Chattisgarh High Court
Vijay Kumar Lanjewar vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 23 June, 2025
1
Digitally
REKHA signed by
2025:CGHC:26808
SINGH REKHA
SINGH
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 4980 of 2018
1 - Vijay Kumar Lanjewar S/o Shri Amrit Rao Lanjewar Aged About 61
Years Presently Post As Revenue Sub - Inspector At Municipal
Corporation Raipur Chhattisgarh. R/o Chandrashekhar Nagar, Ashwani
Nagar, In Front Of Goyal General Store, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Urban
Administration And Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya
Raipur, Po And P.S. Rakhi, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Municipal Corporation, Through Commissioner, Municipal Corporation
Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Pramod Rao Jadhav, S/o Shri Bhupat Rao, Aged About 44 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Mankuram Dhiwar, S/o Shri Bagas Ram Dhiwar Aged About 48 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 - Amar Nath Sahu S/o Shri Bise Lal Sahu, Aged About 47 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
6 - Vijay Kumar Sharma, S/o Keju Ram Sharma, Aged About 45 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
Along with
WPS No. 4994 of 2018
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1 – Jag Mohan Dhruw S/o Late Shri Sehdev Dhruw Aged About 58 Years
Presently Post As Revenue Sub Inspector At Municipal Corporation
Raipur Chhattisgarh, R/o Dudhdhari Temple Premises, Math Para,
Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary , Department Of Urban
Administration And Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan Naya
Raipur, Post Office And Police Station Rakhi, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2 – Municipal Corporation Through Commissioner, Municipal Corporation
Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 – Pramod Rao Jadhav S/o Shri Bhupat Rao , Aged About 44 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation , Raipur District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 – Mankuram Dhiwar S/o Shri Bagas Ram Dhiwar Aged About 48 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation , Raipur District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 – Amar Nath Sahu S/o Shri Bise Lal Sahu Aged About 47 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation , Raipur District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
6 – Vijay Kumar Sharma S/o Keju Ram Sharma Aged About 45 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation , Raipur District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
—- Respondents
For Petitioners : Mr. Ishan Verma, Advocate
For respective Respondents : Mr. Shubham Bajpayee, Panel Lawyer
and Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, Advocate
along with Ms. Swati Agrawal, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
23.06.2025
Heard.
1. The petitioners, who are retired Assistant Revenue Inspectors,
have filed these petitions claiming therein promotion to the post of
Revenue Inspector with effect from 29.06.2018, when their juniors
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were promoted to the said post.
2. Mr. Verma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would
submit that the petitioners were appointed to the post of
Muharrir/Tax Collector way back in the year 1975-77. They were
promoted to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspectors on
22.05.2008 and 21.04.2008, respectively. He would contend that a
policy decision was taken by the State Government to absorb the
services of the Panchayat Department with the Municipal
Department and consequently, the services of the Secretaries of
the Gram Panchayats were absorbed with the Municipal
Department and they were offered posting to the post of Assistant
Revenue Inspector. He would further contend that in the year
2018, a Departmental Promotion Committee was convened and
the private respondents, who were juniors to the petitioners were
promoted to the post of Revenue Inspectors vide order dated
29.06.2018. He would also submit that the Department has
assigned reasons for non-consideration of the names of the
petitioners to promotion to the post of Revenue Inspector that at
the relevant time, the petitioners did not have the requisite
qualification i.e. degree or diploma in computer application. He
would further argue that vide Notification dated 30.04.2014 issued
by the State Government, the requirement of degree or diploma in
computer application was relaxed for promotion. He would also
argue that there was no need for the petitioners to acquire such a
qualification. He would also contend that according to the
Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Appointment and Terms and
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Conditions of Service of Officers and Employees) Rules, 2018 (for
short ‘the Rules of 2018’), there is no requirement to acquire
expertise in computer application, therefore, the respondent
authorities committed an error of law in not considering the names
of the petitioners for promotion to the next higher post. It is also
contended by Mr. Verma though in the letter dated 03.10.2012, the
petitioners as well as other employees of the Corporation were
directed to acquire such a qualification but there was no such
condition in the promotion order. In support of his contentions, he
placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of State of Kerala and others Vs. E.K.
Bhaskaran Pillai, 2007 (6) SCC 524, Commissioner, Karnataka
Housing Board Vs. C. Muddaiah, 2007 (7) SCC 689 and Union
of India and others Vs. Krishna Kumar and others, 2019 (4)
SCC 319.
