Delhi High Court – Orders
Rupika Sharma vs The State Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Ors on 27 May, 2025
Author: Sanjeev Narula
Bench: Sanjeev Narula
$~70
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 3796/2025 & CRL.M.A. 16608/2025, CRL.M.A.
16609/2025
RUPIKA SHARMA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Arun Baali, Ms. Arisha Ahmad
and Mr. Vaibhav Kapoor, Advocates.
versus
THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Hemant Mehla, APP for State.
SI Anup Rana, PS: Hari Nagar.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
ORDER
% 27.05.2025
1. The present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 20231 (corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 19732) is directed against the order dated 07th May, 2025 passed
by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, West District, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi. By the impugned order, the Appellate Court dismissed Criminal
Appeal No. 181/2024, filed by the Petitioner under Section 29 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 20053, on the grounds of
maintainability.
2. The said appeal arose from an interim direction issued by the Mahila
Court on 2nd May, 2024, whereby the Petitioner was directed to furnish her
bank statements and salary slips for the preceding one year, along with an
1
“BNSS”
2
“CrPC”
CRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 1 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50
affidavit affirming that she had not received any benefit under the LIC
policy of her deceased husband. The Sessions Court, while dismissing the
appeal, took the view that the order in question was purely interlocutory in
nature and did not adjudicate upon any substantive rights of the parties.
Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that no appeal under Section 29 of the
DV Act would lie against such an order. Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner
has approached this Court by invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section
528 of BNSS (earlier Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.).
3. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the Petitioner, it is
apposite to take note of the following facts, as narrated by the Petitioner:
3.1 The Petitioner got married to Late Sh. Neeraj Sharma on 22 nd
November, 2009 as per Hindu rites and customs in Delhi. From this
marriage, a male child was born on 14th January, 2012.
3.2 In 2013, the Petitioner and her son were allegedly evicted from the
matrimonial home by her husband and Respondents No. 2 and 3 (mother-in-
law and brother-in-law). Since then, the Petitioner and her son have been
living separately.
3.3 Subsequently, the Petitioner filed an application under Section 12 read
with Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the DV Act against her husband and her
in-laws. However, during the pendency of the said proceedings, Sh. Neeraj
Sharma deceased on 3rd February, 2017.
3.4 Following her husband’s demise, Respondents No. 2 and 3 began
allegedly withdrawing substantial amounts from his bank accounts and
misappropriating his movable and immovable assets, thereby depriving both
the Petitioner and her minor son of their rightful entitlements.
3
“DV Act”
CRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 2 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50
3.5 The Petitioner and her son reside in a modest two-bedroom apartment
along with her mother, and given the pressing need for adequate space for
her son’s upbringing, she moved an application under Section 19 of the DV
Act, seeking either equivalent alternate accommodation to what she and her
son previously enjoyed in the shared household, or, in the alternative,
payment of rent commensurate with the same.
3.6 While considering the said application, the Mahila Court by order
dated 2nd May, 2024, directed the Petitioner to produce her salary slips, bank
account statements and an affidavit confirming whether she had received
any proceeds from her deceased husband’s life insurance policy.
3.7 Aggrieved by the said interim direction, the Petitioner preferred an
appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge, which was dismissed on the
ground of maintainability, resulting in the present petition.
4. Mr. Arun Baali, counsel for Petitioner raises the following
contentions for assailing the impugned order:
4.1 Both the Mahila Court and the Appellate Court failed to appreciate
that the Petitioner had not sought any monetary relief, and as such, there was
no compelling basis to direct disclosure of her salary slips, bank statements,
or other personal financial information. The impugned direction lacks any
nexus with the relief actually sought by the Petitioner.
4.2 The legislative intention underlying Section 19 of the DV Act, is to
safeguard a woman’s right to reside in the shared household, or to secure
alternate accommodation. In the absence of any claim under Sections 20
(monetary relief) or 22 (compensation), financial disclosures, particularly of
the aggrieved party are irrelevant and legally unwarranted.
4.3 The impugned direction compelling the Petitioner to divulge personalCRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 3 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50
financial details, without demonstrating any material relevance to the
adjudication of her claim, amounts to a disproportionate intrusion into her
right to privacy, as protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It
is thus urged that such an order cannot be characterised as merely procedural
or interlocutory in nature, since it directly impinges upon a fundamental
right. On this basis, the Petitioner contends that the Sessions Court erred in
declining to entertain the appeal on the ground of maintainability.
