Delhi High Court
Capt. Ram Kumar ( Retd) vs Rajesh Huda And Anr on 28 June, 2025
Author: Neena Bansal Krishna
Bench: Neena Bansal Krishna
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 16th April, 2025
Pronounced on: 28thJune, 2025
+ CRL.A. 560/2025
CAPT. RAM KUMAR (RETD).
S/o Late Shri Harke Ram
Flat No.20, Sector-18-A,
Vijay Veer Awas, Dwarka
New Delhi-110075 .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Raghuvender Godara, Advocates
Versus
1. RAJESH HUDA
S/o Late Shri Ram Narayan
Flat No.340, Vijay Veer Awas
Sector 18-A, Dwarka
New Delhi-110075
2. THE STATE .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Satyavan Kudalwal, Advocate for
Respondent No.1
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1. Appeal under Section 378 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) has been filed on behalf of the
Appellant/Complainant, Capt. Ram Kumar (Retd.) against the impugned
Judgment dated 04.12.2018 whereby the Respondent/Accused has been
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acquitted by the learned M.M. under Section 341/506 of the Indian Penal
Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC“).
2. The Complainant/Appellant had filed a Complaint under Section 200
Cr.P.C. read along with Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for registration of FIR
against the Respondent. The Application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. got
dismissed.
3. The Complainant/Appellant examined himself as CW1 in the pre-
summoning evidence and the Respondent was summoned under Section
341/506 IPC by the learned M.M. on 11.09.2015.
4. Notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. was framed on 20.07.2016 to
which the Respondent pleaded not guilty.
5. The Complainant/Appellant examined himself as CW1. and was duly
cross-examined by the Respondent/Accused.
6. He also examined CW2, Const. Ravinder Kumar who proved
Complaint Register bearing Serial No.646 dated 03.07.2013 whereby the
Complaint by the Appellant was made, Ex.CW2/A on which DD No.78 Ex.
CW2/8 was recorded.
7. The statement of the Respondent/Accused was recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C. wherein he denied all the incriminating evidence against him.
He set up the defence that the Complainant/Appellant, who was a property
dealer, had asked him to sell his flat to which he had declined. The
Appellant tried to put pressure on the Respondent through his father-in-law.
And had threatened him that he would take revenge of the quarrel by getting
him falsely implicated in a case.
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8. The learned M.M. referred to the Complaint and the testimony of
CW1/Appellant to observe that there was no evidence about the
Complainant/Appellant having been wrongfully restrained or criminally
intimidated and consequently acquitted the Respondent/Accused.
9. Aggrieved by acquittal dated 04.12.2018 the present appeal has been
preferred by the Complainant/Appellant.
10. The grounds of challenge are that inadvertently the facts regarding
the wrongful restraint by the Respondent/Accused could not be mentioned in
the Complaint dated 30.07.2013, but these facts were duly brought forward
in the evidence of the Complainant/Appellant which has not been
appreciated by the learned M.M.
11. Further, while the Complainant/Appellant in his testimony had
deposed that the Complaint had been written by him but in his cross-
examination he had merely clarified that the Complaint was written by his
neighbour, Mr. Jain but it was under his signatures. Therefore, to observe
that this factum created a doubt about a veracity of the statement of the
Complainant/Appellant, is erroneous.
12. It is further contended that it has not been appreciated that earlier an
FIR No.112/2012 under Section 336/341/307 IPC read with 27 Arms Act
had been registered against the Respondent/Accused, on his Complaint.
Subsequently, the Respondent/Accused had criminally intimidated the
Complainant/Appellant on 30.07.2013 by giving a threat to him to withdraw
his earlier case FIR 212/12. The testimony of the Complainant/Appellant
was consistent, but has been wrongly discarded by the learned M.M.
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13. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and the
Respondent/Accused be convicted for the offences committed under the
stated sections.
14. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1/Rajesh Huda submitted
that there was no incriminating evidence against him and the learned M.M.
has rightly acquitted Respondent No.1. There is no merit in the present
Appeal which is liable to be dismissed.
15. Submissions heard and record perused.
16. There is admittedly an earlier FIR 112/12 dated 19.05.2012 registered
against the Respondent/Accused on the Complaint of the
Complainant/Appellant on account of some altercation between them about
the quarrel of the children. However, the Respondent/Accused had asserted
that the disputes were on account of complainant pressurizing him to sell his
flat. Whatever be it, the fact that there was a prior registration of FIR clearly
reflects that the relationship between the Complainant and the Respondent
were acrimonious.
17. In this present case, the incident of 30.07.2013 which had led to the
trial, may be considered. The Complainant/Appellant in his Complaint dated
30.07.2013 had stated that while in the morning at about 7.15 am, he had
gone for his walk, the Respondent/Accused had come on his scooter from
the front and stopped it near him and told him to withdraw the case or else
he threatened to kill him and that he would not let him reside in Dwarka.
Reference was made to the incident of 19.05.2012 which had resulted in
registration of FIR 112/12. He stated that the Respondent/Accused had fired
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at him and Police had even recovered the pistol and the ammunitions from
him. The Complainant/Appellant in his testimony as CW1 however, gave
further details that he was initially threatened by the Respondent/Accused
and as he side tracked him and walked ahead, Respondent/Accused again
came near him and threatened him to withdraw the case.