3. On the other hand, learned Advocates appearing for the
respondents would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Verma.
Mr. Agrawal would submit that the petitioners were promoted to the
post of Assistant Revenue Inspectors in the year 2008. He would
further submit that a notice dated 03.10.2012 was issued to all the
employees of the Municipal Corporation including the petitioners to
acquire a degree or diploma in computer application. Mr. Agrawal
would also submit that the petitioners and other employees were
granted two years period to acquire such a qualification but the
petitioners failed to acquire such qualification, therefore, their
names were not considered for promotion to the post of Revenue
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Inspectors though their names were at serial Nos.1 & 3 in the
seniority list.
4. Mr. Bajpayee, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State would
submit that the promotion order annexed along with WPS No.4994
of 2018 contains a condition to acquire a degree or diploma in
computer application.
5. It is also contended by Mr. Agrawal that with regard to extending
the relaxation to the petitioner, a recommendation was made by
the Municipal Corporation to the State Government and it was
turned down vide order dated 08.11.2017 on the ground that the
relaxation came into force in the year 2014 whereas the petitioners
were promoted in the year 2008 and at that time, the circular of
relaxation was not in existence. He would submit that the
petitioners have already got retired from services therefore they
cannot claim promotion from retrospective date. In support of his
contentions, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Government of West
Bengal and others Vs. Dr. Aman Satpathi and others, 2024
SCC Online SC 3512.
6. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the
documents placed on the record.
7. Initially, the petitioners were appointed to the post of Muharrir/Tax
Collector under the Municipal Corporation. The petitioners were
promoted to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspectors in the year
2008. One of the promotion orders would make it clear that a
degree or diploma in computer application was an essential
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qualification. Pursuant to the condition mentioned in the promotion
order, a notice was issued by the Municipal Corporation to its
employees to acquire such a qualification. It is not in dispute that
the petitioners could not acquire such a qualification till their
retirement.
8. The private respondents were absorbed according to the
Government Policy and undisputedly, they were employees of the
Panchayat Department.
9. With regard to the relaxation, a Notification was issued by the
State Government dated 30.04.2014 whereby the requirement of
computer qualification was relaxed. The petitioners were promoted
to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspectors in the months of April
and May of 2008 and in the promotion order, one of the conditions
was to acquire a degree or diploma in computer application and in
this regard, a notice was issued to all the employees of
Corporation. The petitioners could not acquire such a qualification
and the recommendation made by the Corporation for relaxation
pursuant to the Notification dated 30.04.2014 was turned down by
the State Government, thus, the knowledge of computer or degree
or diploma in computer application was an essential qualification
for the post of Assistant Revenue Inspector and the petitioners
could not acquire it.
10.A DPC was convened in the year 2018 and the names of the
private respondents and other deserving candidates were
considered by the Committee for promotion to the post of Revenue
Inspectors but the names of the petitioners were not considered as
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they did not have the requisite qualification.
11.The contention made by Mr. Verma that in the year 2018, the
essential qualification for the post of Revenue Inspector was
modified by the State Government vide Notification dated
16.01.2018 but it cannot be accepted because the petitioners did
not have the requisite qualification i.e. a degree or diploma in the
computer application for the post of Assistant Revenue Inspectors,
therefore, they have no right to claim promotion to the next higher
post. Admittedly, the petitioners have already retired from services.
12. In the matter of E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in paras 4 & 5 held as under:-
“4. Learned counsel for the State has submitted
that grant of retrospective benefit on promotional
post cannot be given to the incumbent when he
has not worked on the said post. Therefore, he is
not entitled to any benefit on the promotional post
from 15.6.1972. In support thereof, the learned
counsel invited our attention to the decisions of this
Court in Paluru Ramkrishnaiah & Ors. Vs. Union of
India & Anr. [(1989) 2 SCC 541], Virender Kumar,
G.M., Northern Railways Vs. Avinash Chandra
Chadha & Ors.[ (1990) 3 SCC 472] , State of
Haryana & Ors. Vs. O.P. Gupta & Ors. [ (1996) 7
SCC 533], A.K. Soumini Vs. State Bank of
Travancore & Anr.[ (2003) 7 SCC 238] and Union
of India & Anr. Vs. Tarsem Lal & Ors. [ (2006) 10
SCC 145]. As against this, the learned counsel for
the respondent has invited our attention to the
decisions given by this Court in Union of India &
Ors. Vs. K.V. Jankiraman & Ors.[ (1991) 4 SCC
109], State of A.P. Vs. K.V.L. Narasimha Rao &
Ors.[ (1999) 4 SCC 181], Vasant Rao Roman Vs.