Analysis
5. The Court has considered the aforenoted contentions but remains
unpersuaded. The order of the Mahila Court dated 02nd May, 2024, which
was under challenge before the Appellate Court reads as follows:
“Previous cost paid by respondents.
Part arguments heard from both parties on the application of
petitioner u/s 19 DV Act.
Petitioner is directed to file her salary slip as well as bank account
statement of last one year and also file an affidavit to the effect that she has
not received a sum of Rs.75 Lakh from LIC being. nominee of resp. No. 1
(since deceased) on or before NDOH with advance copy to opposite party.
Put up for further arguments on the application of petitioner u/s 19
DV Act on 19.07.2024.”
6. In appeal, the Sessions Court passed the following impugned order:
“Arguments addressed on behalf of appellant
2. Assailing the impugned order, Ld. Counsel for the appellant
submitted that Ld. Trial Court passed the impugned order beyond the scope
and requirements which are necessary to adjudicate the application under
Section 19 of the Act and directed the appellant to produce her bank slips
and bank statement to adjudicate whether she is entitle for an alternate
accommodation or not; that Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the
appellant/complainant only sought residential right and not maintenance;
that in the absence of any maintenance being claimed from the respondent,
Ld. Court erred in summoning the salary slips and bank statement of the
appellant/complainant which is perverse, irrational and unrelated to her
prayer made in the application under Section 19 of the Act; that Ld. Trial
Court failed to appreciate that the appellant/complainant cannot beCRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 4 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50
compelled by way of judicial orders to submit her personal information in
the absence of any core issue and even otherwise the said documents has no
role whatsoever in deciding the application under Section 19 of the Act,
hence, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
3. To buttress his arguments, on wrong provision if any quoted for
seeking relief, Ld. Counsel for the appellant/complainant has placed
reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in CM
(M) No. 2342/2024 titled as Rajeev Shukla Vs. Gopal Krishna Shukla,
wherein it has been held that:
“12. It is apparent that application for condonation of
delay filed by the petitioner has been dismissed merely on the
ground that it was filed under Section 151 CPC and not under
the Limitation Act, 1963. The trial court has not addressed the
application on merits. Mentioning wrong Section of law in an
application by a party is typically not considered “Fatal” to the
case, provided the substance of the application is clear and no
prejudice is caused to the opposite party of the court. The courts
generally prioritize substance over form, especially if the
intention and relief sought by the party are apparent. If
incorrect Section does not mislead the court or the other party
and no prejudice is caused, the mistake is treated as a “curable
defect”. The trial court should have focussed on the content of
the application rather than the technicalities of citing the
incorrect Section. Procedural errors, including mentioning
incorrect provision of law should not override the substantive
justice. The Court has enough powers under Section 151 CPC to
ensure that justice is served. The trial court underscored that it
is a substance of the application that matters and not a form or
the specific provision and should have considered the
application on the merits regardless of respective provision
under which the same was filed.”
Arguments addressed on behalf of respondents
4. Per contra, Ld. for respondents supporting the Impugned Order
argued that there is no infirmity and illegality done by the Ld. Trial Court
and has rightly passed the order which is an interlocutory order as no right
interim or otherwise of the parties has been decided, hence, no interference
is required by this Court. He further argued that the present appeal is
nothing but sheer abuse of process of law and has been devised as a tool to
not only harass the respondents but also for unjust enrichment.
Relevant portion of the Impugned Order
7. The Court heard the arguments as advanced by Ld. Counsel for
both the patties and have gone through the material available on record
including the Trial Court Record.
CRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 5 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50
8. Before proceeding further, the Court finds it appropriate to discuss
the relevant portion of the impugned order, whereby the Ld. Trial Court
directed the appellant/complainant to file her salary slip as well as bank
account statement and an affidavit, which reads as under:
“Part arguments heard from both parties on the
application of petitioner u/s. 19 DV Act.
Petitioner is directed to file her salary slip as well as bank
account statement of last one year and also file an affidavit to
the effect that she has not received a sum of Rs.75 Lakh from
LIC being nominee of resp. No. 1 (since deceased) on or before
NDOH with advance copy to opposite party.”
