Orissa High Court
Constitution Of India vs Mahanadi Coalfields Limited & …. … on 20 June, 2025
Author: S.K. Panigrahi
Bench: S.K. Panigrahi
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 24-Jun-2025 16:53:36
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No. 12707 of 2024
(In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
M/S. GSCO (Gurmeet Singh and .... Petitioner(s)
Company)Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.
-versus-
Mahanadi Coalfields Limited & .... Opposite Party (s)
Ors.
Advocates appeared in the case throughHybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Avijit Patnaik, Adv.
For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. Rakesh Sharma, Adv.
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-24.04.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-20.06.2025
Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.
1. The present Writ Petition has been filed invoking the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution
assailing the legality and sustainability of the order dated 06.03.2024
passed by the Learned District and Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in
Arbitration Case No. 05 of 2021. Vide the said order, the court below
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dismissed the petitioner’s application dated 27.09.2022 which had
prayed for the dismissal of the Section 34 petition filed by Mahanadi
Coalfields Limited (MCL) on the ground of territorial incompetence
and bar of limitation.
2. The principal contention raised in the Writ Petition is that the Learned
District Judge, Sundargarh lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the
Section 34 application filed by MCL, in view of the overriding
mandate of Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
read with the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The
petitioner asserts that the Court at Cuttack, being the seat of
arbitration and the court which appointed the Arbitrator under
Section 11 of the A&C Act, alone has the requisite jurisdiction to
entertain post-award challenges under Part I of the Act.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
3. The brief facts of the caseare asfollows:
(i) The dispute arises out of a contract awarded to the petitioner
pursuant to e-Tender Notice No. CL/SBP/GM/(CMC)/NIT-
088/2012/2986 dated 07.11.2012 for “Hiring of HEMM (Shovel, Drill,
Dozer etc.) for transfer & transportation of materials in various strata
including drilling, excavation, dumping, spreading, dozing and other
allied works” at Kulda OCP, Basundhara-Garjanbahal Area under
Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (MCL). The petitioner, M/s GSCO
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., was the successful bidder, and the agreement
was duly executed between the parties.
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(ii) The work was carried out and ultimately completed to the satisfaction
of MCL. A Completion Certificate dated 03.07.2016 was issued by
Opposite Party No.4 (Project Officer, Kulda OCP) acknowledging that
the petitioner had completed the assigned scope of work on
29.06.2016.
(iii) Thereafter, disputes arose in relation to alleged wrongful deduction of
amounts, withholding of security deposits, non-refund of
performance guarantees, and imposition of penalties. Aggrieved
thereby, the petitioner approached this Court in W.P.(C) Nos.
19909/2016, 473/2017, and 474/2017.
(iv) These were disposed of by a common order dated 25.03.2019,
whereby this Court was pleased to appoint Hon’bleMr. Justice M.M.
Das (Retd.) as the Sole Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to adjudicate all disputes.
(v) In pursuance of the said order, three connected arbitration
proceedings, Arbitration Case Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of 2020, were initiated
and conducted. The entire arbitration proceedings, including
hearings, submissions, and evidence, were held at Cuttack, which was
also the designated seat of arbitration.
(vi) After due adjudication, the learned Sole Arbitrator passed a common
arbitral award dated 25.10.2021, allowing several claims of the present
petitioner. The relevant extract of the operative part of the award is as
follows:
a. MCL was directed to refund ₹3,35,72,511.85 to the claimant
(present petitioner) towards various withheld dues.
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Date: 24-Jun-2025 16:53:36b. MCL was further directed to return all Bank Guarantees
deposited by the claimant, which had been withheld in violation
of the contractual terms.
c. Interest at the rate of 12% per annum was awarded on the above
amount from the date of award till actual payment.
(vii) Despite receipt of the award, the respondent-MCL did not comply
with the directions therein. Instead, on 24.11.2021, it filed three
separate petitions under Section 34 of the A&C Act before the District
Judge, Sundargarh, being Arbitration Case Nos. 05, 06, and 07 of 2021,
seeking to set aside the said award.
