented agriculturists that he and his wife stood as
guarantors and prepared 58 fraudulent loan cases. It is
also case of the prosecution that while the Scheme
envisaged sanctioning loan on security of product stored
in godown subject to certificate issued by The National
Collateral Management Services Ltd. Company (NCMSL),
loans were sanctioned in names of agriculturists who did
not supply grain. Thus, as per allegations, in connivance
with certain officers of the Corporation Bank and NCMSL,
applicants and co-accused succeeded in transferring
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amount Rs.25,11,68,500/- to accounts of farmers. Both
applicants and co-accused, with the help of forged
documents, released food grains worth of
Rs.17,89,00,500/- from "Jagdamba Godown" from
accounts of said farmers. Both amounts were transferred
to their accounts and accounts of certain ostensible
employees and close relatives of applicant Rakesh Singh.
Total amount disbursed fraudulently was to the tune of
Rs.51,49,56,057/- and only amount Rs.7,16,20,000/- is
recovered.
4. On the basis of the said report, the crime was
registered. During investigation, the Investigating Officer
recorded statements of various agriculturists and after
completion of the investigation, filed chargesheet against
accused including applicants.
.....6/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
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5. After filing of chargesheet, applicant Rakesh Singh
preferred application vide Exh.36 and applicant Nutan
Rakesh Singh vide Exh.37 for discharge on ground that
applicant Rakesh Singh is Director of company namely
"Maa Gouri Poultry Pvt.Ltd" and his wife Nutan Rakesh
Singh is owner of "Jagdamba Warehouse Godown". They
only stood as guarantors. It is purely a case of non-
payment of loans. They have not collected any deposits
and there is no promise to agriculturists to pay amounts
back to them. The agriculturists obtained loans and they
are guarantors to the same. Thus, as far as offences under
Sections 3 of the MPID Act and 411 and 413 of the IPC are
not applicable and they be discharged from said charges.
6. The said applications were strongly opposed by the
State on ground that it is applicant Rakesh Singh who is
master mind and his wife and other co-accused, in
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414 revns238 & 239.22
7
connivance with other accused, committed the alleged
fraud and misappropriated amount Rs.48,63,36,057/-.
From the entire chargesheet, ingredients to constitute the
offence under Section 3 of the MPID Act is not made out.
7. After hearing both sides, learned Judge below
rejected applications for discharge and hence these
revisions.
8. In the light of the aforesaid challenge, I have heard
learned Senior Counsel Shri F.T.Mirza for applicants and
learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri Anant Ghongre
for the State. With their assistance, I have also perused
material on record especially chargesheet.
9. Learned Senior Counsel for applicants submitted
that Section 2(c) of the MPID Act defines "deposit". The
entire prosecution case nowhere states that applicants
have collected deposits from agriculturists or villagers.
.....8/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
8
The entire prosecution case states that applicants, through
Nilesh Dhorpe, collected various documents from
agriculturists on pretext of assisting them to obtain
benefits under the Government Scheme and, thereafter,
fraudulent loan applications were prepared in names of
various agriculturists and amounts obtained by way of
loans are transferred to their accounts.
The other allegation is that loans were obtained on
the security of the product stored in the godown in
connivance with the employees of NCMSL and
Corporation Bank. Thus, total amount obtained is
Rs.51,49,56,057/- and only amount Rs.7,16,20,000/- is
recovered and amount Rs.41,47,60,057/- is yet to be
recovered.
He also invited my attention towards objects of
enactment of the MPID Act and submitted that the object
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414 revns238 & 239.22
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of the MPID Act is to address mischief of collecting
deposits from public mostly from poor strata of the society
on false promises. The intention of the MPID Act was
never to govern "inter-corporation deposits" or
transaction" which forms a class apart by themselves.
Thus, application of provisions of the MPID Act itself is
erroneous and illegal.
10. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for
the State supported orders impugned in revisions and
submitted that fraudulently applicants obtained
documents, loans in names of farmers, and
misappropriated the same. Thus, an ample material is on
record to show involvement of applicants and, therefore,
Section 3 of the MPID Act cannot be questioned.