Union of India & Ors. [1993 Supp. (2) SCC 324]
and State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Vinod Kumar
Srivastava [(2006) 9 SCC 621]. We have
considered the decisions cited on behalf of both
the sides. So far as the situation with regard to
monetary benefits with retrospective promotion is
concerned, that depends upon case to case. There
are various facets which have to be considered.
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Sometimes in a case of departmental enquiry or in
criminal case it depends on the authorities to grant
full back wages or 50 per cent of back wages
looking to the nature of delinquency involved in the
matter or in criminal cases where the incumbent
has been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt or full
acquittal. Sometimes in the matter when the
person is superseded and he has challenged the
same before Court or Tribunal and he succeeds in
that and direction is given for reconsideration of his
case from the date persons junior to him were
appointed, in that case the Court may grant
sometime full benefits with retrospective effect and
sometimes it may not. Particularly when the
administration has wrongly denied his due then in
that case he should be given full benefits including
monetary benefit subject to there being any
change in law or some other supervening factors.
However, it is very difficult to set down any hard
and fast rule. The principle ‘no work no pay’ cannot
be accepted as a rule of thumb. There are
exceptions where courts have granted monetary
benefits also.
5. However, so far as present case is concerned, as
per directions given by the Court, petitioner’s case
was considered and it was found that persons junior
to him were appointed and he was wrongly denied.
Therefore, the petitioner was promoted from
retrospective effect i.e. 15.9.1961 but he was not
paid the benefit of promotion in terms of arrears of
salary. Therefore, he approached the Court and
learned Single Judge did not give him the monetary
benefit of the promotional post from retrospective
effect in terms of arrears of salary. In the review
application, the benefit was given from the date he
filed O.P. No. 585 of 1975 i.e. 15.6.1972. This
appears to be reasonable. The petitioner did not
approach the Court for the back wages from
15.9.1961 but he filed a petition dated 15.6.1972
and the Court granted the benefit from the date of
filing of the petition before the Court i.e. 15.6.1972.
The incumbent in the meanwhile has retired on
31.7.1980. Therefore, looking to the facts and
circumstances of the case, the view taken by the
High Court appears to be justified and there is no
ground to interfere in it.”
13. In the matter of C. Muddaiah (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in para 34 held as under:-
“34.We are conscious and mindful that even in absence
9of statutory provision, normal rule is ‘no work no pay’. In
appropriate cases, however, a Court of Law may, nay
must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and
pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The
Court, in a given case, may hold that the person was
willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not
allowed to do so. The Court may in the circumstances,
direct the Authority to grant him all benefits considering
‘as if he had worked’. It, therefore, cannot be contended
as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of
payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a
Court of Law and if such directions are issued by a
Court, the Authority can ignore them even if they had
been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country
(as has been done in the present case). The bald
contention of the appellant-Board, therefore, has no
substance and must be rejected.”
14. The petitioners could not establish the fact that they were eligible
for promotion to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspector and they
acquired the eligibility requirement. The DPC in the year 2018 was
convened according to old service Rules. The petitioners failed to
establish that they have requisite qualification according to the
service Rules on the date of consideration.
15. In the matter of Krishna Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in paras 11,12 & 13 held as under:-
“11. In Deepak Agarwal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2011
(6) SCC 725, this Court observed thus:
“26. It is by now a settled proposition of law
that a candidate has the right to be
considered in the light of the existing rules,
which implies the `rules in force’ on the date
the consideration took place. There is no rule
of universal or absolute application that
vacancies are to be filled invariably by the
law existing on the date when the vacancy
arises. The requirement of filling up old
vacancies under the old rules is interlinked
with the candidate having acquired a right to
be considered for promotion. The right to be
considered for promotion accrues on the date
of consideration of the eligible candidates. 3
(2011) 6 SCC 725 Unless, of course, the
applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah‘s case
(supra) lays down any particular time frame,
-10-within which the selection process is to be
completed. In the present case, consideration
for promotion took place after the amendment
came into operation. Thus, it cannot be
accepted that any accrued or vested right of
the appellants have been taken away by the
amendment.
27. The judgments cited by learned counsel
for the appellants namely B.L. Gupta Vs.