(viii) In response, the present petitioner filed an application under Section
151 CPC dated 27.09.2022 before the same Court, raising a preliminary
objection to the maintainability of the proceedings on two counts:
a. That the Section 34 petitions were barred by limitation under
Section 34(3) of the Act, having been filed beyond the statutory
period.
b. That the District Judge, Sundargarh lacked territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the petitions, in view of Section 42 of the
A&C Act and the seat of arbitration being at Cuttack.
(ix) By order dated 06.03.2024, the learned District Judge, Sundargarh
rejected the petitioner’s application and held that the Section 34
petitions were maintainable before it. Aggrieved thereby, the
petitioner has approached this Court in the present writ petition.
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II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The primary argument canvassed by the petitioner is that the Court at
Cuttack alone has jurisdiction to entertain any application under Part I
of the A&C Act since the appointment of the arbitrator was made by
this Court, the arbitration proceedings were conducted entirely at
Cuttack, and the award was rendered from Cuttack. Therefore, in
terms of Section 42 of the Act, no other Court can assume jurisdiction
in respect of the said arbitration agreement.
(ii) It is further submitted that the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 mandates
that commercial disputes of a specified value must be adjudicated
exclusively by designated Commercial Courts. Section 10(3) read with
the Government of Odisha’s Notification dated 13.11.2020 establishes
the Commercial Court at Sambalpur with jurisdiction over the
Judgeships of Sambalpur, Bargarh, Deogarh, and Jharsuguda.
Notably, Sundargarh district is not included therein.
(iii) In the absence of any designated Commercial Court for Sundargarh
and in light of the seat of arbitration being at Cuttack, it is contended
that only the Commercial Court at Cuttack or Sambalpur (if
jurisdictionally competent) could have entertained the Section 34
petition. It is further argued that since Section 11 proceedings were
instituted and concluded at Cuttack and the award itself was
delivered at Cuttack, the principle of exclusive jurisdiction under
Section 42 squarely applies.
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(iv) Reliance is placed on authoritative precedents including BGS SGS
Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd1., and State of West Bengal v. Associated
Contractors2, to buttress the proposition that once a Court is
approached under Part I of the Act, all future proceedings must be
confined to that Court alone. The petitioner also invokes M.G.
Mohanty v. State of Odisha3to establish that the Commercial Courts
Act is not inconsistent with the Arbitration Act and does not dilute the
application of Section 42.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
5. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the
following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The opposite parties, on the other hand, submit that the jurisdiction to
entertain the Section 34 application rightly vests with the District
Judge, Sundargarh. This is based on the specific contractual
stipulation in Clause 40 of the General Terms and Conditions of
Contract which stipulates that all disputes arising from the contract
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court where the work
is executed i.e. Sundargarh.
(ii) It is argued that the seat of arbitration or the place where the award
was rendered is not determinative of jurisdiction under Section 34
when there exists a contractual clause conferring territorial
jurisdiction. It is also asserted that Section 2(1)(e) of the A&C Act,
which defines “Court”, when read with Section 42, emphasizes that
1
(2020) 4 SCC 234.
2
(2015) 1 SCC 32.
3
W.P.(C) Nos. 3523, 5491 & 5494 of 2022 and W.P.(C) Nos. 28644 & 30554 of 2021.
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the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within whose local
limits the cause of action arises has jurisdiction, therefore, Sundargarh
Court is competent.
(iii) The opposite parties further argue that Sundargarh not falling within
the territorial jurisdiction of the notified Commercial Courts (as per
the 2020 Notification) reinforces that the regular District Court at
Sundargarh alone is empowered to entertain the Section 34 petition.