Analysis and Observation
11. The present appeal has been filed under Section 29 of DV Act.
Appellant/complainant has filed an application under Section 19 of DV Act
seeking alternate accommodation or rent for the same. Section 19 of the Act
deals with residence order to ensure the safety and well-being of aggrieved
person by preventing the respondent from interfering with her residence.
12. The matter is herein the maintainability of the present appeal
against the impugned order. Therefore, the Court deems it appropriate to
first discuss the law on the point. In general parlance, if any order passed
by Trial Court decides any question between the parties which directly
affects the decision in the main case or which finally decides any collateral
issue in perpetuity, it would be a judgment or order which is appealable but
if an order, though deciding an issue between the parties finally, is
temporary and interim and has no bearing or effect on the rights of the
parties or the main issue involved in the case, it would fall within the
parameters of an interlocutory order.
13. However, an appeal can be filed against an interlocutory order in
a Domestic Violence (DV) matter, but it’s not always straightforward
Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005,
allows for appeals against orders made under the Act, including interim
orders passed by a Magistrate. But, the interlocutory orders which don’t
affect the substantive rights of the parties may not be appealable under this
Section. The present case is one such cases since the order assailed herein
is only for calling the salary slip, bank account statement and affidavit
regarding receipt of LIC amount by the aggrieved in order to decide her
claim for residence/alternate accommodation etc.
Conclusion
14. The Court has not decided the substantial right of the parties as
an interim measure or finally and has only directed to file documents to
assess the financial status before providing any relief to the aggrieved.
Hence. this Court is of the view that the impugned order being totally
interlocutory in nature, as it has not decided any right of the party yet
CRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 6 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50
since the application is still to be adjudicated upon, the present appeal is
not maintainable.
15. In view of aforesaid discussion, the present appeal is hereby
dismissed being not maintainable and accordingly disposed of.
16. The Trial Court Record along with the copy of this order be sent
back to the learned Trial Court.
17. The file of this appeal be consigned to record room after due
compliance.”
[Emphasis supplied]
7. As is evident from the Mahila Court’s order dated 2 nd May, 2024, the
Petitioner was directed to furnish salary slips and bank statements for the
preceding year, as well as file an affidavit clarifying whether she had
received ₹75 lakhs as nominee under her deceased husband’s LIC policy.
These directions were issued in the context of adjudicating her claim under
Section 19 of the DV Act for alternate accommodation or equivalent rental
support.
8. The submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioner, that disclosure
of her salary slips, bank statements, or personal financial information was
unnecessary for adjudication under Section 19 of the DV Act, in the
considered view of this Court, is untenable. Section 19 of the DV Act
empowers the Magistrate to issue various forms of residence orders upon
satisfaction that domestic violence has occurred. The reliefs contemplated
under sub-section (1) of Section 19, empower the Court to direct the
respondent to secure for the aggrieved person an alternate accommodation
equivalent to the shared household, or to pay rent in lieu thereof [clause (f)].
For the sake of convivence Section 19 of the DV Act is extracted below:
“Section 19 – Residence orders.
(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12,
the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken
place, pass a residence order–
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other
CRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 7 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50
manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the
shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or
equitable interest in the shared household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared
household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering
any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person
resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the
shared household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the
shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate
accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the
shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the
circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any
person who is a woman,
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass any
other direction which he may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to
provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any child of such
aggrieved person.
(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond,
with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic
violence.
(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an order under
Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and
shall be dealt with accordingly.
(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-
section (3), the court may also pass an order directing the officer in
charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved
person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf
in the implementation of the order.
(6) While making an order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may
impose on the respondent obligations relating to the discharge of rent
and other payments, having regard to the financial needs and resources
of the parties.
(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the police station in
whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the
implementation of the protection order.
(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the possession of
the aggrieved person her stridhan or any other property or valuable
security to which she is entitled to.”
[Emphasis supplied]
CRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 8 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50
9. Sub-section (6) of Section 19 provides that, while issuing such
directions, the Court “may impose on the respondent obligations relating to
the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the financial
needs and resources of the parties.” The phrase “having regard to the
financial needs and resources of the parties” necessarily requires an inquiry
into the economic condition of both the respondent and the aggrieved party.
