Delhi High Court – Orders
Dinesh Kumar Sachdeva vs Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax … on 1 May, 2025
Author: Vibhu Bakhru
Bench: Vibhu Bakhru
$~78
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 5720/2025 & CM APPL. 26056-57/2025
DINESH KUMAR SACHDEVA
.....Petitioner
Through: Dr Kapil Goel and Mr Sandeep Goel,
Advocates.
versus
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME
TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE 15 DELHI
.....Respondent
Through: Mr Sanjay Kumar, SSC, Ms Monica
Benjamin and Ms Easha Kadian,
JSCs for the Revenue.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
ORDER
% 01.05.2025
1. Issue notice. The learned counsel for the respondent accepts notice.
2. The petitioner has filed the present petition, inter alia, impugning the
notice dated 28.03.2025 issued under Section 148 [the impugned notice] of
the Income Tax Act, 1961 [the Act] seeking to reopen the assessment in
respect of the Assessment Year [AY] 2015-16.
3. The petitioner’s case is that the impugned notice has been issued
beyond the period of the limitation.
4. In the present case, the petitioner had filed its return of income for the
AY 2015-16 on 28.09.2015 declaring the income of ₹29,74,570/-. The
impugned notice indicates that a search was conducted on 02.03.2022 under
Section 132 of the Act in case of Gaur Group and related entities. It is
alleged that during the course of the said search, incriminating information
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pertaining to the petitioner was found. Based on the said material, the
Assessing Officer [AO] issued the impugned notice on 28.03.2025.
5. Although the provisions of Section 153C of the Act are inapplicable
in respect of searches conducted after 31.03.2021, in view of the first
proviso to Section 149(1) of the Act, it is relevant to consider whether a
notice under Section 153C of the Act could be issued for the relevant AY
2015-16 for the purposes of determining whether a notice under Section 148
of the Act can be issued.
6. The controversy in the present case is covered by the decision of this
court in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central
Circle 20, Delhi & Ors.: Neutral Citation No.:2024:DHC:4554-DB, this
Court had considered a similar issue and observed as under:
“8. Undisputedly, and in terms of Section 153C(3) of
the Act, any search if conducted after 01 April 2021,
would cease to be regulated by that provision. Sub-
section (3), in that sense, embodies a sunset clause
insofar as the applicability of Section 153C is
concerned. The First Proviso to Section 149(1),
however, bids us to go back in a point of time, and to
examine whether a reopening would sustain bearing in
mind the timeframes as they stood embodied in Section
149(1)(b) or Section 153A and 153C, as the case may
be. The First Proviso essentially requires us to
undertake that consideration bearing in mind the
timeframes which stood specified in Sections 149,
153A and 153C as they stood prior to the
commencement of Finance Act, 2021.
9. Thus, an action of reassessment which comes to be
initiated in relation to a search undertaken on or after
01 April 2021 would have to meet the foundational
tests as specified in the First Proviso to Section 149(1).
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A reassessment action would thus have to not only
satisfy the time frames constructed in terms of Section
149, but in a relevant case and which is concerned with
a search, also those which would be applicable by
virtue of the provisions of Section 153A and 153C.
10. Undisputedly, and if the validity of the
reassessment were to be tested on the anvil of Section
153C, the petitioner would be entitled to succeed for
the following reasons. It is an undisputed fact that the
proceedings under Section 148 commenced on the
basis of the impugned notice dated 30 March 2023.
This date would be of seminal importance since the
period of six AYs’ or the “relevant assessment year”
would have to be reckoned from the date when action
was initiated to reopen the assessment pertaining to AY
2013-14.”
7. We also consider it apposite to refer to the decision in the case of
Principal Commissioner of Income Tax- Central-1 v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt.
Ltd.: Neutral Citation No.:2024:DHC:2629-DB, where this Court had
explained the manner for calculating the block of six years and ten years for
the purpose of computing the limitation for issuance of a notice under
Section 153C of the Act read with Section 153A of the Act as under:
“D. The First Proviso to Section 153C introduces a
legal fiction on the basis of which the commencement
date for computation of the six year or the ten year
block is deemed to be the date of receipt of books of
accounts by the jurisdictional AO. The identification of
the starting block for the purposes of computation of
the six and the ten year period is governed by the First
Proviso to Section 153C, which significantly shifts the
reference point spoken of in Section 153A(1), while
defining the point from which the period of the
“relevant assessment year” is to be calculated, to the
date of receipt of the books of accounts, documents or
assets seized by the jurisdictional AO of the non-
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searched person. The shift of the relevant date in the
case of a non-searched person being regulated by the
First Proviso of Section 153C (1) is an issue which is
no longer res integra and stands authoritatively settled
by virtue of the decisions of this Court in SSP Aviation
and RRJ Securities as well as the decision of the
Supreme Court in Jasjit Singh. The aforesaid legal
position also stood reiterated by the Supreme Court in
Vikram Sujitkumar Bhatia. The submission of the
respondents, therefore, that the block periods would
have to be reckoned with reference to the date of
search can neither be countenanced nor accepted.
E. The reckoning of the six AYs’ would require one to
firstly identify the FY in which the search was
undertaken and which would lead to the ascertainment
of the AY relevant to the previous year of search. The
block of six AYs’ would consequently be those which
immediately precede the AY relevant to the year of
search. In the case of a search assessment undertaken
in terms of Section 153C, the solitary distinction would
be that the previous year of search would stand
substituted by the date or the year in which the books
of accounts or documents and assets seized are handed
over to the jurisdictional AO as opposed to the year of
search which constitutes the basis for an assessment
under Section 153A.
F. While the identification and computation of the six
AYs’ hinges upon the phrase “immediately preceding
the assessment year relevant to the previous year” of
search, the ten year period would have to be reckoned
from the 31st day of March of the AY relevant to the
year of search. This, since undisputedly, Explanation 1
of Section 153A requires us to reckon it “from the end
of the assessment year”. This distinction would have to
necessarily be acknowledged in light of the statute
having consciously adopted the phraseology
“immediately preceding” when it be in relation to the
six year period and employing the expression “from theThis is a digitally signed order.
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end of the assessment year” while speaking of the ten
year block.”
8. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, the block of ten assessment
years is required to be reckoned from the end of the AY 2025-26 being the
assessment year relevant to the financial year in which the impugned notice
under Section 148 was issued. A tabular statement setting out the block of
ten years as set out in the petition is reproduced below:
Computation of the No. of
ten-year block period years
AY 2025-26 1
AY 2024-25 2
AY 2023-24 3
AY 2022-23 4
AY 2021-22 5
AY 2020-21 6
AY 2019-20 7
AY 2018-19 8
AY 2017-18 9
AY 2016-17 10
9. Concededly, the issue involved in the present case is covered by the
earlier decisions of this court in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner
of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others: Neutral Citation: 2024:
DHC:4554-DB, KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of
Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi : Neutral Citation : 2024:DHC:8214-
DB and Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central
Circle 3, Delhi & Anr.: Neutral Citation : 2025:DHC:157-DB.
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10. The learned counsel appearing for the Revenue concurs with the
aforesaid proposition.
11. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed. The impugned
notice is set aside as being barred by limitation.
12. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. The pending
application also stands disposed of.
VIBHU BAKHRU, J
TEJAS KARIA, J
MAY 01, 2025
M
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This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 26/06/2025 at 10:22:43