(iv) Lastly, it is submitted that the arbitration clause does not override the
explicit jurisdiction clause within the contract and that the mere
conduct of arbitration proceedings at Cuttack or appointment of
arbitrator by the High Court does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on
the Commercial Court at Cuttack.
IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION: (i) Whether the District Judge, Sundargarh lacked territorial jurisdiction
to entertain the petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, in view of the seat of arbitration being at
Cuttack and the prior invocation of jurisdiction by this Court under
(ii) Whether the bar under Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 operates to oust the jurisdiction of any Court other than the
one which was first approached under Part I of the Act, namely, the
High Court of Orissa at Cuttack?
(iii) Whether in view of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the
Government of Odisha Notification dated 13.11.2020, which
designates the jurisdiction of Commercial Courts over specific
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Judgeships, the District Judge, Sundargarh could have exercised
jurisdiction in respect of the arbitration award in question?
(iv) Whether the application under Section 34 filed before the District
Judge, Sundargarh is hit by the bar of limitation under Section 34(3) of
the A&C Act, in view of the undisputed receipt of the award by MCL
and the timeline of filing?
V. COURT’S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
6. Heard Learned Counsel for parties and perused the documents placed
before this Court.
7. The first issue to be considered is whether the Learned District Judge,
Sundargarh possessed the requisite territorial jurisdiction to entertain
the petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, in view of the seat of arbitration being Cuttack and the prior
invocation of jurisdiction by this Court in the Section 11 proceedings.
It is by now trite that the concept of “seat” of arbitration is of seminal
importance under the scheme of the Act.
8. This principle, first elucidated in the context of domestic arbitrations
by the Constitution Bench in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services4and later in Indus Mobile Distribution
(P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd.5, marks a clear departure
from the traditional Code of Civil Procedure approach that tied
jurisdiction to where the cause of action arose. In arbitration law, once
the seat is designated, it is treated as conferring exclusive jurisdiction
4
(2012) 9 SCC 552.
5
2017 (7) SCC 678.
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on the courts at that location, irrespective of where the underlying
dispute or cause of action arose. As the Supreme Court in Indus
Mobile(Supra) clarified:
“19. The amended Act, does not, however, contain the
aforesaid amendments, presumably because the BALCO
judgment in no uncertain terms has referred to “place” as
“juridical seat” for the purpose of Section 2(2) of the Act.
It further made it clear that Section 20(1) and 20 (2)
where the word “place” is used, refers to “juridical seat”,
whereas in Section 20 (3), the word “place” is equivalent
to “venue”. This being the settled law, it was found
unnecessary to expressly incorporate what the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has already
done by way of construction of the Act.
20. A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that
the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an
exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present
case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and
Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction
exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of
Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which
applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to “seat” is a
concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the
parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may
not in the classical sense have jurisdiction – that is, no
part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral
venue and neither would any of the provisions of Section
16 to 21 of the CPC be attracted. In arbitration law
however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is
determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest
Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of
regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the
agreement between the parties.”
9. Applying the above law to the facts of the present case, it stands
undisputed that the entire arbitration proceedings, including the
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hearing, recording of evidence, and passing of the award, were
conducted at Cuttack. Furthermore, the appointment of the learned
Sole Arbitrator was made by this Court exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 11(6) of the Act. In such circumstances, Cuttack must be
treated as the juridical seat of arbitration, and by necessary
implication, the courts at Cuttack alone are vested with exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain any application under Part I of the Act,
including a petition under Section 34. Once parties expressly or
impliedly chose Cuttack as the seat, the law assigns “exclusive
jurisdiction” to the courts of that seat for all proceedings concerning
arbitration.
10. The opposite party urged that Clause 40 of the contract confers
territorial jurisdiction on courts at Sundargarh, since the contract was
executed and the project located in Sundargarh. In the present case,
Clause 40 of the contract cannot resurrect the jurisdiction of
Sundargarh in face of the parties’ arbitration having been anchored at
Cuttack. It is noteworthy that Clause 40 is a standard forum selection
clause for disputes under the contract; but once those disputes were
referred to arbitration and a seat was chosen for that arbitration, the
selection of seat supplants the general forum clause.
