Chattisgarh High Court
Dhurendra Singh Raghav vs P.S. Chouhan on 24 June, 2025
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2025:CGHC:27124-DB
Digitally
signed by
NAFR
ARPAN
ARPAN SRIVASTAVA
SRIVASTAVA Date:
2025.06.24
17:13:12
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Reserved On 23/06/2025
Pronounced On 24/06/2025
REVP No. 20 of 2025
Dhurendra Singh Raghav, S/o Late Shri Surendra Singh Raghav, Aged
About 50 Years, R/o MIG 30, Sahyog Park, Mahavir Nagar, Ring Road,
Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner
versus
1 - P.S. Chouhan, S/o Late Shri D.S. Chouhan, Aged About 86 Years,
R/o Smriti Bhawan, Near Green Chowk, Behind Bharat Petrol Pump,
Station Road, Durg, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Sukhvir Singh Raghav, S/o Late Shri Surendra Singh Raghav, Aged
About 63 Years, R/o 5/6, Mahavir Nagar, Ring Road, Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Amrito Das, Advocate
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Jitendra Gupta, Advocate
D.B. : Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal
C A V Order
Per Sanjay S. Agrawal, J.
1. This review petition has been preferred by defendant No.2-
Dhurendra Singh Raghav, under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 read with Rule 19 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh
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Rules, 2007, seeking review of the judgment and decree dated
22.08.2023 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in First
Appeal No.83/2022. The parties shall be referred hereinafter as per the
description before the Trial Court.
2. A suit for recovery of an amount of Rs. 17,00,000/-(Rupees
Seventeen Lakh Only) along with the interest, was instituted by the
plaintiff/ Respondent No.1- P.S. Chouhan, alleging inter-alia, that since
the defendants were in need of money in order to facilitate their
business of seeds, a request was, therefore, made by them for the loan
amount of Rs.17,00,000/-(Rupees Seventeen Lakh Only). It was
pleaded by the plaintiff that since the alleged amount was not available
with him, therefore, he had pledged his FDR worth Rs.18,00,000/-
(Rupees Eighteen Lakh Only) and obtained the same from the bank
and, thereafter, advanced the alleged amount of Rs.17,00,000/-
(Rupees Seventeen Lakh Only) to the defendants by way of self
cheque, while endorsing the name of defendant No.2-Dhurendra Singh.
However, despite repeated requests being made, the same was not
repaid, therefore, he was constrained to institute the said claim.
3. In response, the defendants have denied to receive the alleged
amount by way of loan and, pleaded that, out of compassion and, for
helping the plaintiff, the alleged amount has been withdrawn from his
account at Durg.
4. The Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 05.03.2022,
passed in Civil Suit No.16-B/2015, has dismissed the plaintiff’s claim
holding that no loan amount as such was advanced by the plaintiff.
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5. The aforesaid judgment and decree was reversed by this Court
vide impugned judgment and decree in appeal preferred by the plaintiff
while taking note of the endorsement made in the name of defendant
No.2 in the alleged cheque (Ex.P-3C). The relevant observations made
at Paragraphs 11 and 13 to 15 read as under:-
“11. The endorsement in the cheque (Ex.P-3(c) would show
that it was endorsed in favour of the defendant No.2. It being
so the nature of endorsement would fall under Section 15 of
the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (In short “the Act of
1881”). This section purport that for the purpose of
negotiation, the instrument is endorsed by signing the
instrument and nature of the document would be the person
would be the holder in due course. The signature of the
defendant No.2 on the back side of the cheque is an
admitted fact, which was signed not in the capacity of
maker, but in the capacity of holder, which mean that
instrument was transferred with an intention for transferring
the right to other person for consideration. The holder
means a person, who hold the bill in a representative
capacity and the effect of such endorsement would be
transfer of the property to the transferee and all legal
incidents of such property would also stand transferred to
the transferee.
13. A perusal of Ex.P-3, which was a self cheque endorsed
in the name/favour of defendant No.2, certainly contains a
direction to pay specified person to the bank. A perusal of
the word in Ex.P-3 would reflect the intention of the parties
which shows pay self through Dhurendra Singh Raghav or
bearer of Rs.17 Lakhs. The endorsement in full made in the
cheque, which naturally authorize the defendant No.2 to
receive the amount form the bank.
14. The contention of the defendant No.2, who
accompanied the plaintiff to the bank that in order to help
him out to receive the money on the request of the plaintiff,
he travelled from Raipur to Durg and went along with him to
the bank and thereafter, after the money was received, it
was handed over to the plaintiff. This statement of fact when
evaluated with the statement of plaintiff that the defendant
was in hurry to get the amount and instead of A/c payee
cheque, asked for self cheque with endorsement appears to
be more probable. The statement of defendant that only to
4help the plaintiff to receive the amount from bank, he
travelled from Raipur to Durg and received the amount in
cash counter of bank and handed over to plaintiff, appears
only a self serving statement against human conduct. If the
plaintiff was capable enough to go to the bank, we don’t see
any sufficient reason that he will sit back only at the time of
receipt of cash and push the defendant No.2 to receive the
cash by making endorsement on the cheque under Section
16 of the Act of 1881. Therefore, the submission of the
plaintiff that though the documents have not been proved to
show that actually, the defendant No.2 was acting on behalf
of defendant No.1, who availed loan, the fact that the cash
received by the defendant No.2 from the bank can be
presumed on the basis of the preponderance of probability
by evaluating the documentary and oral statements and
conduct of the parties.
