Chattisgarh High Court
Chandrapal Singh Kanwar vs Manajul Quaraishi on 24 June, 2025
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2025:CGHC:27288
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MAC No. 211 of 2021
1 - Chandrapal Singh Kanwar S/o Maghansing Kanwar, Aged About 30 Years
R/o Village Chunchuni, Nevra Basti, Kusmunda, P.S. Kusmunda, Tahsil
Digitally
REKHA signed by
Katghora, District Korba Chhattisgarh
SINGH REKHA
SINGH ... Appellant
versus
1 - Manajul Quaraishi S/o Azaz Dehati, Aged About 27 Years R/o Infront Of
Mission School, Ward No. 01 Ratakhar, Korba, Tahsil And District Korba
Chhattisgarh
2 - Prafull Tiwari S/o B.L. Tiwari, Hig- 3 Nehru Nagar, Korba, Tahsil And
District Korba Chhattisgarh
3 - National Insurance Company Ltd. 13 Meenu Complex Main Road,
Kosabadi Korba Tahsil And District Korba Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant/Claimant : Mr. Utkarsh Patel, Advocate holding the
brief of Mr. P. K. Patel, Advocate
For Respondent No.2 Mr. Rishikesh Sharma, Advocate holding
the brief of Mr. Vikas Pandey, Advocate
For Respondent No. 3 : Mr. Praveen Kumar Tulsyan, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Judgment On Board
24-06-2025
1) Heard on I.A. No. 01/2021, an application for condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
2) The appellant/claimant/injured has filed this appeal assailing the award
dated 18.11.2008 passed in Claim Case No.335/2007 by the learned
Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora, District Korba
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(C.G.), whereby compensation of Rs.2,52,000/- has been awarded with
interest @ 8 % p.a. from the date of filing of the claim application till its
realization.
3) The facts of the present case are that on 29.03.2007, when the
appellant was going by his motorcycle from his home, all of a sudden,
respondent No.1/driver of the offending vehicle bearing registration
No.C.G.12D/6002 dashed the motorcycle of the appellant/claimant at
Near Dumarkachhar by driving the vehicle rashly and negligently and
consequently, the appellant sustained grievous injuries over his head
and legs.
4) The learned Tribunal after appreciating the documentary and oral
evidence awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,52,000/- with
interest @ 8% p.a. to the claimant/injured.
5) With regard to the application for condonation of delay, the learned
counsel for the appellant/claimant/injured would submit that there is a
delay of 4053 days in filing the instant appeal. He would contend that
the appellant was not aware of the pending proceedings of the claim
case and the law of limitation and when he approached the local
counsel, he advised him to file Misc. Appeal. Thereafter, he managed
funds to file the appeal. He further submits that the appellant could not
file the instant appeal within the stipulated period owing to the Covid-19
outbreak.
6) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance
Company submits that there is an inordinate delay of 4053 days in
filing the instant appeal, therefore, this appeal deserves to be
dismissed on the ground of delay.
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7) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents.
8) Admittedly, the award was passed on 18.11.2008 and this appeal was
preferred on 25.03.2021. In the application for condonation of delay,
the appellant/claimant/injured has stated that he was not aware of the
proceedings and the law of limitation. It is further stated that he
approached the local counsel and thereafter filed an appeal. The plea
of Covid-19 outburst has also been taken. Prior to March, 2020, there
was no COVID-19 outburst and admittedly the award was passed on
18.11.2008, whereas the appeal was preferred on 25.03.2021. A
perusal of the application moved by the appellant under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act would show that the appellant failed to explain the
delay of 4053 days properly.
9) Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba
Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector
(LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024
INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11,
the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were
considered and it was observed thus:-
“10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake
of convenience, is reproduced herein-below:
3. Bar of limitation. – (1) Subject to the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made
after the prescribed period shall be dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a
defence.
11.Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about
suit, appeal and application but since in this case
we are concerned with appeal, we would
hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in
context with the limitation, it being barred by time,
4if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be
condoned.”
10) The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of
Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which
are reproduced herein-below:-
“19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap
Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had
been held that the court cannot grant an exemption
from limitation on equitable consideration or on the
ground of hardship. The court has time and again
repeated that when mandatory provision is not
complied with and delay is not properly,
satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought
not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds
alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to
Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana
and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while
observing, as above, this Court further laid down
that if some person has obtained a relief
approaching the court just or immediately when the
cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot
take the benefit of the same by approaching the
court at a belated stage simply on the ground of
parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC
363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory
explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed
the applications for condonation of delay, this Court
held that the High Court failed to exercise its
discretion in a reasonable and objective manner.
High Court should have exercised the discretion in
a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal
approach in considering sufficiency of cause for
delay should not be allowed to override substantial
law of limitation. The Court observed that the
concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-
oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot
be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of
Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani &
Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case
cannot be considered while dealing with the
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application for condonation of delay in filing the
appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14
SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously
based upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally
interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fide is writ large. It was also observed that even
though limitation may harshly affect rights of the
parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as
prescribed under the statute as the courts have no
choice but to apply the law as it stands and they
have no power to condone the delay on equitable
grounds.”
11) In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati
Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the
above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:-
“26. On a harmonious consideration of the
provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the
law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public
policy that there should be an end to
litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy
rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time
must come to an end or cease to exist
after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act
have to be construed differently, such as
Section 3 has to be construed in a strict
sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice,
though liberal approach, justice-oriented
approach or cause of substantial justice
may be kept in mind but the same cannot
be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the
Limitation Act;
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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise
discretion to condone the delay if sufficient
cause had been explained, but that
exercise of power is discretionary in nature
and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is established for various factors
such as, where there is inordinate delay,
negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in
similar matter, it does not mean that others
are also entitled to the same benefit if the
court is not satisfied with the cause shown
for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to
be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to
be decided on the parameters laid down
for condoning the delay and condoning the
delay for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to
disregarding the statutory provision.”
12) In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the
delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of
the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case
for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is
reproduced herein-below:-
“30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut
any ice as imposition of conditions are not
warranted when sufficient cause has not
been shown for condoning the delay.
Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned
merely because some persons have been
granted relief on the facts of their own case.
Condonation of delay in such circumstances
is in violation of the legislative intent or the
express provision of the statute. Condoning
of the delay merely for the reason that the
claimants have been deprived of the interest
for the delay without holding that they had
made out a case for condoning the delay is
not a correct approach, particularly when
both the above decisions have been
rendered in ignorance of the earlier
7pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj
(supra).”
13) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy
(supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-
oriented approach’ and ’cause for the advancement of substantial
justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to
allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived
and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
14) Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba
Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the application for
condonation of delay is liable to be and is hereby rejected.
15) Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost(s).
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
JUDGE
Rekha
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