18. While it may be noted that the Complainant/Appellant had given a
further detail of being accosted by the Respondent/Accused, but it cannot be
termed as a material improvement creating a doubt in his testimony as has
been observed by the learned M.M. However, the first question which arises
is whether this testimony establishes an offence of wrongful restraint.
19. Section 339 IPC defines wrongful restraint as under:-
“339. Wrongful restraint.–
Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent
that person from proceeding in any direction in which that
person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain
that person.
(Exception)– The obstruction of a private way over land or
water which a person in good faith believes himself to have
a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the
meaning of this section.
Illustration– A obstructs a path along which Z has a right
to pass. A not believing in good faith that he has a right to
stop the path. Z is thereby prevented from passing. A
wrongfully restrains Z.”
20. This Section as interpreted in the case of Keki Hormusji Gharda vs.
Mehervan Rustom Irani, (2009) 6 SCC 475, requires the following essential
ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 339 IPC, which are:
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(i) Accused obstructs voluntarily;
(ii) The victim is prevented from proceeding in any direction;
(iii) Such victim has every right to proceed in that direction.
21. It was observed in Keki Hormusji Gharda (supra) that the word
“voluntary” is significant as it connotes that the obstruction should be direct.
Further, the obstructions must be a restriction on the normal movement of a
person. It should be a physical one. There should also be common intention
to cause obstruction.
22. In the case of Rohan Ashok Khaunte vs. State of Goa, Through Police
Inspector and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 6047, High Court of Bombay
observed that to support the Charge of wrongful restraintment, there must be
atleast such an impression produced in the mind of the person confined, as
to lead him reasonably to believe that he was not free to depart and that he
would be forthwith restrained, if attempted to do so.
23. It is evident that to constitute an offence of wrongful restraint under
Section 339 IPC, it has to be shown that the Complainant had been
prevented/restrained against his wish from proceeding in a particular
direction.
24. Applying these observations to the present case, it is evident from
the entire evidence of the Complainant that there is no indication that the
Respondent obstructed or restrained him in any manner. The accused
blocked the Complainant’s forward path by positioning his scooter in front,
but did not create a obstruction that prevented movement of Complainant in
any directions. The only evidence that has been produced is that while the
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Complainant was out on a walk, he had been threatened twice by the
Respondent.
25. No offence under Section 339 IPC was thus, proved against the
Respondent, as has been rightly observed by the learned M.M.
26. The second offence with which the Respondent/Accused was charged
was of criminal intimidation. This offence is defined under Section 503 IPC
as under:-
“503. Criminal intimidation.–
Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person,
reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one
in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to
that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not
legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is
legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of
such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.– A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased
person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this
section.
Illustration– A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from
prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of
criminal intimidation.”
27. To be able to prove an offence under Section 503 IPC, it has to be
proved that the accused had threatened the other person with injury to his
personal reputation or property with an intent to cause an alarm to that
person to do or not to do what he is legally bound.
28. The essential ingredients to make out an offence punishable under
Section 506 IPC (Punishment for Criminal Intimidation) have been
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discussed by the Apex Court in Manik Taneja vs. State of Karnataka,
(2015) 7 SCC 423 wherein the Apex Court had observed as under:
“11. … A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation”
would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to
another person, of causing an injury to the person,
reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the
person in whom the threatened person is interested and the
threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person
threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally
bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled
to do.”
29. As observed in Manik Taneja, (supra) simply using abusive or
threatening language without any intent to cause alarm, does not come
within the scope of Section 503 IPC. For a threat to qualify under this
Section, it must be made with the intention to cause alarm to the person
threatened or to coerce them into doing something they are not legally
obligated to do, or to refrain from doing something they are legally
permitted to do.
30. Furthermore, the Apex Court in Naresh Aneja vs. State of U.P.,
(2025) 2 SCC 604 referred to Sharif Ahmed vs. State of U.P., (2024) 14 SCC
122 wherein it was held that an offence of criminal intimidation arises when
the accused intends to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter
whether the victim is alarmed or not. The intention of the accused to cause
alarm, must be established by bringing evidence on record. The Apex Court,
also cited Manik Taneja, (supra), to emphasize the necessity of presenting
material and evidence to establish intent. It was held that mere statement
without requisite intention, would not attract the offence.
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31. In the present case, the testimony of the Complainant/Appellant was
that the Respondent/Accused had threatened him to withdraw the earlier FIR
No. 112/12 or else he would make it difficult for him to continue to stay in
Dwarka and that otherwise he would kill him. The manner in which these
words have been asserted along with the previous conduct, it can be inferred
that though the Respondent/Accused had tried to tell him to withdraw the
earlier FIR, but nowhere is there any evidence to show that there was an
intent to cause harm or that the Complainant/Appellant got intimidated.
Mere empty threat was not with the requisite intent to cause harm which is
first essential component of the offence of criminal intimidation.
32. Further, as observed by the Apex Court, that such threat must have
caused an alarm to the Complainant/Appellant – an element which again is
conspicuously missing. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the
Complainant/Appellant felt intimidated or was concerned for his personal
safety and security.
33. No offence under Section 506 IPC was established from the
evidence led by the Appellant.
Conclusion:
34. The learned M.M. therefore, rightly concluded that the offence under
Sections 341/506 IPC were not proved beyond reasonable doubt against the
Respondent/Accused and he has been rightly been acquitted.
35. There is no merit in the present Appeal, which is hereby dismissed.
36. The present Appeal is disposed of along with pending Application(s),
if any.
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(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
JUNE 28, 2025/pp
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