.....10/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
10
11. Before adverting to merits of the matter, it is
necessary to see, what are considerations for considering
application for discharge.
12. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of
considering an application for discharge, the court must
proceed on the assumption that the material which has
been brought on record by the prosecution is true and
evaluate the material in order to determine whether the
facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value,
disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the
offence alleged.
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, reported in
MANU/SC/1113 2023, adverting to the earlier
propositions of law in its earlier decisions in the cases of
State of Tamil Nadu vs. N.Suresh Rajan and ors, reported
.....11/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
11
in (2014) 11 SCC 709 and The State of Maharashtra vs.
Som Nath Thapa, reported in (1996) 4 SCC 659 and The
State of MP Vs. Mohan Lal Soni, reported in (2000) 6 SCC
338, has held as under:
"10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of
considering an application for discharge the court
must proceed on an assumption that the material
which has been brought on record by the
prosecution is true and evaluate said material in
order to determine whether the facts emerging
from the material taken on its face value, disclose
the existence of the ingredients necessary of the
offence alleged. This Court in State of Tamil Nadu
vs. N.Suresh Rajan and ors, (2014) 11 SCC 709
adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid
down on this subject has held:
"29. We have bestowed our consideration to
the rival submissions and the submissions
made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True
.....12/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
12
it is that at the time of consideration of the
applications for discharge, the court cannot
act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act
as a post office and may sift evidence in order
to find out whether or not the allegations
made are groundless so as to pass an order of
discharge. It is trite that at the stage of
consideration of an application for discharge,
the court has to proceed with an assumption
that the materials brought on record by the
prosecution are true and evaluate the said
materials and documents with a view to find
out whether the facts emerging therefrom
taken at their face value disclose the existence
of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. At this stage, probative value of the
materials has to be gone into and the court is
not expected to go deep into the matter and
hold that the materials would not warrant a
conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be
considered is whether there is a ground for
presuming that the offence has been
.....13/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
13
committed and not whether a ground for
convicting the accused has been made out. To
put it differently, if the court thinks that the
accused might have committed the offence on
the basis of the materials on record on its
probative value, it can frame the charge;
though for conviction, the court has to come
to the conclusion that the accused has
committed the offence. The law does not
permit a mini trial at this stage."
14. Thus, the defence of the accused is not to be looked
into at this stage when applications are filed for discharge.
The expression "the record of the case" used in Section 227
of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be understood as
the documents and materials, if any, produced by the
prosecution. The provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure does not give any right to the accused to
produce any document at the stage of framing of the
.....14/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
14
charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to
the material produced by the investigating agency. The
primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is
the test of existence of a prima facie case, and at this
stage, the probative value of materials on record need not
be gone into. At the stage of entertaining the application
for discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the court cannot analyze or direct the evidence
of the prosecution and defence or the points or possible
cross examination of the defence. The case of the
prosecution is to be accepted as it is.
15. In the case of Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar
Samal and anr, reported in (1973)3 SCC 4, the Hon'ble
Apex Court considered the scope of Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. After adverting to the
.....15/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
15
various decisions, the Hon'ble Apex Court has enumerated
the following principles:
"(1) That the Judge while considering the question
of framing the charges under section 227 of the
Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh
the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which
has not been properly explained the Court will be,
fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding
with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it
is difficult to lay down a rule of universal
.....16/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
16
application. By and large however if two views are
equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the
evidence produced before him while giving rise to
some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the
accused, he will be fully within his right to
discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under section
227 of the Code the Judge which under the present
Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act
merely as a Post office or a mouth-piece of the
prosecution, but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the
Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case
and so on. This however does not mean that the
Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros
.....17/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
17
and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if
he was conducting a trial."
16. Thus, the catena of decisions explains the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
from which following principles emerge:
1. While considering the question of framing
the charges under section 227 of the Code, the
court has the undoubted power to sift and
weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case
against the accused has been made out: The
test to determine prime facie case would
depend upon the facts of each case.
2. Where the materials placed before the
Court disclose grave suspicion against the
accused which has not been properly
explained the Court will be, fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the
trial.