15. According to the plaintiff, an amount of Rs.17 Lakh was
given to the defendant No.2 by way of loan may not be
admitted, but the fact remains the liability of the person to
whom money is paid by mistake, the analogy can be drawn
from Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 that a
person to whom money has been paid, or anything
delivered by mistake, must repay or return and the same
can be applied in the facts of this case.”
6. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree, the
petitioner/ defendant No.2 had preferred a special leave petition before
Hon’ble the Supreme Court where the same was registered as Special
Leave Petition to Appeal (Civil) No.22787/2023, which was dismissed
on 06.11.2023 as the petitioner had withdrawn the same after arguing
the matter for some time. The said order reads as under:-
“1. After addressing some arguments, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner seeks leave to withdraw the
present petition with liberty to file an application before the
High Court pointing out the error that is purportedly crept
into the final para of the impugned judgment.
2. Leave as sought for, is granted.
3. The petition for special leave to appeal is, accordingly,
dismissed as withdrawn with liberty granted, as prayed for.”
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7. The aforesaid order was questioned by the petitioner in review,
being Review Petition (Civil) No.7201/2024, but the same was found to
be dismissed vide order dated 24.09.2024, which reads as under.
“1. Delay condoned.
2. Special Leave Petition (c) No.22787/2023 was dismissed
as withdrawn by this Court by an order dated 6 th November,
2023. The petitioner in the said special leave petition has
now applied for a review of the order dated 6 th November,
2023.
3. We have perused the review petition. Since learned
counsel for the petitioner sought withdrawal of the special
leave petition with liberty to apply before the High Court to
point out the error that purportedly crept into the final para
of the impugned judgment, and as such liberty was
granted, we are of the considered opinion that no case for
review has been set up.
4. The review petition is, therefore, dismissed.
5. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
8. After the dismissal of the special leave petition as well as the said
review petition, the instant review petition has been filed by the petitioner/
defendant No.2, while questioning the impugned judgment and decree
dated 22.08.2023 in First Appeal No.83/2022.
9. The said finding recorded by this Court has been assailed mainly on
the ground that the judgment and decree of the Trial court has been
reversed based upon the presumption drawn on the basis of Section 72 of
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as well as the provision prescribed under
Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. According to
the counsel appearing for the defendant No.2, the said presumption has
been drawn as the alleged self cheque was issued by the plaintiff while
endorsing the name of defendant No.2, but, the same has been drawn
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contrary to the pleadings made by the plaintiff. While referring to the
provision prescribed under Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, it
is contended further that the impugned judgment and decree has been
drawn while mis-interpretting the said provision and, therefore, the same
can be interfered in this review petition and, in support, the reliance has
been placed upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the
matter of Raja Shatrunji Vs. Mohammad Azmat Azim Khan, reported in
(1971) 2 SCC 200 and Ajit Kumar Rath Vs. State of Orissa and Others,
reported in (1999) 9 SCC 596.
10. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, while
supporting the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Co-ordinate
Bench of the Court, submits that the ground alleged herein is beyond the
scope of the review jurisdiction as there is no apparent mistake in the
impugned judgment and decree and, therefore, no interference is called
for and the petition, as framed, deserves to be dismissed.
11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and
perused the entire record carefully.
12. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case,
considering further the aforesaid contention of the parties, it appears that
the grounds raised herein are beyond the scope of review jurisdiction as
we do not find any error apparent on the face of the impugned judgment
and decree passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in view of the
elaborate observations made therein at Paragraphs 11 and 13 to 15. At
this juncture, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter
of Perry Kansagra v. Smriti Madan Kansagra reported in (2019) 20
SCC 753, are to be seen wherein, it was held at Para 17 as under:-
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“17. We have gone through both the judgments of the
High Court in the instant case and considered rival
submissions on the point. It is well settled that an error
which is required to be detected by a process of
reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on
the face of the record. To justify exercise of review
jurisdiction, the error must be self- evident. Tested on
this parameter, the exercise of jurisdiction in the present
case was not correct. The exercise undertaken in the
present case, in our considered view, was as if the High
Court was sitting in appeal over the earlier decision
dated 17.02.2017. Even assuming that there was no
correct appreciation of facts and law in the earlier
judgment, the parties could be left to challenge the
decision in an appeal. But the review was not a proper
remedy at all. In our view, the High Court erred in
entertaining the review petition and setting aside the
earlier view dated 17.02.2017.”
13. Insofar as the reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner in
the above-referred matters, the principles laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court are, however, distinguishable from the facts involved
herein, as the impugned judgment and decree has been drawn upon
due consideration of those provisions, i.e. the provisions prescribed
under Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as
well as, the provisions prescribed under Section 72 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872, therefore, under such circumstances, no reliance
could be placed upon it.
14. In view of the aforesaid background, the instant review petition
deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal)
Judge Judge
Arpan