MCD (supra), P. Ganeshwar Rao Vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh (supra) and N.T. Devin Katti
& Ors. Vs. Karnataka Public Service
Commission & Ors (supra) are reiterations of
a principle laid down in Y.V. Rangaiah‘s case
(supra).”
12. Recently, in State of Tripura Vs. Nikhil Ranjan
Chakraborty, 2017 (3) SCC 646, another two-Judge
Bench of this Court held thus:
“9. The law is thus clear that a candidate has
the right to be considered in the light of the
existing rules, namely, “rules in force on the
date” the consideration takes place and that
there is no rule of absolute application that
vacancies must invariably be filled by the law
4 (2017) 3 SCC 646 existing on the date
when they arose. As against the case of total
exclusion and absolute deprivation of a
chance to be considered as in the case of
Deepak Agarwal (supra), in the instant case
certain additional posts have been included
in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the
zone of consideration. It is not as if the writ
petitioners or similarly situated candidates
were totally excluded. At best, they now had
to compete with some more candidates. In
any case, since there was no accrued right
nor was there any mandate that vacancies
must be filled invariably by the law existing
on the date when the vacancy arose, the
State was well within its rights to stipulate
that the vacancies be filled in accordance
with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the
process to amend the Rules had also begun
well before the Notification dated
24.11.2011.”
13. In view of this statement of the law, it is evident that
once the structure of Assam Rifles underwent a change
following the creation of the intermediate post of Warrant
Officer, persons holding the post of Havildar would be
considered for promotion to the post of Warrant Officer.
The intermediate post of Warrant Officer was created as a
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result of the restructuring exercise. The High Court was, in
our view, in error in postulating that vacancies which
arose prior to the amendment of the Recruitment Rules
would necessarily be governed by the Rules which
existed at the time of the occurrence of the vacancies. As
the decided cases noted earlier indicate, there is no such
rule of absolute or universal application. The entire basis
of the decision of the High Court was that those who were
recruited prior to the restructuring exercise and were
holding the post of Havildars had acquired a vested right
of promotion to the post of Naib Subedar. This does not
reflect the correct position in law. The right is to be
considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules as
they exist when the exercise is carried out for promotion.”
16.It is a well settled principle of law that a government servant has a
right to be considered for promotion strictly in accordance with the
existing rules. The petitioners were not having requisite
qualification of computer education for promotion to the post of
Assistant Revenue Inspector, therefore they have no right to claim
promotion to the next higher post.
17. In the matter of Dr. Amal Satpathi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has categorically held that the claim of the Government
Servant with regard to promotion cannot be considered after
retirement, in paragraphs 15 & 19, as under:-
“15. The primary question that arises for our consideration
in the present appeal is whether respondent No.1, who was
recommended for the promotion before his retirement but
did not receive actual promotion to the higher post due to
administrative delays, is entitled to notional financial benefits
of the promotional post after his retirement?
19. It is a well settled principle that promotion becomes
effective from the date it is granted, rather than from the
date a vacancy arises or the post is created. While the
Courts have recognized the right to be considered for
promotion as not only a statutory right but also a
fundamental right, there is no fundamental right to the
promotion itself. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to a
recent decision of this Court in the case of Bihar State
Electricity Board and Others v. Dharamdeo Das, 2024
SCC Online SC 1768, wherein it was observed as follows:-
“18. It is no longer res integra that a promotion is
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effective from the date it is granted and not from the
date when a vacancy occurs on the subject post or
when the post itself is created. No doubt, a right to be
considered for promotion has been treated by courts not
just as a statutory right but as a fundamental right, at the
same time, there is no fundamental right to promotion
itself. In this context, we may profitably cite a recent
decision in Ajay Kumar Shukla v. Arvind Rai, (2022)
12 SCC 579 where, citing earlier precedents in Director,
Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Pravat Kiran
Mohanty, (1991) 2 SCC 295 and Ajit Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1999) 7 scc 209, a three-Judge Bench
observed thus:
41. This Court, time and again, has laid emphasis on
right to be considered for promotion to be a
fundamental right, as was held by K. Ramaswamy,
J., in Director, Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. v. Pravat
Kiran Mohanty in para 4 of the report which is
reproduced below:
‘4……. There is no fundamental right to
promotion, but an employee has only right to be
considered for promotion, when it arises, in
accordance with relevant rules. From this
perspective in our view the conclusion of the High
Court that the gradation list prepared by the
corporation is in violation of the right of
respondent-writ petitioner to equality enshrined
under Article 14 read with Article 16 of the
Constitution, and the respondent-writ petitioner
was unjustly denied of the same is obviously
unjustified.’