11. The petitioner rightly invokes Section 42 of the Act as an additional
buttress to its case on jurisdiction. Section 42 begins with a broad non-
obstante clause and mandates that once a party has approached a
“Court” for any application under Part I of the Act, all subsequent
applications arising out of that arbitration agreement shall be made in
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that same Court and no other. This provision aims to prevent forum
shopping and conflicting rulings by different courts in relation to the
same arbitration.
12. In Associated Contractors (Supra) the Supreme Court applied Section
42 in exactly such a scenario. In that case, a Section 9 application had
been made to the Calcutta High Court, and a later Section 34 was filed
in a District Court in another jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held
that by virtue of Section 42, the Calcutta High Court, being the court
first approached, had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34
petition; the District Court’s assumption was held to be in error. The
relevant excerpts are produced below:
“18…In case an application is made, as has been made in
the present case, before a particular court, Section 42 will
apply to preclude the making of all subsequent
applications under Part-I to any court except the court to
which an application has been made under Section 9 of the
Act..
…
21. One other question that may arise is as to whether
Section 42 applies after the arbitral proceedings come to
an end. It has already been held by us that the expression
“with respect to an arbitration agreement”are words of
wide import and would take in all applications made
before during or after the arbitral proceedings are over. In
an earlier judgment, KumbhaMawji v. Dominion of India,
(1953) SCR 878, the question which arose before the
Supreme Court was whether the expression used in
Section 31(4) of the 1940 Act “in any reference” would
include matters that are after the arbitral proceedings are
over and have culminated in an award. It was held that
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reference” and that such phrase is wide enough and
comprehensive enough to cover an application made after
the arbitration is completed and the final Award is made.
(See Paras 891-893). As has been noticed above, the
expression used in Section 42 is wider being “with respect
to an arbitration agreement” and would certainly include
such applications.”
13. The abovementioned precedent squarely covers the present situation.
Here, the first application under Part I was the Section 11(6) petition
before the Orissa High Court, for appointment of the arbitrator. That
High Court at Cuttack, which is indeed a “Court” as defined in
Section 2(1)(e) for this purpose, was thus the court initially seized of
the arbitral dispute. By operation of Section 42, “that Court alone”
would have the jurisdiction over all subsequent applications arising
from the same arbitration agreement. Consequently, the Section 34
petitions filed before the Sundargarh court are barred by Section 42,
since the Orissa High Court had already been invoked in respect of
the arbitration.
14. It is contended by the Opposite Party that Section 42 should not bar
the Sundargarh court’s jurisdiction. This argument is misconceived.
The language of Section 42 is couched in mandatory terms and begins
with a non-obstante clause: “Notwithstanding anything contained
elsewhere in this Part…”.It provides that once a Court has been
approached under Part I of the Act, that Court alone shall have
jurisdiction over all subsequent applications arising from the
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arbitration agreement. The only caveat to this rule was provided in
the BGS SGS Soma (Supra) wherein it was held as follows:
“Section 42 is meant to avoid conflicts in jurisdiction of
Courts by placing the supervisory jurisdiction over all
arbitral proceedings in connection with the arbitration in
one Court exclusively. This is why the section begins with
a non-obstante clause, and then goes on to state “…where
with respect to an arbitration agreement any application
under this Part has been made in a Court…” It is obvious
that the application made under this part to a Court must
be a Court which has jurisdiction to decide such
application. The subsequent holdings of this Court, that
where a seat is designated in an agreement, the Courts of
the seat alone have jurisdiction, would re- quire that all
applications under Part I be made only in the Court where
the seat is located, and that Court alone then has
jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all
subsequent applications arising out of the arbitral
agreement. So read, Section 42 is not rendered in-
effective or useless. Also, where it is found on the facts of a
particular case that either no “seat” is designated by
agreement, or the so- called “seat” is only a convenient
“venue”, then there may be several Courts where a part of
the cause of action arises that may have jurisdiction.