.....18/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
18
3. The court cannot act merely as a Post office
or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has
to consider the broad probabilities of the case,
the total effect of the evidence and the
documents produced before the Court, any
basic infirmities appearing in the case and so
on. However, at this stage, there cannot be a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the
matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.
4. If on the basis of the material on record, the
Court could form an opinion that the accused
might have committed offence, it can frame
the charge, though for conviction the
conclusion is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused has
committed the offence.
5. At the time of framing of the charges, the
probative value of the material on record
cannot be gone into but before framing a
.....19/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
19
charge the Court must apply its judicial mind
on the material placed on record and must be
satisfied that the commission of offence by the
accused was possible.
6. At the stage of sections 227 and 228 the
Court is required to evaluate the material and
documents on record with a view to find out if
the facts emerging there from taken at their
face value discloses the existence of all the
ingredients constituting the alleged offence.
For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it
cannot be expected even at that initial stage to
accept all that the prosecution states as gospel
truth even if it is opposed to common sense or
the broad probabilities of the case.
7. If two views are possible and one of them
gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished
from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be
empowered to discharge the accused and at
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414 revns238 & 239.22
20
this stage, he is not to see whether the trial
will end in conviction or acquittal.
17. As observed earlier, applicants have only challenged
application of Sections 3 of the MPID Act and 411 and 413
of the IPC.
18. Before dealing with the challenge, it would be
appropriate to note relevant provisions of the MPID Act
especially interpretation clause thereof.
19. The clause (c) of Section 2 of the MPID Act defines
'deposit' as under :
"(c) "Deposit" means the deposit of money either in
one lump sum or by installments made with the
Financial Establishment for a fixed period for
interest or for return in any kind or for any service
and includes and shall be deemed always to have
included any receipt of money or acceptance of any
valuable commodity by any Financial Establishment
.....21/-
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21
to be returned after a specified period or otherwise,
either in cash or in kind or in the form of specified
service with or without any benefit in the form of
interest, bonus, profit, or in any other form, but
does not include--
(i) amount raised by way of share capital or by
any way of debenture, bond or any other
instrument covered under the guidelines given, and
regulations made, by the SEBI, established under
the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act,
1992 (15 of 1992) ;
(ii) amounts contributed as capital by partners
of a film;
(iii) amounts received from a Scheduled bank
or Shraddha Talekar PS Co-operative Bank or any
other banking company as defined in clause (c) of
Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10
of 1949);
.....22/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
22
(iv) any amount received from--
(a) the Industrial Development Bank of India;
(b) a State Financial Institution;
(c) any financial institution specified in or
under section 6-A of Industrial Development Bank
of India Act, 1964 (18 of 1964) ; or
(d) any other institution that may be specified
by the Government in this behalf;
(v) amounts received in the ordinary course of
business by way of --
(a) security deposit;
(b) dealership deposit; and
(c) earnest money;
(vi) any amount received from an individual or a
firm or an association or individuals not being a
body corporate, registered under any enactment
relating to money lending which is for the time
being in force in the State ; and
.....23/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
23
(vii) any amount received by way of subscriptions
in receipt of a Chit.
Explanation I -- "Chit" has the meaning as assigned
to in clause (b) of Section 2 of the Chit Funds Act,
1982 (40 of 1982);
Explanation II .-- "Any credit given by a seller to a
buyer on the sale of any property (whether
movable or immovable) shall not be deemed to be
a deposit for the purposes of this clause."
Whereas clause (d) of Section 2 defines "Financial
Establishment" as:
"(d) Financial Establishment" means any person
accepting deposit under any scheme or
arrangement or in any other manner but does not
include a corporation or a co-operative society
owned or controlled by any State Government or
the Central Government or a banking company
.....24/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
24
defined under clause (c) of Section 5 of the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949)."
20. Thus, definitions of 'deposit' and 'financial
establishment' are rather expansive. The inclusive
definition of 'deposit' covers any receipt of money or
acceptance of any valuable commodity, except those
amounts which have been specifically excluded by sub-
clauses (i) to (vii) thereof. Thus, any person accepting
deposits under any scheme or in any other manner
satisfies the description of financial establishment except a
corporation or a co-operative society owned or controlled
by any State Government or the Central Government or a
banking company defined under the Banking Regulation
Act.