42. A Constitution Bench in Ajit Singh v. State of
Punjab, laying emphasis on Article 14 and Article
16(1) of the Constitution of India held that if a person
who satisfies the eligibility and the criteria for
promotion but still is not considered for promotion,
then there will be clear violation of his/her’s
fundamental right. Jagannadha Rao, J. speaking for
himself and Anand, C.J., Venkataswami, Pattanaik,
Kurdukar, JJ., observed the same as follows in
paras 22 and 27:
‘Articles 14 and 16(1) : is right to be considered for
promotion a fundamental right
22. Article 14 and Article 16(1) are closely
connected. They deal with individual rights of the
person. Article 14 demands that the ‘State shall not
deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws’. Article 16(1) issues a
positive command that:
‘there shall be equality of opportunity for all
citizens in matters relating to employment or
13appointment to any office under the State’.
18. It has been held repeatedly by this Court that
clause (1) of Article 16 is a facet of Article 14 and
that it takes its roots from Article 14. The said clause
particularises the generality in Article 14 and
identifies, in a constitutional sense “equality of
opportunity” in matters of employment and
appointment to any office under the State. The word
“employment” being wider, there is no dispute that it
takes within its fold, the aspect of promotions to
posts above the stage of initial level of recruitment.
Article 16 (1) provides to every employee otherwise
eligible for promotion or who comes within the zone
of consideration, a fundamental right to be
“considered” for promotion. Equal opportunity here
means the right to be “considered” for promotion. If a
person satisfies the eligibility and zone criteria but is
not considered for promotion, then there will be a
clear infraction of his fundamental right to be
“considered” for promotion, which is his personal
right. “Promotion” based on equal opportunity and
seniority attached to such promotion are facets of
fundamental right under Article 16(1).
19. * * *
27. In our opinion, the above view expressed in
Ashok Kumar Gupta [Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of
U.P., (1997) 5 SCC 201, and followed in Jagdish
Lal [Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6
SCC 538, and other cases, if it is intended to lay
down that the right guaranteed to employees for
being “considered” for promotion according to
relevant rules of recruitment by promotion (i.e.
whether on the basis of seniority or merit) is only a
statutory right and not a fundamental right, we
cannot accept the proposition. We have already
stated earlier that the right to equal opportunity in
the matter of promotion in the sense of a right to be
“considered” for promotion is indeed a fundamental
right guaranteed under Article 16(1) and this has
never been doubted in any other case before Ashok
Kumar Gupta [Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of
U.P.], right from 1950.’
“20. In State of Bihar v. Akhouri Sachindra Nath,
1991 Supp (1) SCC 334, it was held that
retrospective seniority cannot be given to an
employee from a date when he was not even borne
in the cadre, nor can seniority be given with
retrospective effect as that might adversely affect
others. The same view was reiterated in Keshav
Chandra Joshi v. Union of India, reported 1992
Supp (1) SCC 272, where it was held that when a
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quota is provided for, then the seniority of the
employee would be reckoned from the date when
the vacancy arises in the quota and not from any
anterior date of promotion or subsequent date of
confirmation. The said view was restated in
Uttaranchal Forest Rangers’ Assn. (Direct
Recruit) v. State of U.P, (2006) 10 SCC 346, in the
following words:
37. We are also of the view that no retrospective
promotion or seniority can be granted from a date
when an employee has not even been borne in the
cadre so as to adversely affect the direct recruits
appointed validly in the meantime, as decided by
this Court in Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of
India held that when promotion is outside the quota,
seniority would be reckoned from the date of the
vacancy within the quota rendering the previous
service fortuitous. The previous promotion would be
regular only from the date of the vacancy within the
quota and seniority shall be counted from that date
and not from the date of his earlier promotion or
subsequent confirmation. In order to do justice to the
promotes, it would not be proper to do injustice to
the direct recruits……
38. This Court has consistently held that no
retrospective promotion can be granted nor can any
seniority be given on retrospective basis from a date
when an employee has not even been borne in the
cadre particularly when this would adversely affect
the direct recruits who have been appointed validity
in the meantime.” (emphasis supplied)”
20.Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dr. Amal
Sathpathi (supra), in my opinion, no case is made out for
interference.
21.Thus, both petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. No cost(s).
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
Rekha