Again, an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration
Act, 1996 may be preferred before a court in which part of
the cause of action arises in a case where parties have not
agreed on the “seat” of arbitration, and before such “seat”
may have been determined, on the facts of a particular
case, by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 20(2) of the
Arbitration Act, 1996. In both these situations, the
earliest application having been made to a Court in which
a part of the cause of action arises would then be the
exclusive Court under Section 42, which would have
control over the arbitral proceedings. For all these reasons,
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the law stated by the Bombay and Delhi High Courts in
this regard is incorrect and is overruled.”
15. In the present case, the Section 11 application was not only first in
point of time but was also filed before this Court at Cuttack, which
undisputedly has jurisdiction as the seat of arbitration. Therefore, the
objection to the applicability of Section 42 is untenable. The Court
accordingly finds that the District Judge, Sundargarh ought to have
declined to entertain the Section 34 petitions on this ground alone,
instead of rejecting the petitioner’s objection.
16. The Opposite Party’s reliance on Section 2(1)(e) of the Act (the
definition of “Court”) and the traditional notions of cause of action is
also misplaced. Post-BALCO, the law is settled that the phrase
“subject-matter of the arbitration” in Section 2(1)(e) does not refer to
the subject-matter of the underlying dispute (as a civil suit would),
but to the subject-matter of the arbitration proceedings, which is
intrinsically connected to the location of the arbitration (the seat). In
the BALCO (Supra) case, the Constitution Bench cautioned the
following:
“96…The term ‘subject matter’ in Section 2(1)(e) is
confined to Part I. It has a reference and connection with
the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify
the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration
proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would
essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration…the
legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two
courts i.e. the court where the cause of action is located,
and the courts where the arbitration takes place….where
the arbitration is held at a neutral venue chosen by the
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the contract were performed.”
17. In line with this, the Supreme Court in Indus Mobile (Supra)
reiterated that in arbitration law, the seat is the center of gravity, and
the Civil Procedure Code’s cause-of-action based jurisdiction has a
limited role once the seat is designated. The Opposite Party’s
argument that Sundargarh courts have jurisdiction because the
contract was executed or performed there is a relic of the pre-BALCO
era. While multiple courts could theoretically have jurisdiction if no
seat was specified (based on where the cause of action arose), that
principle yields once the seat is agreed or determined. Here, since
Cuttack is the seat, the “court having jurisdiction” under
Section 2(1)(e) is the court at Cuttack, and not Sundargarh, regardless
of where the work was executed or the contract signed.
18. Moreover, even if one were to momentarily consider the cause-of-
action paradigm: the record indicates that significant aspects of the
arbitration, including the signing of terms of reference, conduct of
hearings, and ultimately the issuance of the award, took place at
Cuttack. These factors further tether the jurisdiction to Cuttack if
cause of action were relevant. But, as discussed, the legal position
post-BALCO is that it is the seat that is determinative. The Orissa High
Court at Cuttack, and by extension the District Court, Cuttack, are the
courts vested with jurisdiction to supervise this arbitration. The
District Judge, Sundargarh, in proceeding to entertain the Section 34
petitions, acted beyond his jurisdictional competence. His decision to
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reject the petitioner’s objection on this point cannot withstand the
scrutiny of the aforementioned settled legal principles.