21. In the present case, it is nobody's case that
applicants are running any "financial establishment" and
.....25/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
25
they have collected "deposits", but it is case that they have
misrepresented agriculturists, collected documents from
them, obtained loans in their names, and loan amounts
are misappropriated by them.
22. Thus, the entire controversy revolves around
question as to whether loans' amounts obtained by
applicants in names various agriculturists are within the
definition of "deposit.
23. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of State of
Maharashtra vs. 63 Moon Technologies Limited, reported
in (2022)9 SCC 457, dealt with the scope and ambit of
"deposit" and "financial establishment" and held as under:
"(i) the expression 'deposit' is conspicuously broad
in its width and ambit for it includes, not only any
receipt of money but also the acceptance of any
valuable commodity by a financial establishment
under any scheme or arrangement;
.....26/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
26
(ii) the money or commodity must be liable to be
returned. However, such return need not
necessarily be in the form of cash or kind but also
in the form of a service, with or without any benefit
such as interest;
(iii) it is not necessary that the return should be
with the benefit of interest, bonus or profit.
Therefore, if the financial establishment is
obligated to return the deposit without any
increments, it shall still fall within the purview of
Section 2(c) of the MPID Act, provided that the
deposit does not fall within any of the exceptions;
(iv) the phrase 'valuable commodity' cannot be
restricted to only mean precious metals.
Agricultural commodities which NSEL trades in will
fall within the purview of the term, and
(v) the definition is broadly worded to include even
the possession of the commodities for a limited
purpose."
.....27/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
27
24. Thus, The expression 'deposit' is conspicuously
broad in its width and ambit for it includes, not only any
receipt of money but also the acceptance of any valuable
commodity by a financial establishment under any scheme
or arrangement. The expression 'any' is used in the
substantive part of the definition of the expression
'deposit' on five occasions namely;
(i) Any receipt of money;
(ii) Any valuable commodities;
(iii) By any financial establishment;
(iv) With or without any benefit; and
(v) In any other form.
The Hon'ble Apex Court further explains that there
is nothing in the definition of the term "deposit" to mean
that the acceptance of the commodity should be
accompanied by a transfer of title to the commodity. Even
if the financial establishment is only in "custody" of the
.....28/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
28
commodity, it would still fall within the purview of the
phrase "acceptance of commodity".
25. According to the second ingredient of Section 2(c),
the money or commodity must be liable to be returned.
However, such return need not necessarily be in the form
of cash or kind but also in the form of a service, with or
without any benefit such as interest. It needs to be recalled
that clause (v) of Section2(c) states that a deposit of
money or commodity made as a security deposit,
dealership deposit or an advance amount is excluded from
the definition of the phrase "deposit".
26. On going through the entire record and
investigation papers, the prosecution case, on the basis of
statements of witnesses, revolves around facts that
applicants along with co-accused obtained loans in names
of farmers and said loan amounts were transferred in
.....29/-
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29
accounts of said farmers and from accounts of farmers
transferred said amounts to the accounts of "Maa Gouri
Poultry Pvt.Ltd" and "Annapurna Trading Company" and
64 proprietary concerns. These proprietary concerns are
in the name of applicant Rakesh Singh and his close
relatives.
27. Thus, the entire investigation papers show that
amounts are obtained by way of loans in names of
farmers. Thus, loans advanced in names of farmers, which
are required to be repaid to the concerned bank, would
not amount to "deposit" within the meaning and for the
purpose of the MPID Act.
28. The object of the aforesaid enactment was clarified
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s.New Horizon
Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Government of Pondicherry,
thr.Additional Secretary and anr, reported in (2012)10
.....30/-
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30
SCC 575 and it has been observed that the object of this
enactment is namely to protect the interests of small
depositors from fraud perpetrated on unsuspecting
investors, who entrusted their life savings to unscrupulous
and fraudulent persons and who ultimately betrayed their
trust. The said enactment was enacted to protect the
interests of small depositors from fraud perpetrated on
unsuspecting investors, who entrusted their life savings to
unscrupulous and fraudulent persons and who ultimately
betrayed their trust that was stated to be the main object
indicated in the statement of object and reason of the
enactment. The nature of legislation is to protect the
interests of small depositors, who invest their life's
earnings and savings in schemes for making profit floated
by unscrupulous individuals and companies, both
incorporated and unincorporated which needs to be kept
in mind while testing the provisions of the said Act.