When a claim is made for alternate residence or rent, the Court cannot make
a just and proportionate order in isolation from the financial position of the
person seeking that relief. In this context it is apposite to take note of the
observations of the Bombay High Court in Amit Satish Shah v. Archana
Amit Shah & Anr.4 wherein the Court emphasized that Section 19 does not
contemplate blind deference to one party’s demands, but instead calls for a
balanced and reasonable assessment of the circumstances. The Court
observed:
“8. In the making of a residence order, no doubt the Court is required to have
due regard to financial needs and the resources of the parties. In this case, there
is material on record which indicates that the respondent has her own independent
financial income. However, the petitioner, admittedly has to provide for the minor
child. At the present stage, we are not concerned with the issue of maintenance per
se. However there is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner has been
providing for any maintenance with respect to the minor child or his educational
or medical needs. There can be no serious doubt that the responsibility to provide
for not mere maintenance but also shelter to the minor child, is equally that of both
the parents. In these circumstances, if the impugned order, requires the petitioner
to bear the expenses to the extent of Rs. 8,000/- per month towards providing of
shelter to the respondent and the minor child, there is nothing either unreasonable
or unjustified in the same. This is not a case where the Family Court has
completely disregarded the financial needs and resource of the parties. The test, in
all cases cannot be that if the wife is in a position to provide for the financial
needs of the child her spouse is relieved altogether of his obligation to contribute
to the financial needs of such child. The phrase ‘having regard to financial
needs and resources of the parties’ is required to be interpreted in a reasonable
manner. All that the phrase requires is that the Court must have due regard to
both the financial needs and the resources of the parties. Therefore, in making4
2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1517CRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 9 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50
orders under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the D.V. Act, the Court is not
expected to impose some undue burden on any of the parties, by emphasizing
disproportionately upon the needs and ignoring the aspect of resources.
However, this does not mean that in a situation where one of the spouses has the
resource to provide for the minor children, the other spouse ought to be completely
relieved of his obligation to provide for the same. Ultimately, it has to be borne in
mind that the respondent in the present case continues to bear the expenses
towards maintenance, educational and medical needs of the minor child. In these
circumstances, if the impugned order, requires the petitioner to make a
contribution of Rs. 8,000/- per month towards the residence requirements, then
there is nothing unreasonable, which warrants interference of this Court in the
exercise of powers of judicial review.”
[Emphasis supplied]
10. It is thus clear that while adjudicating an application under Section 19
of the DV Act, the analysis of the financial status of the aggrieved woman is
an important consideration. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the
present case, the Petitioner’s asserted right under Section 19 of DV Act
which stems from her assertion that the property occupied by Respondents
No. 2 and 3, i.e., her mother-in-law and brother-in-law, is a “shared
household”, would necessarily then also entail the Trial Court to consider
her financial needs and existing resources and whether, in such
circumstances, any liability can be foisted on the mother-in-law and brother-
in-law to provide for financial assistance in the form of rent or for providing
her alternate residential accommodation.
11. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the Mahila Court’s direction
seeking furnishing of salary slips, bank account statements and an affidavit
disclosing that she was not granted a benefit from her deceased husband’s
insurance policy, is not unnecessary or irrelevant. The Petitioner’s financial
disclosures will enable the Court to determine the extent of her actual need
and ensure that any residence order does not result in an undue financial
burden on the Respondents, while still ensuring that the Petitioner’s
CRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 10 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50
legitimate entitlements are protected.
12. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no infirmity in
the order passed by the Mahila Court or in the appellate decision rendered
by the Sessions Court. The directions issued by the Mahila Court were
indeed procedural in nature and well within the scope of judicial discretion
conferred under Section 19 of the DV Act. No case has been made out for
the exercise of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS,
2023 (corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C.).
13. It is clarified that nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression on the merits of the Petitioner’s claim or the defence raised by
the Respondents. All rights and contentions of the parties are left open to be
adjudicated at the appropriate stage, in accordance with law.
14. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed, along with pending
applications.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
MAY 27, 2025
d.negi
CRL.M.C. 3796/2025 Page 11 of 11
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 21:58:50