19. An ancillary issue raised by the petitioner pertains to the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 and the State Government Notification dated
13.11.2020 issued thereunder. The petitioner submits that the State of
Odisha has, by this Notification, designated certain courts for
entertaining “commercial disputes” (which include arbitration
matters of a specified value), and that Sundargarh is not a notified
venue for a Commercial Court with jurisdiction over the subject
dispute. Without delving into the granular details of the Notification,
this Court notes that the arbitration award in question arises from a
commercial contract and, given the value, the challenge thereto
should indeed be heard by a designated Commercial Court as per the
2015 Act.
20. Even if arguendo Sundargarh’s District Judge were otherwise
competent, the absence of a Commercial Court designation for
Sundargarh at the relevant time would pose an additional legal
impediment to the maintainability of the Section 34 petitions there. In
other words, the proper forum under the Commercial Courts regime
would lie elsewhere. This reinforces the conclusion that the petitions
were filed in the wrong forum. However, since the core jurisdictional
invalidity has already been established on the basis of the seat and
Section 42, the Court need not rest its decision on the Commercial
Courts Act aspect alone. It is noted here only to highlight that the
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petitioners’ objection to jurisdiction finds support from multiple
angles, statutory and factual.
21. Aside from jurisdiction, the petitioner also contends that the Opposite
Party’s challenges under Section 34 were barred by limitation under
Section 34(3) of the Act. The arbitral award was passed and received
by the parties long before the filing of the petitions in Sundargarh,
and on the petitioner’s calculation, the filing exceeded the period of
three months (and even the condonable grace period of 30 days) from
the date of receipt of the award. On this aspect, the legal position is
clear and inflexible: an application to set aside an award must be
made within three months from the date on which the party received
the arbitral award, and a further delay of only up to 30 days can be
condoned for sufficient cause, but not thereafter. The Supreme Court
outlined this principle in the case of M/s. Simplex Infrastructure Ltd.
v. Union of India6. The relevant excerpts are produced below:
“13. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the
proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the
application for setting aside the award on the grounds
mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 could be made
within three months and the period can only be extended
for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient
cause and not thereafter. The use of the words “but not
thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that the extension
cannot be beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act is given to the
respondent, there will still be a delay of 131 days in filing
the application. That is beyond the strict timelines
prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the proviso6
2019 (2) SCC 455.
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cannot be condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to
breach a clear statutory mandate.”
22. In the present case, the District Judge, Sundargarh appears to have
taken a lenient view of the delay, perhaps under the impression that
filing in a wrong forum or other logistical issues could excuse the time
overrun. However, even if the petitions in Sundargarh were treated as
initially filed in the wrong court, the time spent there could at best be
sought to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act on a
refiling in the correct court, but such refiling never happened within
the permissible window. The Opposite Party chose to persist in the
wrong court and by the time this issue is being adjudicated, the delay
far exceeds what is condonable. Therefore, quite apart from the lack of
jurisdiction, the Section 34 petitions are plainly time-barred. The
District Judge’s refusal to reject the petitions on the ground of
limitation was a material illegality, as it amounted to entertaining a
time-barred challenge contrary to the statute.
VI. CONCLUSION:
23. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the learned District
Judge, Sundargarh lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Opposite
Party’s Section 34 petitions, owing to the arbitration’s seat being at
Cuttack and the mandate of Section 42 of the Act which tied all
subsequent proceedings to the court first approached. The attempted
reliance on a contract clause for Sundargarh and on cause-of-action
factors is unavailing in light of settled law giving primacy to the seat
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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 24-Jun-2025 16:53:36
of arbitration. Moreover, the petitions were filed beyond the period of
limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) and therefore could not have
been entertained on that ground as well.
24. Accordingly, the impugned order of the learned District Judge,
Sundargarh, which rejected the petitioner’s objections and assumed
jurisdiction, is unsustainable in law. It is hereby quashed. The
Section 34 petitions filed by the Opposite Party before the learned
District Judge, Sundargarh are held to be not maintainable for want of
jurisdiction and are liable to be dismissed as time-barred.
25. The Writ Petition is allowed with the above findings, leaving the
parties to pursue any remedy available in the proper forum at
Cuttack, subject of course to limitation.
26. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed.
27. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr.S.K. Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 20th June, 2025/
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