.....31/-
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31
29. In the aforesaid view of the matter, loans obtained
by applicants in names of farmers would not amount to
"deposit" within the meaning and for the purposes of the
said Act.
30. Even, the definition of "financial establishment" as
defined in Section 2(d) defines, "as any person accepting a
deposit".
31. On going through the definition of "financial
establishment", admittedly, applicants are not fit in the
definition of "financial establishment" and, therefore, the
contention of learned Senior Counsel for applicants
requires to be accepted that amounts obtained by
applicants, allegedly by obtaining loans in names of
farmers, does not come within the definition of "deposit"
and applicant also are not covered under the definition of
"financial establishment".
.....32/-
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32
32. Learned Senior Counsel for applicants also
challenged the charge under Sections 411 and 413 of the
IPC.
33. Section 411 of the IPC deals with offence of
"dishonestly receiving or retaining stolen property" which
reads as under:
"whoever dishonestly received any stolen property,
defined under Section 410 of the IPC, dishonestly
receiving the same is guilty of the offence under
Section 411 of the IPC".
34. Here, in the present case, there is absolutely no
allegation against applicants that they have received stolen
property and, therefore, application of Section 411 of the
IPC itself is erroneous.
Similarly, Section 413 of the IPC deals with "offence
of habitually dealing in stolen property". The same is also
.....33/-
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33
not applicable as the entire chargesheet nowhere reveals
that applicants, at any point of time, habitually received or
dealt in property which they know or have reason to
believe to be stolen property.
35. A plain reading of Sections 411 and 413 of the IPC
and applying the undisputed facts to the present case
indicates that none of ingredients are attracted to the case
in hand.
36. After having sifted and weighed the evidence on
record; on going through investigation papers, and
considered materials on record, it is difficult to hold that
Section 3 of the MPID Act is attracted against applicants as
allegations levelled against them are that they obtained
money in names of farmers by obtaining loans and
transferred in their accounts and siphoned the same to
accounts of their firms which does not come within the
.....34/-
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34
definition of "deposits". On the basis of the evidence on
record, it cannot be stated that the material is sufficient
for the prosecution to establish the charge against the
applicants under Section 3 of the MPID Act.
Likewise, the charge under Sections 411 and 413 of
the IPC also appears to be erroneous as there is no
allegation that applicants either received any stolen
property or dealt with the stolen property and, therefore,
as far as offences under Section 3 of the MPID Act and
Sections 411 and 413 of the IPC are not made out. As
such, subjecting applicants to face trial for the above said
offences would be abuse of process of law. Learned Judge
below ought to have appreciated this legal position while
deciding applications for discharge. I am, therefore, of the
view that orders impugned are liable to be quashed and
.....35/-
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414 revns238 & 239.22
35
set aside to the extent of application of Section 3 of the
MPID Act and Sections 411 and 413 of the IPC.
37. In this view of the matter, the criminal revision
applications deserve to be allowed partly. Hence, I
proceed to pass following order:
ORDER
(1) The Criminal Revision Applications are allowed partly.
(2) The orders dated 13.6.2022 passed by learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur rejecting applications
of applicants for discharge in connection with Crime
No.304/2018 (Special Case No.539/2020) below Exhs.36
and 37 are hereby quashed and set aside only to the extent
of offences under Section 3 of the MPID Act and under
Sections 411 and 413 of the IPC.
…..36/-
Judgment
414 revns238 & 239.22
36
(3) The applicants are hereby discharged of offences
under Section 3 of the MPID Act and under Sections 411
and 413 of the IPC.
38. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms.
Revisions stand disposed of accordingly.
(URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.)
!! BrWankhede !!
Signed by: Mr. B. R. Wankhede
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge …../-
Date: 23/06/2025 17:50:29